SALAFIYYAH PRACTICE IN SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA, 2000-2020

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CERTIFICATION

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Almighty Allah (S.W) and His Prophet (SAW),

My beloved parents (Late),

and the generality of Muslims.

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ABSTRACT

Salafiyyah, the theological movement that aims to promote orthodox Islam, has taken different dimensions in South-West Nigeria. Existing works on *Salafiyyah* focused mainly on its history and the spread, with little attention paid to its practice. This study was, therefore, designed to examine the *Salafiyyah* practice in South-West Nigeria, from 2000, when it began in the region, to 2020, when it was tagged extremism. This was with a view to identifying the *Salafis* doctrines and non-*Salafis'* perceptions of the group.

Taha Al-Alwāni's Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence was adopted as the framework, while the interpretive design was used. The primary and secondary sources were utilised. The primary sources included the Qur'*ān*, *Ḥadīth*, Internet sources, newspapers and magazines. Oral interviews were conducted across the six states of the South-West with 162 key informants (81 *Salafis* and 81 non-*Salafis*) aged between 27 and 78 years. The secondary sources comprised journal articles, books, dissertations and theses. The data were subjected to historical analysis.

The *Salafis* practice is encapsulated in ten doctrines: *nikāh* (marriage), '*aqīqah* (naming), *niqāb* (face-veil), *bid'ah* (innovation), condemnation of democracy, congregational supplications, trousers that are below the ankle, modernism, echoing of Imam's voice in *ṣalāh* (prayer) and alienation to non-members. Beginning from 2000, conduct of *nikah* and '*aqīqah* by *Salafis* was different from that of non-members, with the notion that the contemporary methods of conducting them by non-members have been contaminated by Western influence. In 2006, wearing of *niqāb* was made compulsory for female Muslims and those who neglected this obligation were considered as nominal Muslims. From 2009 to 2014, democracy was condemned by *Salafis,* with the argument that it is non-Islamic. In 2015, congregational supplications, wearing trousers, echoing of Imam's voice in *ṣalāh* and modernist ideology were regarded as *bid'ah* (innovation). From 2016 to 2020, the *Salafis* arrogated the orthodox practice of Islam to the movement by showing affection exclusively to their members (*al-Walā'*), while alienation (*al-Barā'*) was applicable to non-members. Five perceptions of non-*Salafis* were identified: fundamentalism, ideological imposition, political participation, misinterpretation and extremism. From 2000-2005, the *Salafis* were regarded as extremists in their manner of conducting *nikāh* and '*aqīqah,* which were at variance with that of other Muslims. By 2007, imposition of *niqāb* on female Muslims was contested by non-*Salafis*. The non-*Salafis* held the view that wearing of *niqāb* is optional while *hijāb* is obligatory. In 2015, political participation of Muslims was allowed by non-*Salafis* with the view that Islam allows democracy and modernism, and that not all Western ideologies are unlawful or *bid'ah*. Between 2017 and 2019, the *Salafis* misinterpreted the *hadīth* on wearing of trousers and echoing of the Imam's voice in *ṣalāh*. Arrogation of Islamic orthodoxy by the *Salafis* was regarded as extremism in 2020.

The *Salafis* in South-West Nigeria tilted towards Islamic orthodoxy from 2000 to 2020, although the non-*Salafis* perceived them as extremists.

Keywords: *Salafiyyah*, South-West Nigeria, Islamic doctrine, Religious extremism

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The current trend on the perceptions of people on the ways and manners with which Islam should be practised in South-West Nigeria is seriously calling for investigation. This is due to the manner of practising Islam by the *Salafis* in a way that is at variance with that of other Muslims. In this work, an attempt is made to examine a group called *Salafiyyah* as well as its practices in South-West Nigeria. *Salafiyyah* is an Arabic word. It means following the path of the pioneer successors of the Prophet. It also means an act of following the path of the early *Salafis* by practising Islam in the exact manner that it was demonstrated by them. Besides, *salafiyyah* denotes the act of abiding by the dictates of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Some Muslims usually refer to it as the orthodox or pristine Islam.

The manner of practisimg Islam by the early Muslims made them to be referred to as the pioneer *Salafis*. They abided by the tenets of the Islamic injunctions. However, none of them referred to himself as the *Salafi* (a Muslim that practises *Salafiyyah*). At present, *Salafiiyah* has taken another dimension in South-West Nigeria. These are due to the activities of its present practitioners. Their practices brought mixed perceptions on the meaning of *Salafiyyah* in the era of the orthodox companions of the Prophet and the present generation of Muslims.

This research focuses on the manner of practisng *Salafiyyah* as well as its ʿ*Aqīdah* (doctrine) in South-West Nigeria. The contexts in which the group is examined in this study should be operationally defined. In the first premise, it should be pointed out here that the term "*salafiyyah*" is used in this study in reference to a religious inclination or tendency towards a set of ideas and practices. These practices are subscribed to by some Muslims in the region who advocate for strict adherence to their understanding of the Islamic practices as enjoined by Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W), the final prophet of Islam

and subsequently practised by the early pious predecessors known as the *salaf aş-Şālhīn* only[1].

Salafiyyah (often refers to as Salafism in English) is used to refer to pristine Islam[2]. The adherents of the group had been in existence in the region decades ago and are spread to the states of the study viz: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo. They are individuals and groups with divergence of ideologies on their creeds[3]. Therefore, the study will examine the evolution, doctrines and practices of the *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria, with a view to determining the extent of their compliance with the Islamic injunctions and the perceptions of other Muslims (non-*Salafis*) on the practice.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Perceptions of people on the concept and practice of *Salafiyyah* especially in South-West Nigeria call for academic investigation. Existing works have concentrated on the history of *Salafiyyah* while little attention has been paid to its manifestation and practices in South-West Nigeria. Most of the works address the issues of religious crisis, activities of the Shiites (*Shī'ah*), misconceptions about the *Sharī'ah,* identity conflicts among Muslims and ethno-religious conflicts. However, the works on these studies did not express the practices of *Salafiyyah* either in groups or individuals in the South-West area of Nigeria. This is the vacuum that this research intends to fill with the aim of identifying the *Salafiyyah* practices and examining the perceptions of non-*Salafis* on the practice.

1.3 Research Questions

The research work aims at investigating the following questions;
i.   When did the *Salafiyyah* emerge in South-West Nigeria?
ii. What are the practices of *Salafiyyah* in the South-West?
iii. What are the perceptions of the non-*Salafis* on the practice?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study examines the *Salafiyyah* practice in South-West Nigeria. The region comprises six states in the geo-political structure of the federation. The general aim of the

study is to investigate the manner of practising *Salafiyyah* in the South-West. The objectives of the work can be summed up as to:

- examine the evolution of *Salafiyyah* in the South-West Nigeria.
- expatiate on the concept of *Salafiyyah* in *Maqāṣidush Sharī'ah* (Islamic Jurisprudence).
- analyse its practices in South-West Nigeria.
- discuss the perceptions of other Muslims (non-*salafis*) of the region on its practice.
- examine the injunctions of *Sharī'ah* on the activities of the *Salafis* and *Salafiyyah*

1.5 Scope of the Study

This study investigates the practice and spread of *Salafiyyah* in the South-West Nigeria. The region consists of Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo States which to some degree could capture what obtains in other Yoruba cities in Nigeria.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Activities of *Salafiyyah* especially in South-West Nigeria have generated a number of questions in the practice of Islam. This study is therefore designed to carry out the Islamic jurisprudence on its practices in the South-West Nigeria as well as the perceptions of non-*Salafis* on its practice in the society. Therefore, a number of misconceptions have been perceived on the activities of adherents of the group in the region. Hence, this study is set to fill the gap on the practice, perceptions of non-*Salafi* Muslims and proffer the Islamic jurrisprudence on the practice among *Salafi* and non *salafi*-Muslims. It will also enlighten the society on the meaning of *Salafiyyah* in the Islamic jurisprudence as well as the emergence of neo-*Salafiyyah*.

1.7 Limitation and Delimitation of the Study

The study examines the practice of *Salafiyyah* with reference to the South-West Nigeria. The study was limited to the coverage area out of other states of the nation. The study focuses on the manner of practising *Salafiyyah* in the region. The finding is limited to the year 2020.

Endnotes

1. Mohamed, A. 2012. *The Islamic doctrine of al-wala' walbBara' (Loyalty and Disavowal) in modern salafism*. Thesis. University of Exeter. p.9 + 263.

2. Quintan W. 2006. *Anatomy of the salafi movement. Journal of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.* p.207–239.

3. Amidu, S. O. 2016. *Historicizing salafi and jihadi networks in muslim west africa: the boko haram in context*. Conference Paper. The Institute of African Studies. University of Bayreuth: Germany. p.11.

4. Kamali, M. H. 1991. *Principles of Islamic jurisprudence*. Malaysia: International Islamic University, Malaysia. p.29.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATUE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

      This chapter is meant to review the research works on *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria and beyond. Most of the existing literature centred on the history of *Salafiyyah* in most of the countries outside Nigeria. However, the review will be carried out under certain classifications. These are the concept of the term '*Salafiyyah*' in Islam, Societal Perceptions on the practice of *Salafiyyah* and the existing works on *Salafiyyah* practices in South-West Nigeria.

2.1 *Salafiyyah* in Islam

      First, Abdurrahman (2001), surveys the emergence of *Salafiyyah* in Islam. He describes the term as something that is not new in the history of Islam. He affirms this in his work as he elucidates thus; "the term *Salafiyyah* is an ascription to the *Sala*f, and it is nothing but a worthy ascription. It is neither an innovated thought nor a new school-of-thought. Rather it is a phenomenon that has always been in Islam and which has ensured the passage of Islam…" He cites a number of references of *Ibn* Taymiyyah whereby he claims that the *Salafiyyah* School can be established by any Muslim in this era. This is therefore a reason why he (ibn Taymiyyah) originated the present school of *Salafism* with branches in Saudi Arabia. He also mentions Jam*ā*luddeen *Al-Afghāniy* and Muhammad 'Abduh as other schools of *Salafiyyah*.[1]

      Abdurrahman points out that some people do not know the historical background of the word *Salafiyyah*. Hence, they are of opinion that it is a new development embodied in an Islamic group which breaks off from the circle of one *Jamâ'ah* of Islam and takes the title for itself for a specific understanding. He says that the ascription to *Salafiyyah* as some Muslims tagged themselves is not an innovation in Islam though it was not in use during the time of the companions (because there was no need; they themselves were the *Salaf*). He clarifies this further that the use of the term began during the time of the *Tabi'ūn*. The author submits that other nomenclature claimed by the *salafis* is *Ahlul*

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hadīth. He expresses this second title further that it does not limit to the literal interpretation which connotes the people of *hadīth*, rather, it refers to the Muslims who strictly strive to protect, know and understand the *hadīth* and the Qur'ān whether explicitly or implicitly, and strictly follow them.

From the explanations, Abdurrahman portrays the establishment of the *Salafiyyah* in the contemporary world. He briefly traces the beginning of the term in the history of Islam. Some of the contemporary *Salafiyyah* movements were also made mention of. However, the book does not analyse the activities of the early *salaf as-Salihīn* and that of the present era. It also does not investigate into the practices of the movement nowadays and the reason why there are different perceptions of Muslims on the practices in this century. These and the rest of others are the gaps that this work aims to fill especially in South-West Nigeria.

In the analysis of his work, Cole (2015) takes a cursory look at the Salafism in the modern society of twentieth century and the practices in the history of Islam. Mentions were made of different types of *Salafism* nowadays with their ideologies. He writes that the second stream of Islamic thought that is contributing to the Islamic State's ideology is *Salafsm*. *Salafism* in his interpretation refers to a primarily theological movement in *Sunni* Islam that is concerned with purifying the faith, eliminating idolatry (*shirk*) and affirming God's oneness (*tawhīd*). The author cites two Muslim groups as case studies of non-Muslims in the ideologies of the S*alafism*. These are the *Shī'ah* and non *salafi*. He expresses further that the genealogy of *salafiyyah* extended to the period of *Wahhabiyyah* Movement which was founded in Saudi Arabia. He comments that the country embraced *salafiyyah* as the movement that will eliminate *shirk* and syncretism, and then establish *tawhīd*.

In addition to the above, Cole explains that there is a faction of *salafiyyah* named '*Jihādi'*. *Jihād,* according to the group, is regarded as a volatile act or war against the non-members. Other perception is its attitude towards the democratic governance in the society. The movement views democracy as a failure to the administration of the world entirely. Hence, the *salafi Jihadis* become opposition to the government in any society. The author briefly relates that the faction is an opposition to the government in Iraq and Egypt[2]. However, these are the practices of the movement outside the area of study of this

work. This study will examine the evolution and spread of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria and the perceptions of other Muslims who are non-*salafis* to the practice in South-West Nigeria since its inception till now.

Nuh (1995) expatiates on the concept of *Salafiyyah*. His book entitled 'Who or what is Salafi' deals with the meaning of *Salafism* in the prophetic period and what the term is representing in the present era. According to him, the word *salafi* or "early Muslim" in traditional Islamic scholarship means someone who died within the first four hundred years after the Prophet (S.A.W), including scholars such as Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Anyone who died after this era is one of the *khalaf* or "latter-day Muslims". He expresses further that the term is revived as a slogan and movement, among latter-day Muslims, by the followers of Muhammad Abduh (the student of Jamal al-Din *al-Afghāni*) after the Prophet (S.AW). He adds that the basic claim of the movement was that the religion had not been properly understood by anyone since the demise of the Prophet and the early Muslims. Hence, he expresses that it is essential to go to the origin of the practice of Islam. He also, narrates that in terms of ideals, the movement advocated for a return to the *sharī'ah*-minded orthodox that would purify Islam from unwarranted accretions; the criteria for judging which would be the *Qur'ān* and hadīth only.[3] However, this notion cannot only be adopted in arriving at a verdict under the *Sharī'ah.* Thus, the Islamic jurisprudence on the doctrines of the movement is comprehensively examined in this work.

Jonathan (2009) mentions that most of the early works on the Salafism were carried out without tracing the origin of *salafiyyah*. He says that those authors only traced its advent to *Wahhabi* movement while some are of opinions that it was a group that emerged in the nineteenth century and continued to flourish till this era. He establishes that the *Salafi*s are the pious forbearers of Islam, usually understood as the first three generations of Muslim community (as opposed to the *Khalaf*, or the later generations). He comments that some Muslim scholars look to the *Salafis* as role models. This is due to the historical background of the term in the history of Islam. He expresses further that there are different schools of *Salafism* nowadays. This tends to be a reason why there are factions of *salafiyyah*. Due to the common use of the term *Salafi,* his work classifies the early *salafi* and the contemporary ones as "modernist *Salafis*" and "traditionist *Salafis*".

Jonathan points out that writings on *Salafiyyah* often feature biases in academic investigation. 'The present propagation of *salafiyyah* is totally different from that of ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab. 'The orientation towards the *Salaf* is now based on reasoning in lieu of the dictates of the *Sharī'ah'* [4]. Hence, there are gaps to be filled on the causes of deviation of the modern *Salafiyyah* from the pioneer ones and the effects of changes in the practice. This is one of the perceptions of other Muslims on propagation of the *Salafiyyah* practices in South-West Nigeria.

Zakir, (2016) defines *salaf* as the common name that are ascribed to those who follow the ideas and practices of the righteous ancestors *(as-salaf aş-şalihūn)* while the "*Salafiyyah*" refers to the approach that rejects later traditions and schools of thought, calling for a return to the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah* only. This approach emphasizes the application of *ijtihād*. The author only defines the *salafiyyah* without mentioning its activities in the society. He cites Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), as the major figures in various definitions of *salafiyyah*. However, this work features not only the definitions of *salafiyyah* but also its activities in Yorubaland[5].

Amidu (2012) and Oladosu (2019), write that the *salafiyyah* is not just a definition of the predecessors or early generations of Muslims from the Prophet. They explain that the term has become wider in application in the contemporary society. The practice has therefore led to the formations of different categories of *Salafiyyah*. Parts of their works briefly discuss *Salafiyah* and Politics, *Jihādiyyah* or militant *Salafiyyah*, the local and the global *Salafiyyah* and *Salafi* identity. The authors make these divisions known to the public for further academic study[6]. Thus; their works pave way for further studies on the spread and branches of *Salafiyyah* in this study area.

2.2 Societal Perception of the Practice

In the first premise, Doi (2014) in his work titled "Anatomy of the *Salafi* Movement" points out the existence of *Salafiyyah* in this contemporary period. He expresses the manners with which the movement approaches issues in the society. These include their perceptions on the western governance, democracy and radicalization. In addition to these, he links the creeds of the movement to that of the *Wahabiyyah*. The book traces the origin of *Salafiyyah* to the *Wahabism* which was established by Muhammad *ibn* Abdulwahhab. In addition to these, the group is of different factions viz:

the purists, the politicians and the *jihadists*. Each of them operates differently in the society. The purists emphasize on non-violent methods of propagation of *salafiyyah* doctrines. In contrast, the second group emphasizes the application of the *Salafi* creed to the political arena, which they view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone to legislate. 'The 'J*ihadists*' take a more militant position and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution.[7] All the three factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world. However, the book concentrates on the political aspect of the activities of the *Salafis* in the United States of America (USA) but not in the South-West Nigeria which is the focus of this study.

Mohammed bin Alli (2012) writes on the doctrines of the *Salafis.* His work deals with the interpretation of '*Alwala' wal Bara'* in *Salafism*. This is the creed of love and dislike. He makes it known that in Islam, a Muslim should love another fellow if such a person is calling to the dictates of Islam and he dislikes anybody that calls to the wrong path. However, in *Salafiyyah*, the doctrine takes different dimenssions. It is interpreted as the doctrine of loving only *Salafis* and disliking not only non-*Salafi* but also every Muslim and non- Muslim[8]. This doctrine is rampant among the modern *salafis* globally. The work lays emphasis on this creed. The focus of the book centres only on a creed in *salafiyyah*. Therefore, this study intends to reveal more creeds in *Salafiyyah* and their practices in Yorubaland.

John (2017) in his thesis expresses the meaning of *Salafism* in this modern period. He succinctly defines the contemporary *Salafism* and links it to radicalism, such as the *al-Qaeda* organisation. He mentions that many Islamic radicals today consider themselves as "*salafis,*" while some are influenced by *salafi* teachings, the teachings that are related to violent radicalism are different from other Islamic schools of thought. This includes the perspective of the movement's misinterpretation of *Jihād* as the concept to justify their violent struggle against the West [9]. The central theme of his work is on Egypt while our study focuses on their practices in South-West Nigeria.

Sanni (2016) writes succinctly on Salafism and its types in the early period of Islam as well as the present era. His work, 'Global *Salafism*: Islam's Religious Movement' also discusses the perception of *salafis* on politics and western education. He

sheds light on the origin of the present *salafiyyah* practices which he says was linked to the doctrines and practices of *Wahabiyyah* movement in Saudi Arabia founded by Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab. Mention was also made of the influence of the present *salafis* on politics in some nations. These, according to him, include Indonesia, Sudan, and Egypt[10]. Sub-part of the work expresses the modalities through which the neo-*salafis* propagate *Jihad*. This faction (neo-*salafiyyah*) is tagged by the author as *Jihādi Salafism*. He discusses the militant strands and the "traditional mainstream sects of the movement too. These two factions were volatile on the propagation of Islam, condemning non-*salafi* Islamic movements and claiming superiority over other non-members.

Besides, Sanni's work also expresses other types of the movement. These are termed as the local and the global Salafism. The former operates at the community levels while the latter are the combinations of many branches of the movement from various areas that form alliances against the government on politics and western education. However, the book makes it known that these two factors are the primary motives behind the most advocates of *salafiyyah* nowadays in many parts of the world. Other segment of his work discusses the French, British and Dutch salafism in the context of diasporic communities, especially South Asian British Muslims who, being engaged in identity narrative, try to infuse the movement with *Sufi* elements, in the tradition of the old Indian exponents of reformism. He recommends that the Salafism has always portrayed itself as the binary opposite of Sufism. This is by condemning the acts of sufism and regarding them as sinful practices. The author concludes that in sub-Saharan Africa, there is an antinomy; the various strands of salafism from the nineteenth century. This work thus investigates typess of *salafism* in Nigeria with a particular reference to South-West Nigeria.

Terje's work (2012) centres on the local, national and global levels within and across which *Salafis* operate. It explores how diverse modes of *Salafi* religiosity relate simultaneously to social, cultural, and political affairs of the society. The author is concerned about the nature of operations of the contemporary *Salafism* on national electoral politics, inter- and intercommunal relations, various modes of militancy, as well as questions of identity, gender, and citizenship. As he notes in a chapter of the book that the existing scholarship on the Salafism concentrates much on the ideologies of the

movement rather than how it operates in different localities. He states that the study on *Salafiyyah* now calls for critical exploration of the concept in this century. According to him, much has been revealed about the origin of the movement from *Wahhabism* in Saudi Arabia [11].

Other major concern of Terje is on the present perception of the meaning of Salafism. This is due to their activities that are antithetical to the early doctrines of the *salafiyyah* in the history of Islam. These include the militant approaches, claiming of superiority of their creeds over other fellows and their hatred to non-*salafi* Muslims. These attitudes; according to him, make people regard the advocates of the movement as terrorists. By and large, inclusion of these ideologies into the fundamental creeds of *Salafiyyah* calls for series of questions such as "What are the tenets of *salafiyyah*? Why do people have divergences of opinions on the movement? and what is its relationship with politics and violence?" He also opens door for further investigation on *salafiyyah* and its ideologies in this twentieth century. Solutions to these questions are parts of the investigation of this work with particular reference to South-West Nigeria.

Assaf (2008) mentions some ideologies of the *salafiyyah*. He explains that few attempts have been made to justify the use of the term, "ideology" in connection with the *Salafi-jihad*. His work is based on the *Salafi jihad* which is a faction of *Salafism.* He is of the opinion that the ideology of the faction is different from the principle of the *Shariʿāh*. Instead, it is similar to the systems of fascism or communism. He narrates further that the *Salafi-jihād* is more akin to an ideology than to a religion because like other ideologies; it is a bye-product of the industrialization that swept through Europe beginning from the 19th century and is an outgrowth of modernity.

Another aspect of Assaf findings discusses the *salafi jihadi's* attempt at creating a new identity for its adherents. It then instills into Muslims the notion that the only *salafi* identity is superior over all non-*salafi*-Muslims [12]. The author deals with the aspects of the ideology of s*alafi* with emphasis on a branch of the movement, *salafi-jihad*. However, there are many factions with their leaders. The study of the factions and their practices are be elaborate in this study with reference to the SouthWestern Nigeria.

Joas (2016) writes on a faction of the contemporary *salafi*. He examines the mode through which the faction causes rift among themselves and the society at large. He

observes that due to the internal and external rifts among them, there are factions and different ideologies on their perceptions on the real concept of *Jihād*. His work gives impetus for detail studies on Salafism. His work also narrates that the *Salafis* are the major causes of political conflict in the society [13].

Joas mentions some divisions in the area of his research such as *Zarqawiyyun*"-who see Abu Mus'ab *al-Zarqawi* as their model and concentrate on combat and the "*Maqdisiyyun*"-who want more scholarly guidance, emphasize on the establishment of an Islamic State and follow Abu Muhammad *al-Maqdisi*. These are their divisions in Jordan and Syria while the scope of this work is the South-West Nigeria.

Ahmad, (2009) expresses biographical sketch of the founders of Salafism. He calls on the readers to understand the environment in which the new sect was originated and developed. The author refers to *salafism* as a sect with different ideologies. His expression illustrates that the word "*Salafi*" was used for the first time as a slogan and movement by the followers of Muhammad Abduh (the student of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani) approximately one hundred years ago. He added that the movement has promoted a handful of controversial scholars as supposedly Islamic scholarship. They include Ibn Taymiyyah, his student Ibn al-Qayyim and his followers like Bin Baz, Uthaymin and Albani. These are scholars in Asian countries specifically Saudi Arabia where majority of the *Salafis* in South-West Nigeria studied. A number of those who did not travel abroad read their books and followed their doctrines[14]. However, this work is set to examine the practice of the movement and their scholars in the South-West Nigeria. Incidentally, according to the book, the modern *Salafis* are not considered as foremost authorities or Imams in any of the Islamic subjects. Hence, this work will examine the doctrines as well as other practices of the movement in the area of study.

Daniel's work (2013) on *Salafiyyah* assesses how the movement contradicts the tenets of the Prophet and the *Qur'ān* which it claims that it practises. He elucidates that the movement is only taking Muslims in this era to the root of the religion without any knowledge of *da'wah*. Accordingly to him, the root of *salafiyyah* was traced to the rise and doctrine of *Wahhabiyyah* which exerts pressure on the "return to sources". Gradually, by nineteen century, the *Salafiyyah* adopted the doctrines of Muhammad Abdulwahhab and this led to the rise of *Salafiyyah* in the present era. The spread thus began and

continued to spread throughout the Arab and non-Arab nations. However, the author made it obvious that the movement deviates from what it preaches by acting in contrary to the principles of the early practices of Islam and the four Sunni schools of thought (*Madhahib al-Arba'a*). He argues that the *Salafiyyah* is defined today as a return to original Islam, which uses violence and political power to achieve its goals[15]. Politically, the movement proposes a model of society based on the principle of total submission of the faithful to their sovereign. Also, it follows the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyyah. This can only be applied in the Arab nation which is an Islamic state but not in Nigeria which is a multi-religious nation. Hence, there is a critical need to examine the practices in the area of this study.

Daniel writes on *Salafiyyah* and modernism as elements of *tajdīd* (reform) that encourage modernity in his home town, Aceh in Indonesia. According to the author, the spirit of *tajdīd* in *Salafism* has two meanings: purification in *aqīdah* (creed) and '*Ibādah* (worship) in line with the practices of Prophet Muhammad. *Salafi* group is identified as the vehicle of *Wahabiyyah* deployment in Indonesia, including Aceh. He explains the radical approach that the group used to spread its principles on the people of the area. For instance, purification, which is the main feature of the Islamic modernist movement, is practised by *Salafis* in the forms of eradicating all forms of worship and deeds that fall within categories of *takhayul, bid'ah* and *khurafat* (superstition and heresy) under their doctrines. He writes that the *Salafiyyah* are disturbing and threatening the long-lasting status quo in the religious practices among Aceh society. Some people are worried that the group will do the same as the *Wahhabi* group has done to Arabian society. The movement is thus, termed as *Salaf-Wahhabi* because it is against modernity. How the *Salafi* movement disrupts in Indonesia is also expressed in the work.

Daniel laments on how *Salafism* became the element of radicalism and conflicts in the Acehnese Muslim community. His investigation reveals that there are different accounts on the variants of Salafism. There are reformers' *Salafism* which was established in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by *Jamāluddīn al-Afghānī* (1897), Muḥammad 'Abduh (1905) and *Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā* (1935). Others include Ibn Taymiyyah's *salafism* (1328) and *Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah' Salafiyyah* (1350) and Aḥmad bin Hanbali's Salafsm. He also writes that there are differences among the variants of *Salafsm.* For instance, '*Abduh's Salafsm* referred to intellectual responses to European

colonialism and the backwardness of the Islamic world in the modern age, while *Ibn Taymiyya*h's *Salafsm* was a response to syncretism and the institutional downfall of an Islamic caliphate in the Middle Ages. In addition, Aḥmad bin Hanbal's Salafism was a response to *'ilm al-Kalām* and Mu'tazilite rationality in the era of the *Abbasiyah*. He comments that in current usage, the term *Salafsm* is employed with at least two meanings. First, it refers to a movement that brings the spirit back to religious authenticity based on the *Qur'ān* and the *Hadīth*. Second, it connotes a movement or group of intolerant, rigid, ultra-conservative, anti-modernity and anti-reform. In the contemporary era, the second meaning usually refers to the *Wahhabi* group founded by Muḥammad bin 'Abdul Wahhāb in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, this faction is considered by some as the genealogy of terrorist ideology. Some scholars call it version of *Salaf-Wahhabi*. In addition to this, Daniel describes the other categories of *salaf i*n the order of their establishment in some parts of the world. However, his work was carried out in Indonesia on *Salafis'* opposition to modernism while this study intends to examine the practice of *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland.

Samantha (2013) explains that the *Salafism* should not be regarded as a school of thought or an Islamic movement. He analyses that 'to comprehend the term, one needs to grasp why the model of the *Salafis* is important to Muslims'. He points to the fact that Muslim brotherhood is different from s*alaf* and this is a reason why the Western government does favour and even partner with Brotherhood groups, but denigrates *Salafis*. Mention was made on how the group is rebellious in Syria and some United Nation's states. David Cameron's statement was sighted as he suggested that the conflict in Syria had a religious basis. By and large, the formation of *Salafiyyah* is linked to *wahhabiyyah* which he defines as the official religious ideology of the Saudi state [16]. The author concludes that the ancient scholars whom *Salafis* look to for their guiding lights, such as *Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qudamah* and *Ibn Qayyim* were advocates of *Jihād* and the political dominance of Muslims over non-Muslims. Meanwhile, the concept of *Jihād* has been misinterpreted by the movement as an act of disliking non-Muslims and *salafis*. From the work, there are more areas of the *salafiyah* that remain uncovered. These include the modalities of the operation of *Salafism*, reason for the changes in doctrine and ideologies from the early *salafis* in the prophetic period and the present period. Above all,

there are needs to carry out investigation on how the movement is practised in the society especially the South WesternNigeria.

According to Hayat (2012), due to the radical approach of some factions of *salafiyyah,* a number of many titles have been ascribed to the adherents. This includes its being regarded as an arm of *Taliban* group. He relates how the *salafi*s operate in the battlegrounds of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The activities of the *Salafism* that are very contradictory to the dictates of the *sharī'ah* are also expressed in his work. He analyses how the *salafi* groups are disrupting the political affairs of some countries not only during the elections but also in the principles of governance. Mention was made of some countries such as Washington, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt in addition to the two nations above. It is stated in his work that all the branches of *salafiyyah* are of degrees of conservatism in the ideological spectrum, militants, violent, and theologically totalitarian. In addition to these, they also combine their religious ideologies with politics and militarism or "*jihadism*."

In the same vein, Hayat expresses that *Salafi* groups are also becoming significant players in Kuwait and Yemen, and they are even posing a challenge to Hamas, the Islamist party that rules the Gaza Strip. However, many brethren are joining the group on daily basis. This is the reason why the group is formidable and spread to many branches in Afghanistan and other countries. The work does not only condemn the group but also its doctrines which are antithetical to the ethics of Islamic jurisprudence. That is the reason why he considers the group as an arm of *Taliban* and *Al- Qaedah* in the society. These two movements according to him are known for extremism in their activities to the politics and the western governance [17.] The author concentrates on the establishment of the *salafi* practice with the governance in some nations. The creeds of the movement were not examined. By and large, this study examined the doctrines as well as other practices of *salafiyyah* generally and in the South-West of Nigeria since its spread to the region till the present moment.

Salih (2017) also reveals that the word *salafism* is not new in Islam. It was the term used to refer to the pious successors of the Prophet. The author defines the term as a generic word in the principle of *Islam*. He lays emphasis that different ideologies have crept into the present manner of using the term in the society. For instance, an extract of

his work expresses thus "There is much talk regarding *Salafis* and *Salafiyyah* in books, journals, the press and various other media"[18]. The objective of the author is relevant to this work; though he only mentions that the practice is not alien in Islam. However, this study intends to investigate the fundamentals of the practice in Islam and the reason why it is regarded by the public as a group of Islamic militants nowadays.

Abdulfattah (2016) examines that the *Salafis* dislike non-*Salafis* and ascribe them as infidels. He reiterates that the *salafis* are more hostile to Muslims than non-Muslims in their creeds. In addition, he expresses that the first generation of *Salafi* which the modern ones claim to be following never uttered "*takfīr*" to others, considered any Muslim apostates, or transgressed the limits of the *Sharī'ah*. Additionally, "the *Şahabah*, *Tabi'ūn* did not do *Takfīr* or consider any Muslim apostate"[19]. His study focuses on unfriendliness of *salafis* to non-Muslims while this work concentrates on the practice in SouthWestern Nigeria.

Masud (1995) writes that the term *Salafiyyah* is dated back to a long period in Islamic history. He specifically points out that the word *salafi* or "early Muslim" in traditional Islamic scholarship means someone who died within the first four hundred years after the Prophet including scholars such as Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Anyone who died after this period is regarded as one of the latter-day Muslims. The basic claim of the movement as examined by the author is that the religion (Islam) had not been properly understood by anyone since the post prophetic era and the early Muslims. This is the reason for their formation of the restrict doctrine that Islam should be practised as demonstrated by the Prophet only. The work concludes that in terms of ideals, the movement advocated a return to a *sharī'ah*-minded orthodox that would purify Islam from unwarranted accretions, the criteria for judging which would be the *Qur'ān* and *hadīth* only[20]. The author only traces the origin of *salafiyyah* without relating it to any society. However, this work is designed to examine the practices of the movement in South-West Nigeria in this era.

Mark (2008), in his writing narrates that the Salafism is the new reform of *Wahhabism*. He proclaims that the rise of *Wahhabism* was an example of a larger current, which exerts pressure on the "return to the the life of the earliest companions of the Prophet". The author added that AbdulWahhab, a founder of *Wahhabiyyah* proposed

replacing the present modes of government with full implementation of *sharī'ah* while his disciples, the Wahhabites describe themselves as *muwāhhidūn*-unitarists by advocating for a puritanical and radical Islam. The author explains that the *Salafis* reject any form of social modernity and claim that the state must operate strictly in accordance with the principle of *salafiyyah*. Not only these, he expresses how the movement proposes a model of society based on total submission of every Muslim to their sovereignty, otherwise such a person is threatened to be dismissed. Their claim also includes the "excommunication" of any political authority that does not operate on the dictates of Islam [21]. However, his work focuses on the movement's activities in the world generally and Saudi Arabia in particular while our bone of contention is on South Western Nigeria.

In his work, Ahmad (2009) asserts that *Salafism* is a very diversified and complicated ideologically and religiously motivated trend. He mentions that *Wahhabis* are *Salafis*, but not all *salafis* are *Wahhabis*. He also identifies different types of *Salafism* both in the old and contemporary periods. He however explains that after September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq, some *Wahhabis* and *salafis* merged together with radical Islamists and consequently created neo-*salafism* and *takfiri-jihadism*. His work explains each faction separately and outlines the basic discourse of their trends in addition to their practical impacts on the politics. [22]

Also, Ahmad traces the emergence of *Salafiyyah* in Islam to the periods of successors of the Prophet and the four schools of the Islamic thought (*Al-Madhahib al-'Arba'a): Malikiyyah, Hambaliyyah, Shafi'iyyah* and *Hanafiyyah*. Similarly, it is made clear from the book that *Salafis* regard themselves as the only true Muslims; for their belief in *Hadīth*, *Sunnah* and consequently belong to the 'saved sect' or *alfirqat an-nājiyah*. Not only this, he also briefly mentions the infiltration and innovations (*bid'ah*) on non-*Salafi*s and their claim of infidelity (*kufr*) on other Muslims. Besides, the movement derives the idea of *al-wala',* and *'al-barra'*. This implies loyalty to the Prophet Muhammad and hostility to non-*Salafis*. The author expresses Salafism in Iraq while this work intends to carry out the spread and practices of the movement in Yorubaland.

Muhammad Nasir-ud-Deen (2014) explains the basis of the *Salafi Manhaj*, which is following the way, understanding and practical application of the *Salafis*, who were namely the first three generations of Muslims: The *şahābah*, *Tābi'ūn* and *Atbā'a at-*

Tābi'īn. He supports his argument with a prophetic saying which states that: "The best of mankind is my generation, then those that come after them, then those that come after them." He writes extensively that one cannot truly understand and apply the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* unless he follows the understanding and application of the *Salaf*. [23] From the claims of the *Salaf* as expressed by the author, it is obvious that the doctrines of the movement centred on the practices of Islam solely on the manner of the Prophet and the first and second generations of his followers. This forms a segment of sub-title of our work under the doctrines of *salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria.

Salih (2011) writes on the present situation of people's attitudes towards *Salafism*. This is due to *salafis'* approach to issues in the society which are tagged extremism and radicalism by non-*salafi* Muslims. These have also made some Muslims tagged them with different names such as *Ahlus-Salaf* while they refer to themselves as *Ahlus-Sunnah*. However, the author equates the two titles with one another in his work as he expresses that 'The *Sunni* is the *Salafi*, and the *Salafi* is the *Sunni'*. Whoever distinguishes between the two, then he has distinguished between two things which resemble each other; so the *Salafs* are the *Ahl-ul-Sunnah* and the *Salafiyun* are the followers of the *Sunnah*". This expression paves way for further investigation on the two concepts in the Islamic injunctions [24]. This work will therefore take a critical look into the two terms in the Islamic jurisprudence in relation to the definition of a Muslim in the *Sharī'ah*. More so, the author does not relate his findings to any society while this study focuses on Yorubaland.

Muhammad (2013) laments in his book on how some Muslims who claim to be *salafis* are outrageous in their manners of propagation of Islam in various societies. This, according to him, is due to their personal ways of practising Islam that is different from that of other Muslims. These differences tend to be the cause of the extremism between *Salafis* and non-*Salafis*. The author expatiates that it is permissible in *salafiyyah* to declare non-*salafi*-Muslims infidels until they join the movement. He points out that this behaviour was manifested in the way of Abdurrahman AbdulKhaliq and his faction of *salafiyyah* movement. He also revealed some of the major scholars that brought destructive false principles under the banner of *Salafiyyah*[25]. Hence, his work addresses the attitudinal ways in which the group relates with non-members. This is examined in

details by this study with reference to South-West Nigeria. This study also focuses on the reasons why some *salafis* claim superiority of their doctrines on other Muslims in the study area based on the *aqīdah as-Salafiyyah.*

Jacob (2015) writes in his work that the *Salafism* was widely spread in the twentieth century. He adds that the present trend emerged in 2011. He states that the new trend of *Salafism* brought problems to the practices of the doctrines. He further expresses that the *salafis* are of opinions that Islam should be practised as it was done in the prophetic era. This opinion brings a number of innovative acts into the practices of Islam[26]. According to him, the new ideologies in neo-*Salafiyyah* include innovative interpretations of the dictates of the *Shari'ah* and open condemnation of Sufism in the society. The work highlights few of the creeds of the *Salafiyyah*. The creeds analysed therefore call for detail explanations. These creeds as well as other doctrines of *salafiyah* are carried out in this study.

The work of 'Abd al-Hafiz (2010), discusses the ideologies of *salafis* which he refers to as evils and poison for Islamic communities and other nations. He writes that the propagators of *salafism* are those who wished to benefit from their own interests by claiming superiority of the ideologies over that of other Muslims. He calls this act as an act of misleading the communities. The author also comments on the notion of calling another fellow Muslims hate names such as hypocrites and infidels by the *salafis*. The book submits that those people only hide under *salaf* as a nomenclature while what they are practising is different from the principles of *Salafiyyah* in the history of Islam. They (the *salafis*) are equated, by the author, to the *Kharijites* and those who spread corruption on the land. He expresses further that some of these people can be seen in many regions of the globe spreading their falsehood. He adds that following the thought of only one of the four Imams by the *salafis* is a misguided innovation [27].

Similarly, 'Abd al-Hafiz expresses the strong hatred that the adherents of *salafiyya*h have for the *Sufis*. He adds that the *salafis* claim that the devotional act of *Sufis* is baseless in Islam and they regarded them as a deviant sect. Meanwhile, he debunks the claims of *salafis* against *Sufis* as false and slanderous statements. The author concludes by calling the attention of the contemporary scholars on the need to rise to the corrections on the attitudes of the contemporary neo-*salafis* in the society. Prophetic traditions were cited

to corroborate his expression. These include "This sacred knowledge shall be borne by reliable authorities from each generation, who will preserve it from the distortions of extremists, the plans of the corrupt and the false explanations of the ignorant". The work does not cite an example of a particular region where *salafis* operate. However, this study centres on the practices of *salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria.

Writing on the *Salafiyyah*, Saleem (2000) is of the opinion that some Muslims (whom he refers to as *salafis*) have gone back to the early period of Islam in their method of practising Islam. He added that the *salafis* are strictly abiding by only the dictates of the Qur'*ā*n. He therefore defines the term with references from his work and that of other scholars of Arabic and lexicography such as Ibn Mans*ū*r. According to him, literally, the word *Salaf* means those who have preceded in terms of knowledge, faith, honour and goodness. He expresses further that, technically the word *Salaf*, when it is absolutely used, means the disciples of the Messenger of Allah, while the *Tabi'ūn* who came after them also share in the appellation. He buttresses his view by describing the *salaf* to indicate the best generation that was worthy of emulation. He corroborates his definitions with a prophetic saying which expresses: 'The best of people is my generation then those who follow them then those who follow them[28]. His study defines the term *salaf* and expresses its practices in the early periods of Islam with that of the successors of the Prophet and the two generations that followed them. The central theme of his work is on the definitions of the term. The author does not however, enumerate the branches or types of the *salafiyyah*. He does not also refer to the origin of the neo-*Salafiyyah* in the contemporary society. All these among others are comprehensively discussed in this study.

Louay (2012) writes that the variations of the term "*salaf*" have become very common in Islamic religious debates. Not only this, he narrates that the term is often used by some Muslims as the best way to comprehend the tenets of Islam and to follow the path of the companions of the Prophet. He also defines it as the generic name for the successors of the Prophet. He clarifies that some Muslims nowadays use the term to refer to themselves. The author briefly mentions that the term was first used to refer to the first three generations of Muslims after the demise of the Prophet. A hadith of the Prophet was

cited by the author to substantiate his expression. The hadith reads thus: "the best of you is my generation (*qarnī*), then those who follow them, then those who follow them".[29]

The book, "*al-salaf al-Salhin*" criticizes the interpretation of the hadith by the *salafis*. The author explained further that the hadith does not refer to a particular group of Muslims (as claimed by the *salafis*) but the Muslims that abide by the fundamental dictates of Islam: the Qur'ān and *Hadith* as well as other sources of the Islamic jurisprudence. He adds that the *salafis* also oppose the principles of the four schools of the Islamic jurisprudence. This is highly reiterated in his book as he expresses that the *salafis* distinguish themselves only by what the first generations have said and done as the first and last word on everything. He therefore criticizes the notion of strict adherence to only the Qur'an and Sunnah as claimed by the *salafis*. He concludes that the present *salafi* groups have deviated from real practice of the *salafiyyah*. The author dwells on only one of the doctrines of *salafiyyah*. Not only this, he does not also make reverences to a particular society. However, this study concentrates on South-West Nigeria.

Shail (2015) writes on the doctrinal conflict between *salafis* and Sufis. He tagged this discord as 'civil war' among the two groups. His research makes it obvious that their discord began in the 19th century when *Wahhabis* attacked tombs in Arabia. He expresses that the *Wahhabis* distinguished themselves from the *Salafis* and intensified in the last two decades with the multiplication of groups that claim to be *Salafi*. His work also dwells into the antagonistic attitudes of the *Salafis* to Sufis in some parts of the world such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. He narrates his experience in Tunis after his paper presentation at the conference he attended. He made references to how the *salafis* turned to criticize and oppose the tenets of the Sufis. However, he added that upon all these conflicts, the *Sufis* do not criticize the activities of the *salafis*[30]. His claim calls for proper understanding of the origin of *Sufism* in Islam and the factors behind the hatred of *salafis* for it. In addition to this, he also expresses that the *sufism* contributes tremendously on the acquisition of knowledge among which serves as the premise with which the *Salafism* is practised. His work relates the activities of salafis in Egypt. However, this study intends to investigate the practice of *salafiyyah* in South Western Nigeria.

Vincent's work (2017) addresses the reason why the *salafis* dislike sufism. He laments that the *salafis* are of the opinions that the origin of *sufism* cannot be traced to the

Qur'ān and neither was it mentioned nor practised by the Prophet. Hence, they (*salafis*) perceive it as an un-Islamic and heretical movement. He makes some references to this fact as he says: 'According to this *Salafi'* argument, Sufism is a Tron horse for unwarranted innovations that owe their origins to non-Muslim civilisations such as Greece, Persia and India'. Vincent also shares his experience in America on how *Salafi* adherents do oppose all affairs of the *sufis*. He added that the *salafis* usually deny *Salafis* and non-*salafis* from giving their daughters in marriage to *Sufis*. He expresses that the *salafis* claim that the *Sufis* are not knowledgeable about *Islam*. Hence, getting married to them will take the wife out of the fold of *Islam* to ignorance. This is a threat to Sufis by the *salafis* in America as the author illustrates [31]. While the scope of his investigation is America, the study area of this work is limited to South-West Nigeria.

Mamoun (2004) discusses the *Salafis* ideology, activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and teachings of Sayyid Qutb. He refers to *salafiyyah* as an extreme movement and explains how it has become more mainstream over time. His work sheds more light on the definitions of the *salafiyyah* literally and contextually. According to him, the word *salafi* means the past, the previous generations and those who believe in the teachings of Islam based on the dictates of the previous generations. He concludes his definition by saying 'that is the reason why those who subscribe to the notion of Salafism are those who are unhappy with the interpretation of Islam today, and they want to go to the origins of Islam'. He opposes the ideology of the contemporary *salafis.* The author laments that in *salafiyyah*, the world is divided into two places, the worlds of peace and war. So, those who are in the former world are *salafis* while non-*salafis* are in the world of war. By and large, these principles tend to be the fundamental causes of the extremism in the doctrines of *Salafism* in the society today[32]. The work covers some of the activities of *salafis* in Egypt while this study is limited to Yorubaland.

Al-Atharee's work (2013) concentrates on the doctrine of *Al-Wala Wal-Bara* in the practices of *salafiyyah*. The theme of his work focuses on the disposition of *Salafis* to non-*Salafi* Muslims. His work reveals that other Muslims who are not *salafis* are regarded as infidels and ignorant of Islam in the creed of *salafism*. He says further that the prominent founder of the *Salafism*, Ibn Taymiyyah was cited as the one that propounds the doctrines of ostracizing non-*salafi* Muslims. He comments that *salafis* regard those

who do not affiliate themselves with *salafiyyah* as none but extremists and people of heretical thought. He adds that non-*salafi* Muslims are not recognised in *salafiyyah* as faithful Muslims. Besides, he narrates further that any innovation is tagged *bid'ah* in *Salafism*. His study adds that the doctrine (bid'ah) does not only condemn non-*salafi*s but also forbid relating with them. These are well quoted by the author as he expresses "not being his neighbour, not honouring him, not talking to him, not making tasleem to him and not mentioning his name'.[33] The author submits that among what has weakened Muslims is the misconception about the concept of *Al-Wala Wal-Bara* (love and hatred) in *salafiyyah*.

In conclusion, Al-Atharee comments on *Bid'ah* in the *Sharī'ah.* It expresses that *Bid'ah* varies. Thus, according to him, it includes *Bid'at al-mukaffirah* (the one that takes one out of the fold of Islam) and *Bid'at al-mufassiqah* (the one that makes one a sinner but does not take one out of Islam). From the work, it is established that there are many issues that are associated with the doctrines and practices of the *Salafiyyah*. Examination on these doctrines is parts of the segments that this work aims to carry out in South-West Nigeria in order to enlighten the society.

Farquha (2009), states in his study that 'Salafism' and '*jihadi-Salafism'* have become significant doctrinal trends in contemporary Islamic thought. He examines the regional manifestations of the movement and its doctrines. His findings define the characteristics of the movement and situates it in relation to other trends in contemporary Islamic thought and activism. The author highly recommends further investigation on this movement for anyone that seeks an insight into the complexity of the term in the contemporary Islamic arena. This implies that there are still many areas uncovered by the author on the activities of the movement. Thus, those aspects are parts of the areas that this study intends to examine especially in South-West Nigeria.[34]

Furthermore, Ahmed (2017) writes on the roles of *Salafis* in Libya and their current fight for the Islamic State. He analyses that the group has caused a lot of conflicts in Libya and other neighbouring cities such as Benghazi and Tripoli. The major cause of the crisis is linked with their opposition to the government of the nation. Similarly, the *salafis* are tagged as anti-government in United Nations (U.N). His investigation explains that the group was sponsored from Saudi Arabia by receiving salaries and other funds. He

limited the activities of the movement to Libya. However, this work intends to carry out the impacts of the movement in the South-West Nigeria.

In the chapter two of Ahmed's book under neo-traditional *salafism*, he points out the historical survey behind the emergence of the pre-modern Salafism. The work reveals the global understanding of the concept of Salafism in this period. He mentions the pioneer founders of the practices. Among the most influential exponents are contemporary Middle Eastern Muslim scholars Nasruddeen Al-Albani, Bin Baz, M. Al-Uthaymeen, Al-Madhkhalee, and Jamal Zarabozovi.[35] The book affirms that the majority of the proponents are of Saudi Arabian background or who have studied in the Saudi Kingdom. This aspect of his work is a part of this study on the advent of neo-*Salafism* in the global history. However, this work extends it to the South-West Nigeria.

Ahmed writes further on the interpretations of the Qur'ān and *Ahādīth* by the *Salafis* and their *manhaj* (ideology) that made them to go extreme in the society. He analyses how the neo-*salafis* have deviated from the fundamental principles of the early *salaf as-Salihih* by not only condemning non-*Salafis* but also referring to them as infidels and causing violence in some environments. These among others are the reasons why they are tagged extremists in the society. The practices of the *salafs* are briefly mentioned without citing an instance or a particular place where the movement operates. It is on this premise that this work examines how each of the practices is spread in the southwestern Nigeria which is the scope of this work.

Marc (2003) reveals the activities of *Salafis* in the United States of America. He explains that there are many branches of the movement in the country. He clarifies further that in the United States, *Salafiyyah* has been equated by some people to radicalism and terrorism in some newspaper articles, books and public discourse. However, he clarifies that the true practice of *Salafiyyah* is not synonymous with violence, terrorism or radicalism. This also is part of what this work intends to explore. He mentions that the *salafiyyah* in the United States includes the *Jihadi Salafis, al-Qaeda* and local groups[36]. Reason(s) behind all these sects in *Salafiyyah* are therefore surveyed by this work in order to arrive at the real meaning of *Salafiyyah* and the factor that facilitates its spread especially in the area of study.

Dimal (1999) mentions that there are other sects in the *Salafiyyah*. These are tagged by him as the radical *salafis*. His writing reveals that these sects have taken root in Kosovo and the Western Balkans since the end of the 1999 conflict. He writes further that the movement operates in many mosques and *madrasahs* (Arabic schools) that are funded from the Middle East. He laments that the presence of *salafis* has fueled tensions within the Muslim community of the region. The author recommends that the expansion of radicalism of *salafis* worldwide has become a major concern to the international community. The recommendation of the author calls for more analysis on the reason why the practices of *Salafiyyah* have now become another phenomenon in the society[37]. This is carried out in this work with reference to South-West Nigeria.

Abdullah and Shane (2008) write on the activities of *Salafis* in West Africa with specific reference to Egypt. They both reveal anti-political violence that was caused by the *Salafis* to the government and the country at large. Other activities of the group as portrayed in the book are their misconception about the *Jihād* and how they are operating in the country, Egypt. The movement is described as a brand of radical group in the society with her radical approach to the government and the non-*Salafi* scholars. Besides this, he also writes that the movement hates other Islamic groups in Egypt[38]. His investigation centres on the *Salafism* in Egypt while this work focuses on South West Nigeria.

Jida (2017) writes that Saudi Arabia has been on Islamic evangelist mission ever since the country's dynasty formed a coalition with the *Salafi* preacher, Abdul Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula. He clarifies that *Salafiyyah* which was metamorphosed from *Wahhabiyyah* movement, was originally inspired by the Islamic Scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah, who inherited and assembled various forms of Islamic fundamentalism. He says further that his preaching forms the tenets of the movement anywhere it is spread to. The book , titled 'The Shared History of Saudi Arabia and ISS' explores the extent through which Saudi Arabia, its *Wahhabi* and *Salaf* establishments contribute to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism today and the factors that are responsible for these acts[39]. The research concludes that Saudi influences the present doctrines of the two movements in any community. On the extremism of the two movements, he expresses that it was

caused as a result of globalization. The findings of Jidah centre on Saudi Arabia while outside the scope of this study is South West Nigeria.

Alexander (2017) in his findings, writes on different perceptions of people on the definitions of *Salafism*. According to him, some people define it as the pristine *Islam* that was practised by Prophet Muhammad and the earliest Muslims (*al-salaf al-salih* "the pious predecessors") why journalists and security analysts view it as hardline form of *Islam* exported from Saudi Arabia and associated with *al-Qaeda*. He reiterates the facts that the present attitudes of the practitioners of *salafiyyah* are totally different from its meaning in the prophetic period. He concludes that the word has now been ascribed as a violent and radical nomenclature of a group of Muslims. Besides these, he submits that the practice did not emanate from Saudi Arabia as some people trace its root today[40]. Alexander reveals that the recent researches show that activities of the present *Salafis* involve violent reactions in some societies. Thus, there emerge a number of many societies named *Salafiyyah*. His finding opens room for comprehensive study on *salafiyyah* in the Islamic jurisprudence and the reason why there are many branches of the movement with different ideologies. All these, among others, are parts of the investigation that is carried out in this work.

Robin's work (2012) illustrates that common denominators among *Salafi* groups are inspiration and support from *Wahhabis*, a branch of *salafism* that emerged from Saudi Arabia. He maintains that not all Saudis are *Wahhabis*; but all *Wahhabis* are basically *Salafis*. He adds that Arabs, particularly outside the sparsely populated Gulf, suspect that *Wahhabis* are trying to seize the future by aiding and abetting the region's newly politicized *Salafis*-as they did years ago. Moreover, he explains that the *Salafis* go much further in restricting political and personal life than the larger and more modern Islamic parties that have won electoral pluralities in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco since October. He laments that the *SalafIs* are so violent and oppressive in all their activities politically, religiously and socially. These acts are what make them different and brutal to the non-*salafis*[41]. The main theme of the Robin's work is the effect of *salafis* in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco political structures while this study examines the *Salafiyyah* practices in South-West Nigeria.

Al-Uthaymeen (2008), writes on the interpretation of *Jihad* on the creeds of *salafiyyah*. His writing points to the fact that the *Salafi*s are the causes of misconceptions about the meaning of *Jihād*. He expresses that it should not be strange to the society that those who somehow misunderstand or misapply *Jihād* are none but the *salafi*-Muslims themselves. This is so, because according to him, the scholars of the religion have always cried out that the first people to have misunderstood Islam, especially in this era, are the Muslims themselves[42].

Al-Uthaymeen explains that the misconceptions about the *Jihād* by the *salafis* are the genesis of the manner in which the society perceives Islam differently. He narrates some of the methods of the adherents of the *salafiyyah* such as fighting in the name of *Jihād*. He expatiates on these meanings and adds that the *Jihâd*, like other concepts of Islam, must be learnt properly from the orthodox scholars in this present era. He concludes that that Islam is a beautiful religion and is also full of beautiful teachings. From his work, the general practices in neo-*Salafism* are briefly highlighted. Meanwhile, these practices along with others are focused by this work with references to their effects in the area of study.

Muhammad (2005), condemns the ideology of *As-Salafiyyah Al-Jihādiyyah* movement. He says that the ideology of this movement was similar to, or even worse than, the Nazi ideology, the ideology that causes social conflict in Jordan community. He makes reference to cases of some countries where the *Salafi* ideologies are the factors that led to religious conflicts among Muslims and people of other faith. The author narrates further that in spite of the release of the *salafi* leader in his country, he was still re-arrested by the authority. He explains that the leader is one of the founders of terrorism and the one who, through his books and extremist interpretations, gave rise to many of those who belong to the group now called *As-Salafiyyah Al-Jihādiyyah*, which leads to terrorism worldwide. Other offences levied against *Salafi* adherents by the government include their plan to blow up American military facilities in Jordan, setting Muslim youth against each other and open confrontation to the government[43].

Furthermore, Muhammad makes references to works of some *salafi* leaders. He writes that the primary motive of the movement is to fight Muslims with Islam and not non-Muslims. This is the reason why the group always attacks Muslims in any society

worldwide. This is quoted in his work as he illustrates the work of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi: in his well-known book *Millat Ibrahim* (The Religion of Abraham, i.e. *Islam*) that the concept of *jihad* in Islam should be directed against internal (enemies) before (it is directed) externally,

Muhammad also submits that the present ideology of *al-Salafiyyah al-Jihadiyyah* is alien to the early methods of propagating Islam in Jordan. This is so because the non-*salafi* Muslim groups in the country are moderate in their methodologies of the practice of Islam. He thereby recommends that the ideologies established by the *salafi* movement should not be left unsolved. He challenges the Islamic religious scholars in Jordan to find immediate solutions to the practices of *Salafism*. By and large, the submission of the author is highly germane to the need of every society. Solution to the different ideologies of *Salafiyyah* in Jordan is expressed in the work while this study is carried out in South-West Nigeria.

Mark (2011) expresses the attitude of *salafiyyah* to the Muslim brotherhood and its adverse effects on the Syrian community. He clarifies that the two groups are different in their doctrines. His writing exposes the ideas of the *salafis* on labelling non-*salafis* with hate names such as *Kāfir* (infidel). *Salafism* is therefore defined by him as a movement which emphasizes close adherence to the model of the *Salaf* or 'predecessors' who were the first few generations of Muslims. As a result of this, they expressed that the only solution to practise Islam nowadays is to go back to only what Prophet Muhammad did [44]. His study illustrates that the *salafis* tagged any invention into the religion as *bid'ah* and *harram*. The author emphasizes the practices of the movement in Syria and its opposition to the Muslim brotherhood group in the nation. He briefly mentions the founders of the movement by tracing it to Saudi Arabia *Wahhabiyyah*. The work does not address the detail practices of the movement in other parts of the globe. This study therefore focuses on the doctrinal practices of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria and the perceptions of the non-*Salafis* in the area.

Bruce (2005), when researching on the global Jihad movement (a branch of *Salafiyyah*); writes that the *Salafiyyah* emerged in Europe in 1980. He refers to the adherents of the group as "the ones who were prevalent, totally apolitical in terms of doctrine". He defines it as an ideology that posits that Islam has strayed from its origins.

Not only this, he also claims that the adherents of the group argued that the faith has become decadence over the centuries. Hence, they call for the restoration of what they refered to as the authentic Islam. He equally cites from the work of Kepel that the early *Salafis* in the prophetic era were not violent or outrageous on their practices."[45] He further explains that by the mid-'90s, some Muslims among youth in Europe started claiming to be *salafis*. The period started to witness the emergence of *Salafism* in Europe. They were tagged "*Salafi Jihād*". In other words, they are groups of Muslim brothers who felt that violence and terrorism were justified to realize their political objectives. He states that this is why the (terrorists) were often being regarded as *Salafis*. As a result of this, the jihadists are now tagged to any terrorist attack in European Union countries since 2001. On this motive, he laments that the *Salafi jihādists* constituted less than one percent of the Muslims worldwide. He added that the primary aim of the group was to establish an Islamic state. Meanwhile, his work reveals the activities of *salafi Jihadi*. The scope of his findings was also limited to Egypt and Europe. His study centres on *salafiyyah jihadiyyah* which is a faction of *salafiyyah* in this modern era. This work examines the *salafiyyah* practice in South-West Nigeria.

Baher's work (2010) relates the intolerance of *salafis* to the *sufi* Muslims in Egypt. He explains that the *salafis* are deviant to *Sufism* in Cairo. He makes it known that the opposition has led to denial of freedom of religious rights of the adherents of *sufism*. This has even led to the ban of Egypt's *Sufi* orders from holding gatherings for the performance of *dhikr*–rituals devoted to the remembrance of God by the ministry of *awqaf* (religious endowments). He justifies his argument that the ban is of political threat and support of the *salafi* propagators in the state. He also reveals that "the recent ban is another victory for extreme *Salafi*s at the expense of Egypt's moderate *Sufism*[46]. The author concludes that the present *salafi* activity is strange in Egypt. He adds that any Muslim that deviates from their strictly literal interpretations of the Qur'ān and Hadith is tagged as bad innovator and people of the hell. The major objective of his work centred on the attacks of the *Salafis* on *Sufi* orders in Egypt. However, this work reveals the emergence of *Salafiyyah* as well as its practice in South-West Nigeria.

Jonathan (2011) writes over the emergence of the *Salafs* in Egypt and United States. The summary of his work is about the rise of *Salafsm* in Egypt's political life, its

uprising, ideology and opponent to *Sufi* Political Parties. He concludes on the possible effects of *Salafiyyah* and *sufism* in Egypt's Future. According to him, *Salafism* refers to an interpretation of Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith and practice to the way they existed in the prophetic era and the early generations of his followers (known as the *Salaf*, or the forefathers). He expresses that since the early period of propagation of Islam represented the golden age of Islam in its pure form, *Salafis* believe that the practice of Islam of the period should be the example to be followed by all Muslims today. He adds that the *Salafiyyah* blossomed in the eighteenth century in many parts of the Muslim world, including the Arabian Peninsula, where a successful *Salaf* movement that came to be known as *Wahhabism*[47] emerged. He narrates that the early *salafis* concentrated on the propagation of Islam as it was brought by the Prophet while the present adherents have deviated into politics. He expresses that the decision of Egyptian *Salafis* is to form political parties and enter the realm of electoral politics. Jonathan writes on the practices of *Salafiyyah* in Egypt and USA. However, the area of study of this work is South-West Nigeria.

Francesco (2015) writes on the cases of *Salafism* in Tunis. He laments that the youth of the country embraced the practice as it was spread to the nation with the aims of improving on their knowledge of the religion. Suddenly, they began to find that the propagation of *Salafism* is not totally on the '*aqīdah* of *Islam* but also with some ideologies. He explains that the advent of the movement was started by advocating for the spread of Islamic tenets. Through this advocacy, many people both old and the young ones embraced it. The whole of his work explains how the movement affects the political status of Tunis and turned people out of their understanding of Islam. [48]. Hence, this study aims to carry out the practices of *Salafiyyah* in Yorubaland.

Zoltan (2013) writes on *Salafism* in Lebanese. His work portrays *Salafism* as one of the most dynamic and rapidly growing Islamic movements in that nation. The work states that some scholars have begun to pay serious attention to the movement, and while the body of literature on *Salafism* is growing, there are still many areas of the practices of the movement to be explored. The author provides an excellent opportunity to explore the dynamics of the *Salafi* movement globally and challenges other scholars to embark on more study of the ideologies of *Salafiyyah* not only globall but in their various localities[49].

This study therefore examines the *Salafiyyah* practices in the South-West area of Nigeria since its emergence.

Henri's work (2015) reveals that some Islamic scholars hold that *Salafism* is an innovative and rationalist effort at Islamic reform that emerged in the late nineteenth century. Others argue that *Salafism* is an anti-innovative and antinationalist movement of Islamic purism that dates back to the medieval period and yet persists today. He analyses the concept in the past and the present. Henri builds his history on the transnational networks of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali (1894–1987), a Moroccan *Salafi* who, with his associates, participated in the development of *Salafism* in the country. The work concludes on the present practices of the movement by enforcing people in Morocco to follow their aims. He also explains the general notion of the public on the Salafism[50]. Henri's work concentrates on some of the activities of salafis in Morocco while this work focuses on the South West Nigeria.

Laurent (2011) explains the *Salafiyah* in Yemen. His work reveals that in spite of the practices of the movement in the country, little efforts have been made by academicians on the activities of *Salafism*. He points out that the Yemeni *Salafi* movement originates in the 1970s, and its principal figure Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i (d. 2001) founded the *Dar al-Hadith* Centre in Dammaj after returning from Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s. He adds that at present, some groups have established *salafi* political party led by the Yemeni Rashad Union[51]. Besides this, he laments that the *Salafi* movement is now in a turbulent age while its social and political changes have led to religious identity, the identity that portrays Islam as a faith of turbulence in the minds of many people especially, the non-Muslims. The author analyses further that the growth of the *Salafi* movement has been both a cause and consequence of social upheavals. He narrates that after the 1962 revolution in which the Zaydi Imam Badr Hamid al-Din was deposed and replaced by a republican government, many Zaydis (the *Shi'ah* sect who are dominant in the Northern highlands) have been confronted with a myriad of problems.

Laurent dedicates a chapter to the question of authenticity, arguing that *Salafism*, rather than representing the '*Saudisation*' of Yemeni society, has itself undergone a '*Yemenisation*' process: while belonging to a wider, pan-Islamic reform movement. This implies that *Salafism* in Yemen is a representation of *Salafiyyah* of Saudi Arabia in lieu of

that of Yemen. He arrives at this conclusion based on the radicalization of the movement and rising against the political authority in Yemen. He submits that the movement is now a world phenomenon with different ideologies which include politics and social discord with non-members of the group. He also cites Tunisia and Egypt as notable nations of *salafiyyah*. As the author says, activities of *salafis* are not completely similar in different societies. While his work features the activities in Tunisia and Egypt, this study intends to examine the practice in Yorubaland.

2.3 South-West Nigeria and *Salafiyyah*

Olaiya (2016) writes succinctly on the causes of disunity among Muslims in South West Nigeria in this century. He reveals that the major causes of conflicts among Muslims are the adherents of *Salafiyyah* in the South-West Nigeria. He narrates that difference in opinions on religious matters in a society is not a new phenomenon in Islam. He cited that there were instances that led to disparities among the companions in the days of the Prophet, yet such divergences did not lead to hatred or conflicts among them. Hence, disparities on religious issues should be well accommodated and understood among the *salafis* in Yorubaland in lieu of causing socio-religious conflicts among Muslims.

While stressing the factors of the disunity further, Olaiya examines the levels of division in *salafiyyah* group only in Southwest Nigeria as the major factor that continues to divide Muslims. The actors in these divisions are named as the majority of brothers who studied in Arab countries, Jabata, Amubieya, minority of Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria's (MSSN) members who broke away from the society and few local Muslim clerics. Olaiya reiterates that the divisions within the *salafis* themselves are greater than without.

Olaiya says further that in lieu of searching for real Islamic knowledge, people are now taking some Islamic scholars as the sources of knowledge by following only their footsteps. This is what now led to the notion of over praising the s*haykhs* and *Ustadh* especially by the youth. He says this when he observes that 'the notion of *sheiksm, ustaadhism* or *salafism* has now become a proof of evidence by some Muslim brothers'. This implies that in lieu of seeking for real knowledge of Islam as embedded in the tenets of the religion, *Salafis* now tend to refer to their leaders as the only proof of any act they do in Islam. However, whoever opposes the ideas of such a leader will be condemned and

rebuked in the society by the *salafis*. This is expressed in his writing thus: "The second issue is the rate at which we *takfir* each other, the rate at which we 'b*idialise*' everything, the rate we want to turn the face of *Islam* to *sheiksm, ustādhism* or *Salafism* in the society' without justification from the *Sharī'ah*. Other issues raised by him include the manner of condemning the non-*salafi* Muslims by the *salafi* adherents in Yoruba region. He laments that this attitude has become worrisome, a situation whereby a Muslim named another fellow Muslim a '*Kāfir*' simply because he does not belong to the *Salafiyyah* group[52].

A number of germane questions are raised by Olaiya who was once a zonal *Amīr* of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN). There is therefore a critical need to proffer decisive answers to the questions, such as; what is the theological meaning of *salafiyyah* and what does it connote nowadays? When did the practice begin in the region? Why are there divergences of opinions among the adherents of the practice? What really causes the conflicts among the *salafi* and non-*Salafi* Muslims in the South-West Nigeria? What does the *Sharī'ah* say about calling another fellow Muslim a *Kāfir*? What is the effect of the practices on the people of South-West Nigeria? These questions and others therefore serve as parts of the areas that this work intends to cover.

Aboo 'Amir (2013) writes briefly on an arm of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. He states that the practice was brought to the region about ten years ago. The faction of Muhammad Ali who is popularly known as *Jabata* was sighted in his work. He traces the emergence of *Jabata* to the region from Egypt where he studied. His lecture first attracted the youths who had been yearning for more knowledge about Islam. They immediately admitted him as a scholar. This is due to where he studied, Cairo, a citadel of Arabic and Islamic knowledge.

Aboo Amir reveals that Jabata's lectures were initially centered on the sincerity of *Imān* and true '*aqīdah al-Islāmiyyah*. Suddenly, he began condemning the early scholars of Hadith and rebuked them as infidels. These include the compiler of *Bulugh al-Maram,* Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani. The author was called a *kāfir*. Not only him, Abu Hanifah, an Imam of the four schools of the Islamic thought was also not recognized as an *Imām*. Instead, he was described by him as an ignoramus that rarely said what was correct either in jurisprudential matter or '*Aqīdah*. He was even referred to as a *Murji'ah*. The activities of the *Sufi* were also rejected. He advocates that all the *Sufi* scholars in the region as well

as their disciples are nothing but the inmates of the hellfire[53]. As a result of these, some youth withdrew from attending his *da'wah* and also desisted from applying his verdicts on any issue that relates to Islamic jurisprudence. The work of the author only mentions that there are *salafis* in Nigeria. However, his work leaves gaps for further studies on the practice of Salafism in Yorubaland which is the coverage area of this work.

Paiko (2017) identifies the causes of the syncretism created by the present generation of Muslims who tagged themselves *salafis*. His expression clarifies that this is the fundamental of discords that are confronted by the present generation of Muslims. He claims that lack of knowledge has become a cankerworm in Nigerian society to the extent that people do not ascribe themselves to the religious knowledge. In lieu of bearing the singular religious title as Muslims; individual society now claims the title of his organisation. He mentions that a number of today's generation tagged themselves '*Sunni* Muslims and *Salafis*, whereas there is no need of mentioning those names or titles by utterances but through the understanding of Islam. He clarifies that these ascriptions among other things are the root causes of the sectarianism among Muslims worldwide. He establishes his fact that claiming of superiority of an individual group is another major problem that will continue to cause problem among Muslims in Nigeria generally[54]. From this explanation, Paiko submits that there is no need of forming *Salafiyyah* group in any Muslim society. He concludes that the establishment of *Sunni* movements like *Ansārul Islām* and *Jamā'atu Izālatil Bid ah wa Iqāmatis Sunnah* are enough for the propagation of Islam in the country. He explains that there is a clear need to examine the real definition of *Salafiyyah*. He thus defines it as the path of ancestors, forefathers and predecessor through whom Islam was passed to other generations of Muslims. The work establishes that there is paradigm change in the interpretation of *salafiyyah* nowadays. His work leaves a vacuum to be filled by this study on the real meaning of Salafism in Islam and its practice in Yorubaland.

Ishaq (2010) writes on the creed of *Salafiyyah* in Nigeria over the formation of Islamic organisations. He narrates that the establishment of Muslim societies is not tenable in the doctrine of *salafiyyah*. His explains how the *Salafis* in Nigeria cause divisons to the existing Muslim organisations and Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) inclusive. He centres his findings on an '*aqīdah* of the group which is tagged "*Lā*

Jamāʻah" (condemnation of Muslim association). The book mentions a doctrine of the movement and leaves the rest for further investigation[55]. By and large, other doctrines of the movement are parts of the aspects that will be examined in this work with reference to the Yorubaland.

John (2017) explains that the *salafism* takes different definitions in the societies. He argues that what people perceive as *salafiyyah* is not its real definition in Islamic injunctions. However, his work reveals that the *Boko Haram* in the northern Nigeria has become the most famous manifestation of *Salafism* in Nigeria. He expresses further that the *Boko-Haram* is merely a fringe offshoot of a much larger *Salafi* movement in the northern part of the country. In other word, he describes *Salafis* as the *Sunni* Muslims who describe *Salafiyyah* in their notions, as the only correct approach to being a Muslim. He explains further that the *salafiyyah* took its present shape in the twentieth century when Saudi Arabian *Wahhabism's* ideology was spread to Egypt, India and elsewhere. He narrates that the Northern Nigerian *Salafis* often use confrontational rhetoric toward other non-*salafi* Muslims. He concludes that the *salafis* in the Northern Nigeria are unfriendly with other Muslims who are not *salafis*. According to him, *Salafism* in northern Nigeria emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with Abubakar Gumi (1924-1992) by establishing an Islamic group named *Izalatul Bidʻah wa Iqamatu Sunnah* which means the 'Society for the Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the *Sunnah*. He narrates that the founder established the group as a forum to reform Islam in the northern Nigeria in 1978. He laments that the founder recognised only the members of the group as competent scholars while non-member Muslim scholars were not regarded as such. Not only this, he expresses that the group was also hostile to *Sufism* till now. According to him, the group split into two factions in 1990. In 1993, a faction led by *Shaykh* Jaʻfar Adam advocated for *salafiyyah* as the orthodox way of practising Islam. He comments that his *Salafism* was also political. His impact in politics brought the implementation of the *sharīʻah* in Kano State in 2005. However, the Shaykh was assassinated in the year 2007. His finding focuses on hostility of *salafis* to non-*salafis* and the reform of *Izalatul bidʻah wa Iqamatu Sunnah* in some parts of Northern Nigeria. Meanwhile, this work intends to survey the practice of *salafiyyah* in South Western Nigeria in this century. [56]

Amidu (2012) briefly reveals the dawn of the neo-*Salafiyyah* in the northern part of Nigeria. He mentions that the movement was known in the region in the year 2015 with her leader, Ibrahim *al-Zakzaky*. The author adds that the group was well known with antagonism over the Sufism in Hausaland. It advocates for cancelation of Muslim societies in *Hausaland* and obliges every Muslim to be a *salafi*. However, his work mentions the origin of neo and radical *Salafism* in the north though he said that the date is debatable among the authors. Amidu's work and that of John trace the emergence of *Salafiyyah* in the Northern Nigeria to two different founders, viz, *Shaykh* Gumi and Ibrahim Zakzaky[57]. There works explain the origin and some of the roles of *salafiyyah* in the northern region while the scope of this study is Yorubaland.

Ayinla (2017) analyses his perception on the intra factional conflicts among the *salafi* in South-West Nigeria. He laments that the present states of *salafiyyah* takes different dimensions among the adherents in the region. He says further that the region is under *fitan* (trials), one of which is the *fitnah* of *Jabata* and his disciples; who introduced what he termed as the harmful '*aqīdah* into Islam. The book expresses that the most harmful innovations is the '*aqīdah* that all *bid'ah* is *shirk* and all innovators are idol worshippers. Not only these, propagators of Salafism were equally tagged as those that cause religious conflict in Yorubaland. This is so, by their deviant methods of calling non-*salafi* Muslims infidels and hate names[58]. He adds that most of the adherents of the practice in the region do distinguish themselves from other Muslims by claiming their superiority over other fellow Muslims. His work only mentions the existence of *salafis* in the region without making reference to their factions and activities. Thus, this work intends to survey the origin of the *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland and its practice.

The work of Oladosu (2019) examines the *Jihādi* faction of *Salafiyyah* with its ideology. From the study, *Jihād* in the notion of the *Salafi Jihadi* takes another definition from the contextual meaning of *Jihad* in the Islamic jurisprudence. The work expresses that the interpretations of the *jihād* in *salafiyyah* (which include extremism and violence) are borne out of the verdicts of the two Islamic jurists viz: traditionist and revisionist. The former based its verdicts on what is termed as the '*Ahkam al-Bugha'*. This is referred to as the legal ideal to find solution to undisciplined act in the state and to prevent political turbulence against the government. The traditionists therefore maintain absolute

allegiance to the sovereignty by every member of the state even if he comes to the power through cheating. By this, disobedience to the government will cause more evil to the state. The traditionists oppose any act of disobedience to the constituted authority with the proof that it is tantamount to revolt against the will of Allah.

On the other hand, the revisionists' verdict supports the *Manhaj* (ideology) of the *Salafiyyah-Jihādiyyah*. They claim that revolt against the constituted authority is tenable as a mean to achieve the aim of the movement. The author cites Iraq, Somalia and Nigeria as the nations where the *Salafiyyah Jihadiyyah* is operating under the formation of insurgent groups among which are *ash-Shabab*, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and *Boko-Harram* with the aim of establishing Islamic government in their various countries. *Boko-Harram* is regarded as a faction of *salafiyyah* in the northern Nigeria. The author expalins further that this is why the *salafis* insist on establishment of Islamic state in the North-eastern part of the nation. The movement (*Salafiyyah Jihadiyyah*) upholds that the Islamic government can only be established in this modern day through violence.

Additionally, the adherents of the group maintain that Muslim education (*Tarbiyyah*) and other affairs of life should be purified in this era. They are of the opinion that the present era has been corrupted with *bid'ah* and western ideology. According to them, *bid'ah* is any act that the Prophet did not do. They call what they preach as pristine Islam. Not only this, any Muslim that does anything that the Prophet did not do is tagged unbeliever. This is the reason why they declare non-*Salafi* Muslims as *Kuffār* (infidels) and refer to any nation that is governed by a constitution in lieu of the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* as an idolatrous society[59].

According to the journal, ''Annual Review of Islam in Africa'' democracy and other forms of western systems of government are regarded as threats against the Islamic government. Sayyid Qutub was cited by the author as the typical advocate of the *Salafiyyah-Jihadiyyah*. His interpretation of Qur'ān 5 verse 44 was referred to as the genesis of what led to the *salafiyyah-Jihadiyyah*. He was quoted to have interpreted the verse as "whoever or any nation that does not rule by the *Qur'an* is an infidel". Oladosu reiterates the exegesis of the verse by him as what always causes rebellious act against any western government by the movement. Other *Salafiyyah* scholars that are quoted by the author are Muhammad 'Abdussalam Faraj and Abu Mus'ab *as-Suri al-Maqdisi*. They

are all of the opinion that those who substitute the law of Allah with the man-made-law are indeed infidels and unbelievers. The author concludes that it is on the notion of replacing the law of Allah with that of man that the *Salafi-Jihadis* divide the entire world into two. The first division is defined as "*dar as-Salam*" (a country of peace). The second division is regarded as the *dar al-Harb* (a nation of war). The work is highly germane to this study on the factions of *salafiyyah*. It focuses on north eastern Nigeria while this study is on the South-West Nigeria[59].

Some of the intra religious discords among the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) were investigated in the work of Asimiyu (2011). His study is limited to selected higher institutions in the southwest Nigeria. He made references to some of the factors that lead to the conflicts among the members of the society. These were mentioned as youthful exuberance, intolerance on the part of the students, and poor leadership skill by some of the executive members and love of leadership posts. These were enumerated under the internal factors that led to the misunderstanding in the society. Moreover, the external factors were centred on the negative effects of globalization, proliferation of Islamic organisations, quest for leadership and non-conformity with the norms and values of the MSSN. Additionally, he narrates that there are arguments on different perceptions on the issues of *Niqāb* (women veiling), congregational supplications, divergences of opinions on the exact number of *Rakaʿāt* of *Tarāwih* during *Ramadan* fasting as well as the disparities on the nature of work that a female Muslim should do and how she should be travelling. By and large, few of his findings form parts of the *manhaj* (ideologies) of *Salafiyyah*. His work explores five conflicts among the Muslim Students Society in selected schools while this study is aimed at examining the activities as well as the practices of *Salafiyyah* in the South West Nigeria[60].

Durojaye's work (2008) examines the way in which some Muslims go into extreme in their preaching. He traces the origin of extremism to the prophetic era among some companions and how they were corrected. His work analyses extremism among members of *Jamāʿat Tabligh* in Ibadan. Those members seceded from the general *Jamāʿah* with the aim of practising Islam better than how it has been practised by other members of the *Jamāʿah*. In order to realise their objective, they broke away and named themselves "*Karikasa*". This title distinguishes them from other *Tabligh* members. The

title literally means to 'withdraw from, 'to see and turn away from', or 'to separate from'. It is adopted from their doctrine of dissociating themselves from worldly materials. Therefore, they withdrew from using any object that are made by the west such as plate, pot, eating with spoon, sleeping on a bed and even living in a house that is built with concrete block and cement. [61]

In addition to the above, the faction did not only secede from the *Jama'at Tabligh* but also derive another doctrines which form its aims and objectives. Such as 'to eschew anything that was made from the west. The west in their creed are referred to as the Jewish and enemies of Muslims. Also, to establish what they tagged as the real *Sunnah* of the Prophet and practise them accordingly. In the same vein, they also upheld to be living ascetic life. They concluded that only the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* are the divine laws for Muslims. Thus, secondary sources of the *Sharī'ah* are not only rejected but also referred to as *Bid'ah*. As part of establishing their doctrines, the faction vacated Ibadan and settled at a village named 'A*ba Odan*'. They spent some periods in the village by living ascetic life. Among them are those who refused to be wearing cloth or boarding motor vehicle with the notion that the Prophet did not drive or board motor vehicle. In lieu of vehicle, they did ride on horses. They added that the vehicle and other materials that are made by the west are deliberately produced as *bid'ah* to make Muslims forget their religion, Islam. The faction thus called on other Muslims to join them in what they tagged as "*Karikasa* and pristine Islam"[61]. This dissertation reveals the activities of the faction of *tabligh* in Ibadan while our study examines the practice of *salafiyyah* in southwest Nigeria.

Some of the identity conflicts among the contemporary Muslim youths in Nigeria are featured in the work of Olaniyi (2015). The work focuses on some of the causes of the differences among the Muslims of the area. His research was carried out among *Ta'awun al-Muslimīn*, *Tijaniyyah*, *Qadriyyah*, The Muslim Congress, *Zumrah al-Mu'minīn*, Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) and *Jamā'at Tabligh*. His thesis deals with inter-religious conflict on social institutions and Yoruba affairs. Not only this, Olaniyi also points out how those identities have led to disparities among the selected associations and others that he did not mention. He submits that the different notions on those conflicts call for examination on the real Islamic verdicts as the mechanisms to resolve the intra and inter-religious conflict that usually ensue among the Muslims[62]. His finding also

points out some of the causes of disparities with limitation to his selected groups and leaves some gaps for others to fill. Such vacuum includes the area of this work which centres on the practices of the adherents of *Salafiyyah* not only in Islamic groups but also on the generality of the Muslims of Yorubaland.

Extremism tendencies among Ibadan Muslim youth are examined in the work of AbdulSalam (2017). His work traces the extremism from the Islamic history. Mention was made of *Kharijites* and some of the early extremists in the history. Similarly, the author points out some of the extremists in this present era. He expresses the causes of radicalism among Muslims nowadays. These, according to the dissertation include ignorance, misconception on the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*, disparity on opinions, poverty and negative effects of social media. A segment of his dissertation also focuses on the extremism in Ibadan which is his study area. He cites some of the major tendencies. These are the nation's system of government, salutations in Yoruba culture, gathering for naming ceremony, travelling of women without her protector (*Mahram*) and forbiddance of women from social work.

Not only these, the case of a faction of *Tabligh* was as well expressed in the study. The faction broke away from the main *Jama'at Tabligh* over what some members considered as acculturation of western ideology. Their notion was generated out of their thought that the best manner to practise Islam is to shun away anything or material that has been made by a man especially the west. Such things include western education, wearing shoes, watching television, using plates at home, drinking with cup, building a house with concrete blocks and cement. [63]

As a result of their secession from the movement and shunning away the above, they tagged themselves "*Karikasa*" which connotes to abstain from the worldly things and be living ascetic life. After some periods of propagation of their mission in Ibadan metropolis which was not comfortable for them, they later decided to relocate to where they would not be distracted with worldly things. They thus moved to *Aba-Odan*, a village. They established their mission with addition of more ideologies[63]. His work concludes that the adherents of this faction have no proof under the *Sharī'ah* to corroborate their practices. They only perceived what they tagged as pristine Islam. The work clarifies that there are extremists among present Muslims in Ibadan which is a

coverage area of this study. However, this study centres on the activities of *salafiyyah* not only in Ibadan but also in other states of the South-West Nigeria.

Taofeeq (2019) writes on the different controversies that are caused by the adherents of *Salafiyyah* in many countries. He expresses that some Muslim brothers formed the neo-*salafiyyah* and upheld certain ideologies that are very strange in the principles of Islam. Such ideologies are expressed as the major factors that made them condemn non-*salafi* Muslims globally. In addition to these, the author says that some factions of *salafiyyah* have derived certain creeds in various communities. Among these creeds are their claiming of superiority above other Muslims in faith (*Imān*) and worship (*Ibādah*). Others are relegating of any Muslim-scholar that does not belong to the *salafiyyah* group, calling people to accept *salafiyyah* in lieu of Islam, interpreting the *Qur'ān* to favour their motives, opposition to the formation of any Islamic group, calling other Muslims infidels and opposing democracy as the system of government. He clarifies that the origin of the present *salafiyyah* started from certain political and theological differences[64]. He states further that the contemporary adherents of *Salafiyyah* do impose their *manhaj* and *aqidah* (ideology and doctrine) on every Muslim. The author subscribes that the present adherents consider any non-*salafi* Muslim an unfaithful Muslim. He concludes that this is the major rationale behind their violence against non-*salafis*. The author's work sheds more light on the existence of *salafiyyah* in the present era. However, he is general on his expression without sampling a case study unlike this study which centres on the practice in South-West Nigeria.

2.4 A Brief about South-West Nigeria

This segment examines the history of South-West Nigeria and its contact with Islam. The South-West represents the Yoruba-speaking area of Nigeria. Hence, it is also referred to as Yorubaland. Though, Yoruba speaking area transcends Nigeria. However, the scope of this work focuses mainly on the Yoruba region of Nigeria. The region comprises six major states viz: Ekiti, Lagos, Ondo, Osun, Ogun and Oyo.

Yoruba region comprises people of different origins and ethnicities.They migrated from various localities. These reflect in their dialects. Each clan has its own culture and mode of communication. Thus, variations in their dialects are used to determine the origin of each of them. For instance, Ijebu dialect is different from that of Ondo, while Osun

indigenous intonation is not the same with that of Ogun State. However, irrespective of their variant dialects and traditions, they all refer to Oduduwa as their ancestor through whom they all dispatched to different localities[65]. Another feature of the South-West people is their unique Yoruba language through which they generally communicate and comprehend each other irrespective of different dialects. By and large, the language serves as the symbol of unity in the mode of expression as well as other common means of interpersonal relationship. This is the reason for age-long maxim that portrays Yoruba as "*Ebi Kan*" [66] (A single community of people or family). Each clan has its own traditional rulers. In some quarters, the rulers are referred to as *Obas* (Monarchs) while *Baale* is used in some cities. This was the manner with which the community was coordinated and governed prior to the advent of Islam in the area.

2.5 The Advent of Islam to South-West Nigeria

Islam entered South-West Nigeria arounf the 18th century[67]. Meanwhile, the actual date of its spread to the region is contested among historians and scholars of Arabic and Islamic Studies. However, the Yoruba had accepted the religion prior to the *Jihād* of 'Uthman dan Fodio. This is supported by Almasri as he says:

> The important thing to note about the spread of Islam, however is that it had already become a factor in the country (i.e. Yorubaland) before the Fulani Jihad of 1804. By the 18th and 19th centuries, Islam had a foothold even as far as south and the coast where European travelers bore witness to the flourishing state of Muslim Communities [68.]

Also, Abbas expresses that historians put different periods on the actual date of the arrival of Islam to Yorubaland. This is so, because of the non-formalisation of the traditional record system. However, he elucidates further that Ahmad Baba al-Timbuktu (d. 1627 C.E) in his work *Al- Kashuh wal- bayan li Asnaf majub al-sudan*, puts Yorubaland as a place where "unbelief predominates and Islam was rarely found" [69]. Another account reveals that the South-West Nigeria had not only witnessed the advent of Islam by 18th century but it had also been proclaimed to many areas of the land such as Ketu (1760), Ibadan (1827), Oyo-Ile, (1550) and Iseyin (1770). By this period, Islām had been widely proclaimed in Yorubaland and many mosques were being constructed in

different parts of the region. Yorubaland also had some contacts with the Islamised areas through the activities of settlers and traders. The contact contributed immensely to the infiltration of the religion in the region [70]. Adam also expresses further that Yoruba knew about Islam during the time of Emperor Mansa Musa of Mali (d.1337 C.E) through the Malian-traders and ambassadors who were living in Oyo-Ile, the capital of old Oyo Empire.

Islam was spread gradually to most of the states of the region through commercial transaction between the Yoruba people and the northerners who were both the traders and itinerant Islamic scholars. Majority of these Hausa/Fulani Muslims later settled in some places such as Ibadan, Oyo, Abeokuta, Ijebu-Ode and Lagos[71]. Their settlements at these towns were for both the commercial activity and religious motive. They were at first praying in their different places before they introduced the religion to the people through *Da'wah*.

Upon the advent of Islam to Nigeria via West Africa through the activities of the Muslim merchants and clerics, it was brought to Kanem-Bornu, Hausa-land and later to the southwest Nigeria which comprises mainly Yoruba tribe. The religion was adopted and practised[72]. However, the earlier Yorubas perceived the emergence of Islam as the religion of Malians due to the fact that it was first spread by the Malians. The notion tends to be a reason why Islam was initially referred to as the religion of Mali in Yoruba dialect as "*Esin* Mali" and it was later pronounced as "*Esin 'mole*" [73].

In the early stage of Islam in southwest Nigeria, trade was a means of propagation. The Arab traders arrived to Northern part of Nigeria for commercial transaction of varieties of items. These activities made the Arabs and the Hausa people travelled down to the South-West Nigeria for expansion of trade activities. An account states that the traders started settling in many cities in Yoruba areas such as Ibadan, Lagos, Ilaro, Iboro and Ibese as far back as 18th century [74]. Their arrival to the South-West made the area flourished with knowledge of the Qur'an, Arabic and *Islamiyyah*. Many Yorubas began to learn from the northerners after the commercial transactions. Notable towns of these *Mallams* include Kano, Sokoto, Daura, Kanem Bornou and Nupe land. Meanwhile, Islam had been embraced and practised in those towns since 11th century prior to its advent in the Yorubaland. Their coming to the south-west brought

growth and development to the propagation of Islam. In addition to *Da'wa*h, the Yorubas were also exposed to many Arabic literatures which formed the birth of Arabic learning and scholarship in Yorubaland.[75] At present, the states that make up of the South-West Nigeria are six. Each of the state is succinctly examined as the coverage area of this study

Ekiti State:

As it is in the tradition of Yoruba region, the early religion in Ekiti was traditional worship. This made the propagation of Islam faced myriads of problems. However, Islam was accepted by some of the people. The spread of Islam in the Ekiti is in connection with the impacts of *Shaykh* Musa Ibrahim Ajagbemokeferi. He strove to ensure that Islam was established in the city and its suburbs. His activities earned him the prestigeous and unique title of *Ajagbemokeferi.* He was popular with the title throughout Yorubaland. Not only this, he also reformed the manner of propagating Islam by some pioneer-Muslims which he termed as unorthodox. First, he began the mission by preaching in various places in Ekiti. His knowledge of Islam influenced many people, both Muslims and non-Muslims. He used to organise open-air-*Da'wah* in the town and villages of the land. On this propagation, he faced a lot of persecutions on the hands of the traditional worshippers but he was triumphant due to his efficacy of prayers. His activity was also spread to other towns of South-West Nigeria. [76]

As the religion requires knowledge, a school for the study of the tenets of Islam was established in the town with many branches in the neighbouring cities by the *Shaykh*. The school was named *Zumuratul Mumin* . This institute served as the citadel of Islamic and Arabic knowledge for Muslims to comprehend detail teachings of Islam. The products of the school also embarked on the same mission of propagation of Islam.

There was no exact date of the advent of Islam to Ado-Ekiti. However, it was spread in 1836 during the reign of Ali Atewogboye, a traditional ruler. The freed captives of war who had been converted to Islam also facilitated the practice of Islam in the town. Their impacts aided the spread of the religion to Awo and Ido-Faboro Ekiti. Other factor that facilitated the spread of Islam is the commercial transaction of the people of Ilorin. Their interactions with Ekiti people led to interpersonal relationship. Thus, Islam was spread to many towns in Ekiti State such as Aramoko, Ikere, Itaji, Ikoro, Ijero, Igbemo, Iworoko and Otun. Additionally, Islam was also spread to Ido, Omuo, Oye and Ikun by

Muslim missionaries who came from Oyo. At present, Ansaruddeen Society of Nigeria contributes to the growth of Islam in Ekiti States through its establishment of mosques and *da'wah* (preaching) propagation. [77]

Lagos State:

There was no concession on the exact date that Islam was brought to Lagos. However, it was recorded that people had been practising the religion in the palace of Oba Adele Ajosun who reigned from (1775-1780 and 1832-1834) [78]. He succeeded his father, Ologun Kutere (1749-1775). Adele allowed the practice of Islam not only in Eko (as it called in the 1760 before it was renamed Lagos by the Portuguese) but also in other cities of the town. He did this at the expense of his throne in 1780. He was dethroned by the British authority because of his liberal religious policy. Another account claims that Islam reached Lagos State during his period and it was first practised in his domain by some Hausa-slaves and he allowed its practice. The Hausa were reported to have been captured during Yoruba and Hausa inter-tribal war. After some times, the king got to know about their religion and he allowed them to continue the worship. He also provided an avenue for them to interact and observe their *salawāt*. As a liberal king, he allowed any inhabitant that might want to join them to do so without any ado. Thus, in the year 1775, a central mosque was built in the city along with other *Ratibi* ones.

Oba Adele was sacked in 1775 by the British government. There were two opinions on his suspension. A source claims that it was due to the increase in the population of Muslims in Lagos colony which was contrary to the mission of the British government. Another source reveals that it was due to his negative disposition to the *Egungun* (Masquerade) that was invited to his palace by his children. As a plan to appoint another person to the headship of the community, the elders in the town invited his brother, Oshinlokun to take over the positon. To their surprise, he too allowed the practice of Islam in the palace and was liberal to the converts. [79]

1832 was another historical year in the history of Islam in Lagos State. It marked the year that the colonial ruler returned Oba Kosoko to the throne after his exile to Epe. Most of those who followed him on exile to Epe and the converts who were of Epe origin followed him back to Lagos. Their arrival in large number increased the number of Muslims in the town. The Epe people were made to reside at a new city in Isale Eko. It

was referred to as Epetedo which denotes a place founded by Epe people. The area was then named as Eko-Epe. The return of the monarch to power marked another watershed on the expansion of Islam in Lagos and neighbouring towns. Islam reached Badagry, Epe, Ketu and other provinces peacefully. Another prominent king that facilitated the expansion was *Oba* Oshinlokun (1780-1819) [80].

Other factors that facilitated the contact of Islam to Lagos and other towns in the State were the contributions of returnee slaves from Brazil, Sierra-Leone and Cuba [81]. Some of them were already Muslims before they were sold as slaves to abroad while some were converted to Muslims. By the time they were liberated, many of them preferred returning to their different homelands than staying abroad as slaves. Among them were Salu Shitta and his child, Muhammad Shitta Bay. On their return to Nigeria, most of them settled at Lagos State. That is why they were referred to as "*Aku*" (the term used to refer to the liberated returnees from Sierra Leone). The Muslims among them increased the population of the indigenous Muslims. They also brought tremendous development to the town by the virtue of their foreign exposures. Salu Shitta and other freed slaves formed alliance with the Lagos people to spread Islam to different towns of the State. Muhammad Shitta Bay was an influential Muslim of high repute. He contributed in his capacity to the advancement of Muslim education in Lagos State. As a philanthropist, he used his wealth for provision of Muslim needs and building of mosque. Some years after the arrival of the *Akus*, some people also returned from Brazil to Nigeria and settled in Lagos at different places. The Brazilian group was referred to as *Aguda* (the retunees from Brazil to Nigeria). They came in large number as well. Like the former group, they settled at a place which is now referred to as *Bamgbose* Street. They erected in different localities within Lagos. With the arrival of these two groups, many mosques were built in Lagos.

Other significant factor was the impact of Muslim associations in Lagos. The pioneer society on this noble course was the "*Egbe-Kila*" (*Kila* society). The move for the establishment started in March 1895. The Association comprised many Muslims who came together to foster the intra-religious relationship among the Muslims and to fight against any infringement on the rights of Muslims in the community. Other societies then sprang up in the town with almost the same motive. Such associations included *Ahmadiyyah Muslim Jama'at* and its movement which was founded in 1911, *Ansaruddeen*

Society of Nigeria 1920 and a host of others. The spread of these societies reached so many areas in Lagos including Epe and Badagry. [82]

Oyo State:

According to Abbas, Islam reached Ibadan in 1829 and the people of the area were introduced into the religion by a man called Gunnugun or Igun Olohun. Through his knowledge of the religion, he later became the first Imam of Ibadanland. With his efforts and that of Muslim scholars who came from Ilorin, many people of the town renounced their idolatry practices and embraced Islam in 1830.[83] 'Uthman Abubakr Basunu I arrived Ibadan during the reign of Bashorun Oluyole. He was a Hausa cleric from Katsina. An oral history expresses that Basunu was not part of his name. It was given to him in Ibadan in recognition of his origin. It was coined from the word "*Baba Sannu*" which is the general title given to any elderly male northerner particularly in Ibadan and Yorubaland. He first settled at Borno before his arrival at Ijebu Ode, Abeokuta and finally to Ibadan. He was warmly received and accommodated in Ibadan. This was done on the directive of the then ruling monarch, Bashorun Oluyole. This honour led to the permanent stay of 'Uthman Abubakr Basunu and his people in Ibadan. His knowledge earned him a great prestige to the extent that he was made the chief Imam of the town in 1839 till his demise in 1871. [84]

There is a divergence of opinions on the exact date that Islam was spread to old Oyo Empire. Meanwhile, history says that Islam was early spread to the town and had been practised during the reign of Alaafin Ajiboyede between 1570 and 1582 [86]. Some people from Mali during the time of emperor Mansa Musa on their mission for commercial transaction settled at Oyo, the capital of old Oyo Empire. Also, some Hausa mallams among who was *Baba Kewu* which connotes "a very versed man in Arabic and the studies of Islam" played important roles in many areas of the town. He migrated to Oyo on his itinerant motive. Thus, Islam was brought to the land as far back as 1550 C.E. The impacts of these non-Yoruba itinerant Muslim scholars did not only facilitate the advent of Islam in Oyo but also its spread in the town.

Islam was spread to Ogbomoso in 1840. The advent of the religion was facilitated through a Hausa herdsman called Mallam Shuayb [87]. He migrated to Ogbomoso for cattle rearing and commercial transaction. Shuayb and his group along with his brothers, Badru

and Zubayr were warmly received in the town by the monarch. This was during the period of Oba Soun Oluwusi. The monarch was enthusiastic about their arrival. He arranged for their settlement at the Parakoyi compound. They began their mission with peace by organising daily and periodic *Da'wah*. They also organised Qurānic classes for people. These two avenues were used to enlighten the community on the needs to accept Islam. Gradually, Islam was spread to villages and other communities in the town. Mosques began to spring up in many areas with *Ratibi* Imams. After a while, Mallam Shuayb died and he was succeeded by his brothers. The successor furthered the mission of his brother on the growth and development of Islam in the land. The goals of the efforts of these learned Mallams with that of the indigenes made Islam firm in the town till now. Their knowledge facilitated the establishment of the Qurānic, Arabic and Islamic schools in 1934. By that time, a number of scholars of Islam also came from Katsina, Kano and other parts of West Africa. Then, some Muslim societies sprang up and established their associations to develop the teaching and learning of the Qur'ān, Arabic and Islam. These societies include Ansaruddeen, Nuruddeen, Anwarul-Islam, Akhbaruddeen and Muslim council. Akhbaruddeen established its school in 1979. Other *Madrasah* in the town that also aided to the development of Arabic and Islamic learning are Madrasat Al-itiqan, Madrasat Izharul Haqq, Madrasat Ayegbami, Madrasat Nasiruddeen and *Madrasat Osifila.* [88]

Mallam Aboki, a northerner played a prominent role on how Islam was brought to Iseyin around 1760. He arrived at the town along with his people as nomadic Fulani and they were practising Islam. The community embraced them but they were not denied the propagation of Islam. In the year 1770 which marked the tenth year of their living in Iseyin, they deemed it essential to introduce their religion to the people of the town with the aim of converting them to Islam. An attempt was made by the Mallam along with other northerners to erect a mosque that would serve the community. The mosque was built at a place called Idi-Ose. It was on this mission that other itinerant scholars from Dindi and Kanuri came to the town. Their coming to the land in conjunction with Mallam Aboki facilitated the rapid growth of Islam. They jointly built the mosques and established the first Qurānic School inside it. The mosque thus served dual purposes: centre of worship and leaning avenue. These significant roles of the mosques encouraged

people to be eager to learn details about Islam. Many people of the town enrolled their children to learn the reading of the Qur'an in the mosques. Through this noble efforts, the parents of the children also embraced Islam. This made the number of Muslims to increase. The Aboki and other Mallams in 1781 founded more mosques at different districts within the town. The notion of building Qurānic centres along with the mosques made the propagation of Islam easy for Aboki and his colleagues. The supports of many traditional leaders as well as the monarch allowed them to always stage *Da'wah* without any attack. The students of those *Madāris* who were majorly the indigenes of the land are prominent '*Ulamā*' and Imams in the town at various mosques. [88]

Historical record on the contact of how Islam reached Igbeti was of two sources. First, Islam got to Igbeti due to the attraction of weaving of traditional cloth which is called *Aso-Oke* in the dialect of the town. The local method of weaving attracted one of the traders, Sanni Olajide. He was surprised with the way the cloth was made. Olajide's relationship with the people was cordial. He mingled with them and finally settled in the town. As a Muslim, he used his knowledge to introduce Islam to the people. His mission was successful. Many people who were already of traditional religion started embracing Islam. His interpersonal relationship led to evolution of mosques in the town. As a result of this, the community began to grow on the tenets of Islam with many converts to Islam.[89]

Another history expresses that the emergence of Islam was felt in Igbeti around 18th century through traders and nomadic Fulani. It was brought through Mallam Mumini. He lived for short period of time with his tribe's men who had been in Iganna prior to his arrival. During his time of living with them, he prophesised for one prince named Adelekan (a.k.a Baba Pupa) that he would surely become the Oba of the town. His prediction was later fulfilled and the prince became the king of the town. In appreciation of his activity, the king sent for him to be living in the city. He also gave him one of his daughters for marriage. This gave him an opportunity to propagate Islam not only to the king but also to the people in the town. With his efforts and the people whom he had converted to Islam, a *Ratibi* mosque was built near his residence. This marked the first mosque in the town. It was also used as a learning centre.

Acceptance of Islam by the famous Ifa priest in Okeho led to the spread of *Islam* to the town. The priest, Bibilari was a brave, trust worthy and noble man in the community. His dignity made everybody aspired to associate with him due to his truthfulness and kindness. As an Ifa priest he usually moved from one place to another seeking for more spiritual power. He did visit some towns like Igbeti, Okaka, Ibadan, Saki and Oyo. In one of his missions to Ibadan, he got contact with some Muslims in the town who called him to accept Islam. He admired the manner with which the religion was introduced to him and converted to it. He thus changed his name from Bibilari to Lawal before he left Ibadan for his home town. After periods of time on the journey, Lawal returned home and was welcomed by his people. To their surprise, he expressed his experience about Islam that he brought and added that he had rejected the worship of Ifa. As a priest of integrity, majority of the people of the community believed in him and accepted Islam from him too. They were of the opinions that Bibilari was very brilliant and wise; hence, he could not bring any unreasonable faith to the town His activities on Islam in Okeho facilitated the establishment of mosques in the community. He built the first mosque at his premises. It served the role of the *Ratibi* mosque where every Muslim observed their five daily obligatory prayers (*Salawāt al-Khams*). The mosque was used for teaching and learning the Qur'an in addition to its primary role as the centre of performance of *Salah*. Lawal developed interest in searching for comprehensive knowledge of Islam. This made him engaged '*Ulamā*' from neighbouring towns such as Saki and Igbeti to be teaching the Qur'ān and other fields of Arabic and Islamic subjects in his mosque. He also enrolled as a learner in order to acquire more knowledge about Islam. The ample knowledge he acquired made him to become the first Chief Imam of the land.

Sojourn of Hausa and Tapa men along with the then Alaafin of Oyo brought the first contact of Islam to Igboho area of Oyo State. The Alaafin as the paramount traditional ruler used to be accompanied by those men as part of the royal honour in Yorubaland and for his support for Islam that was brought by them. The northerners that accompanied the monarch used to assemble themselves for *salāh* as an obligatory act of worship in Islam. They performed this holy act throughout the days of their visitation in Igboho. The manner and attitudes of these Mallams were admired by the people of the

community. Thus, Igboho people mingled with them. Unfortunately, after some days, the Alaafin and his entourages returned to Oyo.[90]

After a few periods of time another set of emigrants came to Igboho from nearby towns such as Ilorin, Ikoyi and Osogbo for commercial transaction. They usually stayed for some days on their commercial transaction and practised Islam. This was so because, Islam had reached their lands and they had been converted to Islam. The work of Abbas surveys this history by mentioning some of the early Muslims of the period among who were Ibrahim, Asinta, Balogun, Sulaimon, Agbojule Olorun and 'Uthman Baba pupa. These people and the rest were performing *salāh* individually as they perceived because none of them possessed the required qualities of an Imam. Not quite so long, another itinerant scholar called Mallam Sulayman came to Okeho. He arrived towards the period of the *Salāh al-Maghrib*. As a scholar, the call of the *Adhān* aroused him to go to the mosque where the call had been made. The congregation rated him more knowledgeable than any of them and they asked him to lead them in the *Maghrib* prayer. Moreover, after the *Salah*, he greeted the monarch, Oba Orogunloye and gave him the Holy Qur'an and two *Tira* (Arabic prayer book). The gifts were appreciated by the king. In addition, Sulayman told the Oba to keep a copy of the scripture in the palace for reading in time of any affliction and attack while the other two *tiras* were to be buried at the community's market and in front of the palace. During that period, Igboho town and its environs were so peaceful. In order to be able to propagate Islam in advance, the Mallam made Igboho his home town. His relationship in the community enticed the people to embrace Islam in large number. Mallam Sulayman was succeeded by another scholar called Shakyh Abubakr. Abubakr was a native of Igboho who was living in Iseyin where he was converted to Islam and taught the detailed knowledge of Islam. The focus of his *Da'wah* was on the condemnation of idol worship. His efforts had positive effects on the people generally. Today, majority of the people of the town are Muslims [91].

Ibarapa is an ancient area of Oyo State. It consists of seven distinct towns viz: Eruwa, Igbo-Ora, Lanlate, Idere, Tapa, Ayete and Igangan. The actual date that Islam was spread to the area was not certain. This was due to different oral accounts on the emergence of the religion in the land. However, the spread of Islam started from Igbo-Ora and was facilitated to other towns and villages one after the other with the efforts of some

neighbouring communities. The visitation of Alfa Salihu to Igbo Ora in the 18th century marked the beginning of the introduction of Islam to the area. He was a Tapa man from Bida in the present Niger State. He came to the town as a Muslim cleric. He was alone practising the religion in the community that was full of traditional worshippers. In lieu of being confrontational with people on their indigenous religion, he associated himself with them in the town without compromising his faith. His attitude with the people made them to love him and accepted the religion. They also learnt reading of the Quranic verses from him. The acceptance of Islam by many indigenes of the town gave him an opportunity to build the mosque which served as the first mosque in the town. It was located at Akinyemi compound where he and his family settled.[92]

Islam reached Eruwa around 1860. Invasion of Dahomey and the enthusiasm of the Obas facilitated its acceptance, growth and rapid development. Others included the influx of traders and the impacts of the non-Muslims who were also living in the town. The motives behind the commercial transactions of the emigrants included manifestation of Islam. Through this noble cause, the people followed their mission and denounced their traditional religion. Addition to this role was the supports of the monarch, Oba Omoni. Islam was spread to the town during his time. He embraced the teachings of the religion and allowed the practices of both the traditional and indigenous religions. This attitude gave the Muslims more advantages to stage their daily *Da'wah* in the public places. Islam also gained the support of the Asawo (the Oba) of Ayete. He supported the pratices of the religion and even encouraged its acceptance by his subjects. His conversion aided immensely on the rapid growth of the religion.[92]

Acceptance of Islam by the people of Idere was connected with Muslim traders who used to stay there for a while on their way to Okeho and Iganna and the impacts of Mallam Sanusi who came to settle in the town. The people of Okeho who were already Muslims used to pass through Idere to neighbouring villages and towns with their commodities. They transacted with local attires and other traditional materials. The commercial activities usually took some days before they would return home, Oke Ogun. They did observe the *salāh* on the journey and anytime that the prayer time reached them at Idere. They usually performed the *salah* and even rested at the town for some times before continuing on the journey. Their resting after the journey enabled them to interact

with the people of the town and Islam was gradually introduced to them. Mallam Sanusi was a non-indigene Muslim cleric. He came from Ilorin to settle in Idere. He was initially practising Islam alone in his residence. However, his disposition to the people of the community who were idol worshippers was so cordial. This attitude attracted them to abandon their faith and embrace Islam. By and large, Islam was spread not only by the Mallam but also the citizens of the town [92]. The acceptance thus led to the foundation of a Mosque and Sanusi was appointed as the Imam.

Osun State:

There are different accounts on how Islam was spread to each of the towns in Osun State. In the first premise, Osogbo, the capital of the State got contact with Islam through the impact of the Muslim traders around 1820. Prior to the arrival of those traders, there had been Ifa prediction during the reign of Oba Matanmi I. The oracle foretold that the town would receive three men with turban on their heads who would be Muslims from other town and they would enter the town via a boundary towards Ibokun. Abbas mentions the place in his work as Idi Baba. The Ifa added that the three men should be warmly received and accommodated with respect. The monarch was also instructed to request from them to pray for the peace, growth and development of the land.

After much expectation, the men arrived on the nineteenth day of the divination. They were not of Yoruba origin. They were natives of Ngala, an Arabic village in extreme area of Borno state. Upon their arrival, they were first taken to the Oba. The monarch asked them to pray for him and his wife who was barren. The king made the pledge that he would accept their faith if his wife was pregnant. They honuored the monarch, read some portions of the Qur'ān and prayed as requested. The efficacy of the prayers yielded positive and the wife was pregnant. She gave birth to a male child named Harun. The incidence marked the dawn of acceptance of Islam in Osogbo not only by the monarch but also many people of the town. [93]

As part of appreciation of their roles in the city, the king persuaded them to stay in the town and be part of the community. They agreed with the monarch. After a long period of time, they took permission from the king to proceed on their mission of moving from one area to another as itinerant scholars. Their request was granted by the monarch with the promise that one of them would remain in the town to educate the people on

Islam and reading of the *Qur'ān*. The king deemed this decision essential as part of methods of spreading *Da'wah* to the entire land. Ibrahim 'Uthman who was the most elderly one along with another two Mallams volunteered to take the task. The two Mallams played pivotal roles on the spread of Islam to many provinces of Osogbo. Many people accepted Islam due to their approaches and relationships to people. Gradually, through their relentless efforts, the first mosque was built in Osogbo. It was used for learning of the *Qur'an* and other aspects of Islam in addition to its general role as the religious centre. [94]

Moreover, the son (born by the Oba's wife) was named Harun. At his tender age, his father first sent him to learn the reading of the Qur'an from the Mallams. After the completion of the scripture, he was enrolled for the studies of other knowledge of the religion. Thereafter, his father sent him to Ibadan to improve on his knowledge. Haruna learnt from different scholars in Ibadan and became a prominent scholar in the city. He settled at Oke-gege and lived there for years. His knowledge of the religion made him to be appointed as a *Ratibi* Imam at the mosque in his area. He became the 9th chief Imam of Ibadan in the year 1922. The position he held till his demise. The effects of the monarch's acceptance of Islam and the efforts of the Mallams facilitated the early acceptance of Islam by many people in the city.

In Iwo, Islam was fast growing due to the pivotal roles of the monarchs of the town since early period of the spread of Islam to the area. Majority of the towns and villages around the town were full of many Muslim scholars. Till today, the town is referred to as *Ilu Alfa* (The town of Islamic scholars). Islam was brought to the area by some nomadic Hausas. They settled at an area in Iwo called Ogbaagba. They were at first practising Islam alone and later started calling on the inhabitants to accept their faith. The efforts of the Mallams yielded positive as the people started joining them during the periods of *salawat*. Moreover, the *Mallams* engaged in rendering prayers for people and curing of different diseases through the reading of the Qur'ān. Efficacies of the reading of the *Qur'an* and other prayers reached the monarch of the town, Oba Oderinlo who had been aspiring on how the outbreak of epidemic disease that had affected lives of people in the town would be cured. The Mallams answered the king and the prayers were offered

with the reading of the Qur'ān. The prayers were accepted by Allah and the diseases were cured. [95]

Oderinlo was very happy with the Mallams. He appreciated them and asked them to stay in the town. He himself accepted Islam and encouraged many people to do so. Due to the respect accorded to Oba in South-West Nigeria, many people accepted Islam along with him. Oba Oderinlo was succeeded by Oba Muhammad Lamuye in 1858. He was brought up with Islamic knowledge by the then Imam of Iwoland, Shaykh Muhammad Hadeetha. The shaykh was a Fulani from Borno. His era of administration brought rapid development to the spread of Islam. As an Islamic scholar and Oba, he used his position to support the propagation of Islam and condemn idol worship. The acceptance of this religion by the king and his chiefs brought another glory to the propagation of the religion. The chiefs also preached to their families. This made the number of the converts into Islam increased[95].

The actual date that Islam got to Ede was debatable. However, it was spread during the administration of Oba Timi Bamgboye but was embraced en-mass by the community during the period of Oba Abibu Olagunju[196]. The roles played by the two monarchs coupled with the impacts of Hausa Mallams facilitated the acceptance of the religion. Their impacts made many people who were of indigenous religion converted to Islam. The whole community embraced the religion to the extent that the non-indigenes and captives of wars also practised the belief in secrecy due to their status as minors.

After a period of time during the reign of Oba Timi Bamgboye, an inter-tribal war broke out between Ede and Ibadan warriors. As Ibadan was known with many brave warriors among who was Balogun Oderinlo, the warlord, the Oba sought for the assistance of Mallam Ibrahim who was a Muslim cleric. The mallam honoured the request through the efficacy of prayers. The prayer resulted into the falling of heavy rain that took three consecutive days before it stopped. This incidence could not allow the Ibadan warriors to invade Ede. They were frustrated by the incessant rain fall. They later returned home without achieving their aim. The result of this incidence made both the Oba and the entire inhabitants of Ede happy and believed in the power of the *Qur'an* and prayers of the Mallam. The number of converts thus increased rapidly. This marked the first factor that facilitated the spread of Islam to many areas in Ede as well as other neighbouring

towns. In order to show gratitude to the Mallam and be helpful in the likely future attack, the king provided a place for him to settle in the town. Many people partronised him for several spiritual needs. He was loved by the community and this made him to enlighten the society on the tenets of Islam. [96]

The period of Oba Abibu Olagunju who succeeded the Timi witnessed another tremendous development on the growth of Islam in Ede. Before his birth, it had been professed by the Ifa oracle that a boy would be born to the royal family who would not associate with traditional doctrines of the family but would be worshipping the Lord of the Gambari, Islam. The Ifa's instruction was followed when the boy was born. Instead of giving him a traditional name as the family used to practise, he was taken to the Muslim clerics who named him Habeeb. His parent thus added the royal names, Sangolami Olagunju to his Muslim name. This was done in order to trace him to the royal clan in the future. Habeeb was allowed to learn much about the religion of Islam. This made him a great scholar even before he became the monarch. As a scholar, he allowed the practices and learning of Islam. Many converts were able acquire ample knowledge of Islam. Gradually, the number of converts increased not only in the city but also in the villages as well. The chiefs as well as other people willingly accepted the religion. Not only this, many mosques were built and there were expansion of Qurānic and Arabic schools across the town.[96]

The traditional religious worshippers who remained in the indigenous religion perceived Islam as the religion that was different from their doctrine and viewed the population of the Muslim converts in the community as what might probably put an end to the indigenous religion. As the result of this, the converts were forcefully dragged out of their homes by their people. They (converts) then resulted into the house of the Mallam who accommodated them irrespective of their large population. Similarly any convert that was dragged out of home would resume to the Mallam's residence for asylum and shelter. Through this magnanimity of the Mallam he was nick named as '*Adekilekun*' [97] which connotes the 'person whom his arrival led to the full house with people'. Till now, he was popularly known with this nick name above his real name. His descendants also bear the nick name as their compound or surname. . Till the present, the Adekilekun compound is referred to as the residence of Alfas (Adekilekun, ile awon Alfa) in Ede.

Efforts of Mallam Kasumu Adeosun, Mallam Danialu and Oba Olubuse facilitated the dawn as well as the spread of Islam in Ife and its environs. It began during the period of Oba Kurubusu. Mallam Danialu was the first cleric in the town. He came from his home town, Ilorin to settle at Ife. He was the spiritual consultant to one of the royal chiefs named Orunto Balufe. Because of his status as an alien in the community, he was practising the religion by observing the *salāh* alone. After a while, the arrival of Mallam Kasumu Adeosun who was an indigene of Ife made the religion known to the public at large. He was living in Lagos where he spent his childhood and learned Islamic knowledge before he came back to his town on the mission of introducing Islam to his people. His aim was achieved but with opposition from the then monarch, Ooni Kurubusu. [97]

Mallam Kasumu began the spread of Islam by preaching to the people. Only few people converted to Islam at early period of that time. This was due to the negative attitude of the idol priests to Muslims. He was at first antagonised by the king. The monarch was of the opinion that his spread of Islam would affect the traditional religion. Thus, the negative perception of the king served as the stumbling block on the spread of Islam. With all these hurdles, the Mallam remained firm on the religion. He organised a Qur'an centre where he and the few people that had accepted the faith worshipped secretly. This was due to the fear of the plot that might be planned by the king. In spite of this, his disciples increased always. History reveals that he was assisted by some eminent personalities in the town who had been pratising Islam in Lagos before they returned home, among whom was Hasan Omidiora Akintola. They supported and defended him against any affliction from the traditional worshippers. [97]

One day during the *Olojo* festival, which is a most important traditional festival, the Mallam along with his disciples and students partook in the ceremony. They joined other people of the town on the celebration. On their procession along with the monarch, the Mallam and his disciples started saying the Qur'ānic words while others were singing traditionally as usual. At the shrine, the Mallam prayed in the Islamic manner and instructed his students to recite the *Suratul Fatihah*. The king was happy that the Mallam who was also a relative to him was not hostile to him as the monarch on the indigenous religion. He called for him to know more about the principles of Islam. The Mallam's

explanations enabled the king to comprehend Islam as the religion of peace and not violence. The king thus allowed the practice and preaching of Islam though he did not practise it. This marked the dawn of the growth of Islam in Ife. [97]

Modakeke Akoraye is a town in Osun State. It is very close to Ile- Ife. The two towns share the same boundary. Early religion of Modakeke people was traditional belief. The town got contact with Islam through an itinerant *Mallam* called Salihu. He was a native of Minna, Niger State. He was a trader and a spiritual cleric. He usually offered prayers for people of the town. Acceptance of his prayer made him to be regarded as a spiritual leader. By and large, through trading and efficacy of prayer, he was loved by the community. People of the town were convinced on his religion due to his interaction with them and acceptance of his prayers in Islamic manner. With more intermingling with the people and prayers, a number of the converts was increasing periodically. The population was then led to the formations of *Jama'ah* in the year 1885 Salihu himself built a mosque and founded schools for teaching of the Qur'an. From that period till the present, number of Muslims in Modakeke continued to increase. [97]

Islam was spread to Ijesaland around 1860–1890. It was due to the commercial activities between the town and neighbouring cities such as Ilorin, Lagos, Epe and Badagry. Some traders usually lived with their customers for some days after the transactions before they would return to their places. This cordiality led to interpersonal relationship through which they were able to introduce Islam to people of Ijeshaland. The religion was accepted with enthusiasm. Many of them contributed parts of their wealth for development of the religion. Prominent on this cause were Shuaybu of Okesa, Rayese and Salami both from Egbeidi quarters. They later appointed one of them called Alfa Shuaybu as their Imam because of his Islamic knowledge. In addition to this,   Mallam Abu Muhammad from Nupe land also facilitated the establishment of early mosque in the town. The mosque served as the centre of worship and a place to discuss issues that were affecting the affairs of Muslims. [98]

Islam reached Ila Orangun during the tenure of Oba Adedeji Aniyeloye, the twelfth Orangun ile-Ila. Its spread was through a Muslim cleric, Muhammad Mustafa Ibrahim from Ilorin, Kwara State. The scholar arrived the town on his mission as an itinerant person. He was warmly received by the monarch and this made him to be

accommodated in the residence of Olori Awo of the town. He was allowed to practise his faith. His mode of worship attracted the attention of the people and they moved close to him. Islam got more converts during the period of Oba Orangun Olajolobi Agboluaje the first. The mallam Mustapha had been known by many people of the town at this time. In addition to his activities on the spread of Islam, the monarch married a Muslim woman of Ilorin native which is the home town of the Mallam and she was allowed to practise Islam. Oba gave her freedom of going to the Olori Awo's residence for daily compulsory prayers (*Salawāt*). Participation of the Olori (the monarch's wife) in *Salāh* encouraged not only females but also males to accept Islam. Increase in their population gradually led to the establishment of mosques in the city where people also learned the Qur'ān from the Mallam. Islam was from this stage spread to other parts of the town and villages till now.

Islam reached Ikire in the year1913 through a nearby settlement called Apomu. It was established firmly in the town through the acceptance of the prayer rendered by Mallam Ahmad. He was an indigene of Oyo-ile at Olokunesin compound. Ikire was confronted with intra-tribal civil wars that were rampant in the southwest Nigeria by then. Many inhabitants of the town were captured and sold as slaves while many loss their lives in the wars. Others ran out of the town to neighbouring villages for asylum. All the efforts made by the people of the town to resist the war proved abortive. Due to incessant occurrence of the wars in the city, the traditional ruler had to seek for assistance of a famous Muslim scholar who was said to have possessed very powerful prayers that could stop such problems. Hence, the Mallam was called for the assistance through Muslim prayers which he was famous with. The request was granted and the prayer was answered. The effect of the prayer stopped rampant waging war against Ikire land and restored peace. Those who had fled out of the town returned and they were convinced with the Mallam's prayers. The efficacy of the prayers thus served as the first factor that encouraged the people to accept Islam. [99]

After some years, another civil war broke out during the reign of Oba Olubooye. The monarch instantly called the Mallam for the usual assistance as he used to do during the era of his predecessors. The Mallam responded and the war was stopped. The king therefore begged the Mallam to be living in the town. A residence was prepared for him. The community also built a mosque and the Mallam was appointed as the first Imam of

the city. In addition to the town's mosque, he also built another one at Oke Ada area of the town.

Ondo State:

Old Ondo State which had been split into the present Ekiti and Ondo states is predominantly of traditional religion. A number of idols of different origins were worshipped by different clans. These include Omojao, Osun, Ogun, Oya, Obatala, Sibi, Ailala and Sereku among others. However, how Islam was spread to Ondo can be categorised into two. It was first brought by the non-indigenous Muslim traders and the neighbouring towns that had got contact with Islam prior to that of the State[100]. The arrival of the traders to the state was for commercial activity and religious motive. They gained access to Ondo through the Eastern route that links Ondo to other parts of the nation. At the initial stage, it was so difficult for them to call the people to Islam. The town was so hostile to the traders and their beliefs. Meanwhile, with interpersonal relationship and the commercial transaction, the traders were able to achieve their aim and enlightening them on the doctrines of the faith. Some indigenes were convinced about the doctrines of Islam and they embraced the religion. Influx of these traders continued in the town since then till now. Some of the traders later settled in Ondo for the business and conversion of people to Islam. Their population increased in different towns of the state everyday. With their frantic efforts, mosques began to spring up in some provinces of the city. [100]

By the mid of 1840–1850, these traders who were from Iwo, Lagos, Oyo, Ogbomoso, Offa, Ilesha, Ilorin and Ife began to propagate the religion to neghbouring towns of Ondo state. Those areas included Owo, Ondo, Akure, Akoko, Oba-ile, Omifon, Ore and other towns. Majority of the natives opposed the propagation while a few of them accepted the religion. Those who denied the acceptance of the faith were afraid of difficulties that they might encounter on the hands of the pagans. They raised a number of questions before few of them could convert. Such questions included that 'they would renounce Islam if its practices are difficult. After much questions, they were convinced that the practices of the religion is simple and they should be steadfast that only Allah protects'[101].

In the year 1886, the converts increased. Many families joined the early converts. Muhammad Awwal Okoifa and his wife were the first to accept Islam at this period. The couple was well educated. They had already witnessed the practices of Islam in Lagos before their coming to Ondo, their home town. After some years, other women in the community joined them. Moreover, the early converts began calling the rest people to join the faith. They were preaching to people of different houses to accept the religion. The year marked the period of acceptance of Islam in groups. Leaders of many tribes supported the mission and served as the pillars behind the formation of the early Muslim communities in the town. Notable among these elders were Abu-Bakr Ajao, Baba Agba Ajao, Lejoka Muhammad Kuteyi, Saheed Akinfolarin, Muhammad Sodiq Oyeneyin, Shaykh Alimi Abdulkareem, Alhaji Alli Ajiboye Agba, Imam Ipaye, Alliy Akinwande Akinola, Murtadha Ajiboye, Imam Agbegioroko and Abdulqadir Oladapo [102].

As the primary need for performing daily prayers in Islam, the Muslims requested for land from the traditional rulers of the town for construction of a mosque. This was in accordance with the tradition of the town by then. An individual or a group could not erect a centre of worship in the town except with the permission of the traditional rulers who are responsible for allocation of the land [103]. Prior to this stage, the residences of the Muslim leaders of each family were used for performing the *Salawāt.* Increase in their population led to the request for a piece of land to build a mosque. Contrary to traditional worshippers that were given lands inside the city, the Muslims were given a piece of land to build their mosque outskirt the city. This was unlike other states of the South-West Nigeria where mosques were built very close to the palaces and central markets. The location of the land was referred to as Igbo-Ajaka (Ajaka bush). It was not only too far from the town but also bushy. The allocated land was where they used to dump anybody that died of small-pox[104]. Its location was deliberately given to the Muslims in order to expose them to the danger and pollution of the bush and to move them away from the town.

In 1902, the first mosque was built on the land. It was named Iparuku mosque. It was initially constructed with tents of big stick poles and bamboos through the efforts of the Muslims. The first *Zuhr* prayer was observed on the same day that it was completed. By the year 1912, a number of Muslims in the town had increased rapidly. The population

comprised both the indigenes and foreigners who settled in the town for commercial purpose. These Muslim foreigners assisted the community to rebuild the mosques. Thus, the first one which was made of bamboo was demolished and rebuilt with the architectural design. In 1921, Ansaruddeen Society of Nigeria which had been established in Lagos prior to the spread of Islam to Ondo State contributed to the development of Islam by building another mosque at Oke Otunba. It was initially referred to as Masalasi Alejo (Visitors' mosque). The mosque had since then till now been used as the Ondo Central Mosque. After some times, through the efforts of the early Muslim clerics, authority for establishment of mosques was given to individuals in the community. It allows whoever wanted to build a mosque to do so. At present, there are mosques in some areas of the State especially in Akoko, Ikare, Ondo kingdom, Akure, Owo, Ile Oluji, Ore, Oba-ile, Oke-igbo and Idanre. The impacts of those clerics facilitated the establishment of many mosques in the town and villages. Among them are *Ansaruddeen* mosque, *Islahudeen* Mosque (established by Iwo indigenes that are living in the town), *Taqwallah* Mosque, *Ahmadiyyah* Mosque at Sokoti Street Ondo, *Ahmadiyya* Movement Mosque Idi-Ishin Ondo, Irentitemi Central Mosque, Akinsehinwa area, *Oke-Osun* Central Mosque, Ajiboro Street, Ike-Oluwa Mosque, *Izallatu Bid'at* Mosque, Sabo Ondo, *Adura mi gba* Central Mosque, Sabo Ondo, *Tanabi ni–o bori* Mosque, Igbo-Oja, *Allahu Lateef* Central Mosque Opposite Olamojiba area, Jamat Hausa Mosque, Saabo, *Allahu Wahid* Mosque, Lotogbe, *Abubakre Yusuf* Mosque, Ademulegun, Olohunkemi Mosque, *Nasrullahil-Fathi* (NASFAT) mosque, Ijelu Mosque, Saabo and *Adeyemi* College of Education Mosque. Some indigenes even built mosques in their houses.[105]

Hence, establishment of mosques served as the primary factor that led to the growth and development of Islam throughout all provinces of Ondo. Other factors included the formation of more Islamic societies such as Ondo Muslim Forum (which consists of only indigenous Muslims), Federation of Muslim Women in Nigeria (FOMWAN), *Izalatul Bida'h wa Iqamatus Sunnah* Society, Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria, *Nasrullah Fathi* (NASFAT*), Jamaa'tu Tableeq* and *Anwarul* Islam. The organisations also established mosques and schools at different areas in the State.

As Islam places high premium on knowledge, the few early Mallams established Qurānic learning centres to enlighten the society on the tenets of Islam and this led to the

establishment of Qurānic and *Islāmiyyah* schools in many towns of the State. The traders also contributed to this development. They regarded the learning as the essential need for the protection and practices of Islam. Many new converts patronised the schools. Oke Otunba, the Ansaruddeen Central mosque was made the place of teaching and learning in the year 1934. Other avenues for the studies are the Iparuku mosque and the houses of the Imams among whom were Alhaj Kareem Alimi, members of Ansaruddeen who arrived from Lagos and those that migrated from Ilorin, Ilesa, and other neighbouring cities and settled in the town. [106]

In addition to the foundations of the *Madrasah*, *Ansaruddeen* also established modern schools. It started with the establishment of primary schools at Okelisa and Yemoja areas in 1942 and 1943 while its secondary school was founded in 1980 at Okelisa. Other mosques that were used for this propagation were Balogun mosque at Odosida, Opeyemi Mosque at Ayeyemi area, Awosika Mosque, Olufosoye mosque and Iparuku Mosque. Pioneering families to learn Qur'ān and other Islamic studies at this grass-root included but not limited to Fawehinmi, Alimi Abdul Kareem, Kuteyi, Ajao, Akinfolarin Saheed, Akinwande, Akinnibosun, Adewetan, Akinrele, Akinyosoye, Igbekoyi, Awosika and Mimiko's families. These are the noble families in Ondo kingdom. [106]

At present, the effects of the efforts of the early scholars on the spread of Islam in the town and inculcation of the tenets of the religion into the minds of the people have been dwindling. The number of Muslims in the state is very low if compared with other states in the South-West region.

Ile Oluji: Ile Oluji is an ancient town in Ondo State. It is very close to Ondo West Local Government Area. Islam got to the town through the impact of a non-indigene Mallam named Bello. He came to settle in the town as a scholar. He was hosted by Kinsimile at his Oke-Ehinogbe compound. The Mallam was allowed to practise his religion. He was at first observing his daily prayers lonely. Through his interaction with the people, they moved close to him to learn the details about Islam. With his attitude to them, few of them began to associate with him. He was so loved by the community and this made the traditional leader of the land gave him a land at Oke-atiba where he built a house and as a navenue to call people to Islam. He later built a mosque on the land. The

mosque was used for daily obligatory prayers and *da'wah* purposes. Gradually, the number of the converts increased and the religion was spread to many parts of the town.

As a scholar, Mallam Bello became the first Imam of Ile-Oluji. Other Imams after his demise that also contributed to the spread of the religion were Imam Eyiowuawi, Imam Jimoh and Alfa Lambe. Alfa Lambe played significant roles on the propagation of the faith when he became the Chief Imam of the town. He was a native of Ilorin. He combined his method of *da'wah* with open air lectures and teaching of the Islamic virtues. These encouraged many people to denounce their traditional religion and embrace Islam. It was also recorded that some of the personalities in the town converted to Islam during his reign. Notable among them were Alimi, Akinsinmide who first accommodated Imam Bello and Jomu Buluye who was a high chief. The conversion of these people served as a source of help on his mission. After some periods of time, a Qurānic school was established in the town by Imam Lambe. The school was in operation till 1906 when Imam Lambe decided to return to his home town, Ilorin. The school was later named Muslim Primary School, Ile-Oluji. At present, it serves as a school that many Muslim parents in the area enroll their children. The present state of Islam in Ile-Oluji was affected like that of other towns of the State. Majority of its indigenes had been influenced by western ideology. Majority of the Muslims in the town are aliens of different backgrounds who had made Ile-Oluji their second home. [107]

Akoko: Akoko is another community in Ondo state. It is made up of many towns. Besides the indigenous religion which was the early mode of worship in the town, Islam was spread to the area before the arrival of Christianity [186]. The people of neighbouring states as well as northerners usually came to Akoko for commercial motive. It was through this commercial transaction that Islam was introduced to the area. It was established in the city through Agbenebode and Okene which are sub-parts of Kogi and Edo states. In addition to this, the activities of Hausa Fulani in 1805 also contributed to how Islam was brought to the land. Activities of Ilorin, Nupe and Ibadan emigrants also facilitated the expansion of Islam on the land [108]. They converted some of the indigenes to Islam. There is high population of Muslims in some areas such as Eshe, Ogbagi, Ikare, Irun, Afin and Eriti.

Ogun State:

Islam had got contact to Ogun State province prior to 1830 [109]. The earlier spread of Islam to the State was due to the fact that some of the settlers had been practising the religion in their different localities. Upon their arrivals to the town, they were allowed to practise their faith with restrictions. The Muslims were at the initial stage practising the religion individually. They could not call the *Adhan* or pray in congregation till around 1841. In the year 1841, during the reign of Oba Sodeke, the Muslims made a request for a piece of land to erect a mosque. The monarch was lenient with them and a place was allocated for them at Iparo area. The land was used to construct the first mosque. It served as the centre of worship and preaching for the Muslims. The mission of the spread was led by the people of Owu. Notable among them were Ibrahim, Salih and Isa.[109]

After some periods of time with increase in number of Muslims and new converts, the Muslim community was formed under the leadership of Alfa Sunmonu. He was succeeded by Mallam Umar. He was an indigene of the town who had become a Muslim cleric outside the State. The community invited him to come home to benefit people from his wealth of knowledge. Upon his arrival, he was honoured and made the Chief Imam of the mosque at Abeokuta in 1846. Another factor that aided the spread of Islam was the establishment of the *Madrasah* by Alfa Fulani in 1841. Both mosques and the *Madrasah* served as avenues for the people to comprehend the teachings of Islam. The efforts of the *'Ulama'* on the growth and development of Islam led to the introduction of Islamic chieftaincy to the Muslim personalities. Most of the warriors who converted to Islam were given Islamic titles. For instance, 'Uthman was made the Balogun Adeen (Leader of the religion of Islam). He later became the deputy Imam and Ibrahim was made the adviser to the Muslim community. This chieftaincy mechanism contributed in many ways to the establishment of Islam in both Egba and Ijebu divisions of the State till now. However, Alfa Fulani who was an itinerant scholar was made the *Mufassir* (interpreter of the Qur'ān). This was due to his knowledge of the religion. He settled in the community with his family and spent his life time with people. His impacts facilitated the knowledge of Islam among the Egbas. He also established Arabic and *Da'wah* institutes. By and large, Islam was spread to other places, towns and villages in Egbaland. The people also became *duāt* (preachers) due to their Islamic knowledge. [110]

Ota: Islam arrived Ota in 1847 [111]. It was brought to the city through the activity of a liberated slave called Ibrahim Aina who was a son of the soil. He was kidnapped at his young age on his way to his father's farm and was sold as a slave to Sierra Leone. He spent some years there. He was fortunate at the foreign land. He married and settled there till 1838 when the liberated slaves were allowed to go back to their homelands. In 1842, he left Sierra Leonne for Lagos. This was due to the fact that most of the slaves could not locate their exact towns. Majority of them settled at Lagos where they landed on their way back home. He first settled at Akanni street in Lagos. He was practising Islam with his family along with other converts who also arrived from Sierra Leonne. He led people in *Salawat* and taught them some aspects of the knowledge of Islam. As time went on, people started asking him about his origin and how he got to Sierra Leonne. Through the conversation with people about his origin, he got to know that he was from Ota area of Ogun State. Then, he returned home in 1847. At home, he was living at his father's residence before he relocated to Ipata, where he built his own house. [112].

Ibrahim had three wives who were in purdah (*niqāb*), nine children and four servants. When his father's house could not accommodate him and his family, he had to relocate to Ipata area of the town. His wives were selling "Adi" but he was selling it on her behalf. This act was a surprise to the people and he was nicknamed 'Aina Aladi. As a Mallam, he built a mosque in his compound. The mosque was used for both religious and learning purposes. Many people accepted Islam from him. Seriki reveals that he had at first informed his people when he was in Lagos that if he comes home (Ota) he would not participate in traditional worship rather he would invite them to Islam. The promise was fulfilled [113]. The community allowed him to practise his religion without any ado. With persuasion and *Da'wah*, people accepted his faith, Islam.

Iju-Ota: Iju-Ota is another town that got contact with Islam through Abeokuta. The religion was spread to the town by Alfa Sanni of Oja-Igbo area of Abeokuta in 1885 [114]. The Alfa was a farmer. He converted to Islam through the impacts of the itinerant emigrants. He was at first performing *Salawāt* lonely. After some times, people began to join him. His relationship with the community encouraged people to join him in large number. Another Mallam from Ilorin Abdullah came to the town. He was highly accommodated. He joined Alfa Ibrahim on his mission of propagation of Islam. The

efforts of both encouraged many people to embrace Islam. As the essential need of the Muslim community, the first mosque was built in the town and Abdullah became the first Chief Imam. Islam was also spread to other provinces and villages by the people themselves. Seriki mentions some of them as Oyewole, Akinleye, Onibuku, Ajayi, Idi-Aba, Idodo and Mosafejo [115].

Owode-Egba: Islam was spread to Owode-Egba by Mallam Ibrahim in 1890. He migrated to the town as a scholar and settled there. He began his mission with *Da'wah* and this attracted few people in the early stage. The environment was hostile to the Mallam. He was confronted by the idol worshippers and masquerades. One day, a masquerade went to him in order to provoke him while the rest assembled at his compound. They started singing and drumming heavily. In lieu of fighting back the masquerades, he brought out some gift items, foods and drinks for them. This attitude surprised the masquerades, audiences and idol worshippers who had planned to fight him and destroy his residence. Seriki asserts that he was guided by the *Ayah* 34 and 35 of the *Qur'ān* 41which reads thus:

<div dir="rtl">

وَلَا تَسْتَوِي الْحَسَنَةُ وَلَا السَّيِّئَةُ

ادْفَعْ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ فَإِذَا الَّذِي

بَيْنَكَ وَبَيْنَهُ عَدَاوَةٌ كَأَنَّهُ وَلِيٌّ حَمِيمٌ .

وَمَا يُلَقَّاهَا إِلَّا الَّذِينَ صَبَرُوا وَمَا

يُلَقَّاهَا إِلَّا ذُو حَظٍّ عَظِيمٍ

</div>

Nor can goodness and evil be equal. Repel (evil) with what is better. Then it will turn hatred between you and them to be friendly and even intimate. And no one will be granted such goodness except those who exercise patience and self-restraint and the person of good fortune (Qur'an 41: Ayah 34-35).

Majority of them pondered over his attitude towards them and accepted Islam. They also learnt the Qur'ān and other Islamic knowledge from him. Early converts included Abdussalam Kalejaye and AbdulGhafar Ogundimu. Both along with other personalities in the town became Islamic title holders in the community. The number of converts increased by the arrival of another Alfa called Ibrahim. He married one of the daughters of the soil and this gave him more prestige in the town. His cordial relationship

made many people to embrace the religion in large number. Mallam Ibrahim also established a Qur'ānic school at his residence. The school made majority of the people understood knowledge of Islam. Most of them became Alfas and Imams in various metropolises in the community and villages. [116]

Odeda: Odeda witnessed the contact of Islam through the activities of three itinerant preachers from Oyo-ile viz; Zubayr (d. 1935), Alapafon Sanni and Abdussalam [116]. The three started preaching to the people by encouraging them to accept Islam. Irrespective of their efforts, only minority accepted the religion. The town was so hostile to them. They were even threatened by the idol worshippers. By and large, it was so difficult for them to call the *Adhan* in the public at the time of *Salawāt*. It was expressed that they were warned by the idolaters to stop calling the *Adhan* which was, according to them, tantamount to diverting the attention of people from traditional religion to Islam. [117]

Among the early people that first accepted Islam were the children of the traditional leaders. They were convinced with the *da'wah* (preaching) methods of the *Mallams*. Thus, their conversion strengthened the propagations of Islam by the Mallams. Hence, the idol worshippers could not stop them again. It was on this process that Mallam Sanni from Abeokuta and Alfa Musa from Ilorin joined them. Through their concerted efforts, persuasions and *da'wah*, people of Lisa-Emore, Ayipa, Agbaje, Jaguna and many villages accepted Islam [117].

Ifo: Contact of Islam to Ifo area of Ogun state was due to the migration of two Muslim brothers from Abeokuta to the community in 1906 [118]. They were both farmers. They settled at Ifo. Due to the knowledge of Islam that they had got from their homeland, Abeokuta, they combined *da'wah* with their farming. They also mingled with people and started calling them to Islam. Through their mechanism, many people converted to Islam. The religion was spread throughout the town, villages and neighbouring communities such as Opo, Akinsinde, Pakoro and Ibokuru.

Egbado: Ilaro was the headquarters of Egbado. Islam reached the town in the year 1860 through Alfa Musa Kannike, a servant of the then Olu of Ilaro. He was the first Muslim ruler in the town. The Alfa was a native of Bornu. He was a captive that was made to work under the monarch as the house servant. As a Muslim, he practised his religion (Islam) and was allowed by the king. Another Alfa Abdurrahman Adewumi from

Oyo-ile arrived to the town. He was from a royal family. He was honoured and accommodated. He too joined the former to call people to Islam. Their efforts were crowned as people accepted the religion in large number. Within short period of time, establishment of mosques began in many areas. Both were made the religious leaders in the community. Each of them later became the pioneer Imams of the central mosque. Till now, the selection of Imamship is rotational between the two families since 1929.

Ado-odo: Islam got to Ado-odo through Ilaro with the effort of Alfa Mu'min, a native of Ile-ife in 1870. He started his mission by calling on individuals to accept Islam. He was at the first instance ostracized by the community but his disposition to the people encouraged a number of them to accept Islam. Initially, they condemned his faith and referred to Islam as "*Esin Gambari*" (The religion of Hausa people). After some times, few of them moved closer to him to comprehend the details about Islam. When they got to know the doctrines of Islam, some of them accepted it. Within a short period of time, the number of the converts had increased. The population thus facilitated the establishment of the community mosque. [119]

Ayetoro: Establishment of Ayetoro and the spread of Islam to the town were due to the frantic efforts of Shaykh Seriki Abbas in 1902. He was a native of Ilogun. Seriki was captured in a civil war and sold to a Hausa-man who named him Abbas. The Mallam taught him Islam and converted him to Islam. He was released after some periods of service. He first settled at Badagry in 1884. At Badagary, he started a business and became rich. He was generous to the people and this made him to be loved. The people of Badagry thus nicknamed him 'Seriki'. Seriki is a *Hausa* dialect which denotes a leader. They gave him the title and he was turbaned as the leader of the Muslim community of Badagry district. His fame and magnanimity made people to relate with him and accepted Islam both at Badagry and Ayetoro. [120]

Ijebu-Ode: Islam got to Ijebu-Ode in 1879 during the reign of Oba Ademuyewo Fidipote, the Awujale of Ijebuland (1852-1885). It was brought by Mallam Ali, a native of Ilorin. The Mallam was a servant to Tubogun who was an indigene of Ijebu-Ode. His master who was an idol worshipper did not oppose his religion. He also allocated a place for him in his residence to observe his daily prayers. It was reported that another indigene of the town called Akayinode who was a traveler supported the Mallam. He supported

him because he had come across people outside the town who used to perform *Salawāt* in the exact manner with which the Mallam was observing his own. He too had accepted Islam in Ilorin prior to his return home. With joint efforts of both, many people converted to Islam. The call of *Adhān* also attracted people to move closer to them and embraced the religion. This led to the establishment of mosques in the town. Islam witnessed more converts during the reign of Oba Adesimbo Tunwase who was nick-named Aboki due to his Islamic attitude to the people. [121]

Ijebu-Igbo: Islam was spread to the town by a slave that was bought by a wealthy man in the community. The slave was a Muslim. He was allowed to practise Islam by his master. This gave him and most of slaves who were Muslims in some places in the town privilege to practise their religion even in congregation. They were also allowed to celebrate '*īdul fitr* and '*īdul Adha* by their masters. Their masters did buy rams for them for the festivals. When the idol worshippers in the town got noticed of the practice of these slaves, they threatened them and referred to their religion as that of Hausaland. This confrontation restricted the continuous practice of the religion. However, the arrival of 'Abdullah, Zubayr and Abubakr back home from Hausaland revived the practice. They were sons of the soil living in the northern part of the nation to find their ends meet and they accepted Islam there. Their personalities and activities encouraged many inhabitants to accept the religion. The masters of the slaves also converted to Islam by conviction. The community also established a central mosque and Alfa Ige Agbomeji was appointed as the first Imam of Ijebu-Igbo [122].

Ago-Iwoye: Islam reached Ago-Iwoye around 1880. Its practice started from the house of Chief Onihale Onabegun, the Balogun of Ago-Iwoye. He was an influential, wealthy and philanthropic man. It was reported that his slave called Muhammad was a Muslim. Though Balogun was not a Muslim but he allowed the slave to practise Islam. He provided a place for him to perform his daily prayers. Not only this, he also allowed him to observe the *Ramadan* fasting and other Islamic activities. During this period, the chief's male child called Bosede was seriously sick. All attempts to cure his sickness were abortive. The traditional medications prepared for him did not cure the sickness and the Chief was afraid that the sickness might claim the life of his son.[122]

As a house slave, Muhammad noticed the sickness but he could not intervene into the treatment. Meanwhile, when the sickness persisted; he called on the Balogun to allow him pray for Bosede and he was allowed. He first birthed the boy into Islam which is referred to as the *Ghusl ad-Dukhūl al- Islām* and gave him a Muslim name, Abdulqadr. He then prayed for him with recitation of the Qur'ān. The prayer was accepted and the boy recovered from the illness. The people of the town were surprised with this incidence and some of them pondered over the efficacy of Muslim prayer. Due to this event, the chief freed Muhammad and allowed his son and other children to practise Islam. Muhammad was also employed as the Arabic teacher to educate all his children on the tenets of Islam and he (Balogun) built a mosque in his compound for the performance of *Salawāt* and learning of the Qur'ā n. Impacts of Muhammad made the children of the Balogun as well as the grandchildren became Muslims. Since the initial stage of the efficacy of the prayer, some members of the community joined them and as time went on many people converted into Islam in the town. [123]

Odogbolu: Islam was spread to Odogbolu area of Ogun State by Hausa slaves that were living in the town around 1900. They were at first practising the religion individually. After some times, the people began to question them on their mode of worship which is different from traditional one. Through their interaction with the people and explanation on the practices of the religion, some converted into Islam. Moreover, some of the wealthy people among the indigenes that converted to the religion facilitated its rapid growth to some places within the town. They also helped on the establishment of mosques in the town and the villages. These factors helped the spread of Islam to many areas in the town. [123]

Sagamu: Sagamu is the headquarters of Ijebu Remo. It got contact to Islam in 1869 during the period of Makun-Sagamu. There was influx of people from neighbouring areas and old Sagamu. The people came to settle at the place along with Hausa and Tapa people. Both the Hausa and Tapa who had already got contact to Islam were practising the religion in their vicinities. They gradually increased in population by inviting other fellow Muslims. They constituted the Muslim forum in the town under the leadership of Alfa Ibrahim Kodurogbejo who was a son of the soil and a warrior. Ibrahim was admired by the community and his conversion to Islam made people to embrace the religion. The

Mallams along with him built a mosque in the town that served as a centre of worship and learning of the religion [124].

Isara-Remo: Establishment of Islam in Isara-Remo was due to the frantic effort of Alfa Sulayman Ajisegiri around 1885. He was a native of Ado-Ekiti who was captured at a war from his home to Lagos. He was bought by Chief Imam Ibrahim of Lagos. The Imam exposed him to the tenets of Islam and converted him to the religion. He also attended Arabic school in Lagos. After a period of time, he was freed by his master. As a freed slave, he started a business as a means of sustenance. He traded in rubber and this commercial activity brought him to Isara-Remo where he later settled and established the religion. [125]

Ajisegiri began the spread of Islam in the town through *da'wah* activity. His business transaction could not make him to stay long in *Isara* at the early period of the introduction of Islam. However, towards the end of 1903 he settled in the town and became the leader of the Muslim community. On this mission, he was helped by another two Mallams, Ibrahim Alawiye and Nuhu who were natives of Ilorin. A mosque was constructed as the focal point of Muslims. He and the Mallams inculcated the teachings of the religion into the people. His magnanimity also made the people to embrace the religion.[126]

Generally, establishment of modern Arabic and western schools by the Muslims aided the spread of Islam in the State till now. The methods of learning Arabic and Islamic education were modernised and improved. Besides, in 1923, the Egba Muslim community established a western school. The curriculum of the school combined both the Arabic and western subjects for the benefits of the *'Ummah* (entire Muslim community). It was the first western school founded by Muslims in the State. Also, a Muslim Girls' School was founded at Isoku area in Ijebu-Ode. It was situated at Imepe side of the town. It was the pioneer Muslim Girls' Primary School in South-West Nigeria. Another tremendous development was the establishment of a secondary school for Muslim children in Ijebu-Ode in 1950. The establishment of the schools was a great relief to young Muslims in the State. It was on this mission that the Ansaruddeen Society contributed to the growth of Islam in the State. The Society founded a Teachers' Training College at Otta in 1954. It was named Ansaruddeen Teachers' Training College. It was

established as the training institute for the products of the primary and secondary schools. 1962 marked the dawn of the establishment of another Teachers' Training College. It was founded by the community and named Muslim Teachers' Training College, Oru-Ijebu. Gradually, more primary and secondary schools were established for Muslim children in many parts of the State [126].

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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.0 Introduction

The chapter discusses the methodology adopted for this study under these sub-headings: Research design, instrumentation, target population, sample and sampling techniques, Method of data collection, method of data analysis, ethical consideration, validity and reliability and the theoretical framework..

3.1 Research Design

The interpretive design was adopted and the qualitative method was utilised to carry out this work. It is a detailed study of specific subject, person or an organisation. It is commonly used to study an association in a society. It is used to understand a research problem. It also affords the researcher opportunities to examine, explore and describe a phenomenon in context by using a variety of data sources. These include archival materials and interviews. Its application in this study involves primary and secondary data. The primary data were retrieved from the Qur'ān, Hadīth, Internet sources, print media and interviews. Interviews were conducted for key informnats who were Imams, Islamic clerics, lecturers, students of higher institutions and school teachers. Gender was also considered in the selection. The respondents were selected randomly in the study area. They were interviewed at their various places such as offices, mosques, residences, schools and places of work. The secondary data comprised textbooks, journal articles, thesis, dissertations, Encyclopedia of Islam, Encyclopedia Britanica and Encyclopedia of Seerah.

3.2 Instrumentation

Two research instruments were used to collect the data. These were in-depth interview and Focused Group Discussion (FGD). The key-informants and respondents

were Muslims, *Salafis* and non-*Salafis*. They were purposively selected based on their perceptions on the practices of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria.

3.3 Target Population of the Study

The Population of this study comprised the entire key informants. They were randomly selected from each state of the study area aged between 27 and 78years old. They were grouped into *Salafis* and non-*Salafis.*

3.4 Sample and Sampling Technique

Purposive sampling technique was adopted to select 162 key-informants who were grouped into *Salafis* and non-*Salafis*. The interviews were conducted across the states of the South-West Nigeria.

3.5 Method of Data Collection

One hundred and sixty two informants: (81 *Salafis* and 81 non-*Salafis*) were selected for in-depth interviews. This method of data collection was used by the researcher to obtain information. They were interviewed at their residences, offices, institutions, open gatherings and mosques.

3.6 Method of Data Analysis

Data from the in-depth interviews by the researcher were qualitatively analysed using content analysis. The detailed analysis was examined under the data analysis. The data were therefore subjected to historical analysis.

3.7 Ethical Consideration

The researcher paid visits to the selected informants and booked appointments with them before the in-depth interviews. Permissions were granted to conduct the interviews.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

Unstructured questions for the in-depth interviews prepared by the researcher were given to the supervisor and some professionals to peruse for proper examination to achieve the content and face validity. Their inputs facilitated the structured of the questions before the informants.

3.9 Theoretical Framework

The study adopted Taha Al-alwāni's principle of Islamic jurisprudence on religious dynamism to resolve divergence of issues without resulting to crisis. The Islamic jurisprudence (*'uşūl fiqh*) is the Islamic hermeneutics that examines the *Salafiyyah* practices and profers solutions to their activities in accordance with the dictates of the *sharī'ah*. The term is coined from two Arabic words, viz, *'Usūl* and *Fiqh*. The former means the foundation of Islamic knowledge to find solution(s) to any Islamic matter while the later connotes the methodological jurisprudence under the application of the *Sharī'ah*[1]. It expresses all aspects of a Muslim's life in relation with *Allăh*, fellow Muslims, people of other religions, government and the society at large. It is established for people's welfare, mercy, wisdom and justice [2]. Also, it is the collection of juridical agreements by *Fuqahāu'* (Islamic jurists) of the Islamic schools of thought.

Islamic Jurisprudence is of fundamental or theoretical and secondary or deductive sources [3]. The fundamental source consists of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* or *Sunnah* while the deductive ones include but are not limited to *Maqāşidush-sharī'ah, Qiyās, Ijmā', Istidlāl, Istihsān, Istishāb, 'urf* and *Maşalih*. Not only these, it also includes, the verdicts of the *Madhāhib al-'Arba'a* and *Ijtihād* which gives birth to *Fatāwah* (verdicts) of contemporary scholars. Each of these sources is succinctly expressed below. The methodologies of adopting this principle are derived from the exegesis of the *Qur'ān* which is the fundamental basis of all verdicts in *Islām*. Multidimensional resolutions are laid down in the *Qur'ān* on the practices, doctrines and activities of *Salafiyyah*. Such verses include:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ أَطِيعُواْ اللّهَ وَأَطِيعُواْ الرَّسُولَ وَأُوْلِي الأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ فَإِن تَنَازَعْتُمْ فِي شَيْءٍ فَرُدُّوهُ إِلَى اللّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ إِن كُنتُمْ تُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الآخِرِ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ وَأَحْسَنُ تَأْوِيلا

O you believers (*Mu'min*), follow the dictates of Allah, His messenger (Prophet Muhammad) and that of those in the position of authority among you, but if there is discord on any affair among you, find the resolutions from the Qur'ān) and Hadith. This is best for you (Qur'an 4: 59).

Exegetically, the above extracts illustrate the Qur'ān as the primary approach to resolve any matter; either intra or inter religious issues. It also calls for application of the prophetic sayings as the second guiding principle to find solutions to human and societal challenges. The last segment of the *Ayah* points to the roles of the religious jurists to derive laws from the two primary sources: the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*. The inclusion of the jurists is what gives birth to the *Maqāṣid ash-sharī'ah* and other secondary sources of the Islamic jurisprudence.

Maqāṣidush-sharī'ah is a compound word. It is formed from a combination of two words, '*Maqāṣid* which is plural form of '*Maqṣid*' and '*sharī'ah*. It means the principle, purpose, significance, intent and goal of the *sharī'ah* [4]. Similarly, it can be defined as the multi-dimensional theory in the Islamic law on the necessities of human needs. Its concept addresses the law that regulates the affairs of every member of a society based on justice, interactions, brotherhood and individual welfare. It examines the individual's rights as essential needs of peaceful co-existence. Thus, majority of the *Fuqahāu* (Islamic jurists) classified its goal into protection of the religion, individual life, human rights, privacy and one's property. All these are regarded as the means of living a meaningful and harmonious life.

Maqāṣidush-sharī'ah establishes that *Islām* is not static in its solutions to any socio-religious issue such as that of *Salafiyyah*. It postulates both the primary and secondary codes of conducts to regulate human activities from time to time. While its primary source is unchangeable, the secondary aspect is holistic in approaching to issues in every society[5.] *Maqāṣidush-sharī'ah* examines the well-being of an individual, protection of faith, intellect and lives. Besides this, it is a principal theory in the *'usūl al-fiqh* that explains the applications of the *hukm* (Law) of the both primary and secondary sources of the jurisprudence [6]. Its application provides solutions to the ideology of *salafis* in the society.

The *Qur'ān* is the blue print that proffers solutions to every facet of life. This explicitly reflects in its names such as *al-Huda* (the guide), *al-Furqān* (the separator of the truth from falsehood), *adh-Dhikr* (the remembrance) and *at-Tanzīl* (the revelation) [7]. It is a source of guidance not only on the religion but also in all aspects of the society. It thus serves as the manual that guides Muslim affairs. A number of its *āyāt* (verses) spell out

the governing principle of Muslims. Such *āyāt* can be segmented into *āyāt al-Akhlāq* (ethics), *Al-'ibādah* (worship), *al-Mu'amalah* (interpersonal and interfaith relationship), *Al-Hukūmiyyah* (governance) and *al-Hadd* (penal code) [8] among others. These *āyāt* were revealed as resolutions to the challenges that were encountered by the people of many ages, to reform the people's culture and traditions ('*urf* and '*Adāt*) that are antithetic to the society, maintain orderliness and promote peace in the society. Moreover, othe juridical law of the *Qur'ān* also includes *ṣulh* (Reconciliation), *Amr* (Command), *Nahy* (Prohibition) and *Irshād* (Guidance) [9].

Prophetic sayings and acts are the second juridical aspect of the principle. Both are collectively referred to as *Hadīth* and *Sunnah*. *Sunnah* linguistically denotes way, culture, habit, practice and custom. It means the acts, manners and practices of the Prophet[10]. They are used concurrently. While the *Sunnah* is the technical term for the practices of the Prophet, the *Hadīth* means the reports of the prophetic practices. In the same vein, the *Hadith* is defined as the recorded prophetic narrations and sayings that serve as the guiding principles for Muslims. *Sunnah* on the other hand is the prophetic act that describes his manners, character and attributes. It is referred to as the *Sunnah ar-Rasūl Allah* or *Sunnah an-Nabiyy Allah* [11] (the act of the messenger or the tradition of Allah's prophet). *Sunnah* and *hadīth* are examined in this work on the *salafiyyah* approach. Application of the hadith is traceable to the Qurānic extracts that oblige Muslims to also cite for solutions to any issue from hadīth and *Sunnah*. Such references include:

لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ لِّمَن كَانَ يَرْجُو اللَّهَ وَالْيَوْمَ الْآخِرَ وَذَكَرَ اللَّهَ كَثِيرًا

Indeed, the best conducts are for you to emulate from the life of the Prophet. For those who fear Allah and are mindful of the hereafter and full of Allah's remembrance (Qur'ān33: *ā*yah 21).

This particular verse refers to the significance of the narrations and practices of the Prophet as a code of conduct for Muslims. He was endowed with wisdom (Q.62: 2) to judge all affairs of life. Application of the *Hadīth* as a juridical theory in Islam was first demonstrated by the Prophet himself. This is reflected in his deeds; among which was when he sent Mu'adh ibn Jabal to Yemen. Mu'adh was asked to judge with both the *Qur'ān* and Hadith of the Prophet [12]. Additionally, Muslims are obliged to refer any affair

of their lives to these fundamental sources of the Islamic jurisprudence (*Qur'ān* and Hadīth). This is illustrated as "*I left two things for you (to judge with). You shall never go stray if uphold their tenets. The book of Allah and my traditions (Hadith and Sunnah)* [13].

All the acts and sayings of the Prophet are grouped into two in the Islamic jurisprudence namely, *Sunnah tashri'iyyah wa Sunnah ghayr tashri'iyyah.* Legal and non-legal *Sunnah* [14]. The legal aspect examines what are *Halāl, Harrām, Makrūh, Mubah, Mandūd* and *Wājib* in the society. These rules are binding-rules for Muslims irrespective of any clan, status or community. This is buttressed by the Qurānic reference which says '*whoever complies with the Prophet; indeed has obeyed Allāh* (Qur'ān 4:80). Hadith also expresses issues that are implicit in the Qurānic expressions.

The next in the theory is the *Ijmā'a*. It is the unanimous agreements, decisions and opinions of the Islamic jurists on any issue after the demise of the Prophet based on the dictates or inferences from the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah*. It is agreed by the scholars as the first secondary source of the *'uṣul al-fiqh*. It is the consensus of opinions of the *Fuqahāu'* of a particular period of time on the application of the *sharī'ah*. Doi defines it as a concession of opinions of the *ṣahābah* of the Prophet as well as the unanimous agreement of the *Muftis* on Islamic matters [15]. The concession is therefore based on the generality of human needs for the growth and development of the society entirely. It is adopted in this study as parts of the resolutions to arrive at conclusions on the *salafiyyah* activities in the South-West Nigeria. It is classified into *al-ijmāu' al-sari'h* and *al-ijmāu` al-sukūti*[16]. The former is the written verdicts of the early jurists that are applied in the *'uṣūl al-Fiqh* while the latter implies the present juristic opinions of the contemporary scholars. Difference in its application is due to the variance in tradition of each community. Its scope covers not only religious matter but also all aspects of life, politically, economically and socially. The theory was first practised by *al-Khulafāu ar-Rashidūn* (orthodox caliphs) in *Madīnah*[17]. They usually consulted each other on solutions to various challenges that affected the community. The trend of *Ijmā'a* continued after their reigns to the era of *Tabi'ūn* (successors of the orthodox caliphs)*, Tabi' Tabi'ūn* (the followers of the followers) and it continued till this generation. This implies that the application of *Ijmā'a* is unrestricted to a certain period of time. The jurists will continue to decide on any issue that occurs in the societies like that of the emergence of *Salafiyyah* in this century not

only in South-West Nigeria but also globally. The distinctive feature of this aspect is that an individual can follow any of the thoughts of the Islamic jurists or theorists.

Qiyās is the application of juridical deduction from the primary sources of the *sharī'ah* as a verdict to proffer solution to an occurrence like that of *Salafiyyah*. It is deduced from the *'uşūl-ad-Dīn* by the *Fuqahāu'* as the legal solution (*Hukm*) to certain issues that are judgements are silent in the *Aşl* or fundamental sources of the jurisprudence (*Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*) [18]. Its inclusion in the Islamic law is traced to the extract of the Qur'ān which illustrates that "*refer any issue among yourselves to Allah (The Qur'ān) and the messenger (Hadīth and Sunnah), if you indeed believe in Allah* (Q. 2: 59). Additionally, it is also approved by the Prophet as a resolution to issue that its verdict is not elaborate in the *Qur'ān*. In the first instance, Mu'adh ibn Jabal was asked by the Prophet on what he would apply to find solution to any issue that its judgement is not explicit in the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*. He (Mu'adh) concluded that *Qiyās* would be applied. His response was favourable to the Prophet and it became *Hukm* (law) since then [19]. There are many instances where the *Khulafāu ar-Rashidūn* resulted into the *Qiyās* as a judgement on certain issues. They arrived at the conclusion on the exact punishment on intoxication by eighty lashes of cane. Their verdict was reached from the words of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib as he states that "Anybody that intoxicates will rave and whoever raves will accuse falsely, hence the punishment in the *Qur'ān* for whoever accuses falsely is eighty strokes of cane [20].

Maslahah is an aspect in the *'uşūl al-fiqh* that deals with the promotion of well-being of the society and to prevent social vices[24]. It deals with the consideration of the necessities in the application of the *sharī'ah*. It is a juridical verdict to reconcile any matter that affects the smooth-affairs of the *ummah* for cordial relation. It is also referred to as *Istişlah* by some scholars. It is applied as a solution to any matter that affects social and religious issues based on the contents of the secondary source of the *sharī'ah*. Its principle is adopted to examine the *manhaj* and *'aqā'id salafiyyah* in the South-West Nigeria which is the study area of this work.

It can be divided into *darūriyyāt*, *hājiyat* and *tahsiniyāt* [22]. The first division covers the individual's rights and privileges in a community. The second aspect refers to the right to safeguard the individual rights. The last segment concerns with the respect for

custom that accommodates each other in the society. The Islamic *jurists* agreed that the *Maşlahah* is instituted to cater for the best interest of the society and welfare of humanity. The categorisation implies how the theory could be adopted to meet social changes of each society as well as to solve the contemporary challenges like that of the *Salafiyyah*. Additionally, the theory also calls for joint efforts of every Muslim on any issue that affects the society based on the dictates of the *sharī'ah*. It urges both individual and society to seek for solutions on any issue from the Islamic jurisprudence for welfare of the Muslims. Conclusively, it is used to prevent spread of socio-vices through the *Ijtihād*. This is to prevent the spread of *fasād* (evil) on the land and to reconcile any religious differences like that of *Salafiyyah* amicably.

     Istihsān is an arm of the *sharī'ah* that gives preference for the best judgement in the society on any matter from time to time. It is developed by the efforts of the *Madhāhib al-'arba'a*. *Istishāb* is equating or linking the presence occurrence with what might had occurred in the past with the proof of the Islamic schools of thought. It was introduced by *Madhāb as-Shafi'iyyah* (Shafi'ite school of thought). *Istidlāl* is an aspect of the *sharī'ah* that expresses certain matters that are not elaborate in the *Qiyās*. *'Urf* means an approved custom of a community that is beneficial to the people [23]. Culture is valued in *Islām* as peoples' tradition. However, Islam reforms some customs and condemns those that are detrimental to humanity.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FOUR

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF *SALAFIYYA*H IN THE *SHARĪ'AH* AND ITS PRACTICES IN SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA.

4.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the comprehensive meaning of *Salafiyyah* in the *sharī'ah* and its practices in the study area, Southwest Nigeria. It examines its etymology, meaning, origin, *manhaj*, spread and the perceptions of other Muslims of the area (who are non-*salafis*) on its practices in this twentieth century.

4.1 Etymology and Meaning of *Salafiyyah*

Etymologically, the word *Salafiyyah* is an Arabic word which is derived from the verb '*sa-la-fa*'[1]. It is written and pronounced in English as 'Salafism'[2]. The verb literally means to 'precede', 'to call' 'to follow' or 'to invite'. It also linguistically means 'what has gone' or 'been done in the past'[3]. It is from this verb that the noun '*salaf*' which denotes a follower, predecessor, ancestor or companion is formed. Pioneer Muslims were recognized as *salaf* [4]. The term, *Salafiyyah* technically refers to the forefathers or those who preceded another [5]. Hence, it means those people or forefathers who preceded the later generation. *Salafiyyah* is thus interpreted as the path of the follower(s). However, in its contextual interpretation and for this study, it denotes following the path or way of Prophet Muhammad (SAW), his orthordox companions and the generations of Muslims that followed them. It is also referred to as the strict adherence to only dictates of the *Qur'ān* and the *hadīth* in exact manner that they were practised by the Prophet and his followers. Besides the above, the term is of polysemous definitions in academic milieu. These varied definitions are due to the manners of practising it by some Muslims nowadays in the society. Some of these definitions are summed up as following:

Salafiyyah is the practice of militant group of extremist *Sunnis* who believe themselves as the only correct interpreters of the *Qur'ān* and consider other Muslims as infidels[6]. It is a modernist school, "a school of thought which surfaced in the 19th century

as a reaction to the spread of European ideas" and "sought to expose the roots of modernity within the Muslim civilization"[7]. In another view, it means the monotheistic religious system of Muslims that was founded in Arabia in the 7th century and based on the teachings of Muhammad (SAW), as laid down in the *Qur'ān* [8]. It connotes strict following of the way of the Prophet and his *şahabah.* It is a school of Sunni Muslims that condemns theological innovation and advocates strict adherence to the *sharī'ah* and the social structures that were existing in the earliest days of Islam. Similarly, *Salafiyyah* is expressed as an extreme Muslims' ideology that rejects democracy and *Shī'ah* rule[9]. It means the missionary-call that is based on the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* without addition from other sources of the Islamic law[10]. It is further analysed as the strict compliance to the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, his immediate companions and those that succeeded them in footstep in deeds and religious practices[11]. By this, *salafis* were the companions of the Prophet, and the *Imāms* (leaders) of the first three centuries, mentioned in the *hadīth* which says 'the best of the people are those who belong to my century, then those who follow them (the second century), then those who follow them (third century) [12]. They are also regarded as those who follow the footsteps of the *salaf* who, in turn, follow the Book (*Qur'ān*), *Sunnah* and act according to them [13]. Through this, *Salafiyyah* is the emulation of the deeds, sayings and ideologies of the Prophet as well as those of his companions who also imbibed him in their doctrines after his demise.

Salafiyyah as a term is widely spread as the method or path (*Manhaj as-Salafiyyah*) of the *Salafis*. Any Muslim that ascribes the *manhaj* to himself is therefore nowadays referred to as a '*SalafIyyu'* or *'Salafi*'. It is as if a person refers to himself with his native or origin. For instance, if a person refers to him or herself by claiming '*anā Nayjiriyy*' which denotes "I am a Nigerian". The '*Harf* or letter *'ya'* that is added to the end of the word (*Nayjiri*) Nigeria with which the word means a native of Nigeria is referred to as the "*Ya an-Nisbah'* or '*Ya almunasabah'* in *Nahw* (Arabic grammar). It grammatically functions as the "*Ya*" of origin, ascription, genealogy or attribution. The usage of the term, *Salafiyyah* is generally common in this era. Some Muslims have even ascribed the title to themselves and they preferred to be called with such name instead of being referred to as Muslims. The reason for this ascription becomes necessary in the

movement as a title that distinguishes the adherents from other Muslims in the society. This is well elaborated by a Saudi prominent jurist in his claim that:

> Ascribing oneself to the *Salaf* is an ascription which is necessary and required so that a differentiation can be made between the true *Salafi* and the one who hides behind them... [14].

The Sunni Muslims who uphold the *Manhaj as-Salafiyyah* prove the era of the early *Salafis* as the 'golden age of Islam'. In addition to the prophetic era till that of the three generations that succeeded him, some *salafis* also extend the period to the era of 'Umar ibn 'Abdul Aziz (d. 720) who was the '*Umayyad* caliph. He was considered as the fifth rightly guided caliph[15]. All those periods are considered by the *salafis* (*Salafiyyun*) as the complete and perfect periods of the practice of Islam. Thus, they maintain that the manners of practising Islam in those periods should only be followed by the Muslims of all generations. This is a core reason behind their rejection of other periods after those eras till now.

The usage of the word has taken different dimensions among the contemporary Muslims individually and in groups. It is often used to connote *Islāh* (reform) and *tajdīd* (renewal) which are the concepts that are fundamental to Islamic worldview. Its adherents thus advocate for reconciliation and renewal of the practices of Islam to how it was brought by the Prophet by following the tenets of the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* only. Unlike in the history of early Muslims, the term, *Salaf*iyyah in this modern age is used to define any Muslim who upholds the *Qur'ā*n and *Sunna*h as the only sources of the Islamic Law. It is considered by some groups of Muslims as the excellent manner of practising Islam. Its adherents therefore refer to themselves as the best and most pious Muslims in the society. They claim this superiority with their proof that they are the only movement that emulates the early predecessors of the Prophet in all their deeds. This claim is supported by them with a prophetic tradition which reads that "I am the best *Salaf* for you"[17]. They equally claim that their emulation of the companions of the Prophet is based on the Quranic verses that express them as the best to be followed in the religion and other aspects of life such as *Sūrah* 33 *Ayah* 20 which reads thus:

$$\text{لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ لِّمَن}$$

<div dir="rtl">

كَانَ يَرْجُو اللَّهَ وَالْيَوْمَ الْآخِرَ وَذَكَرَ اللَّهَ كَثِيرًا

</div>

Indeed, there is excellent example in
the life of the messenger of Allah, for
remembrance of Allah and the last day.

The above extract from the *Qur'ān* and similar others are upheld by the adherents of *salafiyyah* as the reasons behind their claiming that Islam should be practised in the exact manner that it was demonstrated by the Prophet and his caliphs. By and large, they argued that following other paths besides that of the caliphs is not only an act of infidelity but also a stray path. Additionally, they argued that their practices are in compliance with the command of the Prophet. They usually quote a prophetic *hadith* as it was reported by 'Abdullah bn Masūd "the Apostle of *Allāh* was asked about the best set of people? He replied: "my generation, followed by those who followed them and those who also followed their followers"[18].

Further more, *Salafiyyah* is used to refer to acts of the pioneer *Mu'minūn* (faithful beleivers, pious Muslims) who were the followers of the prophet, successors and the generation that followed them till the third century. These three generations of the *Mu'minūn* were elevated to highest status of believers through which they were referred to as the '*Salaf as-Salihīn*'. This is in accordance with the prophetic saying sighted above. The early caliphs were ascribed with the nomenclature due to their trustworthiness, sincerity of faith and proximity to the Prophet. The first set of those generations had direct contact with the Prophet. They witnessed the revelations of both the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* and followed all the prophetic instructions[19]. The two later generations also received the scriptures directly from the first companions.

Nowadays, *Salafiyyah* is widely used as a term by individuals and some groups of Muslims who share the views of the movement. They are at times referred to as the *Ahl as-Sunah wa al-hadīth* which implies the people of the prophetic tradition and his saying. The modern spread of the term was ascribed to the teachings of the *Wahhabiyyah* and other related schools of the ideology[20]. Hence, the present set of people that claim the title can be regarded as the 'neo-*salafis* (*Salafi*yyūn) while its propagation can be regarded as the neo-*Salafiyyah*.

According to Hashim, in the *Sharī'ah*, *Salafiyyah* is not a deviant sect but what the present Muslim brothers tagged it in their approaches that make the society perceives

it as a difficult practice. He expresses that it really means *Sunniyyah* which is the practice of Islam according to the *Sunnah* of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). It also means strictness to the teachings of the *kitāb* and *hadīth* of the Prophet as understood and explained by the companions of the Prophet [21]. He concluded that the scholars of Islam therefore explained that the people who tenaciously uphold the teachings of the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* are *salafiyyun* (*Ismu Nasab*) while their practice is *Salafiyyah*. The adherents are similarly referred to with six appellations which were coined out from the *Kitāb wa Sunnah* through the efforts of the scholars. Such appellations are *ahlusunnah wal jamā'ah*, *al-Ijtihādiyyah, ahlul Hadīth wa al-Athar, alfirqatu an-Nājiyyah* and *aṭ-Ṭāhifat al manṣūrah* (Saved sect), *alghurabā'u, as-Sawādu al-A'zam* (The great people) and *as-Salafiyyun*[22]. Some scholars argued that the *salafiyyah* comprised the first three generations of Muslims. They span the three centuries to include that of the companions of the Prophet, *Aṣ-ṣahābah*, the last of whom was Anas *ibn* Malik (d. 91 A.H./710 CE), their followers who were referred to as *Tābi'u at-tāb'in* and Imam Ahmad ibn Hambal (164–241 / 780 – 855) [23].

The usage of *Salafiyyah* is not alien in Islam. It had been known in Islamic history since the days of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). The usage of the term continued after his death and extended to the periods of the three successors after the four rightly orthodox caliphs. Those generations that followed the prophetic era were referred to as *al-Khulafāu ar-Rashīdūn* and *Salafus-Salihīn* which connotes the orthodox and pious successors. The nomenclature was ascribed to them due to the roles they played in the history of Islam. This first generation was tagged the rightly guided caliphs due to their practices of *Islām* and their loyalty to the prophet[24]. They lived with him and did virtually all his *Sunnah*. They were with him at so many occasions through which they were made distinct among other people of the prophetic period. Besides, the generation that followed them sustained their legacies in deeds and practices. Hence, their manners (*Manhaj*) of *Salafiyyah* which are in conformity with that of the Prophet made them to also be referred to as *"as-Salaf-ṣalihūn"*[25.]

4.2 Historical Survey of *Salafiyyah* in Islam

The word *Salafiyyah* has its root in Arabic history since the prophetic period with various interpretations such as 'past, predecessor, survivor and ancient'[26]. It is mentioned in up to seven areas in the *Qur'ān*. Through the learning of the *Qur'ān*, the word later became a technical term in the dialect of the Arabs to refer to the past pious predecessors (*Al-khulaf ā' ar-Rāshidūn*) especially those that lived in the prophetic era and the first three generations that succeeded them [27]. It is used in the Qur'an as verbs and nouns with different interpretations. Such verses include the *Qur'ān* 2 verse 275, *Qur'ān* 4 verse 22, *Qur'ān* 4 verse 23, *Qur'ān* 5 verse 95, *Qur'ān* 10 verse 30, *Qur'ān* 69 verse 24 and *Qur'ān* 43 verse 56.

It is used as a verb in the *Qur'ān* 2 verse 275. Its usage in the verse reads thus: "...فَلَهُ مَا سَلَفَ..." which means "to him is what had past". In the same vein, its mention in the *Qur'ān* 4 verse 22 as … إِلاَّ مَا قَدْ سَلَفَ … also means "...except what has already past…" Similarly, the *Qur'ān* 4 verse 95 contains another meaning of the word *salaf* as in the *Ayah* … عَفَا اللّهُ عَمَّا سَلَف …'Allah has forgiven what is past…' The verb is also used in the *Ayah* 30 of *Yūnus* as... هُنَالِكَ تَبْلُو كُلُّ نَفْسٍ مَّا أَسْلَفَتْ ... which means "An individual will know what he earned before…" Not only these, *Qur'ān* 69 verse 24 contains the same verb with the meaning of '…Eat and drink of that which have been sent on before you…' in the content as كُلُوا وَاشْرَبُوا هَنِيئًا بِمَا أَسْلَفْتُمْ. In addition to the use of the word in verbs, it is equally used in nominal form in the *Sūrah* 43 *Ayah* 56 which reads thus: …فَجَعَلْنَاهُمْ سَلَفًا وَمَثَلًا لِلْآخِرِينَ '…And we made them a precedent and examples for the posterity…' Thus, it is through this verb that the noun *salafiyyah* was formed among the Arabs and its usage continues till nowadays. It is literally used in any Muslim community especially among the *Sunni* Muslims to refer to the practices of the past generations of Muslim companions starting from those that lived with the prophet and those that succeeded them[28].

The constant usage of the term by the Arab Muslims was due to the noble qualities of the companions as revealed by the *Qur'ān* as well as *Hadīth*. The two fundamental sources examine the attributes of the *Salaf as-Salihīn* as honesty, just and trust-worthy in characters. Such extracts include *Qur'ān* 48 verse 29:

مُحَمَّدٌ رَّسُولُ اللَّهِ وَالَّذِينَ مَعَهُ أَشِدَّاء عَلَى الْكُفَّارِ رُحَمَاء بَيْنَهُمْ تَرَاهُمْ رُكَّعًا سُجَّدًا يَبْتَغُونَ فَضْلًا مِّنَ اللَّهِ وَرِضْوَانًا سِيمَاهُمْ فِي وُجُوهِهِم مِّنْ أَثَرِ السُّجُودِ ذَلِكَ مَثَلُهُمْ فِي التَّوْرَاةِ وَمَثَلُهُمْ فِي الْإِنجِيلِ كَزَرْعٍ أَخْرَجَ شَطْأَهُ فَآزَرَهُ فَاسْتَغْلَظَ فَاسْتَوَى عَلَى سُوقِهِ يُعْجِبُ الزُّرَّاعَ لِيَغِيظَ بِهِمُ الْكُفَّارَ وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ مِنْهُم مَّغْفِرَةً وَأَجْرًا عَظِيمًا

Muhammad was Allah's messenger. Those who were with him are severe against the infidel. They bowed and prostrated for Allah. Their signs are on their faces from the traces of the prostrations. Their descriptions in the *tawrah* and *injeel* is like seeds which send forth shoot, become thick, and stand straight on the stem, delighting the sowers that it may enrage the disbelievers with them. Allah promised the righteous among them forgiveness and mighty reward (paradise).

Also,

لَقَد تَّابَ الله عَلَى النَّبِيِّ وَالْمُهَاجِرِينَ وَالأَنصَارِ الَّذِينَ اتَّبَعُوهُ فِي سَاعَةِ الْعُسْرَةِ

Verily, Allah has forgiven the prophet, the Makkans and Madinites that stood by him during the difficulty

These verses as well as others were used by the adherents of *Salafiyyah* to establish their superiority and give preference to the early Muslims over any other generation that followed them. Hence, the interpretations of the above extracts mark the beginning of the usage of the term in Islam. Not only this, the term was also ascribed to the generations of Muslims based on the prophetic expression which places them superior above other generations. Such Hadith include:

> Abdullah ibn Mas'ud said: "the Apostle was asked about the most excellent of people? He replied: "My generation, followed by those who followed them and those who also followed their followers" [29].

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Despite the tremendous roles of these early companions during the era of the Prophet, *Salafiyyah* was not claimed by any of them. They tenaciously dedicated their lives to the worship of Allah and abided by the *Sunnah* of the Prophet.

Historically, as Muslims began to expand on the spread of Islam beyond the Arabian Peninsula after the demise of the Prophet, they came in contact with different cultures, religions and philosophical trends among the Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians[30]. They were also confronted with new situation and intellectual challenges for which they have to devise answers that reflected the ideals of the new faith. In addition to the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith*, they used reasoning to explain Islamic concepts and doctrines. They also applied the techniques to some issues such as the existence of Allah and His attributes, nature of the *Qur'ān* or whether God will be seen in the paradise [31]. Not only this, the violence that took place over the death of 'Uthmān ibn Affan among Muslims opened controversies on some issues such as the nature of faith, the status of the sinners, nature of human acts and series of doctrinal questions. However, the attempts to address those issues led to the application of logic among the Muslims. This brought the knowledge of *Ilm al-Kalām* which implies the interpretation of the *Qur'ā*n by inclusion of analogy and Philosophy by some schools of thought. The major representations of this trend were the *Qadariyyah*, *Shī'ah*, *Jabariyyah*, *Sifātīyyah*, *Khawārij* and *Mu'tazilah* ideologies. Their creeds brought schism into the Muslim '*ummah*[32]. Some of their views brought threats to orthodox understanding of *Tawhid*. Besides, it also gave preference to rationalism over the application of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* in the *Sharī'ah* [33]. Later, there was a dire need to move back to the real *tawhīd*. Imam Hambal, the founder of the fourth school of the Islamic thought was the articulator of this advocacy. He fought against *Mu'tazilah's* doctrines on the creation of the *Qur'ān*, the laid out tenets that later shaped the *salafiyyah*. He condemned the *ta'wil* (subjective / esoteric interpretation) of the verses of the *Qur'ān* and explained it in Arabic philology. He also opposed the knowledge of the *Kalām* which he referred to as *bid'ah* (innovative act)[34]. This is the main reason why the *Salafiyyah* principle opposes '*ilm al-Kalām*. Furthermore, Imām Hambal held the authoritative sources for understanding the matters of the religion from the *Sharī'ah* and his thought constituted the *manhaj Salafiyyah*. That is why his school of thought is accepted above others by the adherents of *Salafiyyah* in their doctrines [35].

However, after a long period of time, the ideology of *Salafiyyah* was changed during the reign of Ibn *Taymiyyah* when the term was characterized by conservatism, reasoning and literalism [36]. Rationalism was introduced to the practices of *Salafiyyah*. The era claimed that the application of human intellect or self-reasoning on Islamic verdict did not contradict the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*. Hence, both the texts (the *Qur'ān* and *Hadit*h) and human intellect were adopted to arrive at judgement in the jurisprudence by its practitioners. It marked the era of opposition to *ijtihād* on the application of the *Sharī'ah*. This act of using reasoning (ra'y) was propounded by *ibn* Taymiyyah and was later influenced by Muhammad *ibn* 'Abdulwahhab. The trend continued till today. These two founders of later generations of *Salafiyyah* advocated that the Muslim society has been influenced by foreign ideologies. Hence, they claimed that there is a need to practise Islam in the exact manner that it was demonstrated by the Prophet and followed by the generations that succeeded him[37]. Their claim was based on the above quoted *Hadith*. At present, there are many factions of *Salafiyyah* with different ideologies on the propagation of *Islam* in the Muslim societies and Europe. Some are rationalistic in their creeds while some are literalistic and antagonistic to non-*Salafi* Muslims while some are moderate in their interpersonal relationship (*al-Mu'amalāt*) with non-*Salafi* Muslims[38].

The eras of *Salaf aş-şalihin* among the Islamic jurists are divided into three. Some limited it to the periods of the *Khulafā' ar-Rāshidun* viz, AbuBakr (632-634), 'Umar *bn* al-Khattab (634-644), 'Uthman *ibn* Affan (644–656) and 'Ali *ibn* Abi Talib (656-661). However, some scholars extended it to the eras of those who succeeded the caliphs (*at-Tabi'un*) as well as the generation that succeeded the *at-Tabi'ūn* which is referred to as *atba'u at-tabi'in* (followers of the followers). By this, it covers the eras from the prophetic time to the third century which ends 855C.E [39]. Meanwhile, during those periods, the term was not pronounced or used as it is common today. The Prophet and other generations of people that came after him were referred to as Muslims and there was no disparity in their names as it is common in this century among the Muslim *Ummah*. The present practice of the *Salafiyyah* is traced to various origins in this study. Such origins are linked to Muhammad ibn 'Abdulwahab, Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), *al-Qaeda*, Jamal al-Din *al-Afghani* (1839-1897), Sayed Qutb, Rashid Rida (1865-

1935) and Hasan *al-Banna*. Each of the following *Salafi* pioneer scholars will be succinctly discussed below.

Ibn Taymiyyah.

Salafiiyah movement in the present society is ascribed to the influence of *Ibn* Taymiyyah. His full name was Taqiuddeen Ahmad *ibn* 'Abdulhalim (661–1263 C.E.). He was a jurist and theologian of Hambali school of thought. He contributed to the evolution of *salafiyyah.* He combated innovation especially by such as pantheism, syncretism, saint worship and rejects *ilm al-Kalam*, the *Sufi* orders, reasoning and philosophy. He regarded himself as *Mujāhid* of Hambali-school. He advocated for restoration of Islam to its pure form, rejected any new idea and advocated for the unity of Muslim *Ummah* [40].

Ibn Taymiyyah was versed in the knowledge of Islamic studies and this made him to be admired by some of his contemporaries. His specific disciplines include reading and exegesis of the *Qur'ān* (*Tafsīr), Tawhīd* (knowledge of Islamic monotheism of *Allah*), *Nahw* (Arabic Grammar) and *Şarf* (Morphology) [42]. He based his verdicts (*Fatāwa*) only on the primary sources of the *Sharī'ah*, viz, the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*. He challenged any other opinions besides the words of Allah and that of the prophet. His path is followed by the modern *salafis* till today. [41]

As a well renowned scholar, he taught many students the knowledge of Islam in addition to *Manhaj Salafiyyah*. He also authored a number of books on application of *salafiyyah* ideology in the society. His ideology generated many controversies in the society during his life time and after his demise. His thought is adopted by those who followed his principles while it created intense divisions among the scholars of his contemporary and the present ones. He was reported of his open attacks on *sufism*. For instance, he argued that all the religious practices of *Sufis* and other Muslims rather than *Salafis* are innovative acts that will earn them no reward but hell-fire[44]. In 698, Ibn *Taymiyyah* was banned in Damascus due to what the government termed as extremist *Fatawa* and rebuking people as infidels[45]. In his principle, he refuted whoever seeks for help from Allah through *Istighāthah* (intercession) of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW). This doctrine was well elaborate in his two prominent works viz: *al'Aqīdatu Hamawiyyah* and *al`Aqidatu Wastiyyah* ditto to other books he authored[46].

Through his prowess, he categorised the doctrine of *at-Tawhid* (belief in the oneness of Allah) into three broad divisions namely, *at-Tawhid al-Hulūhiyyah, at-Tawhid ar-Rubūbiyyah and at-Tawhid al-Asmā' wa şifāt.* He claimed that other non-*salafi* Muslims uphold only the t*awhid al-Hulūhiyyah* and neglect the *tawhid ar-Rubūbiyyah;* which is the belief that differentiates Islam from other religions[47]. Mention should be made here that *At-Tawhid al- Hulūhiyyah* means the belief in the lordship of *Allah* as the creator, sustainer, provider and the giver of security while *at-Tawhid al- Rubūbiyyah* denotes the absolute belief in the worship of *Allah* through performance of *Salawāt* and other acts of worship as analysed in the *Sharī'ah*. This doctrine was imitated by Muhammad *ibn* Abdulwahhab on his formation of *Salafiyyah* movement in Saudi Arabia[48]. Not only this, his interpretation of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith* influenced the adherents of his doctrine and modern *Salafis* such as *Wahhabiyyah*, *Al-Qaedah,* Abul A`la *al-Mawdudi,* 'Abdullah Azzam, Hassan *al-Banna*, Osama *bin* Ladin, Sayyid Qutb, Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani and* Muhammad'Abduh[49.] Some of the present adherents of *Salafiyyah* also emulated his thought through reading of his literary works.

Muhammad ibn 'Abdulwahhab

Another source claims that the *Salafiyyah* group in this twentieth century emerged through the ideology of Muhammad *ibn* 'Abdulwahhab which was originated in the 18th and 19th centuries[50]. The *Wahhabiyyah Salafiyyah* began in Saudi Arabia. It was established among the Bedouin Arabs of the land. His '*Aqidah* was examined as the cornerstone of the modern *Salafiyyah* in many societies; both in Saudi Arabia and other parts of the world. The primary principle of his *da'wah* calls for pristine Islam[51]. This implies to return the practices of Islam to how it was practised in the prophetic era. He argues that the present generations of Muslims have adulterated the doctrines of Islam with different foreign ideologies. He began his mission by establishing a school of thought at the middle of the nineteen century[52]. His thought was widely spread by his students to many parts of the world including the South-West Nigeria, the study area.

Muhammad ibn Abdulwahhab's ideology was based on the adoption of the Islamic government and rejection of modern democracy in every society. He professes that the acceptance of *Salafiyyah*'s creed is not optional but what must be abided with by every Muslim. This is illustrated in his thought as he states: *'in Wahhabi belief, faith is*

not necessarily an option; it is sometimes mandated by force'. He began the *Manhaj Salafiyyah* by enjoining Muslims to uphold his creed while any Muslim that opposed it was tagged *Kāfir* and *Munāfiq* (a non-believer and hypocrite). He also condemned formation of Muslim society and intercession with the Prophet's name. He interpreted the Qur'ān and Hadīth based on *salafiyyah* doctrines [53]. His followers considered themselves as the pious Muslims; while those who did not belong to his movement were regarded as nominal Muslims. This notion was shared by most of the neo-*Salafiyyah* movement today with the claim of propagating orthodox Islam.

Gradually, Muhammad's teachings were spread far and wide to *Najd* and Egypt[55]. As an Islamic revivalist, he gained many followers from different parts of the Arab world. His doctrines were embraced as the orthodox one by many *Sunni* Arabs of Saudi Arabia. The primary motive for its establishment was based on purification of the practices of Islam from innovative acts that have crept into it through some Muslims. He also claimed that the mode of practising Islam has been adulterated by the influence of foreigners by introducing what they (Europeans) termed as modernism which he referred to as the genesis of *Bid'ah* in Islam[56]. He rebuked them and named their practices of Islam as *Shirk* (polytheism). At the onset, the name of the movement was ascribed to the founder, Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab and it was called *Wahhabiyyah* or Wahhabism but later changed to *Salafiyyah*[57]. This is due to his preaching towards the revival of Islam in this generation. Till now, the ideology of the movement continued to generate controversies among the *Sunni* Muslims in many parts of the world. This is so because, why some uphold his ideology; some are against it with criticisms.

Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani*

Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani's Salafiyyah*'s movement was founded in the year 1900 in Egypt as the political *salafiyyah* based on the central principle of Islamic political system[58]. It first started as the Masonic Arab forum in the nation[59]. Its founder was a renowned Islamic political activist. He advocated for the adoption of Islamic political ideology in theory and practice in this era. Meanwhile, his country practised western system of government. Therefore, his advocacy to the government to adopt the Islamic political system as the best way of governing the society led to the formation of his *Salafiyyah* movement. The movement serves as the opposition to the system of

government by revolting against the authority which it termed un-Islamic administration[60].

Genealogically, Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani* was a native of Asadbad in Iran, a city in Hamadan which was an Ismaili settlement[61]. He was born in the year 1838. He died in 1897 at Istanbul in Turkey[62]. He was a prominent founder of the Islamic modernism movement of the nineteenth century. His aim was to bring every Muslim in Egypt and Turkey to the fold of pristine Islam through the *Salafiyyah's* thought. As a measure to actualise his dream, he established the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*) and *Salafiyyah* movements as the purest groups for every Muslim to belong to [63]. He started his educational career at his home town. He later left for Tehran and Iraq in furtherance of his knowledge. He travelled to Britain and India at the age of seventeen yeears. After a while, he spent some of his life in Afghanistan under the leadership of Muhammad Khan and Muhammad Azan in 1866 and 1868 respectively[64]. He was forced to quit the Britain due to his opposition against the ruling government. He then went to Constantinople in Turkey and Cairo where he met Muhammad Abduh who was his student and the teacher to Rasheed Rida. The latter joined the two to establish *Salafiyyah* movement in the country, Lebanon and many societies[65].

In the year 1871, Jamaluddeen returned to Egypt and re-established his ideology of political reform. His approach which was regarded as radicalism made him to be banished again from the land and he moved to Europe for asylum. He also embarked on his journey to Russia, Paris, London, Moscow and some European nations. He established a newspaper as a means of propagation of the religion and political movement. His fame made him to be embraced as an adviser by the France and British governments. He thereby restarted the mission by recruiting some young Muslim brothers under the Ottoman *Khalifah*[66]. His thought on establishment of Islamic polity was not obvious to the *Khalifah*'s government. With passion; he was included among the top government officials in the city. Through this post, he created his own political movement against the government of Turks which he claimed was unorthodox system of administration. History reveals that he had been having meetings with some young Muslims against the western politics for some years on his mission. The movement gradually turned to a formidable force, seceded from the Ottoman *Khilafah* and took political control of Turkey. *Al-*

Afghani and his students later formed *Nazi* party in Turkey[67]. This is a core reason why the *Nazi* party has close connection with the *Ikhwan al-Muslim* party of Egypt which later transformed to *Salafiyyah* movement with different sects such as *Hizbu al-Tharir* [68], which is also another anti-western political group. Teachings of al-Afghani are responsible for rejection of British administration by the advocates of *Salafiyyah* till today.

An account also reveals that in 1834 and 1856 respectively, there was an accord between Egypt and Britain on the creation of a company for construction of maritime canal in Egypt. The agreement was reached for movement of ship to all nations and as a mean of international trade between Africa and Europe. Both countries agreed on the sharing of profit from the canal. However, in 1875, the Egyptian representative, Saaid Pasha sold the Egypt's share to the Britain. This act made the Egyptians revolted against their leaders during Ismail's government. The revolution was led by an organised movement of Jamaluddeen *al –Afghani*, the founder of the *Salafiyyah* movement. He had once been used by the British authority against Egyptians and part of the Middle East. After the departure of Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani* to Britain, Muhammad Abduh who was well-known among his students took the control of his master's role as the editor-in-chief of the British publication in Egypt titled the 'Journal Official'. By 1883, Muhammad Abduh left Egypt for Paris to join Jamaluddeen. This is the reason why the impacts of *Salafiyyah* are felt in these cities till now. The mission for recruitment was embarked by Abduh in all these countries and beyond. He was known as the Islamic reformer and this made many people to join his movement. He formed alliance with the British authority in Egypt in order to achieve the political power over the Egyptians. After the demise of *Al-Afghani* and Abduh in the years 1897 and 1905, *Salafiyyah* movement was further facilitated to Saudi Arabia by Muhammad Rasheed Rida who also formed alliance with Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab. [69]

Muhammad Abduh

Another *Salafiyyah* movement was established by Muhammad Abduh (1849 - 1905), a prominent disciple of Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani*[71]. He was of Turkish and Arab origins. He, like his teacher was an elite, journalist and politician. He taught at the Azhar

University in Egypt. His disciplines include Logic, Theology, History, Ethics and Arabic. He was appointed the *Waqalul Misriyah*, a noble post of the official state newspaper. Also, he was made the grand *Mufti* of Egypt, the title he held till he passed away in 1905. This position and other honours gave him national privilege through which he was able to establish the *Manhaj Salafiyyah* in Egypt[72]. He was later banned from *Misri* for his revolt against the Egyptian government in 1879. He left *Misra* for Lebanon where he founded another *Salafiyyah* school with some students. His educational thought influenced the local Islamic educational system of the land by calling them to the movement. In 1884, Abduh formed alliance with his master, Jamaluddeen *al-Afghani* to spread *Salafiyyah* practices in Egypt[73].

The movement gave preference to *da'wah* and Islamic education. It also emphasises the reform of the western education through the adoption of the Islamic education. This foundation does not only condemn the western literacy but also deny its learning for Muslims. Western school is regarded as the system of education that sets Muslims against the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*. This group of *Salafiyyah* is generally identified as the *Salafi Jihādiyyah* or *Jihadism*[74]. Adherents are mainly young Muslim brothers of *Ikhwan al-Muslim,* Brotherhood of Cairo and in some other parts of the Arab nations. He emerged at the period of tussle between the government of Egypt and British with French empires. The movement eventually won the struggle and Muhammad 'Abduh was installed as the *Shaykhul Islam* and as well the *Shaykh al-Azhar* in Egypt. These are the highest religious and political titles in Egypt. He initially allowed the colonial power to invest in the country through which British conventional banks were established in many areas of Egypt before he later frowned at the British activities in the land which he described as infidelity. His opposition against the policies of the west in Egypt was the primary factor that led to the origin of his *Salafiyyah* movement in the country[75].

Besides the above, Abduh was the first to use the term *Salaf* among the pre-modern *Salafiyyah* advocates by claiming that Islam should be practised nowadays in the exact manner it was preached by the first generations of Muslims. He emphasised that the political institution and the western education of the state were not in conformity with the orthodox principle; hence, they should be rejected. As a measure to establish its *manhaj*,

he founded *salafyyah* school as an institution to reform the educational system of the society[76].

Rashid Rida

      Salafiyyah faction of Rashid Rida is globally known as the separatist and *Kāfir Salafism*. The founder, Muhammad Rashid Rida was a famous student of 'Abduh. His branch of *Salafiyyah* is of radicalism. He was a Syrian, born in 1865 and died in 1945[77]. He was a leading successor of the succeeding students of Muhammad 'Abduh. His ideology influenced the thought of Hasan *al-Banna* and Sayyid Qutb. The two are also founders of another *Salafiyyah* Muslim brotherhood groups. He continued on the legacy of the *Salafiyyah's* doctrines that were laid down by his predecessor. His works and ideology influenced most of the recent founders of the extremist *Salafiyyah* movement in many Islamic states and beyond[78].

      As a student of 'Abduh, he was also influenced by the legacy of the early *salafiyyah* movement of Jamaluddeen al-Afghani who was the tutor of Muhammad 'Abduh. He advocated that the best group that a Muslim should belong to is the *Salafiyyah*[79]. That is what brought the idea of *Takfīr* against Muslims of other Islamic organisations. This implies that those Muslims of his generation who did not join his group were not only condemned but also regarded as *Kuffār*. The neo-*salafiyyah* adherents of this notion make use of the term "*Takfīr*" to label any Muslim that does not belong to the *Salafiyyah* movement. A number of irreconcilable conflicts usually erupt from this ideology in the society.

      This division of *Salafiyyah* also brought the ideology of *Taqlidiyyah* (blind followeship of the movement). His thought was that Muslims should return to the prophetic era and start practising Islam as it was laid down by the Prophet. He argues that only the primary sources of the *Sharī'ah* viz: the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* should be upheld by Muslims on the application of the *Sharī'ah*. He claims that an individual Muslim can interpret the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* and adopt their teachings in the society without following the law of government of such a society. This ideology led to the secession of people from the western government in his city. Rashid Rida is thus named as the separatist[80]. This is so, because, his theory separates the adherents of *salafiyyah* from the constituted authority of any society.

In addition to his condemnation of non-*Salafi* Muslims, he was against the *sufis* and all the doctrines of Sufism. He argued that they (*sufis)* are too excessive in their 'Ibādah (worship) and supplications (*'Adu'ā'*). Like his predecessors, he established institutions whereby young Muslim brothers are trained against the western ideology. Through this, he advocated that the *Manhaj as-Salafiyah* is highly essential to be accepted globally. His literary works also influenced many young and old Muslims to uphold the doctrines of *Salafiyyah* among who was the prolific writer, Nasrud deen al-Albani [81]. His thought was restricted to the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* while he denied the verdicts of the *madhahib al-Arba'a* with the proof that their verdicts do not have perfect effects on the Islamic society [82]. Mention should be made here that Rasheed Rida did not meet Jamaluddeen Al-Afghani but his works and what he learnt from Muhammad 'Abduh, a student of Al-Afghani influenced him. His students include Sayyid al-Qutb and Hasan al-Bannah. The two prominent students also followed his foot-step on the formation of *Salafiyyah* branches in different localities. Hasan founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 [83].

Al-Qaeda Salafiyyah is a movement that was embraced by some Muslim brothers who are of the ideology that the present Muslims should return to the days of the early spread of Islam and shun modernism. This arm of the *Salafiyyah* believed that the present generation of Muslims has been negatively affected by the influence of western polity and there is dire need to return to the days of the *salafis* on the practice of Islam. Its ideology was primarily against that of the western world[84]. It gradually spread to Saudi Arabia since the reign of the king Faisal. The movement is radical in approach as a means of reviving the society to the days of the early *salafus Salihīn* [85]. A number of attacks have been plotted against the western ideologies by this branch. At present, it condemns the system of governance in Egypt. The Egyptian system of administration was described as the corrupt one and not *Sharī'ah* compliant.

Hasan al-Bannah formed another faction of *Salafiyyah* movement by recruiting some young Muslims. This recruitment led to the formation of Muslim forum and later became the Muslim Brotherhood. It was formerly established in 1928[86]. Moreover, Rasheed Ridah influenced al-Banna and inculcated what is termed as the pristine or pure Islam into his ideology of propagation of Islam. This ideology is what the *Salafiyyah*

movements irrespective of their factions are generally ascribed with today. This is a rationale behind condemnation of other Islamic groups. Hasan upholds that any other Islamic association is unorthodox and strayed from the right path. His idea centres on the superiority of *Salafiyyah's 'aqāid* over other Islamic organisations[87].

Al-Banna calls on every Muslim to be a *Salafi* while the Sayyid Qutub's creed was on revolution against the political authority of his nation. He claims that the government is not competent to rule the society and also that its administration is antithetical to the Islamic principle of governance. By and large, the ideas of these two founders of *Salafiyyah* are also imbibed by the practioners in this 19th century in many parts of the world including our study area. This is why the practice takes strange dimension of enforcing all Muslims to belong to *Salafiyyah* with their argument that it is the only sect that was described by the Prophet as the sacred and saved one '*al-Firqat Nājiyah*'[88].

4.3 Premodern *Salafiyyah*

Eighteen century marked the dawn of pre-modern *Salafiyyah*. The movement sprang from Arabian areas to different parts of the world advocating for the acceptance of its doctrines. Abdulwahhab is the most important scholar of this advocacy. At the onset, its founder, Muhammad ibn 'Abdulwahhab (1703–1792) drew on the teachings of ibn Taymiyyah and Hambali with the aim of purifying the Arabian Peninsula from un-Islamic practices and build Islamic state[90]. He was of the opinion that the governance of his country is not a perfect Islamic mode of government. He therefore influenced other movements (so as to be a formidable movement) such as *As-Sanusiyyah*, 'Uthman dan Fodio of Nigeria (1754-1817) and movement of Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624). In addition to these, he spread his mission to other subcontinents such as Indian[92]. His propagation was accepted. His supporters in all these continents also advocated for reform of the practice of Islam in their provinces. This tends to be the rationale behind the *Jihād* of 'Uthman dan Fodio in the history of reformation or purification of the practice of *Islam* in Nigeria. Moreover, they were all literalistic in their interpretation of the practices of Islam with the notion to replicate the model of Prophet Muhammad[93] (SAW).

4.4 Emergence of Modern *Salafiyyah*

Modern *Salafiyyah* is influenced mostly by majority of the contemporary Islamic scholars who studied in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They are influenced by the ideologies of both the early and modern Saudi Arabian *Salafiyyah* scholars. Among them are 'Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz (d. 1999). He was a celebrated *Mufti* in the kingdom. His *Fatāwah* were emulated by the government and many people in society. Most of his write-ups are distributed world-wide. Others include Yahya al-Hajuri, Nasr al-Din al-Albāni (d.1999), Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i (d. 2001), Muhammad ibn Shalih al-Uthaymin (d. 2001), Shalih al-Fawzan and Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali (b. 1931)[94]. Through the impacts of these *Ulamau'*, the kingdom is referred to as the birth of modern *Salafiyyah*. The contemporary adherents usually quote from the texts and verdicts of those scholars as references on their preachings (*Da'wah),* ideology (*manhaj)* and other activities.

In the same vein, the neo-*Salafiyyah* scholars also draw inspiration from the same pre-modern scholars. These scholars include Taqi al-Din Ahmad bn Taymiyyah and Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab. As such, *Salafiyyah* in this modern period are of ibn *Taymiyyah's* and *Wahhabiyyah's* theologies, inspirations and legacies. Not only this, another factions are also formed through the ideological thoughts of ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah (d. 1389) and Muhammad al-Shawkani (d.1834). Some groups have also been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's organisational teachings and political concepts especially those of Sayyid Qutub's *Hakimiyyah* (God's sovereignty) which he adopted from the writings of the indo-Pakistan intellectual, Abu 'Al-Ala al-Mawdudi [95]. These inherited ideologies are used in the *Salafiyyah* to excoriate modern governments and the existing socio-political order. The adherents' advocacy is that any government that does not make God's ruling supreme and the basis of its administration is on idolatrous foundation. Therefore, such government should not be allowed to operate in the society and a nation that practises such system should be attacked[96].

As mentioned above, most of their ideologies are attributed to *Manhaj Wahhabiyyah* (Wahhabism methodology). This is one of the reasons why modern *Salafiyyah* is also referred to as *Wahhabiyyah*. Similarly, another modern *Salafiyyah* group emerged in this twentieth century as a reform movement through the ideology of Jamaluddeen al-Afghani. It aimed at the renewal of Muslims' thought in this present Islamic world[97]. In addition to this, other faction sprang up from the notions of some

groups of scholars that are referred to as the *ahl al-hadith.* These are the adherents of those scholars that uphold *Hadīth* and *Qur'ān* as the only authentic divine sources on the practice of Islam.

Majority of these new reformers emerged in the nineteen century with strict adherence to the theological and juridical views of *Ibn* Taymiyyah in addition to the present perspectives of some *Sunni* Muslims. They are in groups and individuals and are advocating for the revival of the Islamic heritage through what they termed as the pristine Islam. Some of them regard Imam Hambal (d. 855) as the only orthodox and *Sunni* jurist among the four famous founders of the Islamic schools of thought (*Al-Madhahib al-'Arba'a*). Moreover, the modern *Salafiyyah* also emanated out of the thoughts of Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Jalal as-San'ani (d. 1225), Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d. 1354) and Rashid Ridah (d. 1354)[98]. The propagators in this modern age did not witness the eras of most of the above theologians but they were influenced by their writings and ideologies which call for revival of Islam to early period of its propagation.

Other factions of the modern *Salafiyyah* practices have their roots from teachings of some contemporary '*Ulamā'* in their various communities. Some factions emerged from *Da'wah* of the students of these scholars[99]. Some were established from the *fatawa* of councils of Saudi Muslim '*Ulama'* who are appointed as the jurists on religious legal matter. Such include Higher Board of '*Ulama'* and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research (*al-Lajna ad-Da'ima lil Buhūth al-Ilmiyya*) [100]. There is another group that was founded through the *Da'wah* of Muhammad Aman ibn 'Ali Jami (b. 1930) and Rabi *Al-Madkhali* (b. 1931). Both are from Ethiopia and Yemen[101]. Their creeds centre on replacement of the politics of the present government and modernity with Islamic political system.

Nasruddin *al-Albani's* (d. 1999) *Salafiyyah* movement was also formed in Saudi Arabia. His faction calls for purification of Islam and education without inclusion of the western ideology. *Salafiyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* is another branch. It was established from the preaching of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt called (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*). It was founded under the leadership of Muhammad Sayyid Qutub (d. 1966). There is also global *Salafiyyah*. It was borne out of the practices of some Muslims as revolt against adulteration of Islamic tenets by the western modernism. Prominent in this faction is the

al-Qaeda movement. It is well known with violence against the government and anti-Islamic system of administration. Additionally, any division of *Salafiyyah* that operates on societal violence is tagged as the *salafiyyah jihādiyyah*. [102]

In some societies, the adherents of the practice also include their perspectives on the understanding of the *Salafiyyah*'s thought. That is why there are proliferations of different factions and definitions of *Salafiyyah* nowadays. Some are anti-modernism in their approaches and claiming that Muslims should return to the early period of the pioneer *salafis*. They can be broadly categorised as the 'political Islamist *Salafi*' and the 'fundamentalists'. The former opposes the democratic system of government; while the latter calls for returning to the pristine Islam as it was practised by the Prophet till the first three generations of Muslims and the *Madhab* of *Imam* Hambal. [102]

Another scholar observes that all types of the modern *Salafis* can be grouped into three: the *Jihadis*, purists and politicos. [103]The *Jihadis a*dopt the militant approach on any matter that relates to the principles of Islam. They are the branch that severally cause intra and inter religious violence in the society. They maintain that revolution is the only solution to call people back to the orthodox practice of Islam. The second category emphasises that the modern system of education should be based on the tenets of Islam while the third calls for the establishment of Islamic government globally in this era in lieu of the modern system of ruling[104]. Abdul Latiff also segments the present *salafiyyah* into three. These are *as-salafiyyatul harakiyyah, as-salafiyyatul ilmiyyah* as well as *as-salafiyyatu jihādiyyah*[105]. The former one is referred to as the scholarly *salafiyyah*. It lays emphasis on the learning of *Fiqh* and the exegesis of the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah*. The second division is the political, humanitarian and charitable faction. It caters for the needs of the people by reconciling religious issues in accordance with the *manhaj as-Salafiyyah.* It is also regarded as *as-salafiyyatul islahiyyah* which means the *salafi* group that reconciles between the *Salafiyyah* adherents and non-*salafis* by calling them to the path of *Salafiyyah.* The last of this category according to him is established for the purpose of *Jihad* (based on the ideology of *Salafis*). This is by condemning the non-*Salafis* and calling them to accept the doctrines of the movement. This branch is the main cause of extremism and radicalism in many parts of the world[106].

In peroration, there is proliferation of *Salafiyyah* factions in this century. Each sect usually refers to certain scholars as the school of thought that it follows on its '*aqidah*. From all indications, the *Salafiyyun* are not non-Muslims. The only thing thay makes them different from other Muslims is their *manhaj* (ideology) of the practice of Islam and claiming the superiority of their '*aqāid* (doctrines) over other Muslims who are non-*Salafis*. As a result of this claim, other Muslims are regarded as infidels and people of *Bid'ah* (innovators). Similarly, ascribing the title to themselves as *salafis* is opposed by some Sunni Muslims. They opposed the nomenclature by claiming that the title belongs to all Muslims who follow the practices of the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet which they all adhere to. Thus, it is not to be solely claimed by only a group of people or an individual. They corroborate their view that none of the early caliphs since the prophetic era was addressed as the *Salafi*. Instead, they all shared the common title of "Muslims" while their proxy to the Prophet made them to be referred to as '*salaf as-salihīn'*. This rejection usually causes intra-religious discord and at times results to violence among Muslims in this era.

As a result of this, the emergence of the practice in this era can be viewed as the perspectives of some Muslims among the Sunnis on how they perceived that Islam should be practised. They are of the notions that the Islamic doctrines have been adulterated by western ideology which, according to them, is antithetical to the tenets of the religion. Therefore, they call on all Muslims to shun any western or European idea that has been crept into the practice of Islam. However, some of the approaches (of some factions among them) on this practice are not only severe to the society but also contradicting the *da'wah* methodology. Some of them uphold that the literal meanings of the *Qur'an* and *Hadīth* are the only authentic texts for Muslims to comprehend the fact about the tenets of Islam. They argue that there was no *ilm al-Kalām* (Islamic theology) in the prophetic era till the periods of the *tabiu'at-Tabi'īn.* They propose that all affairs of Muslims politically, socially, educationally and religiously should be explicitly derived from the *Qur'ān*, *Sunnah* and history of the early *salafus salihīn*. In order to manifest their aim, they adopted series of approaches. Some are liberal in their approaches to religious issues. However, some factions adopted certain methods which include but are not limited to extremism, radicalism, anti-western government, violence and hostility to non-*Salafi*

Muslims. That is why there are misconceptions on what *Salafiyyah* denotes in reality and what its modern adherents are preaching in the society nowadays [107]. It is their *da'wah* methodology that made them different from other *Sunnis* in any community. Series of germane questions that are generated from their ideologies and practices call for academic answers. This is the gap that this study intends to fill in South-West Nigeria so as to reveal the true meaning of *Salafiyyah* in the Islamic jurisprudence (*Sharī'ah*).

4.5 An Overview of 'A*qīdatus–salafiyyah*

This segment deals with the *ʿAqāʾid as-salafiyyah* (Doctrines of *Salafiyyah*). '*Aqāʾid* (عقائد) which is the plural form of *ʿaqīdah* (عقيدة) is an Arabic word. It denotes creeds, beliefs, doctrines, ideology and principles of a particular society or religious group[108]. It is a concept in Islam that deals with the study of beliefs in the religion. It also connotes the perspectives and verdicts of Muslims on some religious issues over which each sect holds certain conviction. There are fundamental creeds (*ʿaqāʾid*) in Islam which bond all Muslims together irrespective of their religious organisations or sects. Similarly, certain doctrines are also established by different schools of thought in Islam among whom are the founders of the four schools of thought (*al-Madhāhib al-'Arba'a*), *al-Mutakalimūn* (The Islamic theologians) and that of the *salafiyyūn* (*salafis*) which is the focus of this segment. In *salafiyyah* for instance, there are doctrines which are peculiar to its adherents. These *ʿaqāʾid* include: '*Aqidat al-Wala' wal Bara',* returning to pristine Islam*,* rejection of *Taqlīd,* rejection of *ijtihād,* condemnation of formation of Muslim *Jamā'ah*[109], living the ascetic life (*Zuhd*), *al-imān bi Allah, Tawasul* wa *Shifā'a, Ad-da'wat ila Salafiyyah,* rejection of modern exegesis of the *Qur'ān*, opposition to the *ilm al-Kalām,* condemnation of the Gregorian calendar, independence on the nature of a community, rejection of any form of *bid'ah*, hatred to *Sufism* and *Shi'ah, Imān bi al-Qur'ān was- Sunnah, Takf īr* on non-*Salafis* and opposition to modern government.

The *'aqā'id as-Salafiyyah* are succinctly based on dichotomous ideology which are *Tawhīd* and strictness to the *Sunnah* of the Prophet in all affairs of life. By this, any act that is not in the manner of the Prophet and his successors' practices are tantamount to *bid'ah, Harrām* and *shirk* in *Salafiyyah*. Moreover, these two notions (*Tawhid* and strictness to the prophetic *Sunnah*) can be categorised into *manhaj* and '*aqīdah as-*

salafiyyah. Both are the factors that made the adherents different in their doctrines from other Muslims. First, the *'aqīdah* is the creed that every *salafi* upholds while the *Manhaj* is the application of the *aqīdah*[110]. Referring to the statement of Muhammad Nasirud-Din al-Albani, he emphasizes that the two notions are inseparable dichotomies[111]. This implies that a *Salafi* Muslim should not only understand the *Sunnah* of the Prophet but must also act accordingly in all matters of his or her life. This is a reason why they claim superiority of *Iman* over all other Muslims in the society. Thus, every *salafi* is a Muslim but not every *Sunni* Muslim is a *salafi*. They arrive at this ideology by upholding that only *Salafis* practise the *Sunnah* of the Prophet while other Muslims only know little but not practise them. At present, the neo-*Salafiyyah Aqīdah* includes the negative reaction to the modernism [112]. It is through all these *'aqāid* that the adherents derived their manners of relating with people (Muslims and non-Muslims) in their respective societies.

Al-Wala' wal Bara': Among the fundamental creeds of *Salafiyyah* is the *'aqīdat al-Wala' wal Bara'*. The word '*wala*' is Arabic. It is formed from the verb '*waliya*' which denotes 'to protect', 'to guide', 'to embrace', 'to admire', and 'to love'[113]. The words '*mawla*' and '*wilayah*' therefore connote protector and protection'[114]. In other word, the term '*Bara''* is from three letter verb, '*ba ra ra*'. It literally means 'to set somebody or something free'[115]. The two words linguistically refer to taking Allah as the protector and shunning any act of infidelity. It also means to love Allah, the Prophet and Muslims and to do away from infidels. The *salafis* developed this *'aqidah* from their doctrinal interpretation of *Qur'an* 5: *ayah* 55 which reads thus:

إِنَّمَا وَلِيُّكُمُ اللهُ وَرَسُولُهُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ الَّذِينَ يُقِيمُونَ الصَّلاَةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ الزَّكَاةَ وَهُمْ رَاكِعُون

> Besides Allah and his messenger,
> only believers are your intimates.
> They perform salat, paying zakat and
> bow for Allah.

Also *Qur'an* sixty *Ayah* four:

قَدْ كَانَتْ لَكُمْ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ فِي إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَالَّذِينَ مَعَهُ إِذْ قَالُوا لِقَوْمِهِمْ إِنَّا بُرَاء مِنكُمْ وَمِمَّا تَعْبُدُونَ مِن دُونِ اللَّهِ كَفَرْنَا بِكُمْ وَبَدَا بَيْنَنَا

وَبَيْنَكُمُ الْعَدَاوَةُ وَالْبَغْضَاءُ أَبَدًا حَتَّى تُؤْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَحْدَهُ

Prophet Ibrahim and his disciples were exact examples for you. They said to the non-believers: "We are free (bura-ā-u) from you and whatever you worship besides Allah. We renounce you. Enmity and hatred will reign between us until you believe in Allah only...

Through their interpretation of the above Qurānic extracts, they adopt it in their doctrines that a non-Muslim is no more than an enemy. Thus, he should be dissociated from by Muslims. Not only this, such a person is also regarded as an infidel who is not expected to be interacted with by a *salafi* or any Muslim. Meanwhile, the interpretation is different in the real exegesis of the *Qur'ān*. Not only this, the adherents also uphold that *salafis* are to be passionate to themselves only. This is corroborated in their interpretation of a prophetic tradition which says:

Muslims are a community in their compassion and admiration. If a part is affected, the rest shares the pain. "Similitude of a Muslim to another Muslim is like a building that supports each other[116].

Some factions of the contemporary adherents of *salafiyyah* uphold this *'aqidah* with the aim that a Muslim should not be friendly with non-Muslims. Thus people of other faiths are regarded as enemies and threats to the society who, according to them, should not be reckoned with. This *'aqīdah* was first propounded by Ibn Taymiyyah in his book titled "*Iqtida' Sirat al-Mustaqīm*" meaning "Guidance to the Straight path'[117]. He established that there should not be any interpersonal relationship with the adherents of other faith in the society.

This creed had been imbibed in the movement since its establishment but it is more pronounced in this century of the neo-*Salafiyyah*. It means that *Salafis* should restrict their religious and social relationships with one another while people of other faith should not be related with. On social relationship, the movement condemns participation of Muslims in any social affair that is organised by non-Muslims. Instead, they preach that Muslims should portray the non-Muslims as their potential enemies who should be

separated from. They forbid Muslims' participation in the festivals of non-Muslims, exchanging or receiving gifts from them. Additionally, some factions claim that any *salafi* who is living in a non-Islamic community should not relate with the people of other religions except another fellow *salafis* only. According to the movement, any Muslim under such nation is living in an abode of war and fidelity (*Dār al-Harb wa al-Kufr*) and he or she needs to quit such an environment to the abode of peace (*Dār as-Salām*). This is the notion behind the conflicts and violence of some adherents of the movement against non-Muslims. The practice of this *'aqidah* is also extended to non-*salafi* Muslims. They are regarded as nominal Muslims. That is the reason behind referring to them as *Ahlun-Nār*. By this, they uphold that this doctrine eradicates interfaith relationship and preserves the Muslim *Ummah* to the right manner of the practice of Islam[118].

Returning to pristine *Islam*: The primary focus of the *'aqīdatus-Salafiyyah* is the returning the practice of Islam to how it was brought by the Prophet. They claim that the prophet had completed and perfected the practice of Islam. Therefore, it is incumbent on every Muslim to be strict to only the *Sunnah* of the Prophet without any addition or subtraction. Similarly, the practices of the four rightly guided caliphs (*al-Khulafāur-Rāshidun)* and that of the *at-Tābi'ūn* till the era of the third generation that succeeded the Prophet are regarded as the practices of s*alaf as-salihin* which a Muslim should follow[119]. Furthermore, the movement claims that other generations that came after them up to this era are the corrupt and westernised ones. Not only this, it maintains that no other Muslim society can succeed without following the *Salafiyyah's* path. This doctrine is supported with their interpretation of the hadīth which reads thus:

عَنْ أُمِّ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أُمِّ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَائِشَةَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهَا، قَالَتْ: قَالَ: رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صلى الله عليه و سلم "مَنْ أَحْدَثَ فِي أَمْرِنَا هَذَا مَا لَيْسَ مِنْهُ فَهُوَ رَدٌّ وَفِي رِوَايَةٍ لِمُسْلِمٍ مَنْ عَمِلَ عَمَلًا لَيْسَ عَلَيْهِ أَمْرُنَا فَهُوَ : رَدٌّ

Whoever says anything on the religion (Islam) which he (prophet) did not say, such an act will be rejected". Also, whoever does anything that the

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prophet did not do; such deed will not
be accepted [120].

They arrived at these doctrines with their claims that the orthodox practice of Islam has been changed and corrupted by the present generation of Muslims, different Islamic schools of thought, the theologians and modern *tafasir* of the *Qur'an* (modern Quranic exegesis) and *hadith*. Through this creed, they separate themselves from other Muslims whom they regarded as Muslims that have been influenced by the western ideologies. This is the reason why *salafi* adherents usually oppose and condemn other Muslims and call them to the fold of *Salafiyyah* with the aim of propagating the mission of the movement [121].

Rejection of *Ijmā'ah*: *Ijmā'a* in *Sharī'ah* simply means consensus of opinions of the Imams of the fundamental schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*Madhāhib al-Arba'a*). Some adherents of *Salafiyyah* oppose the *Ijmā'a* of the *Madhāhib*. They claim that their eras were neither that of the Prophet nor his companions. They also maintain that their verdicts on Islamic legal matters are not authentic. Most of the scholars of the schools were regarded to have been influenced by their societies against the real tenets of Islam. This doctrine is manifested into *Salafiyyah* through the ideologies of Jamaluddeen al-Afghani (1837-1897), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), 'Adurrahman al-Kawakibi Muhammad, Rashid Ridah, 'AbdulHamid and Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab [122]. They all upheld that in order to practise the pristine Islam, there is a need to separate Islam from modernity and restore the solidarity of Muslims. They also added that the *Ijamā'a* and *Taqlid* of the schools of thought should be rejected. This '*aqīdah* was also coined from the ideology of Muhammad 'Abduh as "to practise the real Islam, it is important to liberate thought from shackles of *taqlīd,* and understand religion as it was understood by the elders of the community before the dissention appeared''…[123]. They therefore, laid emphasis on pure interpretation of the texts of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* as the basis of understanding the practice of Islam.

Rejection of *Ijtihād*: *Ijtihād* is the exercise of the Islamic jurists to arrive at the solution(s) on any issue or challenge that a community is confronted with. This is embedded in the secondary sources of the *Sharī'ah.* However, *Ijtihād* is condemned in *Manha*j of some factions of as-*salafiyyah*. They are of the opinion that the *Qur'ān* has

explained everything in detail. Thus, there is no need for application of *ijtihād*. It is therefore considered antithetical to the principles of Islam. Their assertion is that the *ijtihād* has been adulterated with western ideology. Jamalddeen al-Afghani reiterated this rejection in most of his works among which is the "*Al –urwah al-wuthqa*" (The firm tie) in which he analyses that the weaknesses of Muslims are not by themselves but through the influence of the western ideology on the *Ijtihād* [124].

      Lā Jamā'ah **(Condemnation of formation of religious organisation):** In the '*aqidah as-salafiyyah*, forming *Jamā'ah* is regarded as an innovative act (*Bid'ah*) [125]. This is adopted with their proof that there was no such establishment during the prophetic era and that of the *Khulafa'ur-Rashidun* till the third century after the demise of the Prophet. They claim that the early generations of Muslims from the prophetic period did not form any society but they were bound together by Islam as one *Ummah.* They also argue that the successors of the Prophet followed the same method of propagating Islam without forming an association. Hence, the establishment of any Muslim organisation according to their creed is a *bid'ah* and *harrām*. By this, they call on all Muslims to embrace the *Salafiyyah* ideology as the only pious and reliable path. This is proved with their claim that any other creed that differs from that of the *Salafiyyah* is *Kufr*. Other groups are regarded as infidels and apostates that are not supposed to exist in the society. Series of conflict usually generate from this '*aqīdah*. It at times escalates to intra-religious violence in some societies. [126]

      Living the Ascetic Life (*Zuhd*): *Zuhd* can be defined as the manner of living ascetic life irrespective of one's status in the society. This is the adopted mode of living by the *Salafis* socially and religiously. They uphold this creed with the aim of devoting themselves absolutely for Allah and by shunning secular or materialistic life [127]. They perceive this world as vanity that no Muslim should rely upon. They therefore prefer wearing of trousers that its length is not long beyond the ankles and wearing cap. Almost all of them give priority to the wearing of *Jalabiyyah* over any other types of attires. More so, their women usually dress in *niqāb* (face-veil) and are in purdah. The purdah is highly embraced as the only acceptable mode of dressing for their women. They lay emphasis on this doctrine as the authentic *Sunnah* for female mode of dressing [128].

Al-Imān bi Allah: In *Salafiyyah* practice, absolute belief in Almighty Allah is another fundamental '*Aqīdah*. This '*aqīdah* expresses the superemacy of Allah as the only perfect Being that cannot be denied of His Mighty (*Tamthīl*), the only one that is unique in His names, attributes, wills and decrees [129]. Ibn Taymiyyah was ascribed as the pioneer scholar that established this *'aqīdah* in *salafiyyah* practices[130]. He expatiates on the concept of monotheism in Allah in most of his work among which is '*aqīdat al-wastiyyah* which serves as the manual for the present adherents of the *manhaj*. Reviewing this book, the *Īmān bi Allah* is segmented into three. They are *at-Tawhīd ar-Rububiyyah, at-Tawhīd al-Huluhiyyah* and *at-Tawhīd bi Asmāi Allah was- Sifāt Allah*. The first category describes the belief in Allah as the Lord of all the creatures. The second division distinguishes *salafis* from not only other Muslims but also any other religionists in the society. They maintain that the absolute manner of devotion to Allah which includes worship of *Allah* in utterances, deeds and supplications has been neglcted by non-salafi-Muslims due to the influence of the western ideology. The last division deals with the belief in the names and attributes of Allah.

***Tawasul* wa *Shifā'u*:** *Tawasul* and *Shifā'*mean reliance and intercession [131]. However, interpretations of these two words in the '*Aqīdatus - Salafiyyah* imply that only *Salafis* are sincerely rely on Allah and will see Him on the day of the judgement[132]. This doctrine, according to them is due to their faith in Allah, Prophet Muhammad as well as his households and companions. They claim that this creed places them higher in faith than non-*salafi* Muslims. Through this '*aqīdah*, they opposed any act of intercession to Allah with the names of a creature either dead or alive. These include invoking the dead and seeking blessing from a *Shaykh* [133]. They argued that majority of non-*salafi* Muslims equate their saints nearest to *Allah* in devotion and they even worship their graves after their death. All these acts are regarded as *shirk* and any Muslim that practises them is referred to as the *ahlun-Nār* (inmate of hellfire) [134].

Ad-Da'wah ila Salafiyyah: Advocates of *salafiyyah* call to the acceptance of the *manhaj*. The movement's *da'wah* obliges every Muslim to join *salafiyyah*. This is due to their concession that *salafis* are the only Muslims that call to the real tenets of Islam. The movement claims to be the only victorious group that will be saved on the hereafter (*al-tai'fah al–Mansurah, al-firqah al-Najiyah*). This doctrine is upheld by all the factions of

Salafiyyah by arrogating orthodox Muslims to themselves. They can be grouped into *salaf as-sālihīn*, *salaf al-Jihād* and *Salaf al-Khawārij*. The first of the groups advocates for returning to the practice of Islam in this modern period to the days of the companions till the first three generations that succeeded them. It avoids politics and condemns any Muslim that participates in modern politics. In lieu of politics, *Shūra* is adopted as the best method of appointing a leader in the society. They do cite the life of the orthodox caliphs as a reference that each of the companions was appointed through *Shūra* committees. The second denomination is known with *Jihād* in the name of *Salafiyyah*. Meanwhile, its *Jihād* centres on condemnation of other Muslims in any community with radicalism and extremism. It also advocates for pristine Islam and tagged other Muslims who are not in *Salafiyyah* as *Ahlu al-Bid'ah* and *Kuffār*. The last category is the seceded group among these two branches. The adherents of the faction cast themselves out of the '*aqā'id* of other *salafis* on political participation. Its members participate in politics with the aim of establishing Islamic principle in the governance[135].

Rejection of modern (*Tafsīr*) exegesis of the *Qur'ān*: The contemporary translation of the Holy *Qur'ān* is condemned by some factions of *Salafiyyah,* especially the neo-adherents. They maintain that most of the contemporary scholars have been influenced by modernity and western ideas. As a result of this, the presnt exegesis of the Qur'ān are referred to as mixtures of western ideologies and fabricated translations. The Quranic exegesis from the periods of the four rightly caliphs up the era of the third century are only regarded as the authentic translations. [136]

Opposition to the *ilm al-kalām* (knowledge of Islamic theology): *'Ilm al-Kalām* is one of the factors that led to the emergence of the *Salafiyyah* since the era of Imam Hambali till this present period. The knowledge of the *Kalām* is portrayed as the beginning of adulteration of the Islamic doctrines by the west through the application of philosophy, logic and western culture to arrive at conclusion on the application of the *Sharī'ah*. *Salafis* rejected sectarian principles of *Qadariyyah, Jabariyyah, Shī'ah, Khawārij and Murji'ah*[138]. Not only this, they also regarded their emergence as the influences of the Arab acculturation with the foreign culture. They claim that the theologians of those schools mislead the Muslim *ummah* and set Muslims against each

order. They argued that the establishment of these sects is a *Bid'ah* and whoever follows their creeds is regarded as a *Kāfir* (infidel, disbeliever) [139].

Condemnation of the Gregorian calendar: Islamic months are only regarded by *salafis* as the sacred ones which must be followed by the Muslim *Ummah*. They arrived at this creed with the aim that the Gregorian counting of days and months are derived from the names of deities of the west. Not only this, they also argued that the introduction of the Gregorian calendar is one of the ways through which the west abolishes the Islamic practices. They uphold that the Islamic counting of days, months and years predated that of the modern idea. They added that in order to condemn the Islamic calendar, the Gregorian calendar was introduced by the West. They also argued that the same notion was used to condemn the Islamic method of writing from right to the left by inventing another counter-method of writing that begins from left[140]. Through this ideology, *salafis* belived that the western form of writing and the designing of the Gregorian calendar was made to supersede that of Islam in western ideology. This is the reason why the movement advocates for pristine Islam as the only solution to practise Islam accordingly.

Rejection of *bid'ah*: *Salafis* reject innovative act in Islam. *Bid'ah* in the *Salafiyyah's* doctrines connotes condemnation of any religious act that was not done by the Prophet or his orthodox caliphs. The movement's claim on this creed is that the Prophet had completed the practice of Islam with detailed analysis in the Qur'ān and Hadīth. They therefore, strictly uphold to the dictates of the Quran and the *Hadīth* as the only sources of the *Sharī'ah*. It is on this *'Aqīdah* that the *manhaj Salafiyyah* condemns non-*Salafi* Muslims in the society. This is so because, other Muslims argue that the *Sharī'ah* allows innovative acts that are not contradictory to the dictate of Islam such as *'urf* (local tradition). They (*salafis*) also claim that any religious act that the Prophet did not practise is an innovation and whoever performs such act is tagged as infidel and people of the hell-fire[141]. More so, the verdicts of the fundamental four schools of thought *(Madhāhib al-'Arba'a)* in *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) are regarded as *bid'ah* by some factions. Their claim is buttressed with the prophetic tradition which reads that the best of my successors is my present generation till the third generation in succession [142]. These three generations are regarded as *as-Salaf as-Salihun* (the most pious Muslims). [143]. This

'*Aqidah* reflects in their practices by adhering strictly to the *Sunnah* of the Prophet not only in worship but also in all their activities.

Hatred to *Sufism* and *Shī'ah*: Sufism and its practices are condemned in *Salafiyyah.* The movement opposes Sufism and regards it as an act of *Kufr* and *bid'ah.* Not only this, it is also regarded as an act of worship that has no basis under the Islamic jurisprudence[144]. It is regarded as an inclusion of false acts into Islam through innovative supplications that are different from that of the prophetic ones (*Al-Adhkār an-Nabiyy*). They also condemn congregational supplication of Sufis and tagged it as *shirk*. Due to this claim, any *Sufi-Muslim* is regarded as a threat to the Muslim community. In the same vein, *Shī'ah* is also regarded as the most misleading school of theology. Both Sufism and *Shī'ah* are therefore referred to as *Rawāfid* (Rejecters) in the doctrines with the notion that the two have brought many innovative acts such as visitation to grave sites, use of amulets and veneration of their *Shuyukh* into the religion[145].

***Imān bi al-Qur'ān was- Sunnah*:** The *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* of the Prophet are regarded as the only authentic sources of the Islamic jurisprudence for every Muslim to follow. According to them, the two scriptures are the legacies that were laid down by the Prophet for his successors to adopt for the practice of Islam after his demise. This creed is highly embraced by some factions of modern and neo-*Salafis* by strict adherence to the literal meanings of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth.*

Opposition to Modern Government: In *Salafiyyah*, the problems that the Muslims face nowadays start from deviation from Islamic government and *tawhīd*. The *salafis* uphold that the Islamic system of governance is divine while that of the western is a man-made system and it is against the Islamic administration. By this, nationalism, democracy, socialism and any government that does not apply Islamic law are considered as the system of infidelity and idolatry government (*anzimat al-kufr wa at- tāghūt*) [146]. Not only this, any form of western political system is perceived as un-Islamic and corrupt system of administration [147]. This doctrine postulates that politics and Islam are inseparable and any attempt to separate politics from the religion will make the practice of Islam incomplete.

Salafis thus postulate that the Islamic system of government should be adopted in every nation. This is the fundamental reason why there are incessant conflicts between the

Salafiyyah and modern political government[148]. This *manhaj* is derived from the ideologies of some of the notable *Salafi* jurists among who are Muhammad Nasirud-Din Al-Albani. He emphasises this in a number of his works such as "*min as-siyasah tarku as-siyasah*' (Leaving politics to the politics). This implies shunning the western politics for the Islamic political system. Through this ideology, some factions opposed the curriculum of the western system of education with the notion that it is designed purposely to serve the west and to oppose the philosophy of Islamic education. Meanwhile, those that do not oppose the western education also participate in politics with the aim of incorporating the Islamic system of administration into politics[150]. A faction calls for violence against the existing political order and advocates for establishment of a unitary Islamic state in form of the caliphate. An example of this category is among the *Salafiyyah* factions in Southwest Nigeria. In another perspective, some adherents argue that Muslims can support any form of government of their respective society instead of waging war against the existing government which may lead to civil problem (*Fitnah*) between Muslims and the society[151]. Many factions oppose the democratic system of governance in Yorubaland and shun all the political activities. That is the reason why they do not vote during any election.

Takfīr **on non-***Salafi* **Muslims:** *Takfīr* is an Arabic word which is derived from the verb "*Ka-ffa-ra*". It means to deliberately associate or ascribe partner with Allah in the act of worship. The word denotes more than associating partner with Allah in the '*aqīdah as-Salafiyyah*. It also means excommunication and declaring another Muslim an infidel. It became part of the doctrine in the twentieth century through the advocacy of a prominent *Salafi* scholar, Sayyid Qutb for condemning the non-*Salafi* Muslims[152]. He derived the '*Aqīdatu at-Takfīriyyah* on non-*Salafi* Muslims and further advocates that the Salafis should not associat with non-salafis in the society.

Salafis also believe that there will never be a glory for any Muslim who does not practise Islam as it was practised by Prophet Muhammad. They argued on this creed that the present Muslims have adulterated the '*Aqīdah al-Islamiyyah* with western influences. Hence, non-*salafi* Muslims are considered under this '*Aqīdah* as hypocrites and advocates of the western ideology. Through this, they divide Muslims into two sects namely, *Ahlush-Sharī'ah* and *Ahlunsh-Shaytân*[153] (fellow of God and fellow of shaytan). The

former are those that abide by the dictates of Islam wholeheartedly while the latter are labelled as those who adulterate Islam with the modern ideology. Not only this, the 'aqidah legitimizes takfir on any non-Islamic state. [154].

Summary of their 'Aqāid

'Aqāid as-Salafiyyah are categorised in this work into certain parts such as strict adherence to the Sunnah of the Prophet, concept of Tawhid and following the path of the early generations of Muslims till the third century after the demise of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). Others are condemnation of Shirk, condemning any religious act that was not practised by the Prophet or his pioneer successors, hatred to non-Salafi Muslims, hostility to non-Muslims as well as opposition to modernism. .

Some factions oppose the application of the three out of the four notable Imams of the Islamic schools of thought (Madhāhib al-'Arba'a), viz: Malikiyyah, Shafi'iyyah and Hanafiyyah. Only Hambaliyah school of thought is generally accepted and considered orthodox. They also reject the application of Taqlīd. Their doctrines emphsise that all affairs of Muslims socially, politically and religiously should be derived from the acts of the Salaf as-Salihīn (pioneer salafis), the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. They maintain that the other sources of the Islamic law have been bastardised nowadays and are not divine but man-made ones. The adherents therefore refer to any other juridical verdict besides that of the Hambali as rational thought. They also upheld that the Qur'ān and Hadīth are enough as the guides for Muslims. They buttress their doctrines with the proof that every aspect of life has been comprehensively expressed in the Qur'an by quoting that the Qur'ān says:

$$مَّا فَرَّطْنَا فِي الكِتَابِ مِن شَيْءٍ$$

We have neglected nothing unexplained in the Qur'ān …

4.6 An Overview of the Spread of Salafiyyah

In this era, the practices of Salafiyyah are spread from one nation to another. It began from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was established in 1975 in Madinah under and named Jamā'at as-Salafiyyah al-muhtasibah[155]. It was initially regarded as the most pietistic movement. The primary aims and objectives were centred on the spread of its ideologies on the concept of at-Tawhid, implementation of the Sharī'ah, condemnation of images and taking photographs in the public places[156]. The movement gained many followers in Saudi Arabia not only in Madinah (where it was first established) but also in

many provinces of the country. It was embraced as the movement that called to the *Sunnah* of Prophet Muhammad.

Later, its *da'wah* was against the system of ruling in Saudi Arabia. The government of the land was opposed and tagged un-Islamic and mixture of western ideology. Thus, the movement advocated for change in the system. This advocacy gradually led to extremism and opposition to the authority. It is out of this crisis against the government that a faction of the movement led by Juhayman al-Utaybi emerged as messianic rebellions against Saudi Arabia with the mission to take over the government with force and the control of Makkah from the kingdom in 1979[157]. Besides this, another *Salafi* movement was formed in the city. This is a non-violent *Salafi* group. It was established by Muslim brothers who had been inspired by the teachings of a Syrian activist, Muhammad Surur Zaynu al-'Abidin. He called for combination of *Salafiyyah* ideology and Muslim brotherhood activities as the essential needs for effective social and political changes. These branches of *Salafiyyah* are known as the Sururis[158].

In Egypt, *Salafiyyah* movement started again in 1979 under the *Jihād* group led by Muhammad Abdussalam Faraj (d. 1981). It started early as the *Jamā'at al-ijihād al Islām.* The work of the founder titled as *al-faridah alghaibah* (Missing Religious Duty) and that of *Ibn* Taymiyyah inspired some Muslim brothers to re-establish the movement[159]. They began by preaching pristine Islam and calling Muslims to uphold their mission. Many People embraced the movement and this increased its followers. Later, the leadership of the movement started preaching against the government's policy. [160]. This teaching is what led to the rebellious act against the government in Egypt.

Algeria witnessed the emergence of modern *Salafiyyah* around twentieth century. It was started by some Muslim youths who were of the opinions that the practice of Islam in the country should be revived. They started their mission by first establishing mosques in different parts of the nation[161]. Till now, many of the mosques in the country are controlled by the *Salafi* scholars. This period marked the era of reform in the culture of Algerians. It also brought the notion of *Sunni 'Aqīdah* such as the Islamic mode of dressing, condemnation of sales of alcohol and any illicit act[162]. Besides, it influenced the governmental policies by calling for substitution of the nation's educational theory with the Islamic one.

At present, the *Salafiyyah* movement in Algeria can be grouped into three namely: the *Jihādiyyyah* (*Jihādi*), political and purists[163]. Both the *Jihadi* and political ones emerged in the early 1990. Their motive was to overthrow the government by violence and establish *Islamiyyah* polity. The violence broke to civil war and claimed many lives[164]. *Alqaedah* also played a major role on what metamorphosed to *Salafiyyah* movement in Algeria. It was initiated by some Muslim brethren who were militant and radical on the practice of Islam. They established the movement from their perception on the ideology of Sayyid Qutub, [165] a pioneer scholar of *Salafiyyah*. The *Jihad Salafiyyah* formed alliance global militant forces with the mission of establishing *'Ummah al-Islam* and Islamic system of governance. However, they were radical and conservative in their approaches. This faction spread to Central Asia, Kashmir, Philippines, Bosnia, Pakistan, Chechnya and many nations[166]. On the other hand, the purist *Salafis* are those that advocated for return to the early practice of Islam as it was practised by the *Salaf as-Salihīn*. The advocacy started in the 1980 through the return of some Algerian youths who went to study in Saudi Arabia. They were influenced with the ideologies of the *Wahhabiyyah* school of thought. They returned home after their studies and re-established the movement with the aim of purifying people's *'Aqāid* which they claimed that have been adulterated by western ideas[167]. The movement was embraced by many *Sunni*-Muslims. However, the society is generally divided over the notions of the group. While some people perceived it as a call to pristine-Islam, some viewed it as a threat not only to the Algerian government but also to the people[168].

Salafiyyah was spread to western countries through the impacts of some scholars such as Jamal Zarabozo and Bilal Philips (*Abu* Ameenah) [169]. For instance, it was facilitated to Indonesia by the young Muslims who schooled in Saudi Arabia and were influenced by the tenets of *Ibn* Taymiyyah and *Wahhabiyyah* movements[170]. They included Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz, Yusuf Baisa, Jafar 'Umar Thalib, Ayip Syafrudin, Luqman Babduh and Muhammad 'Umar Sewed[171]. They were embraced and accorded respect due to the recognition of the country where they schooled (as the source of Islamic religion and the city of Prophet Muhammad). As a measure to further the spread of the movement, these scholars translated the works of the pioneer *Salafi* scholars into English language and established *salafiyyah* branches in many provinces.

Taliban movement is another faction of *Salafiyyah* in Afghanistan. The ideology behind its formation is to establish Islamic government and implement the *Shari'ah*[172]. A core factor that led to its establishment is due to the high percentage of Afghans who are pro-*Taliban* movement. The movement claimed the substitution of the nation's government by adopting the Islamic politics in all its affairs. Other objectives of the movement are to rule the country according to the dictates of the *Qur'ān* and relate with any nation in accordance with such[173].

Additionally, Saudi Arabia played prominent role on how *Salafiyyah* was spread to Afghanistan. Its spread was also in connection with the battles between Afghanistan and Soviet Union. As a condition to support Afghanistan on the war, ideologies of *Salafiyyah* were introduced[174]. Saudi government continued to render its assistance to Afghanistan till now. A number of Arabic institutes especially in Swabi and Panjpir were built through the Saudi's aid[175]. The Afghans who embraced *salafiyyah* ideologies also aided the spread of the movement. Among them are Mawlawi Afzal who established Islamic Revolutionary State of Afghanistan in Nuristan metropolis of the nation, Jamil ar-Rahman formed *Jamā'at al-Da'wah ila al-Qur'ān was-Sunnah* and Mawlawi Shariqi founded a *Salafiyyah* Movement. The students of these scholars also continued the spread of the *salafiyyah* in Afghanistan till now[176].

1804 marked the early spread of *salafiyyah* to India[177]. It was facilitated through the impact of Syariatullah. He was an Islamic scholar who studied in *Hijaz*. After the completion of his studies in Makkah, he formed the movement against the British administration in the country. He and al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Bazili were the founders of the movement in Malaysia and many provinces of the country[178]. Acculturation of Malaysian people to Saudi Arabia is another major factor that facilitated the spread of *Salafiyyah* to the country. Some Malaysian Muslim brothers who went to study in Makkah and Madinah were influenced by the *'aqāid al- Wahhabiyyah* (Wahhabi doctrines). This was during the reign of Amir Muhammad bin Sa'ud [179]. They were enlightened on how to combat any form of *Shirk* and innovative act in the religion. It initially started as the *Islah* (reform) movement with the aim of reviving the practice of Islam to how it was brought by the Prophet and rejecting all forms of *bid'ah.* This is referred to as *tajdīd* [180]. Some of the pioneer adherents were mentioned in the work of Nor (2015) among whom were al-

Hasan Bandung, Abu Bakar, Tahir Jalaluddin, Haji Ahmad, Ahmad bin Muhammad Hashim, Abu Bakar al-Asy'ari, Tahir Tiga Serangkai, al-Hadi and Wan Ahmad ibn Dawud. All these scholars embarked on the *Tajdīd* (Reform on the practice of Islam) without distinguishing themselves from non-*Salafiyyah* Muslims in their eras. Their motive was to preach orthodox Islam in accordance with the principles of the *Qur'ān*, *Sunnah* and Hadith.

At present, *'Aqāid Salafiyyah* (doctrines) have been spread to many localities in the country. This new trend was due to the proliferation of *Sunni* Muslim brethren who are graduates of Islamic sciences, *Hadīth* and *Tarbiyyah*. Some of them obtained their degrees from University of Madinah, Umm al-Qurah University in Makkah, Indonesia and Egypt. They were influenced by the *Salafiyyah* movement in different countries of their studies. Thus, their return after the completion of their studies marked the proliferation of *Salafiyah* establishment in many parts of the nation[181]. They advocated for the movement through their *da'wah* in different mosques and gatherings. Some of them even founded *Islamiyyah* and *Tahfiz* schools. Prominent scholars among these contemporary advocates of *Salafiyyah* are Razali ibn Tahir, Muhammad ibn Abdul Majid al-Fatani and Awang Nasiruddin Abu Bakr. Through their impacts, the movement has been spread to Perlis, Kualar Lumpur, Kampung, Kuala Terengganu and many cities of the nation.

Salafiyyah was first brought to Nigeria as well as West Africa by *Shaykh* 'Uthman ibn Fodiye (1754-1817) and his brother Jibril ibn 'Umar. An account reveals that the *Shaykh* got contact with the *Wahabiyyah* movement in Saudi Arabia during his *Hajj* pilgrimage. He was influenced by the group's '*aqīdah* which centres on rejection of *Bid'ah* and purification of the practice of Islam. Upon his arrival, he advocated for the principles of *Salafiyyah* by condemning the mode of practising Islam in the northern Nigeria which he claimed that it had been adulterated with traditional culture. He thus called for returning to pristine Islam[182]. This is the motive behind his *Jihād* in the history of Islam in Nigeria and West Africa.

4.7 Emergence of Neo-*Salafiyyah*

The present neo-*Salafiyyah* began in 1990 in Madinah, Saudi Arabia[183]. Its emergence was borne out of politics and opposition to the Saudi Arabian Government's

policy. It began as the aftermath of the involvement of Saudi Arabia in the second gulf-war between Iraq and Kuwait. The primary factor that led to the war was when the then Head of the Iraqi Government, Sadam Husein decided to invade Kuwait with military force for the battle. The Kuwait Government was afraid of the invasion of Iraq as a powerful nation. Hence, the Kuwait's king fled to Makkah for rescue, support and protection against the Iraqi troops.

Traditionally, Saudi Arabia Government did consult its scholars on decision making. This is based on the concept of the *Shūra* in the *Sharī'ah* (consultation). By and large, the government consulted some renowned jurists among who was Shaykh Abdulazeez ibn Baz. They were consulted on the government's decision to invite American soldiers to Saudi Arabia for synergy to rescue Kuwait from Iraqi invasion and also to protect the country. The jurists agreed with the government. Thus, Americans were invited for the task. American troops were sent to Iraq and also Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This was in the year 1990. This government decision led to another formation of association of indigenous youths who were also young scholars. They were named "*Shabab Shahwa* or *'Ulama' Shahwa* (independent young scholars). They accused the government of two allegations. They alleged it for permitting Americans (whom they tagged as disbelivers) to be living in the country. They did not only condemn this act but they also corroborated their argument by saying that 'religion cannot be more than one in Arabian Peninsula'. Secondly, they argued that the *Sharī'ah* does not allow a Muslim to fight another Muslim with a disbeliever. Those that opposed the government on fighting the Muslims with non-Muslims were also notable scholars in the city. Among them are Salman Awdah, Shafar Awwali and Diwanul Qarni. They all claimed that the government's decision was not tenable in the *Sharī'ah*.[183]

Due to this disparity on the decision, they began to critise and condemn the government's activities in the society for inviting Americans to be living in the country. They also argued that the government should have sent them back to their nation after the war in lieu of accommodating them to still be living in the country. Majority of citizens supported them especially those who opposed this government's policy. These scholars were recognised in the town as the human right activists. By and large, they called the government to be strict with the *Kiātab* (*al-Qur'ān*) and the *Sunnah* (*Hadīth*) which are

the codes of conduct of the country. Mention should be made here that the guiding law of kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the *Qur'ān* and the *Hadīth;* unlike the study area (South-West Nigeria), which uses the constitution of the government.

After a while, another set of scholars emerged in the country. They were pro-government activists. Pioneers on this mission were Muhammad Amman al-Jami'i (b. 1931 d. 1996) and his student, Rabiu al-Madkhali. Both are lecturers in the University of Madinah. The former was a native of Ethiopia while the latter is a Yemenite but they are Saudi citizens by the nation's permission. Amman taught *'Aqīdah* (Islamic doctrine) while Rabiu specialises in Hadīth. They both antagonised those scholars that criticised the government on the living of Americans in Saudi Arabia. They condemned the verdict of those who are anti-governmental decision. They also argued that 'rising against those who wanted to destroy the Muslims and Islamic nation by inviting non-Muslims to support the Muslims is tenable as a mean of defending the nation. By this, Both opposed the Salman Awdah and other scholars who were not pleased with what the government did. Their arguments were made known to the public in their *da'wah* and publications. Muhammad Amman al-Jami'i and his student, Rabiu al-Madkhali did not only support the government on this decision but also supported all the governmental policies. However, those that were against the government were labelled by the two as rebels against the national authority.

Hence, there were two divisions of scholars in the same country: pro and anti-government scholars. The pro-government supported the staying of Americans in the country and tagged them "*musta'malūn*" (Those who were invited to be working and residing in the city by the government). They also claimed that they must be protected by the government and the citizens. They argued that whoever is hostile with them will be denied admittance into *al-Jannah* by Allah. The government appreciated their *da'wah* with the hope that they would be confronting and opposing those who condemned this government's decision. [183]

At the early stage, these two scholars and their disciples were regarded as *Salafiyyah Madinah* (Madinite *Salafis*). Then, the government empowered them by financing them in three ways with the aim of antagonizing whoever opposes the government's activities. They were financed with money. That is why their adherents

even in South-West Nigeria were strict to the practice. This expressed that their neo-*salafiyyah* was formed to spread the practice of *Madinah Salafiyyah*. Besides, they were also supported by the government with capital project and many incentives. On the other side, those who criticized the government on living of Americans in the country were ostracized by the government. They were deprived of access to get money. They were also infringed on their fundamental rights. Thirdly, the pro-government scholars were given job opportunities to teach at higher institutions especially in the universities. More so, they were also appointed as Imams into various mosques. After a while, oppositions were sacked and replaced with the disciples of the two pro-government's scholars. As the results of these governmental interventions, Muhammad Amman and Madkhali incorporated act of eulogizing the government in their *da'wah* at any occasion. [184]

Due to the financial grants from the government, the neo-*salafi* scholars embarked on recruiting people among the students. They gathered students who came to study from different nations such as Africa, Somalia, Ethiopia, Malaysia… and indoctrinated them through their *da'wah* and funds. For instance, they were told not to oppose a leader either he is right or wrong. They taught them that a leader must be absolutely followed. Meanwhile, the rationale behind this verdict was to suppress those who were against the governmental policy and most especially on the invasion of Americans to Iraq and their living in Saudi Arabia after the war. In addition to this, they also preached against voting and election in favour of the government. This ideology was also emulated by their disciples including those that are in South-West Nigeria. However, this principle is against the constitution of Nigeria which also governs the South-West. The reason for not voting in Saudi Arabia was due to the nature of the country. The king is also a political leader and it is appointed by selection. This is the reason for referring to the country as the 'Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'. Hence, this feature is not tenable in Yorubaland as a democratic society.

Through the funds realized from the government, the pro-government scholars embarked on financing many students to spread their ideologies which were centred on ascribing *bid'ah* to those that were against the government on the policy of fighting Muslims with non-Muslims and staying of Americans in the kingdom. Initially, among those that opposed the decision were Salman Awdah, Ikhwanul Qarni and some of

'*Ulamā' shahwa*. This was how they trained their disciples who came to study in the Kingdom from Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and other nations including some indigenes that subscribed to their doctrines. These included AbdulAzeez Raheez who is also a scholar. Thus, there *'aqāid* were spread to many places and other countries. [184]

Their creed caused many problems to the opposition to the extent that they found it difficult to get job to sustain themselves. The opposition had to consult eminent scholars such as Ibn Baz to recommend them to the government to provide employment for them. On the same vein, another scholar also rose against the pro-government scholars among whom was Abu Bakr abu Zayd. He accused the pro-government jurists of condemning the activities of the opposition to the government on the act. He even wrote a book titled '*Rifqan ahlus-Sunnah bi ahlis-sunnah*' Patience of the *sunni* to *sunni*'[184]. He urged the pro-government scholars to be sincere in their activities in lieu of causing socio-religious discord in the country.

Thus, neo-*salafiyyah* that emerged in 1990 in Saudi Arabia and was spread to many societies including South-West Nigeria was borne out of politics of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The advocates only linked it to the religion (Islam) and named it *salafiyyah*. However, they were opposed on this title by non-*salafi* Muslims. That is why they were tagged '*salafiyyah* of 1990'. After a while, they were neglected by many scholars of the Kingdom. They confronted them that they were not practising *salafiyyah* but worshipping the government and money. For instance, Salih Fawzan confronted AbdulAzeez Raheez for condemning the work of Muhammad ibn 'Abdulwahhab by referring to it as *bid'ah*. He lamented that the neo-*salafiyyah* of 1990 lacks adequate understanding of Islam. By and large, their *salafiyyah* deviated from the real *salafiyyah*. It was the practice of Muhammad al-Jami' and Rabiu *al-Madkhali*. They both were also described as *Madkhaliyyah* and *Madakhilah* which means the *Madkhalism*. It means propagation of the ideology of *Madkhali*. The *Madkhaliyyah* developed certain notions in addition to its opposition to the anti-government scholars of the coutry. Such doctrines included hostility to non-member Muslims, hatred to the *ikhwanul* Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhod Organisation), labelling any act of another fellow Muslims as *bid'ah*, tagging Yusuf al-Qaradawi a bad innovator (*ahlu-Bid'ah*) and upholding an aspect of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) on divergences of verdicts. [184] These ideologies were also practised by

their adherents in South-West Nigeria in addition to their perceptions on the manners of practising Islam by non-*salafis*.Through this, the neo-*salafiyyah* practices in South-West Nigeria can be categorised into *Madkhaliyyah* and *Wahhabiyyah* (*Madkhalism* and *Wahhabism*).

4.8 Advent and Spread of Neo-*Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria

The present *Salafiyyah* practice in South-West Nigeria is referred to as neo-*salafiyyah*. It began around the year 2000 [185]. A number of factors contributed to its emergence. It was born out of the idea of some Muslim youths who perceived that the practice of Islam in the region should be revived to the exact manner that it was practised in the prophetic era and that of *al-Khulafāu ar-Rāshidūn* till the third century of the *Sahābah* that succeeded him[187]. Therefore, it was initially started with the aim of reforming the practice of the religion in Yorubaland to the early era of the pioneer *Salafis*. However, the ideologies and approaches of its propagators have generated a number of questions in the region; not only among the Muslims but also in the society at large. This is so because, there have been many revivals by different scholars since the inception of the spread of Islam to the area till now which were accepted by the Muslims while that of the *salafiyyah* brought controversies. Its spread therefore caused different perceptions on the real meaning of *salafiyyah* and what its present practioners are practising. Some Muslims upheld it as a reform while it was tagged as the expansion of *Madkhaliyyah* or *Madakhilah* to Yoruba region. Not only this, it also causes divisions among Muslims. At present, the Muslims are sub-divided into *salafis* and non-*salafis* in the southwest.

Prior to the present *salafiyyah* in southwest Nigeria, there had been several reforms by some Yoruba Muslim scholars and Islamic movements in the region. This can be regarded as the pre-advent of the present *salafiyyah* in Yoruba region. However, the early scholars that brought reforms into the manner of practising Islam did not claim *salafiyyah* or refer to themselves as *salafis*. Their mode of preaching (*Da'wah*) only centred on reforming the Yoruba society from syncretism and other adulterated acts that crept into the practice of Islam. Among the early reformers were *Shaykh* 'Abdulbaqi Muhammad and *Shaykh* Usamat Uwais. The former was also referred as "Oluko-Agba" [186] (The great teacher). This was due to his high knowledge of Islam. He was a native of Iwo while the latter was from Kuta. The aim and objectives of their *da'wah* activities led

to the establishment of an association named '*Islahuddeen*' (Society for the reform of Islam) and an Arabic school which was also named *Islahuddeen* in 1945 (1366 A.H) [187]. In 1978, the permanent site of the school was situated at Obatedo, Oyo-Ode in Iwo, Osun State.

Shaykh Usmat Uwais was an itinerant preacher. He started his *da'wah* activity from his community and later spread it to neighbouring towns such as Bode-Osi, Iwo and lIe-ogbo[188]. In one of his days on this noble course, he met *Shaykh* 'Abdulbaqi Muhammad who was also a *dā'i* (Islamic preacher). The *da'wah* of both of them centred on reforming the manners of practising Islam in Iwo, Kuta and other neighbouring towns. Having had the same motive, they both jointly emphasised on how Islam would be reformed from syncretism not only in Kuta and Iwo but also in other towns and villages of the cities. An account revealed that *Shaykh* Uwais had been making effort to found an organisation as a forum to be gathering people together to eradicate un-Islamic culture among people of his community but it had not been named before he had the contact with *Shaykh* 'Abdulbaqi [189]. By and large, they deliberated on the formation and named it '*Jam'iyyatu Islāhuddeen*' which means 'the society for the reform of Islam'. As the pioneer leader of the society, *Shaykh* Usamat led the Society for two years and was succeeded by Alhaji 'Abdulbaqi. He left the position because he was made the Chief *Imām* of his home town, Kuta by that time. Shaykh Usamat died on the 5th of January, 1983.

Alhaj Abdulbaqi was a renowned scholar of repute. People used to consult him on religious affairs especially on *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). He was born in 1916 at Ajigbagun compound, Molete, Ile-Ogbo, in Iwo, Osun State. He was versatile in the knowledge of Qurānic exegesis, *Sharī'ah* and *Fiqh*. He was a famous preacher. He began his open air lecture in 1958. His lecture were usually published in Nigerian newspapers especially that of the South West Nigeria such as 'Nigerian Tribune, The Sunday Star, Iwe Irohin and The Sunday Tribune'. He also wrote series of pamphlets and books in Yoruba language on Islamic reform for the benefit of people [190].

The *da'wah* of Shaykh Usamat and Abdulbaqi were spread to many provinces in Iwoland and other towns such as Ajagunla, Ase, Ogbaagba, Telemu, Iwo-oke, Agberire, Ife-Odan, Deure, Oluponna, Alaya, Bode-Osi, Owu, Ogbaagbaa, Igege, Toto, Idi-Iroko,

Obajoko and Oloogun[191]. Their disciples also followed this mission and spread it to various places in and outside Iwoland. They both centred their *da'wah* on monotheism, compulsory use of *niqāb* (face-veil) for Muslim women, condemnation of funeral ceremony, condemnation of syncretism, rejection of any innovation into the practice of Islam, keeping beard for men, seclusion of Muslim wives and condemnation of western education. Not only these, they also criticized many scholars in the towns for adulterating the practice of Islam with Yoruba culture. Intermingling of males and females in the community was also preached against.[190] However, they preached against all these acts with the aim of reviving the practice of Islam from syncretism and to call people to uphold the *Sunnah* of the prophet.

On monotheism, they both urged the people of their communities to be faithful to the oneness of Allah by worshipping Allah according to the dictates of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. They also preached against indigenous or traditional religion. They regarded it as shirk (associating partner with Allah). On *niqāb*, they preached that the female body is naked and it was not ideal for any woman to expose it. Not only this, *hijāb* was also disregarded as a mode of dressing. Thus, they preached against the exposure of female faces which they referred to as compulsory part of body that should be covered. Funeral ceremony was condemned and Muslims were warned to desist from it. It was also tagged as an act of *bid'ah* (innovation) into the funeral rites in Islam. They also established that beard should be kept growing by every male Muslim. This was emphasised in their *da'wah* as part of the *Sunnah* of the Prophet and his *Sahābah* (companion). [191]

In the same vein, they emphasised that women should be in seclusion. They preached that seclusion is the prescribed way of life for women. They added that it is an ideal manner of sanitizing the society from intermingling of male and female in public and also to prevent the society from looking at women's faces which may lead to committing *zina* (fornication and adultery). Similarly, they emphasised on the use of '*Lawani*' (men's turban). They upheld that it is part of the mode of dressing for male Muslims as the *niqāb* is obligatory for the female. Similarly, Islamic knowledge was embraced as the only education that a Muslim needs to acquire. [192]

People were of two different perceptions on the *da'wah* of both. Some people admitted their preaching while some disregarded it and tagged them as "*Aku ma ha obi'*

(miserly people). Similarly, their association was also regarded by some elites in the town as non-conforming, reactionary and retrogressive that did not contribute to the growth of Iwoland and its environment. Negative reaction of the organisation to western education made the elites in the towns decided to establish Ahmadiyyah Grammar School which was later named *Anwarul* Islam Grammar School, Iwo. Additionally, the Muslims clerics ('*Ulamā'*) who were non-members of the *Islāhuddeen* opposed their preachings. These led to series of confrontations with the missionary (Alhaj Bāqi) to the extent that he had to be followed by the police officer for security reason whenever he had a public *da'wah*[192]. After some times, with the intention of the founders to reform the practice of Islam and sanitise the society from syncretism, many of the oppositions embraced the mission of the society and also contributed to its progress in and outside the town. The impacts of the reform led to the Yoruba maxim of 'Iwo, ilu Alfa' (Iwo, the town of Muslim scholars)'. However, the modality for the reform of these two scholars was different from that of the present factions of *salafiyyah* (neo-*salafiyyah*). For instance, there was no segregation among Muslims during the eras of these two scholars as it is today on the activities of the present *salafis*. Not only this, there preachings did not lead to disunity and doctrinal crisis among Muslims. Not only these, there was no notion of division of Muslims into *salafis* and non *salafis* as it is well established nowadays. Their main aim was to inculcate the tenets of Islam into the minds of Muslims through the reform.

In addition to the above, southwest Nigeria also witnessed another several reforms by many scholars, individuals, elites, religious associations and groups of people. Their impacts enlightened Muslims on the doctrines of the religion and paved ways for the growth and development of many communities as well. They started by educating people on the reading and learning of the *Qur'ān*. There residences and *Ratibi* mosques were used as the learning centres. Through their efforts, many young and adult Muslims were able to comprehend Islam more than an act of observing *Salawāt* (prayers) only. Majority of those who could not read the *Qur'ān* acquired the knowledge through their impacts. In addition to this, celebration of completion of the reading of the Qur'ān (*Walimāt al-Khatmi al-Qur'ān*) entised many people to eager to acquire the knowledge of reading of the *Qur'ān*. The learning also included interpretations of some Islamic text books which were purely written in Arabic to Yoruba.[192]

This reform metamorphosed to another form of the revival. In Oyo state for instance, those scholars founded Arabic schools as a mechanism to update the people's horizon on the knowledge of the religion. Some of those schools include *Kharashi* Memorial Arabic School. It was jointly established by Alhaj Muhammad Thani Kharashi and Alhaj S. S. Magaji in 1945. The institution was named after the demise of the former. *Mahad al-ʿArabi* was founded in 1958 by Shaykh ʿAbdussalam Murtadha. Other schools on this trend include *Shamsu Shuhūd al-Islām*. It was formally founded in 1959. Its name was changed from *Madrasah Munawarah* as it was referred to in 1940 when it was first established. Its founder was Shaykh ʿAbdul Majid Ahmad. *Dar al-ʿulūm-al-ʿArabiyyah* was founded in 1973 at Oke-seni, Ibadan and *Daʿwah Islamiyyah* in 1978 by Shaykh Adelani. Also, in Lagos, *Markaz* of Shaykh Adam ʿAbdullah *al-Alūri* was founded. It was first established in Abeokuta before it finally situated at its permanent site at Agege, Lagos State. Other sister schools include *Islāhuddeen* in Iwo, Osun State. It was founded by Alhaj Usamat Uwais and Alhaji ʿAbdulbaqi. There is *Madrasah Kamalddeen* in Ilorin[193]. These institutions reformed the practice of *Islām* by teaching and learning. Besides, there was behavioural reform. It was embarked upon by the indigenous scholars of each community through *daʿwah*. They were referred to as '*Alufa Oniwasi*' (The missioners or preachers). Prominent among them were *Shaykh* Ahmad Awelenje, *Shaykh Adam* Abdullah, *Alfa* Alaga and *Alfa* Bisiriyu Apalara. Those '*Ulamāu'* (scholars) used their knowledge to reform human behaviour to the real principles of Islam. Some influential people in many localities accepted Islam through them and they also used their fame to reform their colleagues. It was through this behavioural reform that the father of the late Alafin of Oyo, Oba Lamidi Adeyemi III accepted Islam. He performed pilgrimage as a monarch and built a mosque inside the palace. The revival was also carried out through oration of some Muslim orators among them is Alhaj Olanrewaju Adepoju. He contributed to the reform through his *Ewi* exponent. Many of his fans and other friends understood the practice of Islam through him and those that were non-Muslims also converted into the religion[194].

In addition, another group of scholars brought the reform through comparative lectures. They preached the basic tenets of *Islam* by using both the *Qur'ān* and Bible. Prominent on this act include Buniyaminu Alalaye, Ajagbemokeferi and Dr. Dawud

Amoo Alaga. Their lecture-series satisfied the need of the contemporary Muslims. Some of these preachers adopted Yoruba and English languages in their lectures. These also enticed some elites and made them to comprehend the details about Islam. Not only these, the Muslim youths in different communities also contributed immensely to this path of revivalism. They established many Muslim circles as avenues to enlighten the masses on the religious practices. Notable among them was the Young Muslim Brothers and Sisters (YOMBAS).

Similarly, some Muslim philanthropists used their resources for the reform through the establishment of schools in various parts of the South West. Their impacts served as an eye opener to Muslims on the significance of the Islamic and western education or balanced education on the propagation of *Islam*. As part of the reform, Ahmadiyyah Muslim Jama'ah with the movement, Anwar al-Islām, Ansārud-Deen Society and Muslim Association of Nigeria established schools in many parts of the region. Till today, these organisations especially *Ansāruddeen* society and *Ahmadiyyah* have schools virtually in all states of South-West Nigeria. Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) also played crucial on the reform. It was founded in 1954. It is the umbrella forum for Muslim-students in secondary schools and higher institutions nationwide. Its methodology of revivalism includes preaching and learning with susbstatial references from the Islamic injunctions. As a knowledge-based-society, its *da'wah* methods are based on the factual evidences from the *Kitāb wa Sunnah* (the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith*). [193]

In 1990, the leadership of the association (MSSN) began to challenge each member to buttress any opinion with the proof from the Qur'an and *Sunnah*; otherwise such opinion would be rendered unauthentic. By this, every member especially the executive was eager to further their acquisition of Islamic knowledge in order to substantiate their opinions with proofs. The notion of challenging any member to prove any religious issue with references from the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* thus made some youths among the members went ahead and started claiming that there is a dire need to return the practice of Islam to the prophetic era as the real solution to revive Islam. By the year 2000, this notion had generated into another idea. Some members argued that substantiating any opinion with references from the Qur'ān and Hadīth are not enough to

preach orthodox Islam but to be practising Islam as it was practised by the pioneer *salafis*.[195] These members also condemned the activities of the society. Through this, those that called for returning to era of *salafis* began to refer to themselves as *Salafiyyun* (*salafis*) since then till mow. This incidence led to the split or pitfall in the association and the emergence of neo-*Salafiyyah* in southwest Nigeria in this century. Those who insisted that the Muslims should return to pristine Islam seceded from the membership and formed their circles in various towns. Additionally, there are other external influences that also contributed to the emergence of this neo-*Salafiyyah*. These are the activities of the graduates of Saudi Arabia who had been inclined towards the neo-*salafiyyah* of Madkhaliyyah and other Arab nations.

The genesis of neo-*Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria is categorised in this study into two viz: internal and external influences. The internal one was caused by the seceded youths among the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria who upheld and are still claiming that the practice of Islam should be returned to the prophetic and *Salafi* eras. Among them were those that were taught by the MSSN scholars in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Second factor was caused by the returnee students from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Cairo and other Arab nations. A number of them came back home and started advocating for pristine Islam. Among the returnees are those that had already belonged to *salafiyyah* groups in those countries (especially those of Saudi Arabia) when they were learning as students. The impact of *da'wah* of the returnees reformed some youths in the communities and some adherents of the MSSN. Their activities therefore inculcated the need for returning to pristine Islam into the minds of the people especially the youths.

Moreover, prior to the year 2000, MSSN had been confronted with internal challenges on the issue of *'aqīdah*, *Sufiyyah*, *Ahmadiyyah* and those who could not substantiate their arguments with the proof from the *Sharī'ah*. So, those who were of *Sufiyyah* and *Ahmadiyyah* ideologies were banned from the membership because they could not defend the practices with any orthodox proof. After much debates, they were hedged out of the MSSN membership when all efforts to reconcile with them proved abortive and the society could not manage their perceptions. This was so, because, both practices are not in conformity with the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* which are the watchwords of the MSSN. Members of the organisation are thus divided into two over the issue of

Salafiyyah. The aftermath of this internal sectarianism led to break-away of some core members. Those who advocated for *salafiyyah* claimed that they are the most pious and thereby calling other members to join their fold. At the onset, when they wanted to secede, they started raising issues of divergence of opinions among the jurists of the Islamic schools of thought. This generated a lot of arguments. So, their secession from the MSSN marked the dawn of mentioning *Salafiyyah* in Yorubaland in this century[196].

In the year 2001, another conflict between the MSSN adherents and those that seceded from its membership by calling to *Salafiyyah* re-occurred at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife over the issue of *niqāb* and seclusion of female Muslims (face-veil and purdah). Meanwhile, such issues had been earlier managed in the Federal University of Technology, Akure (FUTA) in 1995 when there was no faction among the members. A sister was allowed to be using *Niqāb* in the university. Similarly, Fatimah Ishowo was also allowed to use *Niqāb* in the University of Ibadan. Some Universities in southwest Nigeria also permitted its usage. This implies that the purdah is not a real challenge that led to the establishment of neo-*Salafiyyah* but it was used as a process to actualise the dream of its formation in the region. [197]

Another factional discord erupted in the year 2002 at Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) Ife over the *salafiyyah* ideology again. It emerged with resistance. Those who upheld *Salafiyyah* tendencies (among the Muslim students of the institution) were at logger head with the other Muslim students. They were opposing any Muslim student who did not accept their *salafiyyah* ideology. Not only this, they were also antagonistic to all the activities of the society. They formed their group by withdrawing some students from the MSSN programmes. By this, the society was split into two factions in the same campus. There were mainstream MSSN and *Lā jamaʻah* which is also referred to as the splinter. The former is the real MSSN while the latter was formed by the adherents of *salafiyyah* among the students. The mainstream was well recognised by the University Muslim Community and the school management. The splinter on the other hand, is heretical and was accused of extremism, disregard for the established rules of the school and unholy offences against the principles of Islam. It usually advocated for cancelation of the MSSN in the institution with the proof that its formation is of no importance to the practise of Islam on the campus. The criticism led to open discords. As

another plan to achieve its aim, the splinters formed another arm of Muslim students' association which comprised *Salafis* among the male and female students. Fajuyi and Awolowo halls of residence-mosques were used as their secretariats. Through these avenues, they started recruiting people to the *Salafiyyah* and ostracising those that did not abide by their ideologies[198].

This internal conflict gradually escalated to open secession between the two factions. The main causes of their segregation are summed up into four: *Nikāh* solemnisation on the campus without the presence of the parents or guardians of the spouses, imposition of the use of *Niqāb* on female Muslim students, withdrawing female Muslim students from university education and advocacy for cancelation of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria in the institution. On the *Nikāh*, they claimed that a female Muslim can be married to another male Muslim with the permission of the *Amir* without necessarily informing their parents. They argued that the *Amir*'s role represents and as well supersedes that of the parents. There was a case of such in the institution. A female medical student in the OAU was married to one of the *Salafi* brothers without consulting her parent. The *Amir* of the group acted as the *Waliy* in the *Nikāh*. They withdrew her from the campus and took her to Sudan to learn Islamic Studies. After some months, Sudan environment was unfavourable to the spouses. They could not get a job to find their ends-meet. Hence, they returned to Nigeria. After some months, her father (who is a naval officer) was informed about the incidence and he came to the school for its confirmation. He asked those *Salafi* brothers that he wanted to see his daughter. In lieu of answering his request by showing him his daughter, they started crying "*Hayya 'ala Jihād*" which implies "it is time for *Jihad*". However, their '*Jihād'* in question denotes preventing the father to take her daughter back from them. The father who did not dress like military personnel was so infuriated. Through their attempt of '*Hayya 'alā al-jihād*' which might lead to beating the man.; he left the institution for barracks and brought some soldiers. The husband was arrested for this un-Islamic attitude. The lady was taken back by her parent and re-enrolled to the University of Ilorin. Her father was so sad with this incidence. She ought to have graduated as a medical doctor by the time she re-enrolled in the University. [199]

Secondly, *Niqāb* was made obligatory for every female Muslim student. They embarked on this act by preaching against the use of *Hijāb*. They claimed that a female Muslim student that used *Hijāb* was not a pious *Muslimah*. The third cause of their secession centred on their withdrawing female Muslims from the University. They argued that the western education is misleading and cannot benefit them at all. Instead, they preferred Islamic education for them as the only knowledge that they need to acquire at *Madāris*. These acts led to turbulence and confrontations between the two factions to the extent that the school management suspended the Muslim students' religious activities in all halls of residence and locked up the two halls that were used by the *Salafiyyah* advocates[200].

Gradually, they started to spread their ideologies to other higher institutions in southwest Nigeria. They succeeded in establishing their '*aqāid* in some universities such as the University of Ilorin, Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso and Polytechnics among which are the Polytechnic, Ibadan and Federal Polytechnics, Ede[202]. Some female Muslim students were withdrawn from those schools by confusing them that they did not need to acquire western education. Some were even confused that the western knowledge would set them against Allah and deprive them entrance into *al-Jannah*. Through this *da'wah* a number of them dropped out of the schools and accepted to be going to '*Ile-kewu*' (Arabic school) in compliance with their creeds. [201]

The trend of the establishment of *Salafiyah* was facilitated to the whole region by its practitioners. It gained disciples in almost all areas in Yorubaland till this present time. The adherents began the practice by condemning the already established Muslim associations which have been in existence since the advent of Islam in different communities. Meanwhile, these organisations were founded for the growth and development of southwest Nigerian Muslims[202]. On this mission, they ascribed hate names such as *al-Mubtadi'i,* infidels*, ahlu-bid'ah, ahlu-Kufr* and *ahlun-Nār* to any Muslim that does not follow their *Manhaj* (ideology) on issues of divergences of opinions in the *Shari'ah*. This is the beginning of their ascribing *Takfir* to other Muslims who refused to join their practices. Not only this, they also claimed that the entire Muslims have committed a grievous sin by forming associations for propagating Islam. This marked their claiming of '*Lā Jamā'ah*' (cancelation of Muslim group). This ideology led

to their open confrontation with many leaders of Muslim communities. It also divided the *Ummah* into two. While some oppose their '*aqīdah*, some support it by admitting that there is no need of establishing association before Islam can be propagated. [203]

As a measure to put an end to this ideology of condemnation of Muslim associations, series of proactive steps were taken by the 'B zone' executive council of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria. The zone comprises the southwest Nigerian states. One of the measures included open dialogue between the claimants of the *Salafiyyah* and other Muslims. In the year 2005, the first *nadwah* (debate and dialogue) was held for a whole week. The University of Ibadan was chosen as the venue. Scholars of *Salafiyyah* and non-*salafiyyah* were invited from different towns across the region. The primary motive behind this *nadwah* was to call the *salafis* to order on ideologies which are contrary to the dictates of the existing practices of the religion in southwest Nigeria. They (*salafis*) agreed with the discussions of the debates. However, they returned to their '*aqīdah* (doctrine) after the debates[204].

Another similar *nadwah* was held at Ibadan central mosque, Oja-Oba. Scholars were invited from various towns of the region among who were Alhaj Abdurrasheed Hadiyyatullah, from Iwo, Osun State, Dr. Idris Sekoni from Akure, Ondo State, Professor A.A. Oladosu, Professor Abideen Olaiya (an ex-zonal Amir of the MSSN), *Shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya, Miftah Mikail, Alhaj *Shaykh* Isa Akindele (the founder of *Tadhamunul Muslimin*, Ibadan) and many ebullient '*Ulamā'*. This *Nadwah* constructively criticised some of the ideologies of the *Salafi* scholars. Through the debate, some disciples withdrew from following the practice. This was so because; some of the acts of the scholars that are not Islamic were known through series of discussions in the congregation. It also served as an eye opener for them on the real manner of practising Islam. Majority of their disciples were reformed though this *nadwah* while some are still following the ideology. Meanwhile, the *salafiyyah* scholars among who were *ustadh* Jabata, *Shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya, Miftah Mikail (*Abu* Rahimah) insisted that there is no need for formation of any Muslim forum with the aim of spreading Islam. Abu Rahimah was of the opinion that every Muslim should belong to his group which he named '*al-Muslimun*'. Shaykh Amubieya expressed that the Muslims can form a group but it should not be tagged with any name. Their ideology was against the verdict of the

Nadwah. The congregation concluded that assemblage of many people as a group calls for a title through which each group would be referred to by the public. Such group can be named by its policy or by the name of its founder or leader. They also agreed that there cannot be a nameless group[205].

After many deliberations at the different *Nadwah*, it was obvious that the *Salafiyyah* advocates wanted the movement to be reckoned with in every Yoruba community by inventing new ideas. Such ideas include imposing their ideologies on many divergent issues that are not supposed to cause disunity among the *Ummah*. They also wanted to return the practice of Islam to the period when there were conflicting tendencies among the founders of *al-Madhahib al-Arba'a*: Imams Malik, Hambal, Shafi'i and Abu Hanifah. Each institution was founded on its founder's verdicts on interpretation of the *Sharī'ah*. That is the reason why their agreements are different on some aspects of *Usul ad-Din*. However, only what can cause division among Muslims are differences in the fundamental doctrines and pillars of Islam. By their '*aqaid*, they (neo-*salafis*) wanted every Muslim in the southwest Nigeria to follow their path without considering the environmental culture (*'urf*). For instance, there are disparities in the culture of Arab nations from the South-West Nigerian culture which is a multi-religious society. The concession of the entire Muslims in the debates was to uphold the '*aqāid* of *Ahlusunnah wal Jamā'ah* and be referred to as Muslims. They also agreed that there would continue to be differences on certain decisions but such disparities should not lead to secession from the fold of the Muslim community. [206]

Those who broke away from the MSSN also continued to facilitate the spread of *Salafiyyah* in many communities. Each of them had held executive post in the Society prior to the incidence. For instance, Dr. Luqman Idris Sekoni served as a Director of Studies; Qamaruddeen Bello was an ex-unit *Amir* at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife and a former executive member at the 'B Zone' in 1999. He later became the Imam of Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko, Ondo State. He also served as secretary to Islamic Affairs under the leadership of Professor Abiddeen Olaiya, the then Amir [206].

Similarly in Osun State, advocacy for *Salafiyyah* also began by those who seceded from the MSSN[207]. It started over the conflict on the headship of the society. An account revealed that some of the members of the Association who inclined into the *Manhaj*

salafiyyah claimed to be in the position of the MSSN executive posts at an *usrah*. However, due to the fear that they might cause havoc to the Society, they were not appointed to the posts. This made them to break-away from the Society. In Ede for instance, the practice of the *Sunnah* was established by the MSSN. The organisation introduced the orthodox practice of *Islam* to the people through its *da'wah*. Most of the Muslims who had been adulterating the practice of Islam with syncretism rejected the mixing of the traditional mode of worship with Islam. Majority of them became *ahlus Sunnah wal jamā'ah*. This impact of MSSN was felt not only in the town but also in schools[208].

After a long period of its propagation, there emerged segregation among its members at the unit level. The unit level of the Society is also referred to as the state branch. Some of them called for reviving the propagation of Islam to the prophetic era as well as the eras of first to the third generations that succeeded him. Prominent on this notion were Abu Hanun and *ustadh* Habeebullah. They were scholars of Islamic studies. The former is an indigene of Ife while the latter was from Ede. The two of them along with other brothers were tutors of Arabic and Islamic Studies. Abu Hanun is versed in the knowledge of *Hadith* while *Ustādh* Habeebullah is an *Hāfis* of the *Qur'ān*. They were initially teaching at the *Madrasah at-Tawhid* at Oke Iresi in Ede. Not only these, both also usually led the *Jum'ah* prayer on weekly rotation for a long periods of time. Prior to their segregation, they formed a group and tagged themselves *ahl-at-Tawhid*. They were using *Madrasah at-tawhid* for teaching and learning purposes. However, internal discord that broke out between the two of them made *ustadh* Habeebullah *al-Edewiy* decided to leave the group. Through this conflict, he vacated the *madrasah* and established his own school along Agip area. By and large, their split brought two *salafiyyah* factions to Ede and they are operating independently. There *salafiyyah* ideologies were also inherited and spread by their students who came from various parts of the State. [209]

Neo -*Salafiyyah* was facilitated in Ibadan by *ustadh* Sulayman Hamzah. He was a former *Amīr* of the University of Ilorin and also a former Director of Studies of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria at the central branch. He left the Society and began the propagation of *Salafiyyah*. His activity and that of *Shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya, Dr. Sharafuddeen Raji Gbadebo as well as other *salafis* contributed to the spread of the

salafiyyah to many areas in Ibadan, Ogbomoso and Oyo State in general. Shaykh Najimuddeen and Murtadha Adedokun are the pioneer founders of neo-*Salafiyyah* in Lagos State. He was also an executive member of the MSSN. He was an Imam of Fajuyi hall of residence of the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife in 1990[210]. *Salafiyyah* ideology in Ogun State can be categorised into three. They are referred to as the mind, violent and severe factions. 'The mind' are those who uphold the *salafiyyah* creeds but do not ascribe the appellation to themselves. They strongly believed that every Sunni-Muslim is a *Salafi* if he or she abides by the dictates of the *Qur'ān* and Hadīth. The second and third categories are those that arrogated the title to themselves and condemned non-*Salafi* Muslims in the State [211]. Similarly, its practice in Ondo began through the impacts of some Muslim brothers who are also among the scholars in the town. They included *ustadh* Ma'ruf 'Abdulghaniy (who is also referred to as *Abu Ramlah*), *ustadh* Hashim Omotayo, Ridwanullah Sulayman and *ustadh* Mahmud Kuranga. Abu Ramlah established an *halqah* (a circle of learning) along Rainbow area to enlighten the adherents on the concept of *Salafiyyah* [212]. Another *Halqah* was formed by *Ustadh* Mahmud in the town. The adherents can be classified into two. Some are moderate in the ideology while there are those who are severe. The moderate upheld that every *Sunni* Muslim is *ahlus-Sunnah wa Jamā'ah* and also a *Salafi*. 'The severe' arrogated the appellation to themselves and claim to be the most pious Muslims [213].

4.9 Factions of Neo-*Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria

There are different factions of neo-*salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. This is due to the different manners of its propagation by its adherents. The differences are due to their factional perceptions on some Islamic verdicts. The factions are summed up in this work as *salafiyyah* of minority of former members of the MSSN leaders who broke away from the membership, *salafiyyah* of returnees from *Arab* nations (*Madkhalism* etc), moderate *salafiyyah*, educated, individual, anti-political, *Salafiyyah Takfiriyyah*, *Lā Jamā'ah,* anti-western, *Taqlidiyyah,* campus *salafiyyah* (splinter), local scholars, serious and *salafiyyah hizbiyyah* or *ustādhiyyah* (Partisan *salafiyyah*)[214]. Each of them is succinctly discussed below.

The first faction of neo-*salafiyyah* was started by the minority leaders among the executive members of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) around year

2000. They seceded from the Society over some sectional ideologies and claiming of superiority of their *Imān* (Faith) above other members. Such ideologies were centred on their perception that Islam should be practised in the exact manner that it was demonstrated in the prophetic and his *Sahabah* eras. This is tagged by them as the pristine-Islam. Others evolved round purdah, *Nikāh, Niqāb*, anti-western education and *Lā Jamā'ah* (advocating for cancelation of the existing Muslim organisations). Those leaders decamped from the membership of the MSSN and began the formation of *salafiyyah*[215].

Next to the above faction is that of the returnees from the Arab countries. As part of efforts to acquire advanced Arabic and Islamic knowledge, some students from private *Madāris* (Arabic institutions) got educational scholarship to some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Cairo, Kuwait, United Arab Emirate and Qatar. Some of those students especially those that travelled to Saudi Arabia and Cairo became the adherents of Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab and other scholars of *salafiyyah's* advocates. Not only these, some of them were the disciples of the neo-*Salafiyyah* of Madkhaliyyah that emerged in Saudi Arabia in 1990. Upon their return, they began to spread the *manhaj Wahhabiyyah* and Madakhilah by condemning the existing manners of practising Islam in their different localities in the region. In the same vein, some Muslims in various towns who perceived the mode of practising Islam by some scholars who did not travel to Arab countries as unorthodox accepted the ideologies of the returnees and also gave preference to the *da'wah* of those returnees over other scholars. [216]

Partisan *Salafiyyah* is also referred to in this study as factional *Salafiyyah*. It emerged among the scholars of *salafiyyah* over their different interpretations of Islamic verdicts and condemnation of salafi scholars by another salafi scholar' opinions on Islamic issues. It gradually led to a situation whereby the adherents praise only their scholars over another and condemn some. It brought the notion of hero-worship of their leaders. Hence, it (*salafiyyah*) turned to *shaykhiyyah* and *ustadhiyyah*. Each adherent only praises his leader and condemns others. At present, there are *shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya *salafiyyah*, Abu Rahimah, *salafiyyah* of Abu Ibeji, Dr. Sirajuddeen Gbadebo, Dr. Idris Sekoni and 'Abdulghaniy Jum'ah *salafiyyah* among others.

Campus *Salafiyyah* operates in every higher institution in the southwest. It was formed by the adherents of the *salafiyyah* groups among the students. It was purposely

established with the aim of not only disrupting the activities of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria on campuses but also to eradicate it. Its objective was to cancel the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria with the claim that there is no need of establishing the MSSN before a Muslim student can understand and practise Islam. In some cases, it recruited students outside the campus as oppositions to the programmes of the MSSN. More so, some students (especially females) have been confused on their academic careers that the western education is a deceit and anti-Islamic knowledge. Through this, some of them were withdrawn from the schools. Therefore, its existence on the higher institutions usually causes myriads of problems for Muslim students. Such problems at time led to closure of the mosques and suspension of both the MSSN and *salafiyyah* adherents as a mechanism to restore peace in some higher institutions in the region.

Politics is construed by the anti-political *salafiyyah* as a system that opposes the dictates of Islam. Not only this, it also argues that the Nigerian democracy is antithetical to the Islamic polity. The adherents of this faction do not participate in any election or voting. They preach against democracy and advocate for adoption of Islamic political system in many states of the south west Nigeria and as well Nigeria at large. [217]

Lā Jamāʿah Salafiyyah is in every area of the south west Nigeria. It is a faction that condemns establishment of all the existing Muslim organisations in the Yorubaland. Initially, it started with the notion of condemning the established Islamic societies. The already existing Muslim organisations are regarded as non-orthodox while their scholars are tagged *ahlu-l-Kufr*. Disciples of this faction among the youths are those that are disrupting the activities of the MSSN in higher institutions.

Another arm of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria is *Takfiriyyah.* It is a faction that tags the manner of practising Islam by the non-*salafi* Muslims as *kufr, harrām* and *bidʿah.* This is so because; any act that a non-*salafi* which was not done by the Prophet or his companions is regarded by them as an unlawful act which should not be performed by any Muslim. Thus, other Muslims are referred to as *ahl al-kufr, ahl al-bidʿah* and *ahl an-nār*.

Individual *salafiyyah* was borne out of the perception of some Muslims on the *daʿwah* of *salafiyyah* scholars. Some Muslims were fascinated by the preaching of some *salafi* scholars and they too started the practice without affiliating to any particular group. Among them are those who have been yearning for an avenue to comprehend the dictates

of Islam. Therefore, they upheld the tenets of the movement as the orthodox creed and they also become self-*salafis* without belonging to a particular faction.[218]

Another faction is classified as the moderate or educated *salafiyyah* faction. It comprised some scholars and adherents of the movement who are well educated and moderate in their practices of the ideology. They upheld it without neglecting western education or regarding non-*Salafi* Muslims as infidels. They are of the opinion that the *Sunnah* of the Prophet can be practised according to an individual's perception based on the Hadīh:

$$وَمَا أَمَرْتُكُمْ بِهِ فَافْعَلُوا مِنْهُ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ$$

"... whatever I commanded you to do, do from it
as you are capable to do so… (Sahih Bukhari, 6858).

Anti-western *Salafiyyah* perceives the acquisition of the western education as the root-cause of adulteration of Islamic tenets. According to them, the western system of education was designed to mislead Muslims and deprive them *al-Jannah*. Majority of members of this faction are the returnees from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations. The *Salafiyah* practitioners of this branch have been banned from preaching in higher institutions by the national executive council of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN).

4.10 An Overciew of '*Aqāid Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria

Salafis in south-West Nigeria uphold certain beliefs or practices which serve as their doctrines ('*Aqāid*). These practices are based on the following:

***Wahdaniyyatu-Allah*:** This is the concept of belief in unification of Allah. The concept is distinctively categorised into three in *salafiyyah* viz: *at-Tawhīd al-Ulūhiyyah, al-'Ibādah* and *al-Asmāu was-Sifāt Allah.* The first category deals with belief in Allah as the creator, sustainer, provider, giver of security and cherisher. The second aspect expresses '*Ibādah* which means the act of worship in Islam and all what Allah loves in deeds and utterances. The last segment is the belief in the names and attributes of *Allah*.[218]

***Al-walau wa Al-barrau*:** This '*aqīdah* centres on interpersonal relationship among *salafi* practitioners only. It connotes friendliness with only *salafis* and dissociating from non-*salafis* in the society. They uphold this doctrine by regarding to themselves as the true Muslims while other Muslims are tagged infidels. By this, any Muslim who does

not abide by the ideology of *salafiyyah* is dissociated from by the salafis and he is also regarded as a disbeliever. This is a reason while *salafis* are always hostile with non-*Salafis*.

Lā jamā'ah* (condemnation of Islamic associations):** This *salafiyyah's* doctrine forbids formation of any Muslim association in South West Nigeria. The movement upholds that it is a bad innovation to establish an association before Islam can be propagated. By this, all Islamic associations are condemned and regarded as *harrām.* It is on this *'aqīdah* that MSSN, Ansaruddeen society, *Ta'awunul Muslimīn* and other sister associations are condemned and tagged as *bid'ah* by the neo-*salafis*. They substantiate this *'aqīdah* with their interpretation of a verse of the *Qur'an* which states that:

وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ قَوْلًا مِّمَّن دَعَا إِلَى اللَّهِ
وَعَمِلَ صَالِحًا وَقَالَ إِنَّنِي مِنَ الْمُسْلِمِين

The best person is he who calls to the path
of Allah, be of righteous deeds and says I
am a Muslim (Qur'an 41: *Ayah* 33).

According to their doctrine on the above verse, *salafis* express that the verse does not mention formation of any Islamic forum as a need for the propagation of Islam. Instead, they claim that it enjoins every Muslim to call to the path of Allah individually. This is the general *'aqīdah* of all the factions of *salafiyyah* since its inception in the southwest Nigeria.

Forbidding of Kneeling and prostrating: These two acts are forbidden in the *manhaj salafiyyah*. They argued that prostration and kneeling are only meant for Allah alone but they are forbidden for any other creature of *Allah*. A reference from the *Qur'ān* is cited on this creed. It reads thus:

وَأَنَّ الْمَسَاجِدَ لِلَّهِ فَلَا تَدْعُوا مَعَ اللَّهِ أَحَدًا

And the mosques (also all body
parts) are for *Allah* alone, and do
not invoke anyone else in it…

The word '*masajid*' in the above verse means body parts and mosques. However, salafis upheld that it refers to the whole human body parts. Hence, they interpreted that the whole human body parts are for the worship of *Allah* alone; and none of them should be used to prostrate for a creature of *Allah*. This *'aqīdah* is contested by other Muslims

who are not *salafis*. They argued against its interpretation in *salafiyyah*. According to them, the word '*masājid*' means mosques. They (non-*salafis*) also argued that the verse reminds every Muslim of the significance of mosque as the sacred place to worship only Allah ascribing no any partner with Him.

Rejection of *Bid'ah*: *Salafiyyah* '*Aqīdah* upholds that Islam should be practised in the exact manner that it was demonstrated by the Prophet. By this, addition of scholarly opinions on certain aspects of its practice are not only condemned but also regarded as *bid'ah* and *harrām*. They emphasise on this '*aqidah* by expressing that the Prophet had completed the manner of practising Islam. Qur'an five *Ayah* three is usually quoted on this doctrine:

الْيَوْمَ أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي
وَرَضِيتُ لَكُمُ الإِسْلاَمَ دِينًا

This day, I have perfected your religion
for you, completed my favour upon you,
and have chosen Islam for you as your
religion... (Q.5: 3).

Condemning the manner of '*aqīqah* (naming ceremony) celebration by non-*salafis*: This '*aqīdah* states that the '*aqīqah* ought to be done by distributing the slaughtered-ram without cooking it. They argued that the hadith on '*aqīqah* does not mention cooking the ram with soup or serving it with food. This doctrine postulates that addition of other things such as soup, food and drinks is *bid'ah*. On this premise, it (*salafiyyah*) maintains that the ram(s) should be cut into pieces and given to those who witness the '*aqiqah*. It is through this doctrine that they antagonise the mode of naming celebration by non-*salafi* Muslims in the communities. [219]

***Wājibātu-n-Niqāb*:** *Niqāb* is made compulsory on every female Muslim as the mandatory mode of dressing. It is considered as the sacred attire that must be worn by female Muslims. They argue that the *niqāb* is divinely chosen for every *Muslimah*. Thus, *hijāb* is condemned as a mode of dressing. They added that any *salah* that a female prays with *hijāb* is void and unacceptable. Some of them even admit that any female Muslim that disregards the use of *niqāb* is a nominal Muslim and her practice of Islam is deficient.

Condemnation of the manner of *Nikāh* (Marriage) solemnisation of non-*salafis*: *Nikah* which is an essential part of Islamic rites on every mature Muslim and

Muslimah has been conducted since the advent of Islam in the region. However, the manner of its solemnisation is considered unorthodox and against the dictates of the *Sharī'ah* by the *salafis*. They claimed that the *Nikāh* should be conducted based on the only the prerequisites: *Ijāb* (offer), *Qubūl* (acceptance), *Shahādatayn* (two witnesses), *Waliy* (guardian) and *Mahr* (dower). They therefore, condemn addition of other requirements of its solemnisation such as collection of money and food items from the groom's family as well as *walīmah*, hiring of chairs, tables, and renting of halls. They buttress their notion that all these additional requirements are nothing but *bid'ah*. Not only these, the usual intermingling of male and female during the solemnisation is also tagged *zinah*.

Takfīriyyah: This is another '*aqīdah* of the neo-*salafiyyah* in southwest Nigeria. It is an act of ascribing *Kufr* (infidelity) to non-*salafi*. They uphold that *salafiyyah* is the only path that a Muslim should abide by. As a result of this notion, whoever contradicts the doctrine is labelled as *Ahlu al-kufr* (a disbeliever) and *ahlun–Nār* (inmate of the hell-fire). Adherents of other Muslim associations are also tagged *kuffār*. [220]

Condemning *'Itikāf* in other mosques besides *Makkah* and *Madinah*: This *'aqīdah* is adopted with their claim that '*Itikāf* was neither observed by any of the companions of the Prophet in other mosques except in the *Ka'abah* and *Masjid an-Nabiyy* in Madinah. Hence, performing it in *masājid* (mosques) in Yorubaland is regarded as not only contradiction to the prophetic act but also a *bid'ah*.

Perception on *Hijāb*: Wearing *hijāb* is not recommended in the *salafiyyah* ideology. They argued that it does not cover the face, hands and legs of a *Muslimah*. *Niqāb* is thus made compulsory on all female Muslims in their doctrines. By this, any female Muslim that uses hijāb is not recognised as a true believer but a nominal female Muslim.

Ascription of *Salafi* nomenclature: *Salafiyyah* adherents adopt '*salafi*' as the unique name that distinguishes them from other Muslims. They maintain that the name portrays them as the most pious *Mu'min*. However, they also bear other peculiar nomenclatures but *salafi* is the most common to all of them.

Rejection of democracy: Nigerian democratic system of governance is tagged as secular political system that is characterized with many atrocities. They therefore

condemn its principle and call for Islamic system of administration. Also, any Muslim that supports democracy is condemned and rebuked as a *kāfir*. [221]

Voting is a *kufr*: In addition to the rejection of democracy, neo-*salafis* regarded voting as an act of *kufr*. They argued that election was introduced in the southwest from western philosophy against the principle of *shūrah*. This is the reason why *salafis* do not vote or participate in any election. Not only this, they also preached against the Nigerian system of government.

Returning to pristine Islam: *Manhaj Salafiyyah* calls to the early manner of practising Islam in the periods of the pioneer *salafis*. It claims that a lot of external ideologies have been crept into the present manner of practising Islam in Yorubaland through modernity and western ideology. It therefore lays much emphasis on this creed. This '*aqīdah* is the primary motive behind the emergence of *Salafiyyah* in Southwest Nigeria with the aim of separating the western ideologies from the real doctrines of Islam.

Congregational supplication is a *bid'ah*: Individual supplication (*adhkār*) is only allowed in *salafiyyah*. The adherents disregard any collective or joint supplication by a group of Muslims. They maintained that neither the Prophet nor the pioneer *salaf aṣ-ṣalihīn* gathered together for joint supplications in group.

Rejecting the *Taslim* of non-*salafi*-Muslims: Adherents of some factions of the movement do neither say *taslīm* (Islamic salutation) nor answer the *taslīm* of non-*salafi*-Muslims. To some, it is believed that a non-*salafi* Muslim is synonymous to an infidel. They argued that since the *Taslīm* is not meant for a *Kafir*; a non-*salafi* is also not entitled to be greeted with the *taslīm*.[222]

Prescription of *madrasah* education for female Muslims: To some *salafis*, *Madrasah* education is prescribed as the only form of literacy for female Muslims. This is buttressed in their creed that the western education is not useful for them. They added that western education misleads female Muslims from their responsibilities towards the real practice of Islam. Besides, they also argued that the Islamic education is the only form of knowledge that a *Muslimah* needs to acquire. They claimed that the female education is not necessary to be acquired in a University. This is the reason why they do withdraw female Muslim students from higher institutions.

***Shaykhiyyah* and *Ustādhiyyah*:** This *'aqīdah* emerged due to sectional ideology among the neo-*salafis*. It is an ideology of quoting the verdicts of a *salafiyyah* factional leader as the only solution to arrive at the conclusion on Islamic issues in lieu of citing references form the sources of the *Sharī'ah*. The leaders of each group therefore serve as the reference points for their disciples. For instance, there are adeherents of *Shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya, Sulayman Hamzah, Jabata, Abu Ibeji, Abdulghaniy Jum'ah, Abu Raheemah, Abu Ramlah, Dr. Idrees Sekoni and Dr. Sharafuddeen Raji Gbadebo …[222].

Rejection of the MSSN constitution: Besides their condemnation of the establishment of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria and its activities, *salafis* also reject the constitution of the society. They upheld that the leadership of the MSSN has completely deviated from the principles of Islam by enacting the constitution. They claimed that the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith* of the Prophet are the guiding principles of Muslims in all affais of life [223].

Rejection of chieftaincy titles: Ascribing chieftaincy titles such as *"Seriki Adini, Giwa Adini, Balogun Adini,* and *Iya Sunnah*. are regarded as *Bid'ah*. They prove that distinguishing Muslims with such titles is *harrām*.

Hostility to *Sufiyyah*: The practice of *sufism* is a condemnable act in *manhaj salafiyyah*. The adherents uphold that *sufiyyah* is a baseless act of devotion that cannot be proved from the *Kitāb wa-Sunnah*. Therefore, *sufism* is tagged as *bid'ah* while the *sufis* are labelled as *ahlun-Nār*. [224]

Substitution of the *ummah's* leaders: The *salafis* advocates for replacement of the clerics of all the early Muslim associations. They regard those leaders as naïve clerics who are not competent to be religious leaders. Hence, they upheld that they should be replaced with *salafiyyah* scholars whom they claimed are ebullient and religious.

Campus faction of the *salafiyyah* is of the *'aqīdah* of conducting *Nikāh* in which the *Amīr* acts in the position of the *Waliy* (parent or guardian). This *'aqīdah* is adopted with their proof that the role of an *Amīr* supersedes that of the parents or guardians of the spouse; therefore, *nikāh* can be conducted by the *Amīr* without necessarily informing the parents.

Forbiddance of Islamic Vacation Course (IVC): Islamic Vacation Course is a periodic *da'wah* enlightenment progamme of some Islamic associations in Yorubaland. It

is usually organised by the *Muslim* Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN), *Ansaruddeen* society, Muslim Association of Nigeria and others. This vacation course is forbidden in the '*aqidah salafiyyah* due to the intermingling of males and females.

Female participating in the Islamic Vacation Course is *bid'ah*: Participation of a *Muslimah* either married or single in the periodic IVC is also regarded as *harrām*. It is cited by the movement that the vacation course creates rooms for unnecessary intermingling of males and females. Such act is therefore regarded as an outrageous forum that may lead to *zinah* in the society. This doctrine also states that the participation of women in the public occasion such as the IVC negates the dignity of women whom they claimed are supposed to be in seclusion. [224]

Some factions made it obligatory for their children at the age of six years to be using *niqāb*. They maintained that its usage at the tender age will make their children familiar with *niqāb* when they grow to the marriageable age.

Talfīq: This is an aspect of the *Sharī'ah* in which a Muslim may abide by the verdict of any of the four schools of the Islamic thought in addition to the Qur'*ā*n and Hadīth. The case is different in *salafiyah*. The adherents proclaimed that any of the schools that they follow is the best for every Muslim to follow. Precisely, *madhhab* of Imam *Hambali* is given preference and regarded as the orthodox one.

Tasbīh is *kufr*: Using *Tasbīh* or rosary in counting the number of supplication is condemnable in *salafiyyah*. It is claimed as an act that is against the use of fingers. Therefore, counting of any supplication with the use of rosary is rejected in their *'Aqīdah*.

Hajj without *Mahram*: The manner of performing *Hajj* in South West Nigeria especially by women without their husbands is regarded as *Harrām* in the '*aqīdah*. The movement forbids for a married woman to embark on the pilgrimage alone. By this, performing *Hajj* by a *Muslimah* without her husband is tagged *bid'ah*. They corroborate their creed with the prophetic tradition which states that "It is unlawful for a woman to embark on a journey except with her protector or husband".

Condemning the non-*salafi* scholars: other Muslim scholars who are non-*salafis* are not regarded as competent scholars in *salafiyyah* practice. They are accused of propagating *bid'ah* in the society and leading the people astray. They are also referred as

the causes of misleading acts on the manner of propagating Islam. Majority of them are also labelled as ignorant of the knowledge of the religion.

Defamation of Scholars: This is a doctrine of giving preferences to only *Salafi* scholars over others. Not only this, it also includes dissociating from verdicts of any non-*Salafi* Muslim jurists. Hence, the non-*salafiyyah* scholars are believed to be unorthodox. Some factions of *salafiyyah* even defame scholars of another faction of *salafiyyah*.

Ascription of hate names to non-*Salafi* Muslims: This ideology upholds that other Muslims are charlatans by rejecting the path of *salafiyyah*. Some factions named the non-*salafis* infidels, *Ahlu bid'ah*, *Ahlu kufr* and *Ahlun-nār*. They added that the practice of Islam of such Muslims has been compromised by the western ideologies.

Wearing long-trouser is *kufr*: In *salafiyyah*, the normal sizeable length of a trouser is either below the knee-cap or not beyond the ankle. This doctrine is against any trouser that is long beyond the knee cap or ankle. Thus, any Muslim that wears such trouser is regarded as inmate of hell-fire. [225]

Condemnation of female associations: establishment of Muslim female associations is forbidden in the *manhaj as-salafiyyah* with the proof that its formation does not contribute to the propagation of Islam. They added that females are not allowed to be propagating *da'wah* in public places like men[225]. Through this, formation of Muslim women organisations such as Federation of Muslim Women Association in Nigeria (FOMWAN) and *Alasalatu 'Ibadu* Rahman Society of Nigeria (AIBRASON) are regarded as *bid'ah*. Additionally, establishment of women-wing by other Muslim associations is also regarded as *harrām*.

Wearing *Jalābiyyah*: *Jalābiyyah* is a long loose garment worn by male Muslims especially during the prayer time. It is a long garment that distinguishes male Muslims in a society. However, it is not compulsory for a male Muslim to wear *Jalābiyyah*. Hence, other types of cloth such as shirts, trousers, Kaftan are also recommended for a male Muslim. Meanwhile, most *Salafis* upheld that *Jalābiyyah* is the best attire that Muslims should be waering. They upheld this doctrine with their proof that it covers the *awrah* (nakedness) of Muslims and it is *Sunnah*. Some factions therefore disregard shirt and trousers. They support their argument that trouser and shirt show man's body private part

of which he is supposed to keep. This is the reason why majority of them usually wear *Jalābiyyah*.[227]

 Echoing the sayings of Imam in *salah* is a *bid'ah* in *salafiyyah manhaj*. They buttress this that none of the *sahabah* did such act. They also concluded that the *Imam's* voice is enough for the *Ma'mum*. Thus, the *Mua'dhin* is not expected to be repeating what the Imam is saying in the process of performing *şalah*[226].

 Some *Salafis* condemn tiling a mosque or praying on a rug. They argued that the Prophet did not pray on a tile or rug. Some factions also added that neither the tiles nor rug were used by the Prophet or his companions who were the pioneer *salaf aş-şalihin*. Therefore, they opposed the uses of such items. Other factions lay emphasis on polygamous marriage. They argued that it is part of the *Sunnah* that was practised by the Prophet as well as the *sahābah* and pioneer *salafis*.

4.11 Results and Discussion of the Findings

 This sub-section of the chapter presents the results of the data collected from the field through qualitative methodology. The data were retrieved on the *Salafiyyah* practices in South-West Nigeria and were examained in two phases. The first section dealt with the socio-demographic characteristics of the key informants, while the second phase focused on the analysis of the findings. The information were gathered via interviews from the sampled respondents in the South-West states and analysed as presented below.

Section A
a. Distribution of the respondents based on gender

 The researcher considered the gender in the selection of the respondents. This is due to the propagation of the practice which involves both male and female Muslims. There are male adherents of *salafiyyah* as well as female practitioners. They were both randomly selected and interviewed separately at different communities in the study area. All the respondents are Muslims. However, they are classified into *salafis* and non-*salafis*. The non-*salafis* were also interviewed purposely to examine their perceptions on the *salafiyyah* practice.

b. Distribution of the interviewees based on states of residence

 The respondents were contacted at different parts of the states of South-West Nigeria which represent the Yoruba speaking area in Nigeria. Their selections were from

different towns and villages across each of the six states that make up the region: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo. For effective data collection, educational backgrounds of the respondents were also considered. These consisted of first degree, Masters and Ph.D. holders. Besides, some Muslim students of higher institutions, Islamic clerics and Imams were also interviewed.

c. Distribution of the respondents based on occupation

Occupational careers of the interviewees were considered on the selection. They were teachers, *Alfas* (Muslim clerics), Imams and lecturers. The teachers are Muslims in public and private institutions across the selected areas in each state. The *Alfas* were selected from different mosques, Islamic learning centres and their residences. Imams were also randomly interviewed at different mosques. Lecturers were contacted at their offices and residences as scheduled by individuals. All the respondents were Muslims.

Section B: Results from the findings

Salafiyyah **Practices in South-West Nigeria: Issues and Discourses**

The variables were based on the practices of *salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. The adherents or practioners were selected as well as the non-*Salafis*. The interviews were conducted on the practices which include: *Al-walau wa al-Barrau* (Love and disavowal), perception on *bid'ah and muharramāt,* Perception on '*Aqīqah* (Naming Ceremony), belief about *Niqāb* (face veil, purdah), *Nikāh* in the *Salafiyah, Takfīriyyah* (declaration of a non-*Salafi* Muslim as an infidel), *Lā Jamā'ah* (Abrogation of Muslim associations), notions on democracy among the *Salafis*, returning to pristine Islam and defamation of non-*salafi* Islamic Scholars. These variables are subjected to qualitative analysis.

a. When did the *Salafiyyah* emerge in South-West Nigeria?

Perception of the Prevalence of *Salafiyah* Ideology in South-West Nigeria:

The results of the interviews showed that some Muslims in South-West Nigeria are practising *salafiyyah*. Those who practise it among the Muslims are also referred to as *Salafis*. This explains that their practice is *Salafiyyah* while they are *Salafis* or adherents of *Salafiyyah*. According to Abdulateef[227] (who is a *salafi*), he expressed that there are *Salafis* in Yorubaland. He sighted himself as an adherent. He supported his response that all his friends are also *Salafis*. He added that, it (neo-*salafiyyah*) emerged in Yorubaland

around early 2000 and it continued to spread till now. He concluded that there are *Salafis* in virtually all cities, towns and villages in South-West Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole. He quoted himself as an adherent of Dr. Sharafuddeen Raji Gbadegbo who he described as an ebullient scholar of *salafiyyah* in Ogbomoso. Other practitioners he mentioned included *Shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya and Dr. Idris Sekoni. His statement was also supported by the responses of Olaiya[228]. He responded that the present or neo-*salafiyyah* began in Yorubaland around year 2000 and it has since then been spread to many parts of the region. He cited some of the leaders of the movement among who are those that are named above. He added that Dr. Sharafuddeen lives in Ogbomoso, *Shaykh* Sulayman in Ibadan and Dr. Idris resides at Akure in Ondo State. Each of them has students in all areas of Yorubaland and Nigeria in general who are also spreading their *da'wah* of *salafiyyah*.

Similarly, the responses of non-*Salafis* affirmed that there is neo-*salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. They added that the activities of the movement are well obvious in this era than when it was first started. They responded that the practice of *salafiyyah* in this era was initially brought to Yorubaland in the year 2000 by some young Muslim brothers who were also named as Alfas by then. They argued that the brothers were among the members of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria and the graduates of Arab nations. They added that there are many *Salafis* in the region nowadays than when it was initially emerged. Burhanuddeen[229], Dhikrullah[230] and Shakirullah[231] argued that the emergence of the movement began in the year 2000 through the preaching of some *Sunni* Muslim brothers in some mosques. They expressed further that the preaching was condemned by some *Imams* of most of the mosques in Yorubaland. Burhanuddeen cited 'ita Aare Egbe omo in Ibadan' as a sample. His statement was also supported by Khadijah[232]. She expatiated that *salafiyyah* began when some young Muslim scholars emerged and were preaching to people to be more religious on the tenets of Islam by becoming *salafis*. She said that the trend of their *da'wah* continued till now. She also responded that some *Sunni* Muslim brothers have inclined into *salafiyyah* in this era. By and large, the responses of both showed that some Muslims called to the practice of *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland as a method of preaching Islam. Not only this, it is also affirmed that it started around year 2000 and continued till now.

(b). People that are practising *salafiyyah* are mostly found in Yorubaland

The results of the interview on the above research question revealed that many adherents of *salafiyyah* are mostly found in South-West Nigeria. This is corroborated by the responses of the interviewees on the above item. According to a *salafi*, Murtadha[233] "the adherents of *salafiyyah* are many and can be found in many *sunni masājid* (mosques) not only in Yoruba area but also everywhere even outside Nigeria". He submitted that they used to identify one another through the practising of the *Sunnah* which according to him is peculiar to only *salafis*. He concluded that there are also other Muslims who are non-*salafis*. On this question, the non-*salafis* maintained that there are *salafis* in every state in Yorubaland but with little percentage compared to other Muslims who are not *salafis*. Abduljabbar[234] upheld that they are only identified as minor among other Muslims. Though, they are in everywhere in the region.

The result of the interviews revealed that both the *salafi* and non-*salafi* respondents believed that people that are practising *salafiyyah* are mostly found in Yorubaland. The outcome of these results showed that both the adherents of *salafiyyah* and the non-*salafi*-Muslims expressed that the *Salafiyyah* is prevalent in South-West Nigeria. It also implies that some Muslims among the *ahlus-Sunnah* are the propagators of the practice in the area. Their submissions established that *Salafiyyah* exists in South-West Nigeria among the *Sunni* Yoruba Muslims. However, an aspect of the results shows that not every *Sunni* Muslim is a *Salafi* but every *salafi* is a sunni-Muslim. This is so because; the *Salafiyyah* emerged among them in southwest Nigeria.

(c). Responses on types, ideologies and practices of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria

From the responses of the *salafis*, it is reported that the *salafiyyah* practice can be categorised into a number of types. This is due to the perceptions of the adherents and their leaders or scholars. All the responses of the interviewees showed that there are types, ideologies and practices of *salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. This is also supported by Abiddeen[235]. He expressed that such types and ideologies can be succinctly classified as Partisan *Salafiyyah, Shaykhiyyah*, *Ustādhiyyah,* factional *Salafiyyah*, campus *Salafiyyah, Lā Jamā'ah Salafiyyah, Takfīriyyyah,* individual *salafiyyah* and educated *salafiyyah.* In his own response, Murtadha[236] grouped the movement into Muslim Students' Society's (MSSN) *salafiyyah* and *Salafiyyah* of the returnees from Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations. They admitted that the branches and the ideologies of the *Salafiyyah* in the South-

West Nigeria evolved from these two main sources i.e. the seceded faction from the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) and majority of the returnees from Saudi Arabia as well as other Arab countries. In his response also, Abiddeen[237] further explained that the division can be summarily classified into two. These are those who seceded from the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria over certain doctrinal differences and some brothers who studied at Arab nations.

In the same vein, the other Muslims who do not subscribe to *salafiyyah* ideology (non-*Salafis*) also believed that some adherents of *salafiyyah* belong to different leaders and factions. However, they explained that all factions are practising *Salafiyyah* in the exact manner. Among them were Qamaruddeen[238], Jabbar[239] and Abduljalil[240]. They explained that there are different factions of *Salafiyyah*. Mention was also made about the *Salafiyyah* of *Ustādhiyyah, Shaykhiyyah, Lā Jamāʿah, Takfīriyyah,* campus *Salafiyyah,* MSSN *Salafiyyah* and the returnees' *Salafiyyah*. They also added that most *Ahlus sunnah* are *salafis* in the South-West. This is so because, the *salafiyyah* originated among *Sunni* Muslims who were of the creed that the practice of Islam has been adulterated by the western ideology. They thus concluded that the only resolution is to go back to the practice of pristine Islam as it was practised in the *şahābah* era. The responses of all the interviewees indicated that every Muslim in the South-West Nigeria admits that there are different factions of *Salafiyyah* practice in the Yorubaland in this era. Not only this, there are also *Salafiyyah* factional leaders in the region.

(d). *Ahlus-Sunnah* are *salafis* in the South-West

Generally, *ahlus-sunnah* is the generic term that is used for a *Sunni* Muslim. It is derived from the *Sunnah* which means the practice. In the religious context, it refers to the practice of the Prophet. Therefore, every Muslim that practises the *Sunnah* is referred to as *ahlus-sunnah*. However, the nomenclature is contested among Muslims who can be grouped into *Sunni* and *Sufis*. Like *Sunnis*, the *Sufis* also claim that they abide by the *Sunnah* and they are both Muslims. By this, they lamented that the title can not only to be claimed by *Sunnis* but both. This is the general notion of every Muslim in Yorubaland prior to the new trend in the spread of *salafiyyah* among *Sunnis* in this era in Yorubaland.

Ascription of *ahlu-Sunnah* is therefore claimed by the *salafis* while they regarded other Muslims who do not subscribe to *salafiyyah* as *ahlu bidʿah*. This was generated

from the responses of the interviewees among the *salafis*. In his response Ismail[241] lamented that only *salafis* are the orthodox Muslims who should be bearing the title of *ahlus-sunnah* while others are not. He corroborated his claim that the *salafis* practise the *Sunnah* whole-heartedly while other Muslims have compromised their manners of practising Islam due to the influence of the western ideology. Similarly, the non-*salafi* interviewees explained that the *salafiyyah* practices began among *ahlus-sunnah* but not all of them subscribed to its practice. Ridwanullah[242] affirmed that some factions among the *Sunni* are those that referred to themselves as *salafis*. Overall, it is believed from the responses that the title is usually claimed by the adherents of *salafiyyah* while they disregarded other Muslims from bearing the same title (*Salafi*).

(e). Most of those who seceded from the MSSN are with *salafiyyah* ideology

Ideology is the laid principles of doing things especially by a religion or an organisation. It is synonymous to creed. Meanwhile, Islam lays down fundamental creeds that should be abided by a Muslim. These include the doctrines and beliefs in Islam. In *salafiyyah*, certain ideologies were derived as the principles to be followed by the adherents. The primary ideology is the concept of returning to the pristine *Islam*. This is the cause of secession of some members from the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria. According to Abiddeen[243], a former president (*Amir*) of the MSSN, he affirms that those that left the society (MSSN) were already inclined to *salafiyyah's* practice. He expressed further that they began the motive of their secession by condemning the leadership of the society and claiming that there is dire need to practise Islam as it was laid down by the companions of the Prophet.

The same response was reported from the non-*salafi* interviewees among the Muslim students. They said that after which a number of efforts had been made to correct the notion of segregation and clamour for returning to *Salafiyyah* by some members, the society resulted to their secession as the final resolution. According to Murtadha[244], those that separated themselves from the MSSN were of the notion of establishing *Salafiyyah* in the society; but when their efforts were abortive, they opted out of the membership. These responses showed that those who seceded from the MSSN (which also forms a faction of

salafiyyah in South-West Nigeria) had been nurturing their ideology of *salafiyyah* prior to their secession.

(C). The practices and the perceptions:

Perceptions on *Al-Walau wa Al-Barrau* (Love and unfriendliness) in *Salafiyah*

(a). Love of only *Salafis* in *salafiyyah* notion

Islam enjoins Muslims to be kind to one another as well as non-Muslims. This gesture was demonstrated by the Prophet and his companions. A number of references from the Qur'ān and Hadīth enjoin Muslims to be friendly with every individual in his or her community. Not only this, it expresses the differences in religion as part of organisation of life. Thus, each individual should uphold his faith without enforcing it on another. The *Sharī'ah* further elaborates this concept under the interpersonal relationship. Hence, a Muslim can relate with people of other religions on so many social functions without compromising his religion.

In *salafiyyah*, this concept is tested under their practice of '*al-walau wa al-barrau* (Love and unfriendliness)'. It is established from the responses of the *salafis* that it is not ideal for a Muslim to choose non-Muslims as friends. This is buttressed by Abdullah[245] in his response that only *Salafis* are true Muslims while others are nominal-Muslims. He supported his argument that it is not tenable to choose a non-Muslim as an intimate. Ibrahim[246] reiterated further on this practice. He said that a non-Muslim is nothing than an infidel. He concluded that a non-Muslim is tagged infidel in the *Salafiyyah* practice based on the *Manhaj* (ideology) of ibn Taymiyyah.

This ideology is buttressed in the responses of the sampled non-*salafi* Muslim interviewees. They lamented that a non-Muslim is regarded as a disbeliever who should be hostile with in the ideology of *salafiyyah*. By this, *salafis* believe that Muslims should love only Muslims. Abdulwasi'i[247] expatiated further on this practice. He said that other Muslims who are non-*Salafis* are regarded as unorthodox Muslims in *salafiyyah* by associating with non-Muslims. This is the reason why the adherents of the *salafiyyah* prefer to associate with only *salafi* fellows in lieu of non-*Salafi*s or non-Muslims. From the findings, the notion of this creed is the fundamental cause of rift between some factions of *Salafiyyah* especially the *Jihādis* and other Muslims in different societies. Also, Abdulazeez[248], in his response said that "non-Muslims dissociate themselves from

Allah by not worshipping Him accordingly". Additionally, he said that it is not ideal for a *salafi* to relate with such people. This *salafiyah* ideology is prevalent in South-West Nigeria. Meanwhile, the ideology is not tenable in the Islamic jurisprudence.

From the theory, the Islamic jurisprudence lays down guiding principles for Muslims on interpersonal relationship. Not only this, the *Sharī'ah* also obliges Muslims to be kind to people irrespective of their religious affiliations or ethnicities. An illustration of this is the *Qur'ān* 4 verse 36 which reads thus:

وَاعْبُدُواْ اللّهَ وَلاَ تُشْرِكُواْ بِهِ شَيْئًا وَبِالْوَالِدَيْنِ إِحْسَانًا
وَبِذِي الْقُرْبَى وَالْيَتَامَى وَالْمَسَاكِينِ وَالْجَارِ ذِي الْقُرْبَى
وَالْجَارِ الْجُنُبِ وَالصَّاحِبِ بِالْجَنبِ وَابْنِ السَّبِيلِ وَمَا
مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ إِنَّ اللّهَ لاَ يُحِبُّ مَن كَانَ مُخْتَالاً فَخُورًا

> Worship Allah. Do not ascribe anything with Him.
> Be kind to your parents, the kinsfolk, orphans,
> immediate neighbours, distance neighbours, the
> immediate companions, distant companions, the
> wayfarers... Allah does not love the arrogant.

The above extract obliges a Muslim to be friendly with people of his community (both Muslims and non-Muslims) without any discrimination. Christians in particular are referred to as the neighbours or people of the book in the Qur'an and are to be related with. The book in question here is the *Injil* (Bible). In addition to this verse, there are instances where the Prophet related with non-Muslims. Also the caliphs related with the people of the book. A case study was Umar ibn al-Khattab (634 - 644 C.E). His administration as the leader accommodated people of other faiths. History states that he cleansed the temple for the non-Muslims to worship at Jerusalem and he established the peace of treaty with the people of the land. The caliph therefore wrote an epistle which is a proof of right of worship and kindness to non-Muslims in the society:

> 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, the commander of the
> faithful has granted the people of Jerusalem
> peace, tranquility, protection of their lives
> and churches and crosses. Their churches
> shall not be demolished or be taken by
> Muslims or the church properties be
> violated. They shall not be oppressed or
> harmed[249]…

Hence, it is ideal for a Muslim to relate with non-Muslims for the growth and development of the society. South-West Nigeria is multi-religious society. Therefore, under the Islamic jurisprudence, there should be interpersonal, intercommunal as well as interfaith relationships between Muslims and Christians without compromising their religions. This is the injunction of the *Sharī'ah* under *Istihsān* in a nation like South-West Nigeria which is dominated by both Muslims and Christians in population.

(b). Notion of unfriendliness with non-Muslims

The response on the above is similar to the previous. The *salafis* maintained that non-Muslims are non-believers and that there is no need for a believer to interact with a non-believer. According to Ibrahim[250], a non-Muslim should neither be chosen as a friend nor an intimate. He said that such a person will only mislead a Muslim. He interpreted the *Qur'ān* 2 verse 257 as the basis of his argument. He said that Allah dissociates Himself from the non-Muslims. Hence, it is incumbent on any *Salafi* to act accordingly. He concluded his response by maintaining that this is the core reason why *salafis* do not accommodate non-Muslims in South-West Nigeria. His interpretation of the verse was opposed by the non-*Salafi* Muslims who maintained that the real meaning does not imply hostility to non-Muslims.

This *salafiyyah* ideology is also criticised in this study. Hostility with non-Muslims especially the Christians is contrary to the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*. In the Yorubaland as a sample survey, the society is largely dominated by Muslims and Christians. The *Sharī'ah* lays down the essential of friendliness as the mechanism for mutual co-existence. Not only this, it also provides tolerance towards other faith. This is also succinctly expressed by Bidmas[251]. He points out that the adherents of the two faiths need to live in harmony with certain reasons. He made mention that Islam and Christianity are divine and were revealed with scriptures as the guides. By this, the *Qur'ān* enjoins the adherents of both religions to live harmoniously. He cites a reference from chapter 109 verse 6 of the Qur'ān which says 'to you is your religion and to me is my religion'.

Additionally, the *Sharī'ah* emphasises on peaceful co-existence of everybody in the society irrespective of their differences in religions. Muslims are thus encouraged to propagate Islam with peace without being hostile to another fellow. This is expressed in the chapter 10 verse 99:

<div align="center">

أَفَأَنتَ تُكْرِهُ النَّاسَ حَتَّى يَكُونُواْ مُؤْمِنِينَ

… do not be unfriendly to people
because they are not Muslims.

</div>

(c). *Salafis* **are best in behaviour and religious practices**

There are different perspectives among Muslims in Yorubaland on the behavioural attitudes of *salafis*. For instance, the adherents of *salafiyyah* claimed to have been of best character on their practices while other Muslims are referred to as nominal Muslims who should join the *salafiyyah*. This is highly reflected in their doctrines. According to the sampled *salafis* among whom were Ismail[252], Nuruddeen[253] and Hashim[254] they said that, "*Salafis* are best in character and conduct; because they follow the real practice of Islam as it was laid down by the *şahābah* who were best in deeds as mentioned by the Prophet". Reverse is the case on the responses of the non-*Salafi* Muslims.

From the explanations of Ma'ruf[255] (non-*salafi* Muslim), he responded that the manner of practising the *Salafiyyah* in Yorubaland does not encourage people to accept the practice. He lamented that most people in the society view the *salafis* as extremists'. Habeeb[256] added that the act of addressing religious issues by the *salafis* usually frightens non-*salafis* and this has generated many conflicting issues among Muslims. In his comment, Ridwanullah[257] lamented that some *Salafis* have even caused more havoc than what they are preaching against. He cited the case of their being hostile to other Muslims who are non-*salafis*. He therefore submitted that those that are hostile to non-*salafis* among the adherents should accommodate other Muslims as brethren in Islam instead of showing hatred.

From responses of the *Salafis*, it shows that the adherents of the *Salafiyyah* upheld that they are of best conduct on the practices of Islam than non-*salafi* Muslims. According to Ibrahim[258] (a *salafi*), "the *salafis* are the best in behaviour and other acts of identifying Muslims in any society. He explained that they are practising Islam as it was practised by the *şahābah* and they are also behaving in the same manner with the *Şahābah*". Also, Ahmad[259] supported this opinion. He admitted that the best manner of behaviour is for a Muslim to be a *Salafi*. Luqman[260] (a non-*Salafi* Muslim) said that the manner of preaching Islam by *salafis* to other Muslims is too extreme. He condemns the activities and attitudes of *salafis* which he said are not tenable in Islam. He added that most of the *salafis* do

<div align="center">

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claim superiority of their characters over non-*Salafis*. Not only this, he added that the *salafis* did not consider non-*salafis* as orthodox ones.

Examining the above two responses of the *Salafis* and non-*Salafis* under the Al-Alwani's theory, every Muslim must be of good behaviour and character. Islam spells out the criterion of good conduct. Illustrations of such conducts are analysed in *Qur'ān* 23 verses 1-11. These could be summarised as "indeed a *Mu'min* (Righteous Muslim) is successful by observing his *Salah* (prayers) regularly with the fear of Allah, paying the *Zakāt*, guiding his modest, fulfilling the promise that keeps unto him… Muslims of these attitudes are the inheritors of the paradise of Allah". An addition to the above verse is the Prophetic tradition which obliges a Muslim to be of good conduct and character toward the people. Besides this, another *Hadith* also reiterates that 'righteousness is a good character of a Muslim'. 'Righteousness is any behaviour that satisfies the soul and heart of a Muslim'[261]. Hence, any Muslim that possesses the above qualities is of good conducts and best character. Thus, a good conduct and character should be preached in every Muslim forum as an act of calling other Muslims to join its organisation not imposition of organisational doctrines.

(d) Perception of taking non-*salafi* Muslims as intimates by *salafis*

A Muslim is the adherent of Islam. The name Muslim is ascribed as the generic name to the adherent. At present in Yorubaland, the adherents have been divided into two, namely: *salafis* and Muslims. The *salafis* perceived other Muslims as disbelievers. This perception led to their doctrine of hatred to non-*salafi*-Muslims which is referred to ''*al-walau wa al-Barrau*'' (Love of *salafis* and hatred to non-*salafi* muslims). Citing the response of *salafis* among whom was 'Abdurrazaq[262], he claimed that the *manhaj as-salafiyyah* regards any Muslim who does not accept *salafiyyah* as a disbeliever. He reiterated his point by saying that this is the belief in *Salafiyyah*. This creed therefore forms the basis of taking only Muslims who are *salafiyyah*-practitioners in the South-West Nigeria as intimates while others are regarded as nominal Muslims. The practice was also adopted from their interpretation of the *Qur'ān* 60 verse 4: …"*We dissociate ourself (bura-a-u) from you and whatever you worship besides Allah. We renounce you. Enmity and hatred will reign between us until you believe in Allah only*". Similarly, another *Salafi* interviewees claimed that it is compulsory for every Muslim to be a *Salafi*

as the right path to practise *Islam*. Abdulhakeem [263] (a *salafi*), empahsised that only *Salafis* comprehend the tenets of Islam and are acting according to its dictates; while other Muslims do not. 'This is the cause of disparity'. In the same vein, non-*Salafi* respondents affirmed that the adherents of *salafiyyah* dislike the non-*salafi* Muslims because of divergences on their factional doctrine ('*aqīdah*). Shakirullah [264] expressed that majority of the *Salafis* dislike other Muslims who do not subscribe to the *manhaj as-Salafiyyah*.

In the jurisprudence, there are fundamental doctrines that bind Muslims together. These are absolute belief in monotheism of Allah, performance of *salawāt* (prayers for the worship of Allah), fasting *Ramadān*, paying *Zakāt* and performance of *Hajj*. Others are beliefs in *Al-malāikatullāh* (Allah's angels), the scriptures, prophets of Allah, last day and destiny. Besides these, a Muslim forum may adopt additional principles as their norms. Meanwhile, such norms should not contradict the primary ones. As a result of this, any Muslim who does not subscribe to the norms of such a forum should not be disliked or ostracized by the members of the group. Through this, it is not tenable for a Muslim to dislike others as a result of organisational creed. A note of guide is expressed in the jurisprudence among which is:

> Do not envy, outbid, hate or outsell each other. Be obedient to Allah as brothers. Muslim is the brother of another Muslim. He does not wrong, humiliate or look down upon him. It is evil for a Muslim to look down upon his brother Muslim. The life, wealth and honour of a Muslim are sacred to another [265]

Another narration says:

> … do not seek out faults, spy, envy or hate each other, and do not turn away from each other. Rather, be servitude to Allah as brothers[266].

(E). Perception on *Bid'ah* and *Harrām* in *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria

(a) Notion of perceiving anything that the Prophet did not practise as *Bid'ah*

The word *bid'ah* denotes innovation, invention or an act of originating new things. It is used in the religious context to refer to an act of inventing new idea, principle or creed to the mode of worship in Islam. In the South-West in particular and the world in general, there are always mixed percptions on *bid'ah* literally and contextually. While some Muslims uphold that inclusion of any deed into the practice of Islam in addition to the prophetic act is *bid'ah*, some Muslims object it. They argued that a condition may

necessitate certain innovative acts that may not contradict the prophetic deed. Hence, such act or deed according to them (non-*salafi* Muslims) cannot be rejected by any Muslim.

The data gathered from the informants showed that the *salafis* believed that doing anything that the Prophet did not practise is *bid'ah* and they claimed such by referring to the *manhaj* (principle) of ibn Taymiyyah. This is attested to by a number of the *Salafis* among who were Abdurrazaq[267] and Balqis[268]. According to them, they laid emphasis that every Muslim has to practise Islam in the exact manner that it was done by the Prophet and *şahābah*. Thus, in *Salafiyyah*, any additional act on the practice of the religion is tantamount to *bid'ah* (innovation) and it is *harrām* (forbidden act). Non-*salafis* also attested to the above perception of *salafis* on the interpretation of *bid'ah.* They commented that in *salafiyyah's* practice, doing anything that the Prophet did not practise is *bid'ah.* They expressed that it is upheld in *Salafiyyah* that a Muslim is restricted to practise Islam in the exact manner that it was done by the Prophet. For instance, *Salafis* perceive that the present manner of propagating Islam has been adulterated with western ideology and modernism. Waliyyullah[269] responded that all *Salafis* in Yorubaland are of the belief that it is unlawful for a Muslim to add any deed to the practice of *Islam*. He explained that any religious act that is done or added to the manner of the fundamental Islamic principle is generally tagged *harrām* in *salafiyyah*. The same response was given by 'Abdulkarim[270] and Ihdayah[271].

According to a *Salafi*, Kamil[272] the Prophet had perfected his mission and completed the practice of Islam. He said that it is incumbent on every Muslim to practise Islam as it was strictly laid down by the Prophet. Response of Mutiah[273] was that a Muslim should follow the *Sunnah* of the *şahābah* (companions of the Prophet) who are the early *Salaf as- şalihin* (the pioneer *salafis*)

Meanwhile, from the responses of non-*Salafi* Muslims among whom were Badruddeen[274] and Dhulfah[275], they all expressed the view that it is not a *bid'ah* for a Muslim to innovate any act into the practice of Islam in addition to how it was laid down by the Prophet. They buttressed their points that Islam allows dynamism. They cited examples from the lives of the four orthodox caliphs. According to Badruddeen,[276] he said that certain things were added to the practice of Islam by Abu Bakr during his reign as the first successor of the Prophet. Compilation of the *Qur'ān* was cited as an example.

Similarly, Dhulfah[277] claimed that it is not a *bid'ah* to innovate any act into the manner of practising Islam. She concluded that a number of additional innovations were brought to the practice of Islam in the reigns of *şahābah*. Administration of 'Umar *ibn* al-Khattāb was referred to as an example. According to her, the caliph facilitated a lot of developments to the practice of the religion (Islam). Such innovations included resuscitation of the *Tarāwih* prayers in congregation at night during *Ramadān*, introduction of the *Hijrah* calendar and constituting of *Shūrah* committee. Not only these, standardization of the *Qur'ān* during the tenure of 'Uthman ibn Affan was also referred to as an ideal innovation. On this premise, the non-*Salafis* maintained that it is ideal to bring new things that are not contradicting to the dictates of the jurisprudence into the practice of Islam. Additionally, *Badruddeen* added that *bid'ah* can be categorised into two: the acceptable and contradictory *bid'ah*. The former is described as any innovation that is introduced by Muslims with the aim of promoting the ideal of Islam as well as bringing development into the practice of the religion. Illustrations of such were traced to the lives of the rightly guided caliphs. The second category is any act that negates the dictates of Islam.

From the observations, the results revealed that the *salafi* respondents upheld that any Muslim that does anything that the Prophet did not practise has brought an innovation (*bid'ah*) to the practice of the religion. However, non-*Salafi* Muslims disagreed. They upheld that it is not a *bid'ah* for a Muslim to do any act that the Prophet did not practise. The non-*salafi* Muslims admitted that it is allowed in the *Sharī'ah* to develop the practices of *Islam* by inventing new things that are needed nowadays without negating the fundamental principles.

Examining the responses of both under the theory, inclusion of certain acts to the fundamental doctrines of Islam is tenable. However, any innovation that is detrimental to the primary beliefs is condemned. Illustrations of acceptable innovations were the examples of the administrations of the orthodox caliphs. Other examples are the four schools of the Islamic thought. Verdicts of each of the schools brought different divergences of opinions and beneficial innovations that serve as reference points on the application of the *Sharī'ah* since then till now in any Muslim society.

(b).Western ideology (e.g modernism) is *bid'ah* (innovation) and *harrām* (forbidden)

Western modernism is a western ideology or materialism. Islam expresses the modernism with references from the Islamic injunctions. This makes it different from that of the western ideology. Additionally, it accommodates any ideology that is in conformity with the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*. Meanwhile, the case is different in the practice of *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland. The findings showed that modern ideology is not tenable in *salafiyyah*. This is reflected in the responses of the *salafis*. They all maintained that the western ideology (e.g. modernism) is *bid'ah* (innovation) and *harrām*. This is the claim of the *salafis* respondents. Some of them explained that the western ideology was designed against the principle of Islam. They added that even the manner of practising Islam nowadays has been adulterated by the western ideology and this is the reason behind their calling every Muslim to *Salafiyyah* in order to go back to the spring board. In his response, Bashir[278] added that the rationale behind the establishment of primary and secondary schools by some *Salafis* was to inculcate the real tenets of *Salafiyyah* into the minds of their young ones. In the same vein, Sulayman[279] responded that modernity is an act of bastardising the real *'aqīdah al-Islāmiyyah* (Islamic creed) and that is the reason why they (the *Salafis*) do not subscribe to it. In his own reaction to this question, Bashir[280] condemned modernity. He said that it was innovated from western ideology in order to ensure that everybody imbibes the western culture. He concluded that no *salafi* will follow the path of modernism. He thus called on every Muslim to shun modernism and embrace *Salafiyyah*.

In his response, Zakariyya [281] (a non-*Salafi* Muslim) clarified that Islam has its own culture and it does not negate modernism except the aspect of modernism that contradicts the Islamic tradition. Another respondent, Ishaq [282] was of an opinion that only *Salafis* oppose modernism why other Muslims like him do not'. He made mention that some of the achievements of Muslims nowadays are acquired through modernism.

Examining the opinions of the two respondents (*Salafis* and non-*Salafis*) under Taha Al-Alwāni's Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islam accommodates aspects of modernism that are not detrimental to the dictates of humanity and societal development. Though Islam has its unique way of approaching issues of development, still, it does not neglect modernism. Meanwhile, the perspectives may be different in some instances from that of the western world. For instance, Islam recognises the roles of the gender in the

society. This is referred to as gender mainstream. Males are apportioned with certain roles to play in the society as well as the female. The motive behind the creation of both is to complement each other for the growth and development of the society without contradicting the primary roles of individuals. Both genders have access to education, job opportunity and other functions for the advancement of humanity and society.

Thus, application of modernism is at times based on the culture of each environment. This is expressed in the jurisprudence under '*urf* (local custom). That is why modernism is adopted in different ways in individual society. For example what is obtainable in the South-West Nigeria as a multi-religious region may be different from that of foreign nations especially Islamic countries like Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, United Arab Emirate (UAE), Egypt and Saudi Arabia. By and large, what is acceptable in some countries may not be allowed in some. This is due to different culture of each society.

(c). Perceptions on using constitutions, rules and regulation to guide a Muslim association in lieu of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* as an innovation or *Bid'ah*

On the adoption of constitution as a norm for guiding an Islamic organisation, *salafi* interviewees rejected the adoption of the constitution in lieu of the *Qur'ān* as the source of rule for an Islamic association. According to Abdulghaniy, [283] "constitution is borne out of western idea and it contradicts the dictates of Islam. Its application is *bid'ah* and *harrām*. He added that the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* are the guiding principles for Muslims in accordance with the verdict of *Salafiyyah* scholars. He thus condemned the act of adopting constitution. Constitution according to him, is not tenable in Islam.

Also, Abdulghaniy upheld that the *Qur'ān* and *hadīth* are emulated in *Salafiyyah* based on the life style of the *şahābah* who are the prototypes in *Salafiyyah*. 'AbdulQuddus[284] (a *Salafi*), reiterated that 'the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* are explicit enough as guides for Muslims. So any other mean of rules and regulations are *bid'ah* and unlawful. He also claimed that other forms of rules besides the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* of the Prophet are man-made laws'. He submitted that any Muslim that abides by such constitution is an infidel. Similarly, Qasim[285] expressed that the *Sharī'ah* has laid down a complete and perfect codes of conducts for Muslims to follow. He argued that the constitution is a tradition of the west which should not be placed over the *Sunnah*. His conclusion was that the constitution is unlawful and an innovation which is not tenable in *salafiyyah*.

On this perception, the non-*salafis* respondents reported that the use of constitution is tenable in Nigerian society. They added that its application becomes necessary due to the democratic system of government of the country. Similarly, they explained that some Muslim organisations have their constitutions which serve as their manual of administration. Some of them expressed further that only the *salafis* believe that the use constitution, rules and regulations to guide a Muslim association is an innovation or *bid'ah*. Mutiullah[286] in his reaction to this question made it known that *Salafis* uphold the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* of the Prophet as the only codes of conduct for any Muslim forum. Therefore, any other guiding principle like constitution is tagged *bid'ah* and *harrām* in the practices of the *salafis*. 'Abdullah[287] also subscribed to this view. He added that the adoption of constitution in the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) is among the reasons why some of its members seceded and formed *Salafiyyah* on various campuses.

In another dimension, the responses of non-*salafi*-Muslims were that an Islamic organisation may draw rules and regulations as its guiding principles without contradicting the dictates of the Qur'ān. Murtadha[288] who is an Amir of the MSSN explained that the society has its constitution which is in conformity with the injunctions of the *Sharī'ah*. He said that the constitution was written by unanimous decision of the executive members at all levels of its administration. He explained that the contents of the constitution were derived from the Islamic jurisprudence and it had been in the tradition before the emergence of *Salafiyyah* among its members who opposed it (the constitution). Shakirullah[289] also commented on this item. He said that not only the MSSN uses the constitution but also other Islamic organisations. Mention was made of *Nasrullahi-l-fathi, Ansaruddeen* Society, Muslim Association of Nigeria and other sister organisations in South-West Nigeria. He said that the constitutions of these associations do not negate the dictates of the *Qur'ān* but serve as guiding principles to their members.

(d) Perception on chieftaincy titles e.g Baba Adini, Seriki Adini as *Bid'ah*

Chieftaincy is a title given to an individual especially by a monarch in recognition of his or her contribution to the society in Yorubaland. It is also ascribed to some philanthropists in appreciation of their impacts to the growth and development of the society. It is an aged-long tradition in South-West Nigeria. After a while, the Yoruba

clerics adopted the idea of chieftaincy. Hence, they began ascribing some religious titles to some individuals especially the Muslim philanthropists. These include Aare Musulumi, Balogun Adini, Iya *Sunnah*, Baba Sunnah, SerikiAdini, Giwa Adini, Osupa Adini, and Asiwaju Adini. The clerics do confer these titles on some affluent Muslims with the aim of enlightening them on the tenets of Islam, inviting them to use their wealth for the benefits of Muslims and in appreciation of their financial contributions to Muslim development.

The chieftaincy titles were condemned in *salafiyyah*. They upheld that such titles are emulations of *kufr* (disbelief) and replica of traditional culture. Abdulquddus[290] (a *salafi*) lamented that it is a wrong notion to be using such appellation to refer to a Muslim irrespective of his or her status in the society. He added that the emulation of such idea is tantamount to infidelity and *bid'ah*. Shakirullah[291a] also said that in *salafiyah*, every Muslim is equal and there is no need of referring to any Muslim with such titles. Thawban[292] and Kabirah[293] explained that the chieftaincy titles are opposed in the *manhaj as-Salafiyah* (principle of Salafism). Meanwhile, non-*salafis* accepted the use of the chieftaincy.

In his reaction, Ismail[294] (a non-*salafi*) reported that the titles are very good in South-West Nigeria. He referred to the necessity of the titles as a mean of encouraging the Muslim philanthropists to strive unto the cause of Allah. He also added that the titles are cherished in the Yoruba culture and that is the reason why the clerics do ascribe them to Muslim philanthropists in order to appreciate their financial impact into the religion.

From the sampled opinions on the item, it was revealed that the adherents of *Salafiyyah* regarded any chieftaincy title as a bad innovation (*Bid'ah*) and unlawful act. Some of them regard the clerics that created the titles as *ahlu al-Bid'ah*. It was said by Ibrahim[295] that there is no need of ascribing specific titles to a Muslim irrespective of his impacts in the mosque. He concluded that the reward of any Muslim who strives on the path of Allah is from Allah.

Reviewing the item under the Taha Al-Alwāni's Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, religious titles are tenable in the jurisprudence. For instance, some companions of the Prophet were honoured with specific titles during the prophetic era. Among them were the four orthodox caliphs. History revealed that '*as-Sidiq*' and '*Abū*

Bakr' were the titles that were given to 'Abdullah ibn Qahaf due to his trust and veracity. Till today, he is still referred to with the titles more than his real name. Not only him, the second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab was also nicknamed '*Farūq'*. 'Uthman ibn Affan's title was '*Dhu-Nurayn'* while the forth caliph Ali *ibn* Abi Talib was honoured with the titles of '*bayt al-Hikmah'* and '*Sayfu Allah*' (House of wisdom and the lion of Allah) due to his knowledge and bravery. Above all, they were collectively referred to as *al-Khulafāu ar-Rashidūn* (orthodox or rightly guided caliphs). With these references, it is not a *bid'ah* to honour a Muslim with chieftaincy title in Yorubaland. What is forbidden in the *Sharī'ah* is hate-nicknames such as the names of infidelity. This is explicitly mentioned in the verse of the *Qur'an* which reads thus:

$$...وَلَا تَلْمِزُوا أَنفُسَكُمْ وَلَا تَنَابَزُوا بِالْأَلْقَابِ بِئْسَ الِاسْمُ$$
$$الْفُسُوقُ بَعْدَ الْإِيمَانِ وَمَن لَّمْ يَتُبْ فَأُوْلَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ$$

> ...do not defame one another, do not call each other by offensive nickname such as hypocritical name after which you have believed in Allah. Whoever refuses to desist from this illicit act is a wrong doer Qur'an 49: 11).

(e) Perception on Counting *Tasbīh* in supplications (*Adhkār*) a *bid'ah*

Tasbīḥ which can also be referred to as rosary is a form of counter that is made with beads. It is used as a mean of counting in supplication of numbers. Many Muslims usually use it in prayers that require counting of number. Besides, it is also used after prayers by some Muslims to count recommended numbers of supplications after each *salah*. It is used by every Muslim (*Sunni* and *Sufi*). With the practice of *salafiyyah* in the south-west, its use has brought different perspectives among Muslims. While many of those that subscribed to *salafiyyah* condemn and tagged it as *bid'ah*, non-*salafis* as well as *Sufis* believe that it is a good method of counting the number for supplications. This divergence of notions was tested.

Abubakr[296] (a *salafi*) said that use of *Subhah* or *Tasbīḥ* (rosary) in supplications (*Adhkār*) or hanging it on neck is *bid'ah*. He expressed that the fingers are the *Sunnah* or recommended method of counting numbers in supplications. He regarded the use of *Subhah* or rosary as an act of *Sufiyyah* which is contrary to the doctrines of *Salafiyyah*.

Ibrahim[297] (a *salafi*) also explained that the use of *Tasbih* is peculiar to *Sufis* but it is a *bid'ah* (innovation) in *Salafiyyah*. He expressed further that the use of fingers is the emulated mode of counting from the *şaḥābah* (companions of the Prophet) who practised Islam as it was exactly demonstrated by the Prophet. He added that this is the reason why *salafis* use fingers in counting of *adhkār* (supplications) in lieu of a *subhah*. This is supported by Yusuf [298]. He expressed that the *Subhah* is against the practice of *salafiyyah*. He reported that fingers are adopted in *salafiyyah* for counting numbers of supplications. Similarly, Ya'qub[299] said that the *subhah* is regarded as the tradition of sufism and that is why it is condemned in *salafiyyah*.

In the response of non-*salafi* Muslims, usage of *tasbih* or *subhah* is accepted as another means of counting the supplications in Islam. They upheld that the rosary does not contradict the act of using fingers in counting any supplication that requires number. Jamaluddeen[300] expatiated that the use of *Tasbih* is helpful to him in counting supplications of a large number. He supported his claim that the *subhah* guides him against any mistake in his supplications. On the same account, he said that he preferred using *tasbih* to fingers in counting supplication. His response showed that *tasbih* is not a *bid'ah*. He lamented that some *ahlus-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* and *Salafis* rejected the *tasbih*. He emphasised that the use of *tasbih* is tenable in Islam.

Investigating this item under the *sharī'ah*, the use of both is allowed. Though fingers were mostly used for counting during the *şaḥābah* era, there were instances where other counters were used without being condemned by the Prophet. 'Aishah, a wife of the Prophet was reported to have tied a cloth to form knots as a method of counting some supplications such as '*subhanallah*'. The Prophet asked her the reason for using the knots in lieu of her fingers and she explained that in order not to make a mistake. The prophet did not frown at it. He told her to increase her supplications to include "*subhanallah adadda 'ilmihi wa khalqihi*"[304]. As a result of this, usage of other means as counters is allowed in Islam. Besides *subhah*, other instruments of counting have been developed by modern technology.

(f). Perception on Performing *Hajj* by female Muslims without her *mahram*

Hajj, the pilgrimage to *Makkah* is an annual act of worship whereby Muslims troop to the holy land to worship Allah. It takes place in the twelfth month of Islamic

calendar (*Dhul Hijjah*). Preparations for its performance usually begin towards the end of the eleventh Islamic month (*Dhul Qaʿdah*). It is of three kinds: *Tammatuh, Qirān* and *Ifrād*. Its rites take some days. As a journey that requires some days to be spent by the pilgrims outside the family, Islam enjoins intending female Muslims to embark on its journey along with their *mahram*-protector or husband. However, the manner of performing it in Yorubaland is contested in *salafiyyah*. Due to economic and some other reasons, women are permitted by the Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Board to perform the rites without her husband or *mahram*. However, this act was condemned in *salafiyyah* and tagged *bidʿah*.

Ismail[301] and Yaqeen[302] (*salafis*) lamented that it is *harrām* for women to go for *hajj* without their *mahram* or protectors according to *ibn* Taymiyyah. They also added that no woman is allowed to embark on a journey except she is accompanied by her husband or a protector. They submitted that the manner of performing the pilgrimage by women in Yorubaland negates the acts of the *salaf aş-şalihīn* and it is a *bidʿah*. From the response of Imran[304] (a *salafi*), he expressed that the method of performing hajj in Yorubaland is *bidʿah'*. He added that if a husband does not have means of sponsoring himself and his wife, he should delay the holy pilgrimage'. The notion was also supported by other *salafi* respondents. They said it is *Harrām* for a woman to go for Hajj alone. They therefore complained that the method is not ideal and should be changed.

Non-*salafi* respondents reported that the manner in which women in Yorubaland perform *Hajj* without a family member or protector (*mahram*) is tenable and not *bidʿah*. Musa (a non-*salafi*) [305] commented on this notion by saying that the manner becomes necessary due to economic factor and high cost of the *hajj* fare. He concluded that only few families can afford the payment. Similarly, other non-*salafis* among whom was Murtadha[306] explained that performing *Hajj* by a woman without her *mahram* in Yorubaland is embedded with a number of reasons'. He cited bad economy of the nation as a core factor. He also said that the couple may not be buoyant enough to perform the pilgrim at the same time. Hence, husband may allow his wife to perform the rite. He reacted that south-west Nigeria cannot be compared to the developed nations and Arab countries. He said that only few families can perform *Hajj* together due to economic constraint of the country.

Examining this question under the Islamic Jurisprudence, performance of *Hajj* by a woman without her husband or *mahram* is borne out of the need to assist a family that cannot afford its performance together due to its high financial cost. Hence, there is a need to provide solution. One of the mechanisms is to allow either of the couple that wants to perform the holy pilgrimage under an alternative principle as it is provided by the Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Board. If otherwise, it will be so difficult for many female Muslims to become *Alhajah* in Yorubaland.

(F) *Salafiyyah's* Perception on *'Aqīqah* (Naming Ceremony) in South-West Nigeria
(a) Manner of organizing naming ceremony (i.e by inviting *Alfas* and forming large gathering).

'Aqīqah is an Arabic word for naming ceremony. It is the special occasion of giving names to a newly born baby. This manner is well known in the south-west since the advent of Islam in the region. Its celebration in Yorubaland serves as an act of being servitude and gratitude to Allah over safe delivery. The manner of celebrating it involves inviting Alfas (Islamic clerics and scholars), forming a large gathering and other forms of celebration. The event usually takes place on the eight day of the birth. Meanwhile, seventh day is chosen by some Muslims for the celebration. This is based on the comprehension of the prophetic tradition on the fixed day for the naming ceremony. However, the mode of celebration takes another dimension in the practice of *salafiyah* in the region. The manner of conducting it by non *salafi*-scholars is condemned in *salafiyyah* and considered unorthodox. The opinions of the *salafis* were sampled through the interviews.

The above item addresses the reactions of *Salafiyyah's* adherents on the manner of conducting *'aqīqah* in South-west Nigeria. The respondents believed that the manner of conducting *'aqīqah* by other Muslims who are not *salafis* (i.e by inviting *Alfas* and forming a large gathering) is unacceptable according to Muhammad *ibn* Abdulwahhab. The *salafis* tagged the manner as an acculturated form of naming ceremony from the Western ideology. Some of the interviewees reported that *salafis* usually distribute raw-meat during their naming ceremony without organising a gathering. Yaqeen[307] (a *salafi*) admitted that the sharing of raw meat is in accordance with the dictates of the *salafis* on

child naming. He argued that there is no need of cooking any food during the '*aqīqah* but to share the raw-meat for the well-wishers who attend the naming ('*aqīqah).*

Abiddeen[308] (a non-*salafis*) on his response to the doctrines of *Salafiyyah* in Yorubaland said that the manner of inviting scholars and other relatives to the naming ceremony by non-*salafis* is tagged an innovation and un-Islamic ceremony by the *salafis*. He also expressed that the *salafis* regarded the invitation as a western culture that has been imbibed by non-*Salafi* Muslims. He concluded that the majority of *salafis* are condemning the manner of celebrating naming ceremony of non-*salafis* without citing any cogent reference from the Islamic jurisprudence. Instead, he said that they based their perceptions on the verdicts of the *salafiyyah* scholars. He thus encouraged the practitioners to seek for comprehensive knowledge of *fiqh* on any Islamic jurisdiction.

Similarly, another *Salafi* respondent, Ishaq[309] explained that the act of naming ceremony by non-*salafi* scholars is not in conformity with the act of *salaf as-Salihin*. He said that the naming should be celebrated by slaughtering the ram or sheep and distributing it to the well-wishers that witness the programme. Not only this, he also said that the money or gifts that the non-*salafi* clerics used to collect during the ceremony is *bid'ah*. According to Abdulhakeem[310] who is also a *salafi*, he said that 'the manner of naming in Yorubaland by non-*salafi* scholars is misleading the non-*salafis* on the real manner of the naming*'*. He encouraged other Muslims who are non-*Salafis* to emulate the *Salafiyyah*'s practice on the manner of celebrating the birth of a newly born baby.

While responding to the question, Abdulazeez[311] who is a non-*Salafi*, opposed the arguement of the *salafis* on the issue. He said that the naming ceremony is an act of glorifying Allah. He added that it is very essential to cook foods and provide other entertainments during the ceremony. He made it known that the roles of clerics or *Alfas* on the day of the naming have been in Yoruba tradition since the advent of Islam to the region. He added that the tradition is not against the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*. In his response, Abiddeen[312] agreed with the manner of conducting the '*aqīqah* by the non-*salafi* Muslims. He commented that the wining and dining at the ceremony are allowed in Islam. He also expressed that the ceremony serves as an avenue for social gathering and interaction with friends, families, well-wishers and scholars. Not only this, it as well serves as an occasion to listen to sermons and learn more about Islamic teachings.

Assessing the question under the *Sharī'ah*, the manner of conducting *'aqīqah* by non-*salafi* scholars in the South-West Nigeria is not a *bid'ah*. However, it is in conformity with the local custom (*'urf*) of Yoruba people which is not against the *Sharī'ah*. Mention should be made here that Islamic jurisprudence provides room for any culture that does not negate the real practice of Islam. Moreover, there are divergences of opinions on the manner of celebrating the naming in the schools of thought. While the *salafiyyah* upholds that the meat should be shared without cooking it, others maintain that it can be cooked and served with drinks. Hence, a Muslim can uphold either of the two thoughts.

(b) Distribution of raw meat by *salafis* in child-naming without organising a gathering

Responses of *salafis* on the distribution of raw meat as a manner of celebrating naming ceremony is upheld by its adherents as the exact manner of *aqīqah* while that of non-*salafis* is regarded as *bid'ah*. Not only this, the mode of the celebration is described as the emulation from the western ideology and Yoruba local tradition. According to Yaqeen[313], (a *salafi*) he upheld that the only method of celebrating the *aqīqah* is by slaughtering a ram or sheep and distributing it raw to those that attend the naming. He added that this manner is the laid down principle of its celebration. Hashim[314] (a *salafi*) in his response said that 'it is an extravagance to be organising party on the celebration of *aqīqah'*. He said that organising a party is a culture of non-*Muslim*s which has been imbibed by non-*salafi* Yoruba Muslims. He reiterated that this is a reason why it is regarded as a *bid'ah* in *salafiyyah*. In the opinion of Salahuddeen[315], he said that none of the early *Salaf*is organised a party on celebration of *aqīqah*. Thus, it is forbidden for a *Salaf*i to do so.

Abdurrazaq[316] (non-*salafi*) attested that many *salafis* do not organise party or invite clerics to their naming ceremony. Instead, he said that each parent usually gives names to his babies by himself and distribute raw meats to those that attend the naming. He explained further that the idea of distributing raw meat is not tenable in the Yoruba tradition and is not contradicting the dictates of the *Sunnah*. His opinion was the same with that of Abiddeen. He explained that the practice of *salafiyyah* on '*aqiqah* lacks ample knowledge and application of the *sharī'ah*. He lamented that the factions of *salafis* that opposed the mode of cerebration by non-*salafis* need to seek for more knowledge on the manner of naming celebration in Islam.

(c) *Salafiyyah's* **perception on cooking food and merry-making during naming ceremony**

The responses on the above item revealed that merry-making such as dancing, inviting friends and singing is condemned in *salafiyyah*. Yaqeen[317] explained that the practice of *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland on 'aqīqah is in conformity with the school of thought of *ibn* Taymiyyah. He explained that other means of celebrating the naming has no Islamic proof to back it. However, merry-making is not opposed by non-*Salafis*. It is regarded as a manner of appreciating Allah during the naming ceremony. Therefore, why the *salafis* regard it as a *Bid'ah*, some among other Muslims who are non-*Salafis* uphold it as an act of being gratitude and servitude to Allah.

Celebration of *'aqīqah* is the rite of a Muslim to appreciate the favours of Allah on the newly born baby. Though the *sharī'ah* urges the father to slaughter either ram or sheep as sacrifice to appreciate Allah, it is silent on the manner of its celebration. It therefore paves way for each community on its celebration without negating the principle of the *sharī'ah*. It is on this manner that the non-*salafi* scholars in Yorubaland postulate the need for cooking the meat and prepare foods for well-wishers at the occasion. This is examined under the *istihsān* and *'urf* in the Islamic jurisprudence.

(G) Perception and belief on *Niqāb* (Face-veil) in *Salafiyyah*

(a) Perception on the use of *Niqāb* by every female Muslim

Niqāb, face-veil is a garment that covers faces of female Muslims. It is a mode of dressing used by some female Muslims that covers their faces. It is different from Hijāb. While hijāb covers the head to bosom, *niqāb* covers the head, face and bosom. It is of different styles. Some styles cover the whole face while eyes are exposed in some. *Jilbāb* is another type of garment that covers the whole female body parts. Meanwhile, the use of *niqāb* is contested among the Islamic jurists. This is based on their interpretations of the Quranic references on the prescribed female mode of dressing. Some scholars regard it as a compulsory garment while it is recommended by some. Meanwhile, the responses on its use among the *salafis* and non-*salafis* respondents in South-West Nigeria are revealed below.

The *salafi* interviewees reported that *niqāb* is compulsory on every female Muslim. Their responses revealed that all the wives of the pioneer *Salafis* used *niqāb* and

they were in purdah. Abdullah[318] stressed that the *niqāb* is a unique form of dressing that is designed for women. He also cited that the wives of the Prophet and that of the *şahābah* did dress in *niqāb*. According to Abdurrahman[319] (a *Salafi*), he said that it is compulsory for every mature female Muslim to dress completely by wearing *niqāb*. He said further that it is an act of modesty that was emulated from the lives of early predecessors of the Prophet. He also explained that any female-Muslim who does not use *niqāb* does not follow the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. In his reaction to this item, Ilyas[320] who is also a *salafi* said that the *salāh* (prayer) of a female-Muslim who does not dress with *niqāb* will not be accepted. He buttressed his explanations that his wife and that of other *salafi* brothers use *Niqāb*. In the same vein, Murtadha[321] claimed that *niqāb* must be worn by every mature female-Muslim either single or married. He added that some *salafis* usually dress their children of teenage with *niqāb*. He commented that those *Salafis* that prefer their female-teenagers to be dressing with the face-veil are of the opinion that their children will be familiar to the mode of dressing from their childhood. He expressed further that the use of *niqāb* by *salafi* females does not prevent them from their human rights. According to him, such rights include access to practise their religion, Islam.

Examining the use of *niqāb* under the Taha Al-Alwāni's Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, the Islamic jurists have divergences of opinions on it. Their divergences are on the translations of the verses of the *Qur'ān* that revealed the female-Muslims mode of dressing. Such verse includes verse 31 of the chapter 24:

وَقُل لِّلْمُؤْمِنَاتِ يَغْضُضْنَ مِنْ أَبْصَارِهِنَّ وَيَحْفَظْنَ فُرُوجَهُنَّ وَلَا يُبْدِينَ زِينَتَهُنَّ إِلَّا مَا ظَهَرَ مِنْهَا وَلْيَضْرِبْنَ بِخُمُرِهِنَّ عَلَى جُيُوبِهِنَّ وَلَا يُبْدِينَ زِينَتَهُنَّ إِلَّا لِبُعُولَتِهِنَّ أَوْ آبَائِهِنَّ أَوْ آبَاء بُعُولَتِهِنَّ أَوْ أَبْنَائِهِنَّ أَوْ أَبْنَاء بُعُولَتِهِنَّ أَوْ إِخْوَانِهِنَّ أَوْ بَنِي إِخْوَانِهِنَّ أَوْ بَنِي أَخَوَاتِهِنَّ أَوْ نِسَائِهِنَّ أَوْ مَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُهُنَّ أَوِ التَّابِعِينَ غَيْرِ أُوْلِي الْإِرْبَةِ مِنَ الرِّجَالِ أَوِ الطِّفْلِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يَظْهَرُوا عَلَى عَوْرَاتِ النِّسَاء وَلَا يَضْرِبْنَ بِأَرْجُلِهِنَّ لِيُعْلَمَ مَا يُخْفِينَ مِن زِينَتِهِنَّ وَتُوبُوا إِلَى اللهِ جَمِيعًا أَيُّهَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

> Tell the faithful Muslim-women to lower their gaze, protect their modesty, not to show their beauty, except what may appear. Their veils should be drawn to their bosoms. Their beauty should only be disposed to their husbands, fathers, husbands' fathers, their children, brothers, sisters, women, and little child. They should not bang their feet in order to draw the attentions (of other men).They should turn unto Allah for forgiveness and prosperity (Qur'ān 24 verse 31).

On the analysis of the above verse, the jurists unanimously agreed on the interpretation of the verse but differ on the meaning of the phrase 'إِلَّا مَا ظَهَرَ مِنْهَا' 'except what may appear". According to *Hambaliyyah* and *Shafi'iyyah* schools of thought, it is compulsory for a woman to cover all her body parts from head to toes whenever she goes out of her residence. The interpretations were supported with their claims that:

> Allah commanded the believing women to cover their faces from heads with cloak and to expose one eye whenever they are moving out of their abodes for a purpose[322].

Besides this, ibn Mas'ud was quoted to have related the *Hadith* that says:

> A woman's body is *awrah* (a sensitive attraction and nakedness). Thus, whenever she moves out, *shaytan* does beatify her[323].

Also, Aishah's narration was also expressed. It reads thus:

> When we were with the Prophet in the state of *ihrām* of performing the *Hajj*, travelers used to pass by us. Each of us used to cover her face from head when they were close to us. When they passed by, we would uncover it [324].

With the cited references from the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith*, the two schools of thought agreed that *niqāb* is compulsory for a Muslim woman to wear anytime she goes out of her residence. This thought was also followed by later generations of scholars among who was *ibn* Taymiyyah. His *manhaj* is adopted in the *salafiyah* on the use of *niqāb* in Yorubaland.

In addition to the above, other verses that were cited to substantiate their verdicts are:

وَالْقَوَاعِدُ مِنَ النِّسَاء اللَّاتِي لَا يَرْجُونَ نِكَاحًا فَلَيْسَ عَلَيْهِنَّ جُنَاحٌ أَن يَضَعْنَ ثِيَابَهُنَّ غَيْرَ مُتَبَرِّجَاتٍ بِزِينَةٍ وَأَن يَسْتَعْفِفْنَ خَيْرٌ لَّهُنَّ وَاللَّهُ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ

The elderly women who have passed the age of marriage have no blame if they lay aside outer part of their garments unless they display their beauty. However, it is best for them to be modest. Allah sees all and has full knowledge (Qur'an 24 verse 60).

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ قُل لِّأَزْوَاجِكَ وَبَنَاتِكَ وَنِسَاء الْمُؤْمِنِينَ يُدْنِينَ عَلَيْهِنَّ مِن جَلَابِيبِهِنَّ ذَلِكَ أَدْنَى أَن يُعْرَفْنَ فَلَا يُؤْذَيْنَ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ غَفُورًا رَّحِيمًا

O you the prophet, tell your wives, daughters and faithful women to draw their garments over their bosoms. And they should not display their beauty outside. Allah is the most forgiving and the Merciful. (Qur'an 33 verse 59).

On the other hand, another schools of thought claim that the use of *niqāb* is not obligatory but optional. They arrived that the phrase إِلَّا مَا ظَهَرَ مِنْهَا "except what may appear" refers to the exemptions of face, hands and legs. Notable schools of this thought are *Malikiyyah, Hanafiyyah, Shafi'iyyah, Yusuf al-Qaradāwi* and Muhammad Nasruddeen al-Bani. Contemporary scholars that also uphold their verdicts are Hasan at-Turabi, Abu Hamid, Muhammad al-Ghazali and Sayyid Sabiq. They made references to some instances when the females did not cover their faces and the Prophet did not ask them to do so. These include the hadith narrated by ibn 'Abbas, Ikrimah and Aishah. For instance Aishah's narration was cited as thus:

> Asmau, the daughter of Abu Bakr once entered into the house of the Prophet and her dress was transparent. The Prophet turned his face away from her and said to her 'O Asmau, when a woman reaches age of puberty, then, it is not permitted that any of her body should be seen except this and this. And

the Prophet pointed to his face and hands.[325]

(H) a. Perception on the use of *Hijāb* by adult female-Muslims

Hijāb is a female-Muslim garment that covers head to bosom but exposes the face. It is a form of garment that is prescribed for female Muslims. References from the *Qur'ān* lay emphasis on the significance of female garment. Similarly, the Islamic jurists agreed on the use of *hijāb*. However, there are disparities on the face-covering. At present, *hijāb* is perceived as unlawful garment in neo-*salafiyyah*. This was tested in the interview. The responses from the respondents revealed that its use is opposed by *salafis* in south-west Nigeria. The *salafi* respondents argued that *Hijāb* is not ideally recommended for women and ladies. According to Badrah[326] (a female *Salafi* Muslim) she said that '*Hijāb* is not the ideal dress of a Muslim-woman but the *niqāb*. She expressed that this is the reason why wives of *salafis* use *niqāb*. She referred to herself as a typical example. In the response of Fawzah[327], she explained that the wives of the pioneer *salafis* used *niqāb*. Therefore, it is conpulsory for every Muslim woman either married or single to be wearing *niqāb* instead of *Hijāb*. She explained that the use of *hijāb* is not allowed in *salafiyyah* for a Muslim-woman.

The non-*salafi* interviewees admitted that most *salafis* in southwest Nigeria reject short or long *Hijāb* while other Muslims who are non-*salafis* accept it. Response of Fatimah[328] (non-*salafi* Muslim woman) on the same item is the same. She admitted that some women are using *niqāb* but the use of *hijāb* is also tenable in Islam. Moreover, Ghaniyyah[329] subscribed that the *hijāb* is allowed in Islam. She said that the aspect of disparity among the scholars is the interpretation of a portion of the *Qur'ān* twenty-four verse thirty-one that was cited above which implies "except what can be exceptionally exposed in her garment". She interpreted 'the exception' as the face with hands and said that this is the reason why some Muslim sisters and women use *hijāb*. Tajuddeen[330] claimed that the use of *hijāb* is compulsory while *niqāb* is optional. He frowned at the condemnation of the *hijāb* by *salafis*. He thus concluded his argument that both modes of dress are allowed in the *sharī'ah*.

(b). Impression on *Hijāb* in *Salafiyyah*

In Yorubaland, *salafis* do not recognize *hijāb* as a decent garment of a female Muslim. The users are considered as those that do not comprehend the tenets of Islam. Their responses revealed that a female Muslim that uses *hijāb* is weak and nominal. For instance, according to Abdullah[331] and Jamiu[332], they both said 'that is why every wife of *salafis* uses *niqāb*. They submitted that the *niqāb* is in accordance with the verdict of ibn Taymiyyah. In his response, Zulaykha[333] said that *hijāb* serves as the primary mode of female dress and any Muslim-lady that prefers the use of *hijāb* over *niqāb* is a nominal one. She referred to herself that she uses *niqāb*. Hanifah's[334] opinion was also the same with that of Zulaykha. However, she added that those that use *hijāb* have exposed their faces to the public which (according to her) are what they should cover.

The non *salafis* attested that in *salafiyyah's* doctrine, a female Muslim with *Hijāb* is considered as a weak and nominal *Muslimah*. These responses were supported with the comments of Mu'minah[335] and Ṣafiyyah[336]. They explained that the *salafis* usualy laid emphasis on the use of *niqāb*. They cited themselves as examples that they are always considered as nominal *Muslimah* by *Salafi*s because they use *hijāb*. In the same vein, Tawakalih[35] said that any Muslim lady that uses *hijāb* is considered as unknowledgeable about Islam. She reiterated that the scholars of the *Salafiyyah* always preach against the use of *hijāb*. She added that some members of *salafiyyah* choose *niqāb* for their young daughters of teenage with the aim that they (the daughters) will be familiar with it from the childhood age before their maturity. Similarly, she said that the *salafis* are extreme in their approaches on the use of *niqāb*. She concluded that the *niqab* is optional while *hijab* is made compulsory on every mature female Musllim. She therefore condemned the argument of *salafis* and tagged them extremists.

Meanwhile, under the *Sharī'ah*, *hijāb* and *niqāb* are allowed by the jurists. Their acceptance was based on the exegesis of the references of the *Qur'an* on the prescribed female Muslim's mode of dressing by the different Islamic schools of thought. By and large, both are tenable in Islam. This is a reason why some Muslim women do dress in *niqāb* while some are in *hijāb* in South-west Nigeria.

(I)a.Perception and belief on manner of conducting *Nikāh* (marriage) *in Salafiyyah*

Nikāh, marriage is the solemnization of man and woman in Islam to become legal husband and wife. It is an institution in the *sharī'ah*. Its manner of solemnization by non-

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salafi scholars in Yorubaland since the advent of Islam into the region has been perceived as *bid'ah* and outrageous in *salafiyyah*. A number of factors led to the rejection of the method of solemnization by the *salafis*. The *salafi* respondents explained that the manner of conducting *nikāh* in South-West Nigeria by non-*salafi* scholars is unacceptable and *bid'ah*. The manner was criticised due to what they (*Salafis*) tagged as an unorthodox innovative method of conducting it. Husain[337] clarified that sitting together of the couple in the public in the midst of large crowd is a *bid'ah*. This is also supported by Zulaykha[338]. She said that the method of conducting *nikāh* by non-*salafis* is unholy, westernized and un-Islamic.

In addition to the above responses, the manner is also perceived as extravagance. According to Abdulghaniy[339], 'renting of halls and sitting together of the couple for the solemnisation are not tenable in *salafiyyah*. Not only this, he also added that the manner of entertainment is condemned in *Salafiyyah*. Abiddeen[340] also shed more light on this *salafiyyah's* practice. He lamented that *salafis* forbid putting the wedding ring into the hands of the couple in the gathering. He concluded that such act is tagged as an imbibed ideology from western culture and innovation (*bid'ah*).

From the sampled respondents, *salafiyyah's* practice is against the method of conducting *nikāh* by non-*Salafis* in South-West Nigeria. Luqman[341] (a *Salafi*) said that only *salafis* conduct the *nikah* in accordance with the *sunnah*. He lamented that the method of conducting marriage by non-*Salafi* scholars is totally different from that of the *Sahābah*. According to him, sitting together of the couple during solemnisation of marriage is not allowed in *salafiyyah*. He added that there is no need for the male-audience to see the would-be-wife in the gathering during the solemnisation. Thus, wife is expected to sit with the female audience who are to be separated in the occasion from the males. Also, Harun[342] (a *salafi*) said that non-*Salafi* Muslims do spend extravagantly on *nikāh.* He cited hiring of halls or event centres for conducting the *Nikah* as an act of extravagance. He made mention of mosques as the best avenue for conducting *nikah* of Muslims. The same response was given by Kafilah[343]. She added that there are many things that the non-*Salafi* Muslims have introduced into the *nikāh* solemnisation from the western culture. She made mention of imposition of wedding-ring, dancing of the couple, siting together of the male and female well-wishers. The responses from the non-*salafis* showed that the manner of conducting nikah by non-*salafis* is not against the Islamic principle. According to Abdurraheem

(a non-*salafi*), he explained that the manner of conducting the *nikah* by non-*salafis* is in accordance with the *sharī'ah*. He added that the *salafis* disregarded the non-*salafis* and that is why they claimed they objected their manner of conducting *nikāh*.

Solemnization of *nikāh* in Islam requires some prerequisites. These are *ijāb* and *qabūl* (offer and acceptance) between the would-be-couple, permission of their guidance, payment of *mahr* (nuptial gift) by the husband and the presence of two witnesses from both families. After these prerequisites, Islam allows celebrations of *nikah*. This can be organised on the economic status of the family. The *sharī'ah* enjoins the feast to be celebrated with at least a sheep. This is so because, *nikah* should be announced to the public and not to be organised in secret. The manner of celebration can take any form based on the concessions of the Islamic jurists. The couple may sit together on a chair or separated. What is unlawful is the hugging of the both in the public. Exchanging ring during the ceremony is not alien in Islam. It is a sign of love and it is not obligatory.

(J). Perception of *salafiyyah* belief on *Takfiriyyah* (declaration on non-*salafis* as infidel)
(a). Wearing a trouser that is long up to the ankle is *Kufr* (an act of infidelity)

Takfir is an Arabic word for infidelity. It means an act of referring to somebody as an infidel or a non-believer. The meaning takes a new connotation in *salafiyyah* practice in Yorubaland. It is used as a term to refer to any act that a Muslim does which is different from the practice of the *salaf aṣ-Ṣalihīn*. The results of the interviews conducted on this act revealed that the *salafis* rejected any addition into the manner of practising Islam from how it was laid down by the early *salafis*. For instance, the *salafis* reject trouser that is long up to the ankle with the proof that it is against the tradition of the pious caliphs and the tradition of the Prophet.

Adherents of *salafiyyah* uphold that the length of a trouser should not be long up to the ankle. They added that any Muslim that wears a trouser that its length is long up to the ankle is an infidel. For instance, according to Salih[344], 'the appropriate length of a Muslim's trouser is either a little below the knee-cap or on the top of the ankle'. He explained that any other measurement is outrageous and extravagant. In his contribution, Badruddeen[345] said that the best measurement of a Muslim's trouser is below the knee-cap. He added that this is what the *salafis* advocate for in Yorubaland. He concluded his statement that most of those that there trousers are below the ankle are imitating the

western mode of dressing which he said is against the practice of *Salafiyyah*. He also expressed that it is not tenable for a Muslim to wear a trouser that is long below the ankle. He concluded that those that draw their trousers' length below the ankle are *kuffār* (infidels) and people of the hell-fire.

However, the responses from the opinions of the non-*salafis* differed. According to Abdurraheem[346], he commented that "a trouser that is long beyond the ankle is not outrageous. He also commented that there are some reasons behind the length of such measurement at times". He expressed that some rules in Yorubaland-workplaces do not allow wearing short trousers like that of the *salafis*. He added that the southwest Nigeria is not an Islamic state but is a multi-religious region. By this, there will be little difference on some aspect of practising Islam. Abdurrazaq[347] argued that only *salafis* laid emphasis on the short trouser. He explained that it is not outrageous or extravagant for a Muslim to wear a trouser that is long up to the ankle. He said that the issue of precise length of trouser is optional and it depends on an individual's perspective. This was supported with responses of *Imām* Mu'min[348] and Sherifuddeen[349]. Both said that any long trouser that is below the ankle is not outrageous and any act that was not practised by the pioneer *salafis* should not be regarded as *Kufr* in *Salafiyyah*.

Analysing this item, there is a dire need to refer to the primary and secondary sources of the jurisprudence. During the prophetic era, there was an instruction on the sizeable length of trousers which should not be longer than the top of the ankle. The reason that was stated in the Hadīth was to avoid show-off and extravagance. This is referred to in the *fiqh* as *isbāl*. Its rule covers the dress code for both male and female Muslims. However, an exception was given to some companions among who was Abubakr with obvious reason that his trousers' length that was long below the ankle was not out of pride. The *hadith* was reported thus:

> The Prophet said whoever trails his garment on the ground out of pride, Allah will not look at him on the day of judgement. 'Abubakr said unto him; 'O Apostle of Allah, my *Izat* slips down if I do not pay attention to it. He said 'You are not one of those who do it out of pride.[350]

It is on this premise that the *Salafis* and non-*salafis* in Yorubaland derived their divergences of opinions on the measurement of trousers. While the *Salafis* uphold that the

trousers' length should be limited to either a little bit below the knee-cap or on the top of the ankle, the non-*Salafis* objected this act. The non-*salafis* based their argument on the above hadith. They argued that some conditions may warrant the length of a trouser to be longer than the ankle. Issue of *Abubakr* that was cited in the Hadith serves as a reference point for their justifications. This is a reason why *salafi* trousers are not long beyond the ankle why that of some of other Muslims is below the ankle. However, wearing a trouser that is long beyond the ankle is not only condemned but also regarded as an act of *kufr* or infidelity in *salafiyyah* practice especially in Yorubaland.

(b). *Salafiyah* perception that sufism (*Sufiyyah*) is *kufr*

The *salafi* interviewees lamented that *Sufis* are *ahl al-Kufr*. The whole factions of *salafiyyah* in the south-west regarded the *Sufis* as infidels while their act is referred to as infidelity. According to Mansur[351] (a *Salafi*), he said that '*sufiyyah* is not part of Islam'. It was just a mere act of supplication in an un-Islamic way'. He added that the *sufis* do pray at the graveyards of their saints and use amulets. He submitted that all acts of *sufis* are against the tenets of orthodox practice of Islam which the *salafis* are practising in Yorubaland'.

In his response to the question, Abdulmajeed[352] said that *sufis* are the innovators of *bid'ah* in south-west Nigeria. He also said that they are the group that started celebration of the Prophet's birthday (*Mawlid an-Nabiy*), congregational supplications in mosques and opposition to s*alafiyyah*. He concluded that these acts are against the deeds of the pioneer *salafis*. Hence, the *Sufis* are tagged as *ahl al-Kufr*. Similarly, he also lamented that the *Sufis* are infidels for a number of reasons. According to him, he claimed that they are anti *Salafism*. Not only this, he also lamented that they mislead people in the society and worship their *shaykhs* (saints and spiritual leaders). Additionally, Kafilah[353] responded that none of the clerics of *sufiyyah* practices *Sunnah* and this made them to be tagged infidels.

From the responses of non-*salafis*, it was stated that the *salafis* and *susfis* are hostile to each other. Mukaram[354] in his submission said that what is regarded as *Bid'ah* in *salafiyyah* is not considered as such in *sufiyyah*. He cited the case of *Mawlid Nabiyy* (celebration of the birthday of the Prophet). Accordingly, he expressed that the *Sufis* embrace the celebration of *Mawlid an-Nabiyy* and regard it as a festive of cherishing and

the impacts of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) while *salafis* oppose it and referred to it as a *bid'ah* (innovation).

Shakirullah[355] who is a *sufi* responded that there is no *Hadith* that forbids the celebration of the birth of the Prophet. Not only this, he added that the remembrance of the Prophet's life history is highly worthy of celebration and that is the reason behind his celebration in *sufism*. He added that the Prophet was an exemplary messenger of Allah and his biography is full of blessings for the whole Muslims. He concluded that celebrating his birthday is unique in the doctrines of Sufism.

Examining these perceptions under the Islamic jurisprudence, there are divergent opinions on the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (S.A.W). The perspectives of scholars are borne out of *Qiyās, ijtihād* and *Fatāwa*. In *salafiyyah*, it is upheld that the Prophet did not celebrate his day of birth likewise none of the four rightly caliphs till the four *Sunni Imams* of the Islamic schools of thought did so. Not only this, they also maintain that the Prophet forbade the *Ummah* from praising him excessively as the people of the book did to Prophet *'Īsa* (A.S). By this, they claimed that it is not tenable for any Muslim to celebrate his birthday. The perspective in Sufism is different. The celebration is part of their doctrines and it is highly embraced as an act of appreciating the roles of the Prophet in Islam. *Sufis* do cite the *Qur'ān* 33 verses 21 and 56 as references on its celebration:

لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ لِّمَن كَانَ يَرْجُو اللَّهَ وَالْيَوْمَ الْآخِرَ وَذَكَرَ اللَّهَ كَثِيرًا

إِنَّ اللَّهَ وَمَلَائِكَتَهُ يُصَلُّونَ عَلَى النَّبِيِّ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا صَلُّوا عَلَيْهِ وَسَلِّمُوا تَسْلِيمًا

Indeed, there is perfect example in the life of the Prophet for whoever fears Allah and the Last day and remembers Allah much (*Qur'ān* 33 verse 21).
Verily, Allah and His angels send benedictions on Prophet (Muhammad). O you, who are believers, salute and bestow mercy on him (Q. 33: *ayah:* 56).

(c). Perception on echoing of the *Imām's* voice in *Salāh* (prayer in the mosque with the Imām).

The *salafi* informants explained that echoing of the *Imām's* voice in *Salāh* is *bid'ah*. This is proved as part of the principles that was laid down by *Imām* Hambali, a renowned scholar of *salafiyyah*. Tajuddeen[356] and Abubakr[357] explained that it is against the *Sunnah* of the *sahābah* to be echoing the voice of Imam by the *Muadhin* (caller to prayer) during *salāh*. While responding to the question, Abdulqadri[358] also said that it is not ideal for the *Mua'dhin* to be repeating what the *Imām* is already saying such as '*Allāh Akbar'* during the performance of *salāh*. He claimed that the *manhaj* of *ibn* Taymiyyah (principle of ibn Taymiyyah) opposes such repetition. He submitted that the roles of the *Mua'dhin* are to make the *adhān* and *Iqāmah* during the prayer. He therefore condemned the act of repeating what the *Imām* is saying repeatedly and also regarded it as lack of adequate knowledge of Islam by non-*salafis*. He concluded that such repetition was not done by the pioneer *salafs*.

Responses from the non-*salafis* stated that the repetition of the voice of Imam during the *salāh* is only forbidden in *salafiyyah* practices in Yorubaland. According to Mustapha[359] (a non-*Salafi*), he expressed that 'the repetition of *Allāhu Akbar* by the *Muadhin* during the *Salāh* is only forbidden in *Salafiyyah'*. He said that many mosques are using the *Mua'dhin* to do the *iqāmah* and also to be echoing the sayings of the *Imām* during the performance of *salah*. He submitted that the repetition is adopted by entire Muslims in south-west Nigeria as an essential mean of echoing the voice of *Imam* among Muslims who are not *Salafis*. 'Abdulsami'i[360] said that it is forbidden to be repeating the voice of *Imam* during *salah* in the s*alafiyyah'*s creed but not forbidden by other Muslims. He added that they always echo the voices of *Imām* during *salah* in his mosque as an *Imām*.

(K). Perception of *salafiyah's* belief on *Lā Jamā'ah* (Abrogation of Muslim Associations) in South-West Nigeria
(a). Perception on the formation of Islamic association

The entire *salafis* believed that there is no need of establishing an Islamic association before Islam can be practised. As a result of this, the formation of any Muslim congregation or association is a *bid'ah* in *salafiyyah's* doctrine. According to a *salafi* adherent, Ibrahim[361], he said that there was no Islamic organisation during the eras of the

Sahābah; hence, Islam can be propagated by any Muslim without forming an association. His word was also supported by most of the interviewed members of *Salafiyyah*, among who were Abdulkabir[362], Ishaq[363] and Jibril[364]. In her response, Nafisah[365] expressed that any Islamic forum is regarded as innovative act of some Muslims in the *Salafiyyah*'s creeds. This is the reason why the movement condemns all the Muslim associations in South-West Nigeria.

From the response of Sa'dullah [366] (a *salafi*), he also lamented that 'there is no need of establishing any Muslim organization in Yorubaland. He established his point that the formation of such organisation is not tenable in *salafiyyah's* doctrine'. In the same vein, he said that there was no similar association in the life time of the early *salafis*. So, its emergence nowadays is nothing but an innovation of some Muslims in Yorubaland. He concluded his statement that the formation of a Muslim congregation cannot be regarded as a mean of propagating Islam. In the response of Ya'qub[367], he said that the formation of any Muslim association is termed *'Lā Jamā'ah'* in *salafiyyah*. He supported his argument that *Salafiyyah* does not call for the establishment of any forum on the evangelisation of Islam. He was of the opinion that the religion (Islam) can be propagated without belonging to an association. This motive was also supported by Abdulwahid[368].

Considering the responses of the sampled non-*Salafis* on this variable, it was reported that the establishment of the Muslim associations in Yorubaland is very important. While answering the question on this item, Waliyullah[369] lamented that the establishment of the Islamic associations is a way of propagating Islam. He added that those associations helped Muslims to comprehend the teachings of the religion in detail. Besides this, he said that there are historical backgrounds that led to their establishments since the pre-colonial era. He classified their periods of establishment into three viz: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. Jamaluddeen[370] expressed that every Muslim in southwest Nigeria embraces the establishment of the Muslim organisations except *salafis*. He added that their establishment brought many advantages to Muslims. Some of the merits he mentioned were 'the opportunities to get admission into the public schools, assistance on employment into governmental ministries, representation of Yoruba Muslim affairs in the governmental policy, helping the less-privileged and founding Muslim schools at the primary and secondary levels. Furhermore, Ishaq[371] reiterated that the

Muslims in Yorubaland established the religious associations in order to solve the problems that were confronting them in the nation. Some of the challenges he listed were the marginalization of Muslims on getting admission into the government's schools, the need for enlightenment on the practices of Islam and establishment of Muslim modern schools. This is also supported by Oyeweso[372] on his assessment of the establishment and the role of *Ansaruddeen* Society in Yorubaland.

By and large, formation of Islamic organisations is highly essential in South-West Nigeria. The motives behind their establishment were to alleviate the suffering of the Muslims, providing centres of *da'wah*, representing the Muslims' interests in the government and most importantly to tackle the challenges of Muslim children on getting admission into schools as well as founding the Muslim schools. These are what brought the Muslims together to cater for their growth and development. Hitherto, the same reasons are still imbibed by the contemporary Muslim organisations in Yorubaland.

In a region like South-West Nigeria, it is imperative for Muslims to provide solutions to their challenges and fold their relationship. This is important based on the dictates of the *Qur'ān* such as the chapter 5 verse 2 which expresses that:

> … help one another on the good thing
> (such as the growth and advancement
> of the society) and fear of Allah'…

It is on the comprehension of the above *Qur'ān* reference that the Muslims deemed it essential to form a synergy as a way of helping one another and solving parts of their challenges. Through their laudable efforts, they were able to foster unity among themselves, establishing Qurānic and *'Arabiyyah* schools in different communities in Yorubaland. The rich among them also established modern primary and secondary schools. Till now, there is proliferation of Muslim fora in the region. Each forum contributes to the development of his environment in different Yoruba communities.

(b). Salafis' perception on the establishment of Muslim societies e.g. *Ansaruddeen*, Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria

In *Salafiyyah*, establishment of Muslims associations such as the *Ansaruddeen* society and Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) are not tenable. Their establishment is referred to as *bid'ah*. The *salafis* thus preach for their cancelation. The

salafis commented that their formation is an unacceptable act that accrues no reward in Islam. Muslih[373] mentioned that the establishment of the associations is not needed to practise Islam. He said further that there was no Muslim forum in the eras of the pious predecessors. Hence, there emergence among the Yoruba Muslim communities in the past and the present is nothing but a *bid'ah*. Similarly, Talihah[374] responded that the practice of *salafiyyah* is against the formation of the Muslim circle of any form. He regarded the formation of such as an imitation from the western ideology. He concluded his response that every Muslim in Yorubaland should uphold the dictates of *Salafiyyah* in lieu of belonging to other Islamic religious bodies.

In his contribution to this item, Ya'qub[375] who is a non-*salafi,* affirmed that the establishment of Muslim organisation is rejected by the adherents of the *salafiyyah* practice. He added that this rejection is not only peculiar to the Yorubaland but also nationwide. Additionally, he revealed that there will continue to be reasons for establishment of Islamic associations in Yorubaland. He believed that the reason for their establishment in the early history of Islam in the South-West will continue to create rooms for Muslims to establish more organisations where by their challenges will be tabled and resolved. He cited example of the Muslim communities in every state of the south-west Nigeria. He said that their formations became imperative due to certain factors which cannot be solved by an individual Muslim. In the same vein, 'Abdulwasi'i[376] also responded that the establishment of Islamic societies in Yorubaland is necessary. He cited National Council of Muslim Youth Organisations (NACOMYO) as an example. He said the society was first named Council of Muslim Youth Organisations (COMYO) with the aim of tackling the challenges of the Muslims that could not be solved by an association. He expressed that through the amalgamation of some Muslim associations; many challenges had been resolved. He concluded that it was through the synergy of many Islamic associations that the COMYO was spread beyond south-west Nigeria to other states of the country. Now, it has become a national body as its present nomenclature is the National Council of Muslim Youth Organisations (NACOMYO).

In the response of Muzammil[377], he said that the formation of Muslim societies is very germane in Yorubaland. He made reference to the achievements of some of those organisations. He was of the opinion that there would be necessities for establishment of the associations. He also expressed that there should not be any discrimination among the societies. He added that all

the Muslim organisations at the local or regional level of the Yorubaland are to be formed under the dictates of the *kitāb wa sunnah* (The *Qur'ān* and *Hadith*) without a claim of superiority over another.

Examining the formation of Islamic associations under the theory of this work, its formation is highly important in a society like Yorubaland. Meanwhile, the aims and objectives of establishment should conform to the dictates of the Islamic jurisprudence. The *Qur'ān* is very explicit on this. It says:

$$\text{وَلْتَكُن مِّنكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ}$$
$$\text{وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ}$$
$$\text{وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ}$$

Let there arise some group of people among you (Muslims) by calling people to the good path, commanding them to follow the path of Allah and forbidding from doing illicit act. Those who do this are the successful (Qur'ān 4 verse 104).

Indeed, your associations are one (by following the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*). I am your Lord (Allah), so you should be sincere to me (Qur'ān 21 verse 92)

Verily, your associations are one, therefore; worship me in accordance with the dictates of the *Shari'ah*. (Qur'ān 23 v 52).

From the above verses, establishment of Islamic societies can be allowed with the aim of devoting to the worship of Allah and *da'wah*. These fundamental aims are as well expressed in many *ahādith* of the Prophet among which is:

The Muslims will be divided into seventy sects. However, only one sect will enter into the paradise'. The one that abides by the tenets of the *Qur'ān* and the *Sunnah*[378]

Through the above extracts, the motives behind the establishment of a Muslim forum should not be against the principle of the *Sharī'ah*. Meanwhile, Muslims founded the associations as umbrella bodies to propagate the religion and provide solutions to their challenges. Their motive was supported with the prophetic tradition which expresses that "amalgamation or association of Muslims shall bring strength to them in their

community"[379]. Moreover, the associations always aid the Muslims to tackle some intra religious challenges nowadays through the religious leaders. This is the reason for establishing Muslim Communities' fora in each state of the region. Similarly, Yoruba region is a multi-religious society. Hence, the amalgamation of entire Muslims is very important as a mechanism to fold their relationship and solve their challenges. By this, rejection of the establishment will bring disunity and severe challenges into the Muslims. The results of the non-*salafi* respondents have shown that many problems that were faced by the Muslims were usually solved through the organisations. Thus, their formation brings growth and development to entire Yorubaland.[380].

(c) ***Salafiyyah's* perception on formation of female Muslim associations in South-West Nigeria (e.g. Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), *Alasalatu* Ibadu Rahman Society of Nigeria (AIBRASON) etc.**

Female Muslim organisations are the Muslim circles that were formed by some Muslim women in addition to the mixed Islamic associations. Their establishment serves as a forum for Muslim women to discuss their peculiar issues on the religion and other affairs. The societies help Muslim women to express their feelings and share different opinions among themselves. Their administrative arm consists of executive members among which are the posts of *Amīrah*, *Naibah al-Amīrah*, Secretary, Public Relations Officer and *Da'wah* Officer. Formation of these associations usually is condemned in *salafiyyah*. They were perceived as forbidden fora. Therefore, *salafis* perception on their establishment was investigated under this study.

The responses revealed that the formations of associations of Muslim women in South-West Nigeria such as Federation of Muslim Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) and *Alasalatu 'Ibādu Rahman* Society of Nigeria (AIBRASON) are not tenable in the *Salafiyyah* practice. Luqman[381] lamented that there was no Islamic association during the reigns of the orthodox caliphs and early *salaf as-salihīn*. He said that the establishments of the above Muslim organisations and others are parts of the culture of the western modernism. His opinion is the same with that of other *salafis* in the region. Similarly, Nafisah[382] also reiterated that there is no need of establishing Muslim female society. She concluded that its establishment contradicts the tenets of the *Sunnah*

of the *ṣahābah*. Other Muslims who are non-*Salafis* also attested that the formation of Islamic organisation is forbidden and criticized by the *salafis.*

In the opinion of *Hafṣah*[383] (a female *Salafi*), she said that gathering of female Muslims together as an association is a *bid'ah*. She added that such gathering does not add any value to the methodology of propagating Islam. She also responded that none of the women during the periods of the orthodox companions formed their separate organisations as it is prevalent in the southwest Nigeria nowadays. Fawziyyah[384] expressed that it is against the *manhaj as-Salafiyyah* (practice of *Salafiyyah*), for Muslim women to be speaking or preaching in the public places even amidst other females. By this, she said that such act is not tenable. Yusra [385] was of the opinion that the voice of a female is naked (*awrah*). So, it should be protected from being heard in the public. She enjoined every female Muslim not to participate in joining the above female associations or any female Muslim forum in their communities.

On the other hand, Ruqayyah[386] (non-*salafis*) opposed the condemnation of the female association by the *salafis*. She said that there are many issues that will be best discussed among the females without interference of males. According to her, such issues call for establishment of female's forum. Ihdayah[387] said that it is good for female Muslims to form an association in Yorubaland. She said it is one of the ways to discuss their issues on religious, social, political and other affairs. She referred to the establishment of private schools and vocational trainings that had been organised by the Federation of Muslim Women Assocation in Nigeria (FOMWAN) as parts of the reasons why she viewed that female society is important as that of the Muslim organisations.

In the Islamic jurisprudence, some traditions ('*Adāt*) that are not against the principles of Islam are allowed. This is examined under the secondary sources of the Islamic law. There are divergences of verdicts among the scholars in Yorubaland on its (Muslim female soceties) establishment. Some scholars view its establishment as the demand of the females in order to be able to interact with each other on some peculiar issues that are related to their affairs. It is under this law that some Muslim associations also established female wings in their societies in addition to the associations of female Muslims. Meanwhile, some scholars are of the opinion that its establishment is of no importance. They argued that all the affairs of every Muslim either male or female are to be directed by Muslim organisation. In conclusion, divergence of opinions paves

way for Muslims to uphold either of the verdicts. This is the rationale behind the existence of female Muslim association in Yorubaland.

 (L). **Western Education in the *Salafiyah* practice**

(a). Western education and Islamic education

Salafis were divided among themselves on the acquisition of western education. This was due to the perceptions of the membership; some acquired the western education while some did not; especially among the graduates of Arab nations. Those that opposed western education reported that western education was established to mislead Muslims. Meanwhile, the non-*salafis* upheld that the western literacy is an eye opener and essential knowledge that is important for Muslims to acquire. According to Rizqah[393] (a *salafi*) on this question, she claimed that the curriculum of western education was designed purposely to mislead Muslims. She referred to the western ideology of writing from left to right as a way of opposing the Islamic manner of writing. She expressed further that the Islamic act of writing which predated that of the western one began from right. However, as an opposition to the Islamic education, the British invented another method of writing in contrary to the Islamic one by changing the mode of writing from the left hand side to the right. Not only this, she said that they also designed the syllabus in a way that jeopardizes the interest of Muslims in Yorubaland. She concluded her response that these are the reasons why western education was not successfully allowed in Hausaland initially.

'Abdulmu'min's[388] opinion was similar to that of Rizqah[389] with some additions. He lamented that the western education is an ideology of the British people with the aim of colonialism and to cause disunity among Yoruba Muslims. He said that there was no disparity among Muslims in Yorubaland prior to the foundation of western education on the land. He made mention that its effect will continue to create gap and hostility not only among the Yoruba Muslims but generally among Yoruba people. He added that this is the core reason why the educated people considered those that are unable to go to western school as illiterate and unproductive people to the society.

Murtadha[390] said that the effects of western education are what led to the withdrawal of some *salafi* brothers and sisters from some schools in the society. He also expressed that the western education deprives female Muslims their modes of dressing

and the use of *niqāb*. He submitted that this is the rationale why some *Salafis* are establishing private primary and secondary schools in some communities in Yorubaland. Imran[391] responded that the western education is not a type of education that a Muslim needs to acquire. He added that it (western education) is the main cause of corruption in the society. Not only this, he also described it as the plot of the west against Islam. He concluded that some *salafis* embrace the western education and also send their children to schools. His conclusion shows that not all *salafis* objected the western education.

Salman[392] (Non-*Salafi*) opposed the notions of the *salafis*. He said that some factions of *salafiyyah* adherents condemned the western literacy by regarding it as a misleading education while other Muslims who are not *Salafis* embraced it as a mean of literacy. Similarly, Hasan[393] responded that western education is not a misleading path. He said that he is a graduate. He added that western education helps him to read the meanings of the *Qur'ān* and comprehend the tenets of the religion more. Tirmidhi[394] also said that he enrolled for the western education after he completed the *Madrasah* education. He explained that he began to develop interest in the acquisition of western education from his Arabic school. He expressed that his school had included some western subjects in her syllabus. Among the subjects he mentioned are Government, English Language, Literature-in-English, Social Studies, Economic and Yoruba language. According to him, 'the motive behind the inclusion of the western subjects into the syllabus is to help the students to be more relevant to the society on the *Madrasah* education and to be able to further the studies to higher institutions in the future.

Examining the western education under Islamic jurisprudence, it is an essential requirement for Yoruba Muslims. First, Islam obliges Muslims to strive for acquisition of knowledge not only of the religion (Islam) but also that of the survival. A number of hadith addressed the significance of education as an eye opener to Muslims and an essential of growth and development. Historically, a prophetic tradition commanded Muslims to seek for knowledge beyond Arabian Peninsula to China. China was by then a non-Islamic country. This implies that the Prophet obliged every Muslim to acquire knowledge of different disciplines which include that of the western education.

Not only this, Islam also obliges every Muslim to pursue knowledge of different fields of study. Many references of the *Qur'ān* examine the importance of science

education in detail. For instance, the first five revealed verses of the Qur'an lay emphasis on the acts of reading as the primary stage of knowledge acquisition. This is followed with the act of writing as the second stage of educational attainment. Next is the listening skill as the medium of expression. As a result of this, it is incumbent on every Muslim to achieve both the religious and western education in Yorubaland.

(b). *Salafiyyah's* perception on the effect of western education

Salafis perceived that western school was founded to promote the western ideal. This notion was similarly proved by Idris[395] and Kamal[396]. According to Kamal, "the curriculum of the western education gives preference to western knowledge without considering the affairs of Muslims". Idris added that this is the rationale behind withdrawal of some *Salafi* brothers and sisters from western schools. Imran[397] reiterated that western education is a misleading form of education that is not needed by Muslims. He said that it is not only anti-Islamic education but also a form of education that a female Muslim does not need. He explained that instead of western education, Quranic education is the only form of learning that a female Muslim needs. Sharafudden[398] said that the non-Muslim teachers do prevent Muslim students from practising Islam in many western schools in Yorubaland. He also claimed that some public schools deny female Muslims to use *niqāb* and *hijāb*. This attitude, according to him is an act of frustrating Muslims out of the religion and promoting western ideology. He described the western education as a method of literacy that is designed to promote western thought. He said that the system is completely against the concept of Islamic education and it does not favour *Salafis* women.

Meanwhile, Madinah[399] who is a non-*salafi* was of the opinion that western education comprises merits and demerits to the Muslims in Yorubaland. She observed that the attitudes of the tutors to the education through discriminating and preventing Muslims from getting admission are major disadvantages and the causes of some *salafis'* negative perceptions on its acquisition. In his reaction, Aminullah[400] expressed that *Salafis* are divided on western education. He said that some of them embraced it while some will never support it. He lamented that those who rejected it argued that the school syllabi were designed out of the dictates of Islam. He added that this is a core reason why western form of education is rejected in *Salafiyyah* by some of them. He further explained that some modern schools have been established by some *salafis* with the aim of providing

Islamic literacy and salafiyyah doctrines into the minds of the young ones. In his comment, Abdurrazaq[401] said that this perception in *Salafiyyah's* practice in Southwest Nigeria is the major reason that led to the withdrawal of some Muslim students from western schools. Rasheed who is a non-*Salafi* [402] upheld that the western education has benefits for Yoruba Muslims.

Expatiating this issue under the *Sharī'ah*, Islamic education is beyond learning at the *Madrasah* or Qurānic school only. It includes knowledge of different fields of studies. The *Sharī'ah* obliges Muslims to be literate of all facets of studies: sciences, humanities, social sciences, languages and curative medicines. This is well displayed by the pioneer Muslim philosophers. Additionally, a number of verses of the *Qur'ān* examine the essence of knowledge of all fields of learning for the benefits of Muslims. Through this, it is incumbent on every Muslim *Salafi* and non-*Salafi* to acquire Islamic and western education and use them to propagate Islam.

(c). Perception of *salafis* on enrolment of children for western education

Some *Salafis* do not attend western schools or send their children to attend. While responding to this question, Tawfeeq[403] (a *salafi*) explained some of the reasons why he did not allow his children to attend western school. He expressed that her daughters are using *niqāb* which will not be allowed in western schools. He added that western school denies Muslims from practisng Islam as it was exactly demonstrated by the pioneer *salafis*. He also expressed that the purpose of its foundation in Yorubaland was to convert Muslims and their children to Christianity. Qayyum[404] added that the aim of western school is completely against the tenets of the *Salafiyyah* and that is why some *salafis* withdrew from higher institutions. Maymunah[405] and Aminah[406] were of the opinions that western education is unfavourable to them. They said that it prevents them from using *niqāb*. Aminah explained further that her husband preached against it (western education) while Maymunah upheld that *Madrasah* education is the only form of education that female Muslims need.

From the responses of the non-*Salafi* interviewees, western education is perceived as the core literacy that a Muslim must acquire irrespective of gender. Shurakah[407] said that there are instances nowadays that made western education germane in the society. First, he said it is an eye opener to comprehend many things that are happening globally.

Secondly, it aids on the interpretation, transliteration and translation of the Islamic texts. Reference was made to the interpretations of the *Qur'ān*, *Hadith* and some Islamic texts into English. Thirdly, the system is a factor that facilitated the spread of Islam to most of European countries nowadays through which Islam is well understood by non-Arabs. He enjoins *salafis* in Yoruba-region who do not value western education to embrace the advantages of western education. Munirah[408] (non-*Salafi*) said that western education is of merits and demerits to Muslims. However, she said that she is a student of a higher institution and she uses *Khimār*. She added that the *salafis* should also enroll themselves as well as their children into schools as the essential steps towards the growth and progress of Muslims not only in Yorubaland but also in Nigeria as a country.

Under the Taha Al-Alwāni's Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, education is of paramount importance in Islam. That is why Islam and literacy are inseparable. Moreover, the scope of education in Islam transcends that of *Islamiyyah* schools. It is all encompassing. Irrespective of the contents of the western education, it is very obligatory on Muslims to learn it. This is the core reason why pioneer Yoruba Muslims organised their own western schools in many areas in South-West Nigeria. Their missions and visions on the establishment of those schools were in accordance with the dictates of the *Sharī'ah* which places high premium on literacy.

(d). *Salafi's* notion on *Madrasah* and western education

The result of the above notion revealed that some factions of *salafiyyah* in southwest Nigeria believe that *madrasah* education is only needed by Muslims. Citing from the opinions of the *salafi* respondents, it was obvious that some factions of *Salafiyyah* prescribe *Madrasah* education as the only form of education that is meant for Muslims. Some groups maintain that males can combine western and *Madrasah* knowledge together; while only *Madrasah* education is regarded as the orthodox education that a female Muslim should acquire. 'AbdulQadr[409] who is a student of *Madrasah* said that the ample knowledge of Islam can only be achieved in *Madrasah*. That is why he chose to go to *Madrasah*. Jamilah[410] said that *Madrasah* allows the use of *niqāb* and teaches detail knowledge of Islam. She added that her husband enrolled her into the *Madrasah* in order to update her horizon on the tenets of the religion.

In Islam, *Madrasah* serves as the primary centre of knowledge for Muslim children to begin acquisition of Islamic knowledge. It prepares the young ones towards the future by

instilling morality and fear of Allah into their minds. Historically, education first began in the mosques and transformed to *Madrasah*. It metamorphosed from the *madrasah* to higher level of learning. Knowledge of many disciplines was examined in Islam. For survival of the Islamic heritage, Muslims were encouraged to seek for additional knowledge along with the religious education. This is the reason why the *Qur'ān* enjoins Muslims to explore the land as an act of pondering over other forms of literacy. By and large, acquisition of knowledge will guide a Muslim on the act of worship of Allah and also serve as a mean of sustenance.

(M) Perception on Democracy among the *Salafis* in South-West Nigeria.

(a). Nigerian system of government in *salafiyyah*

S*alafis* upheld that democracy is *bid'ah*. This is further stressed by Ibrahim.[411] He considered the Nigerian democratic system of government as antithesis to Islamic system. He added that the democracy was against the Islamic mode of administration. He expressed that the acceptance of democracy in Yorubaland is the bedrock of bad governance and unending corrupt practices. According to him, 'the Nigerian system of government is *kufr* (infidelity) and embedded with corrupt practices of different categories'. He also said that the system deprives Muslims the fundamental rights of their faith. He submitted that the government makes use of common-law in the administration but neglects the Islamic law. Dhul-Kifl[412] explained that the governance in Yorubaland should be substituted with the Islamic theocracy. He buttressed his opinion that corruption has not been resolved in Nigeria since the adoption of democracy. Therefore, he suggested that the solutions to Yoruba problem are embedded in the Islamic system of administration. He was of the opinion that the system of government in the South-West is against the will of God (Allah). He concluded that the adoption of democracy is the reason why the nation in general and the region in particular is neither growing nor developing. 'AbdulGhaniy[413] pointed out in his response that the system of government in Yorubaland is *Kufr*. He lamented that the leadership comprises those who do not believe in Allah or cater for the needs of the masses. He added that if the leaders are not infidel they would assist the masses instead of embezzling the properties that were meant for their subjects. Bushrah's [414] contribution was that democracy is antithetical to the type of governance that the Yoruba region needs. References were made to some Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait.

She pointed out that the leaderships of the mentioned countries catered for the welfares of their subjects because they (leaders) are just and God-fearing which their types, according to her, are missing in South-West Nigeria.

Sadiq[415] and Kamal[416] who are *Salafi* Muslims lamented that the *Salafiyyah* ideology is against the Nigerian system of government. They claimed that the Islamic system of government is only adopted in the principle of *salafiyyah*. In his statement, 'Abdussami'i[417] (a *salafi*) claimed that the south-west Nigerian system of government is completely different from the Islamic one which the *salafiyyah* advocates for. 'By this, democracy is not tenable in the *Salafiyyah'*. He said that the *Salafiyyah* calls to the perfect method of ruling the society in accordance with the *Kitāb* and *Sunnah* (*Al-Qur'ān* and *Hadith/Sunnah*). Waliyullah[418] expressed that the best system of government has been prescribed in Islam. So, any other form of government is man-made and cannot be accepted in the *Salafiyyah*. He added that democracy will never be adopted in *Salafiyyah*. Other *salafis* also subscribed to his response.

Muhibah[419] (a non-*Salafi*) responded that the system of government in Yorubaland is designed with secular and western ideals. Thus, it can never admit the Islamic system of administration. She concluded that the south-west differs from northern Nigeria which is of high Muslim population. She submitted that the *Shari'ah* may not be accepted in Yorubaland due to its multi-religious nature. 'AbdulQuddus[420] who is a non-*Salafi* also said that bad leadership is the major challenge of governance in Yorubaland. He expressed that if the Yoruba political leaders practise democracy in accordance with its real concept; it is a good system of administration. Additionally, Qamaruddeen[421] (non-*Salafi*) responded that the democracy should not be rejected but the manner of its practice in the south-west should be changed. He said that incessant corruption in its practice is the factor that made the *salafis* reject it. He finalized that the democratic system of government should be embraced as the constituted authority and Muslims can demand their rights under its administration.

Investigating the system of government under the *Sharī'ah*, Yorubaland is made up of multi-religions and ethnicities. Besides this, it was colonized by the British. This is what gave birth to its system of administration politically, socially, economically and educationally. Society can be succinctly categorised into the Islamic and Muslim ones.[422]

The former is the *Shari'ah* compliant society. Its system of administration is purely Islamic. The later on the other hand comprises Muslims with other religionists but the system of governance is not Islamic. An example of this is Yorubaland. As a multi-religious society, practising the Islamic government may not be accepted in Yorubaland. However, provision should be made for Muslims on agitation of the practice of their faith. Similarly, the Muslims are to support the democratic system of administration in Yorubaland as the part of their responsibilities irrespective of the religion of the leaders.

(b) *Salafiyyah's* perception on voting and election

The results revealed that election is regarded as *bid'ah* or invention in *salafiyyah* practice. The practitioners believed that the voting and election are derived from western ideology. According to them, voting is against the orthodox principle of appointing or selecting a leader. They also said that election is usually characterized with many fraudulent acts. Analysing the responses of the sampled *Salafis*, they admitted that the election is unacceptable and it is *bid'ah*. According to Mikail[423], voting is not only opposed in *Salafiyyah* but it is also referred to as an act of injustice. Thus, selection of a leader through *shūra* or committee is regarded as the ideal method of appointing a political leader. He cited the appointment of Abubakr (the first caliph in Islam) as a case study for every Muslim to emulate. Ridwanullah[424] also upheld that the best method of choosing or appointing a leader is through *Shūrah*. He stated that the duty of the *Shūrah* is to select a qualified candidate based on the fundamental qualifications that a Muslim should possess. His opinion negated the act of electing a leader by voting. He maintained that voting is not tenable in the *Salafiyyah* practice in Yorubaland. He substantiated his claim that election is not a process of appointing the competent candidates into the public offices. He concluded that the consequence of election always leads to poor governance which he said is the major cause of problems in Yorubaland's polity. Meanwhile 'AbdulQadri[425] (non-*salafi*) said that election is good if it is conducted free and fair as defined in the principle of democracy. He added that election in the south-west and the nation generally is characterized with fraudulent act and that is the reason why it is rejected and tagged *bid'ah* in *salafiyyah* practice.

In the jurisprudence, *Shūrah* and election are tenable. This is in according with the tradition of each state. In an Islamic state, election or *Shūrah* can be adopted based on the

concession of the people. However, it should be in accordance with the dictates of the *Sharī'ah*. Moreover, in a Muslim or multi-religious state like South-West Nigeria, election is usually adopted as a mean of appointing a leader to the political positions. In Yorubaland, if the election is conducted without favouritism or nepotism, it is tenable under the *sharī'ah*. This implies that prior to the election; there should have been screening exercise for all the aspirants. Not only this, the election should be conducted with justice. Islam prescribes justice as the bed-rock of forming an egalitarian society for Muslims and non-Muslims that live in any society.

(O). Perception on Pristine Islam in *Salafiyah* in South-West Nigeria.
(a). Returning to pristine Islam.

The *salafi* interviewees revealed that Muslims have to practise Islam as it was practised by the *şahābah* who were the orthodox caliphs. This creed is fundamental in *Salafiyyah* practice in South-West Nigeria as well as other societies. In his reaction, Ibrahim[426] lamented that many innovative acts been crept into the present manner of practising Islam. He said that the method of practising Islam has been adulterated by modernism. Hence, in order to be faithful, there is a dire need to practise Islam as it was exactly laid down by the Prophet and the *şahābah* (immediate companions of the Prophet). This is also attested to by Abduşşabur[427]. He said that only *salafi*s worship Allah perfectly. He added that he and other *Salafis* in his community did invite people to join the movement in order to teach them how to perform the *salawāt* and other aspects of worship as it was observed by the *salaf salihīn*. Imran[428] also responded that the present manner of practising Islam has been negatively influenced by western culture. He thus said that it should be practised as it was done by the orthodox companions of the Prophet, who were the pioneer *salafis*. He responded further that 'not all the present Muslims in Yorubaland comprehend the *Sunnah* or have ample knowledge of the manner of observing *salāh*'. He said this is the reason why the *salafis* are calling other Muslims to accept the movement. Rahimah[429] responded that the best form of worship can only be learnt from the lives of the   pioneer *salafis* who were the rightly guided companions of the Prophet. She also said that the manner of observing *salawāt* (prayers) and other forms of '*Ibadāt* (religious acts) have been adulterated by Yoruba culture and western ideas.

However, Islam is not a static religion. It embraces any development that is beneficial to the growth and development of the humanity. Such development includes the use of modern equipment and adoption of some western ideas that are not contradicting to the Islamic doctrines. In his response, 'AbdulQahhar[430] lamented that the present manner of practising Islam is not in accordance with that of the *manahaj as-salaf as-şalihīn* (path of the orthodox successors of the Prophet)'. He explained that many innovations have been brought into the religion by western ideologies. He condemned the manner of appearance of some mature female Muslims in the society nowadays. He emphasised that Muslim females are to be in purdah by using *niqāb* as it was in the era of the *Sahābah*. He expressed that the effects of the adulterated culture on Islam are the reasons why the present Muslims do not understand the orthodox manner of practising the religion. Khalid[431] said that the *Salafiyyah* was brought to the South-West Nigeria in order to enlighten Muslims on the real manner of practising Islam.

In his expression, 'Abbas[432] (a non-*salafi*) reported that not all western ideas are unlawful as upheld in the *Salafiyyah* ideology. He said that there are developments nowadays which were not in existence in the eras of the *şahābah*. He referred to the use of modern facilities in mosques and other Islamic gatherings as the needs that are not against Islamic principle. He concluded that there are a lot of developments in this present world which were not invaluable in the early period of Islam. Hence, he submitted that not all aspects of western culture are unlawful in Islam.

(P). Perception towards non-*Salafi* scholars.

(a). Recognition of only *Salafi* scholars

Salafis believed that non-*salafi* scholars that are in Yorubaland are not well knowledgeable about Islam. 'Abdulhakim[433] said that the non-*Salafi* scholars in Yorubaland are not competent to lead the Muslims. He added that majority of them are *Sufis* while some of them do not preach real Islamic doctrines. This is also supported by AbdulKarim [434]. He said that most of non-*Salafi* clerics do not possess ample knowledge that can qualify them to be either *Imām Sughrā* or *Imām Kubrā*. According to 'AbdulMuqaddim, [435] "*salafis* are the only orthodox Muslims. He explained further that they practise all the *Sunnah* of the Prophet and that of his companions". He said further that only the scholars of *salafiyyah* are orthodox. Similarly, Khalid[436] said that the *Salafi*

scholars are ebullient due to their practice of the *Sunnah* of the prophet and by preachings on it. He emphasised this in his response and added that he joined the *salafiyyah* in order to be able to comprehend the *Sunnah* of the Prophet in details. Kafilah[437] said that she recognised the *salafi* scholars due to their calling to the manner of practising Islam as it was laid by the pioneer companions of the Prophet.

Moreover, the non-*salafis* attested that *salafiyyah* does not recognise the non-*salafi* scholars as ebullient scholars. Instead, they were tagged as unknowledgeable of Islam. On this item, Sulayman[438] (who is a Muslim cleric) proved that he and some of his contemporaries had been publicly confronted by some *Salafis* as ignorant of Islam because they are not *Salafis*. Ibrahim[439] added that this notion had generated a lot of discords among *Salafis* and other Muslims who are not *salafis* in many communities. In his response, Mubashir[440] said that the *salafis* disregard the non-*salafi* scholars in Yorubaland due to disparity on the practice (*sunnah*) of the Prophet. He lamented that while the *salafis* scholars embraced most of the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, other Muslim scholars who do not subscribe to *Salafiyyah* also practise some of the *Sunnah*. He concluded that the level of practising the *Sunnah* does not disqualify a scholar. He therefore said that the *Salafis* based their conclusion on the level of practice of *sunnah* of each scholar, and are using it to give preference to the *Salafi* scholars over the non-*salafis* in Yorubaland.

Examining the responses under the jurisprudence, differences on the practice of the *sunnah* among Muslims (either *salafi* or non *salafi*) does not negate the competence of a scholar. Also, level of practising the *sunnah* of the Prophet will continue to vary among Muslims. This is in accordance with the prophetic saying which illustrates:

> Whatever I forbade you, move away
> from it. Whatever I commanded you to
> do, practise it as much as you can [441]...

Based on the above extract, some Muslims uphold that not all the prophetic traditions can be performed by a Muslim while the *salafis* upheld that the *sunnah* is as compulsory as the *fard* (obligation) in Islam. Those who claimed that the *Sunnah* is also compulsory as the obligatory acts in Islam are generally referred to as *the Ahlus-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* among whom are the *salafis*. The *salafis* thus maintain that all the *Sunnah*

acts are compulsory on every Muslim. Not only this, they also claimed that whoever does not practise the *Sunnah* as it was demonstrated by the Prophet is a nominal Muslim. This is a reason behind the emergence of the movement in the southwest with the aim of reforming the Islamic practices to how it was laid down by the pioneer *salafis*.

(b). Substitution of non-*salafi* scholar

Substitution of non-*salafi* scholars is advocated for by *salafis*. This is due to their perceptions that they are incompetent. Not only this, they usually preached against their activities by condemning them. In addition to the above responses, Mudaththir[442] and Abdulkabir[44] reported that the non-*salafis* scholars are also regarded as *Sufis* in *Salafism*. Not only this, the non-*Salafis* were also tagged with non-Muslims who are not liable to be preaching Islam. Both respondents concluded that the disparity will continue to be in Yorubaland. Reference was made to Jabata as an advocate of substitution of non-*Salafi* scholars. His preaching and that of other *Salafis* contributed to the spread of this ideology to many areas of South-West Nigeria. While responding to the question, Bilal [444] (a *salafi*) said that the only competent scholars are the *salafis*. He supported his statement that they call Muslims to shun western ideology that has been adulterated with the orthodox manner of practising Islam. Burhan[445] also submitted that the scholars of *Salafiyyah* are competent because they enjoin every Muslim to accept *Salafiyyah*.

In another dimension, Salman [446] who is a non-*salafi* revealed that the notion of judging the competence of an Imam is peculiar to the practitioners of *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland. He added that the *salafis* usually claim the superiority of their doctrines over other Muslims who are not *salafis*. According to him, 'the issue of supremacy of doctrine of a group is not a yardstick to determine the competence of a scholar in a Muslim forum'. He expressed that any Muslim that merits the qualities that are stipulated under the *Sharī'ah* is competent to be a scholar and an Imam in Islam.

Examining this notion in the *sharī'ah*, the criteria to determine a scholar are comprehensively analysed in the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). These are ample knowledge of Islam, knowledge of the reading and exegesis of the Qur'ān, possession of the knowledge *Hadith,* application of the Islamic jurisprudence and *taqwā* (piety). Others include patience, knowledge of the Islamic history, fluency in Arabic and intelligence. The claim of the competence of scholars by the *salafis* is not supported by the majority of

Muslims. *Salafis* opinion on the claim of superiority of their leaders is based on their perception that their scholars are most ebullient in Yorubaland. However, scholars of other Muslim organisations should not be defamed or condemned. Their act is addressed as a method of calling people to join *salafiyyah*. This is pointed out succinctly as:

<div dir="rtl">
مِنَ الَّذِينَ فَرَّقُوا دِينَهُمْ وَكَانُوا
شِيَعًا كُلُّ حِزْبٍ بِمَا لَدَيْهِمْ فَرِحُونَ
</div>

Among those who deviate in their religion
and became sects, each sect will be
rejoicing with what is with it (*Qur'ān* 30
verse 32).

(c) Different perceptions on *salafiyyah* practice in Yorubaland

The manner of practising *salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria has generated two perspectives. The practitioners claimed that it is the authentic method of preaching Islam while other Muslims who are non-*salafis* regard it as an extremist ideology. Opinions were sampled on this practice from *salafis* and non-*salafis* in order to authenticate their claims in the *sharī'ah*. Responses of the *salafis* revealed that the *salafiyyah* is practised in accordance with the *manhaj* of *ibn* Taymiyyah and Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab. This is also said by Habibullah[447] and Kabirah[448]. They said that the practice of the *Salafiyyah* was not accidental, extreme or being out of the dictates of the *Sharī'ah* but in accordance with the *Madhab* of ibn Taymiyyah and also to call Muslims to practise Islam as it was practised by the pioneer *salafis*.

In his response, Musa [449] (a *Salafi*) said that every *salafi* adherent is regarded as an extremist by non-*Salafis* in Yorubaland. However, he explained that the *Salafis* are not extremists. He cited himself as an example. He said that he has been tagged extremist by his colleagues who are not *Salafis* due to the manner he used to call them to join the *Salafiyyah*. His response was also supported by Nurayn[450]. He said that the *Salafiyah* is spread in the South-West Nigeria in accordance with the *manhaj* of *Wahhabiyyah*. He added that the methodology of *Salafiyyah* should be emulated by every Muslim. Nuruddeen[451] upheld that the other Muslims who are non-*Salafis* do not want to join them and that is the reason for tagging them extremists. Ahmad[452] admitted that the non-*Salafis* do criticise the manner of the practice in Yorubaland. He said this is a major challenge that he and other adherents in his vicinity encounter every day.

Aminullah [453] (a non-*salafi*) responded that the real *Salafiyyah* is good but the present adherents are neo-*salafis*. Not only this, he also added that the practice is extreme and different from the real *salafiyyah* in Islam. He said that the adherents usually compel non-*salafi* Muslims to practise Islam as it was demonstrated by the pioneer *salafis* which they termed as the pristine Islam. He stated that the adherents enforced the doctrines on other fellow Muslims and this often resulted into discord in the society. Hasan [454] (non-*salafi*) responded that the disposition of *Salafis* to non-*Salafi* Muslims is a major factor that causes the condemnation of the practice by non-*Salafis*. This response was also supported by 'Abdussalam [455]. He affirmed that the non-*Salafis* will continue to perceive the *Salafis* as extremists and radicals due to their manner of preaching the *salafiyyah*. According to Mikail[456], the advocates of *salafiyyah* are propagating their mission with extremism. He added that this is why the Yoruba Muslim community did not totally accept their doctrines. He lamented that they are regarded as extremists and radical Muslims. Response of Ihdayah[457] and Qasim [458] revealed that the approaches of some *salafis* made them to be labelled extremists and radicals by other Muslims and non-Muslims in South-West Nigeria. He expressed that the *Salafiyyah* is a call to the pristine Islam but the manner of its practice nowadays in Yorubaland is too extreme on other Muslims who are not *Salafis*.

Examining the responses under the jurisprudence, Islam lays down criteria for calling people to the fold of the religion. It spells out wisdom as a core prerequisite of *da'wah*. Therefore, a Muslim should be soft in calling people to the religion. Not only these, it is also obligatory on the caller (*dā'i*) to comprehend not only the knowledge of the *sharī'ah* but also its application in each community. Similarly, it should be put in mind of the neo-*salafis* in the region that there is a dire need to seek for more methodology of *da'wah*. The findings show that there is paradigm shift from *salafiyyah* in Islam and the practice of neo-*salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria in this era.

4.12 Reconciliation of *Salafiyyah* Practices in Southwest Nigeria

This segment is aimed to reconcile the perceptions of the *Salafis* and other Muslims (non-*Salafis*) on the *Salafyyah* practices in South west Nigeria as analysed in the previous chapter. This will be done by examining the practices in the adopted theory, the *Maqāsid ash-Sharī'ah*.

4.12.1 Application of the Knowledge of the Islamic Jurisprudence.

Islamic jurisprudence is a broad field of study. It comprises the rules and regulations that guide all affairs of Muslims in different communities. Its scope consists of the act of worship in Islam ('*Ibādah*), intra and inter faith relationships (*al-Mu'amalāt*), social interaction, diplomacy, ethics (*ādab*), morality (*tarbiyyah*), penal codes and torts among others. However, application of each of these concepts requires adequate knowledge of the Islamic jurisprudence in theory and practice. This explains that acquisition of the knowledge of *fiqh* is not only enough to practise Islam but also its application. Hence, a Muslim is obliged to possess the knowledge of the jurisprudence and comprehend its application in the society. Such knowledge can be broadly classified into two viz: the primary or fundamental knowledge such as the *Qur'ān, Mustalih al-Hadīth* (Science of *Hadīth), Tafsīir al-Qur'ān, Tārīkh al-Islām* (Islamic history) and Arabic language. Other classification is the secondary knowledge. This involves other branches of the jurisprudential law that are derived from the primary. Among them are the *Qiyās, Ijmā'a, Maşālih, 'Urf, Istihsān, Istidlāl* and *Ijtihād*. Examination on these secondary and primary knowledge usually leads to *fatāwah* (scholarly verdicts on Islamic affairs) in the jurisprudence. By and large, it is highly essential for a Muslim not only to know all these sources of the Islamic law but also to understand their practices in each society [459].

4.12.2 Nature of the Society and the Need to Identify Muslim State from Islamic State

Society is regarded here as the organisation of men of different tribes, races custom and traditions that have come to live together for the purpose of co-existence. Citing Nigeria as an example, it is a society that comprises a number of ethnic groups. Besides the three major or principal ethnicities viz: Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, there are many other tribes. Not only this, while Hausa is of high number of Muslims, Yoruba and Igbo are not. In the case of Yoruba, both Muslims and Christians are of largest percentage while the traditional religionists are few. However, the percentage of Muslims in Igbo land is very low compared to that of the Hausa and Yoruba lands. Traditions of these

different tribes will be examined in the application of the secondary sources of the jurisprudence.

Society is categorised in this chapter into four. They are Islamic, Christian, secular and Muslim societies. Each of them will be succinctly expressed. A country or state whose inhabitants are mainly Muslims and it as well uses both the sources of the Islamic jurisprudence in all its administration is referred to as an Islamic state. It can also be referred to as a *Sharī'ah* compliant society. *Sharī'ah* will be fully implemented in such a society due to its nature. Meanwhile, this state may accommodate non-Muslims based on certain agreements especially on the practices of their religions and social activities. Those aliens are referred to as *Dhimmis* under the *Sharī'ah* [460]. It is the responsibility of the Islamic government to cater for them and protect their lives and properties.

On the other hand, a Christian state is defined here as any country that is governed by the Christian doctrines. It consists of highest percentage of Christians in the society. However, people of other faiths can be accommodated by the government for certain reasons which may be economy; through bilateral or international trade, immigration and tourism. A secular society is any nation whose religion is neither Islam nor Christianity but indigenous ones. This is so because the two religions were revealed with scriptures while the traditional faith was not. Instead, the mode of worship of such a nation is designed by each clan. Examples of such are the Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism [461]. Lastly, a Muslim nation is of mixed religions. It comprises Muslims, Christians and other faiths. Besides, its constitution accommodates all the religions and also provides for the rights of individuals irrespective of their religions. The head of administration can be Muslim, Chritian or traditionist. The Muslim society can also be referred as a multi-religious society.This is so because, it accommodates many religions. Nigeria in general and South-West Nigeria in particular are cited here as an example of a Muslim or multi-religious state.

Islamic polity recognizes the organizations of different societies as well as their cultures that do not contradict the Islamic principle or detrimental to the progress of humanity. Hence, the application of the jurisprudence in those societies is varied. For instance, while the whole principles of the *Sharī'ah* can be implemented in an Islamic state since it is owned and controlled by Muslims, it is not feasible in other states. For

example, application of the *Sharī'ah* in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Iraq cannot be compared with that of Nigeria which is a non-Islamic state. Thus, besides the primary codes of conducts which its applications are inimitable, the secondary codes are applied with the nature of each society. By this, not all that is applicable in the above listed Arab or Islamic countries can be totally practised in Nigeria. This is a core reason why there are divergences of verdicts among the Islamic jurists of both early and the present eras. For instance, the *fatāwah* of Y*us*uf *al-Qaradāwiyy* are at times different from that of ibn Taymiyyah. This is due to their different societies.

From the above analysis, the fundamental prerequisites of a Muslim are to study the origin of a society as spelt out under the Islamic jurisprudence. This will determine the mode of approaching religious affair of the people. Historically, when Islam was spread to *Madīnah*, the culture of the inhabitants was not immediately condemned. Mention should be made here that *Madīnah* was not an Islamic land before the migration of the Prophet and the *Muhājirūn* to it [462]. However, when the Prophet and his entourages entered the city, they were warmly welcome with songs and drumming as signs of appreciating them. Not only this, there were many Arabic poets in the city who did satirize one another prior to the advent of Islam to the land. This tradition was not instantly condemned by the Prophet but gradually until the whole city understood the tenets of Islam. This is an illustration of the application of the jurisprudence. There was no full implementation of the *Sharī'ah* at the initial migration of the Muslims to the city due to the tradition of the society as a non-Islamic state. Meanwhile, the *Sharī'ah* was fully implemented when Islam had been understood by the *Ansār* (the people of *Madinah* or the Madinites) [463]. This is an indication of the need why a Muslim, especially a preacher (*Dā'i*) should understand the tradition of the environment as part of the prerequisites for the spread of Islamic tenets peacefully.

4.12.3 Flexibility on the Matters of Religion

Islam enjoins Muslims to maintain peace while propagating the religion. A number of examples were related from the prophetic traditions as guides for Muslims on religious affair. Muslims are obliged to be soft on any issue that relates with Islamic propagation. An example of this is traced to the *Hadith* of *Abū Hurayrah* which addresses a Muslim to be soft in propagating the teachings of Islam. Such as:

Islam is simple to propagate. Whoever is too strict on its propagation will never be able to practise it as required or achieve the goal of its propagation [464].

The above extract expresses that a Muslim should be flexible on the act of practising the religion. Additionally, he should understand the real teachings of the religion and how to relate it with the society. It is therefore highly essential for the *Salafis* especially those that are volatile in their spread of the *manhaj* to be flexible on the propagation. This will project their doctrines and probably enable non-*Salafi* Muslims to comprehend the real definition of *Salafiyyah* and the reason for its advocacy in this century.

Perceptions of Muslims on the religious matter will always be different. This is due to the schools of thought that an individual may uphold or follow in the *fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence). Among the Sunni Muslims in Yorubaland for instance, majority of them follow the *Madhhab* of *Malikiyyah* (Malikite school of thought). Others also abide by the principles of *Hambaliyyah*, *Shafi'iyyah* and *Hanafiyyah* schools of jurisprudence. Thus, a Muslim has right to adopt any of the schools of thought. By and large, it is tenable in the *Sharī'ah* to believe in all the four schools of thought and abide by any of them. Meanwhile *Hambaliyyah* school of thought is mostly upheld in *Salafiyyah* in addition to that of the ibn *Taymiyyah* and *Wahhabiyyah*. Other scholars of the *salafiyyah* include *Sayyid Qutb*, Jamaludden *al-Afghāni* and Nasruddeen *al-Bāni* [465]. Thus, due to these disparities on the schools of thought, there will always be divergences of verdicts on religious issues. Such issues should therefore be handled with soft hand and be explained to the Muslims who do not subscribe to *Salafiyyah* creeds (non-*salafis*).

4.12.4 Need for Adequate knowledge of the Religion

Islam places high premium on knowledge as the primary tool for its propagation. As a result of this, a Muslim is required to be highly skilled in the knowledge of the *Qur'ān*, *Hadith* and other branches of knowledge in the *Sharī'ah*. Additionally, it is essential to distinguish *Makrūh* from *Bid'ah* and *Harrām*. This is one of the major reasons behind the misconceptions about the three concepts. *Makrūh* is any act that is rejected in the *fiqh* due to one reason or the other. Rejection of such act may be due the verdict of

any of the notable four Sunni schools of the Islamic thought. In some instances, certain things may be rejected by the *Madhhab* of Imam Shafi'i but recommended by either *Malikiyyah* or *Hambaliyyah* and vice versa. Thus, a Muslim is free to follow any of the schools. Also, there may at times be '*Talfīq*' [466] in adopting the verdict of the schools. *Talfīq* is an act of adopting and giving preference to any of the notable schools on certain issues of religious matter.

Bid'ah can be linguistically defined as an innovation or invention. It is etymologically derived from the Arabic verb "*Ba-da-'a*" which means to invent, innovate, establish, precede, or create something new. Contextually, it is an innovative act in the religion especially any act that was neither done by the Prophet nor his companions. It can be classified into religious and desirable *bid'ah*. The latter is any innovation on the people's culture, traditions and custom. However, the former connotes innovation or additional act(s) into the religious activities in addition to how it was demonstrated by the Prophet (S.AW.). The religious *bid'ah* is also sub-divided into the primary and secondary ones. The primary *bid'ah* is any invention that was added to the practice of Islam by the companions of the Prophet after his demise. These include the compilation of the *Qur'ān*, its standardization, performance of the *Tarāwih* in congregation inside the mosque during *Ramadān*. These additional acts had been embraced since the companions' era till now. Any new development in Islam is termed as the secondary *bid'ah*. It is defined here as the innovative ideas or deeds by the contemporary jurists on the practice of Islam. It is also classified into acceptable or good *bid'ah* and non-acceptable or bad *bid'ah*. The good ones are such acts that do not negate the primary *bid'ah* while the un-acceptable ones are the rejected innovations into Islam.

Meanwhile in the *Salafiyyah* practice, any act or deed that was neither done by the Prophet nor the early *Salafis* is termed as *bid'ah*. The principle of *Salafiyyah* therefore forbids the secondary innovations. Emphasis is always laid on the prophetic saying as the evidence for rejecting inclusion of new deeds into the religion. Such Hadith is

> The best word is the *Qur'ān* and the authentic guidance is the speech (*Ḥadīth*) of the Prophet (SAW). Innovations are the worst of all deeds in the religious practice. Innovative deeds are errors and misguidance. Any invention is a misguidance and

any misguiding act or deed will lead his doer to nowhere but hell-fire [467].

Like other *Salafis* in other parts of the world, *Salafiyyah* in the Southwest Nigeria is not an exception. There are misconceptions among the Muslims of the region on the meanings, interpretations, perceptions and practices of *bid'ah* and *muharramāt*. The Muslims are divided, in the findings of this study into 'the *Salafi* and non-*Salafi* Muslims. The discord among them brought a number of thoughts into the manner of practising Islam. Why the *Salafiyyah* adherents perceive that Islam needs to be revived to its pristine period, the non-*Salafis* upheld that there is paradigm shift on the real practice of the *Salafiyyah* from what the present generation of Muslims in Yorubaland professes as *Salafiyyah*. They (non-*Salafis*) thus objected to the practice of the neo-*salafiyyah* and tagged it extremism and radicalism in the spread of the religion. These factors and others have caused disunity on the ways and manners of practising the tenets of Islam and also separated Muslims of the region. It also led to a situation whereby Muslims fight against Muslims on organisational and doctrinal disparities.

The *Salafis* in the area (individual and groups) uphold that only acts that were done by the Prophet when he was alive till his demise are meant for Muslims to practise. Additionally, they maintained that such acts should be carried out in the exact manner in which they were performed by the Prophet without any modification, addition or substraction. They therefore condemn other Muslims who do not comply with their creed and principles. They buttress their arguments that Islam is a complete religion and the Prophet was perfect on his mission to mankind. They further expressed that the Prophet had explained every act in Islam in detail. Their arguments to substantiate that any act besides what the Prophet had expressed is *bid'ah and muharramāt* include *Qur'ān* 5 verse 3 which reads thus:

> Today, I have perfected religion, Islam for you (Muhammad and entire Muslims), completed my favour on you and chosen Islam for you as the divine religion (Chapter 5 verse 3).

The verse extract from the *Qur'ān* is usually quoted by the *Salafis* as the reference that restricts Muslims to the tenets of Islam as they were practised by the Prophet and recorded in both the *Sunnah* (Practices) and *Ahādith* (Sayings) of the Prophet. According

to them, they maintained that the word ،ُأَكْمَلْتُ (in the Arabic text of the verse) which connotes *"I have perfected"* in the above verse implies that Allah has perfected the practices and any act that has to do with how Islam should be practised. Their argument was also supported that this is a reason why Allah sent Prophet Muhammad as the last of His messengers to demonstrate the manner of practising Islam. They argued that the Prophet had expressed everything comprehensively prior to his demise. In the same vein, they also proved that the word أَتْمَمْت(I have completed) in the verse is another reference point on the completion of how Islam should be understood.

Also, they maintained that the word 'I have completed' corroborates and as well expatiates on the previous clause; 'I have perfected'. Through this, they are of the opinions that Islam is a complete and perfect religion and any other act that anybody introduces into its practices besides what the Qur'ān and *Hadīth* revealed is not only tantamount to *Bid'ah* and *Harrām* (Bringing or introducing new things into the practice of Islam, innovative and unlawful acts) but also an act of adulterating the religion. As a result of this, they declared such a person as an infidel and hypocrite. In addition to the above quoted reference from the *Qur'ān*, the group usually cited many prophetic sayings on its argument. The most quoted Hadith is traced to the farewell message of the Prophet where emphasis was laid on Muslims to desist from innovations. The text of the Hadith reads thus:

<div dir="rtl">

فَإِنَّهُ مَنْ يَعِشْ مِنْكُمْ فَسَيَرَى اخْتِلَافًا
كَثِيرًا، فَعَلَيْكُمْ بِسُنَّتِي وَسُنَّةِ الْخُلَفَاءِ الرَّاشِدِينَ
الْمَهْدِيِّينَ، عَضُّوا عَلَيْهَا بِالنَّوَاجِذِ، وَإِيَّاكُمْ
وَمُحْدَثَاتِ الْأُمُورِ؛ فَإِنَّ كُلَّ بِدْعَةٍ ضَلَالَةٌ".
رَوَاه اَلتِّرْمِذِيُّ وَقَالَ: حَدِيثٌ حَسَنٌ صَحِيحٌ

</div>

Verily, he among you who lives long will see many controversies. So you must keep to my *Sunnah* and to the *Sunnah* of the *Khulafā ar-Rashidūn* (the rightly guided caliphs), those who guided to the right way… Beware of newly invented matters (by not including bad practice into Islam). Verily every *bid'ah* (innovation) is misguidance [468].

They claimed that the Prophet knew that there would be a time after his demise when people would be adulterating the tenets of Islam by using rational proofs to invent new things into the fundamentals of Islam. By and large, they upheld that the above Hadith is not only a prophetic word but also a warning and command. Besides, their argument was also substantiated that Allah and prophetic commands in the *Sharī'ah* are to be abided by Muslims without any compromise. Based on these both divine scriptures, they supported that an individual should adhere to the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* of the Prophet on any matter that has to do with Islam. They concluded that any act outside the contents of the scriptures turns a Muslim to an infidel. They also referred to any Muslim that acts outside their doctrinal interpretations of the above extracts of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith* with many un-Islamic names such as *Kuffār* (disbeliever), *Munāfiqūn* (hypocrites) and *Ahlun-Nār* (inmates of the hell-fire).

In conclusion, the *salafis* claim that the religious acts of those who do not restrict to the *Qur'ā*n and *Hadith* will not be accepted of them. They reiterated that they would be inmates of the hell-fire on the day of the judgement. This claim has generated many controversies among Muslims. It at times escalated to violence in some mosques and many occasions especially during the public *d'awah* (Islamic lectures) that deal with the issues of the prophetic tradition (*Sunnah*) on *Bid'ah, Muharramāt* and other related principles in Islam.

On the other side, those who do not subscribe to *Salafiyyah* (non-*salafis*) upheld that the concepts of *bid'ah and muharramāt* (innovation and and forbidden acts) do not restrict Muslims to only what the Prophet did or demonstrated. According to them, Islam is not a static religion but a dynamic and universal one that covers all spectra of life in the past, present and the future occurrences. Many references on the meanings, concepts and scopes of *bid'ah and muharramāt* were cited by this group. First, they debunked the claim of *salafis* that Islam restricts or limits its practices only to what the Prophet did, demonstrated or practised. Instead, they claimed that Islam paves way for applications of *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* connotes ability to exercise reasoning to arrive at solutions on certain things that are not explicit in the *Qur'ān*, Hadith and are not contradicting the fundamental principles of Islam. They argued that the *salafis* only based their ideology on the literal meanings of the *Qur'ān* and Hadīth but neglected other sources of the

jurisprudence. They also expressed that the *salafis* wanted to establish '*aqīdah al-Wahhabiyyah* and *Madkhaliyyah* in Yorubaland by comparing the nature and culture of the region (Yorubaland) with Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the non-*salafis* were of the opinion that the South-West is not an Arab country where the creed of *Wahabiyyah* and Madkhaliyyah can be established by *salafis*.

In the same vein, they claimed that there are certain things that did not happen during the prophetic era that are occurring now. They argued that such new things call for critical reflections on the advance study of the application of the *Sharī'ah* but not returning to the pristine Islam as in the *salafiyyah* practice. The non-*salafis* also referred to the *Qiyās, Ijmā'ah, Istihsān, Maşālih, Istidlāl* as well as *Ijtihād* as the concepts that call for environmental study on the propagation of Islamic teachings. Early cases on application of the *Shari'ah* were also cited. They buttressed their arguments that the Prophet established juristic solutions on matters that were not directly mentioned in the Qur'ān or Hadith and enjoined the *Ummah* since his period to apply wisdom on the contents of'*uşūl-ad-Dīn*.

The thought of the non-*Salafis* is traceable to the migration of *Mu'adh bn Jabal* to Yemen when he was sent by the Prophet. After his perfection on the application of the use of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth* to proffer solutions to any issue ahead of him, he was also instructed to use his wisdom (on the dictates of Islam) to tackle any issue or problem that its resolution was neither explicit in the *Qur'ān* nor *Hadīth*.

A companion of the Prophet, *Mu'adh bn Jabal* was sent by the Prophet to spread the message of Islam to Yemen. When Yemen he was about going, he was instructed by the Prophet to first apply the dictates of the *Qur'ān* to arrive at any issue before him at Yemen; but if he could not discover a solution directly in the Qur'ān; he should refer to the hadith. The Prophet expressed further that if he could not still find a direct solution to any religious issue before him, he should make use of reasoning based on his assimilation of the primary sources of the *Sharī'ah* (*Qur'an* and *Hadīth*). This incidence, according to Islamic jurists, marked the dawn of the *Qiyās* in the secondary sources of the *Sharī'ah*. The hadith as it can be found in a number of the prophetic traditions such as *Sahih al-Muslim*, *Sahih –Bukhāri* and *Musnad* Ahmad reads thus:

Narrated upon the authority of Mu'adh ibn Jabal (May Allah be pleased with him) who said:" The Prophet peace be upon him said to Mu'adh ibn Jabal when he was about to send him to Yemen: 'How will you judge (between the people) if it so happens that you must judge?' He (Mu'adh ibn Jabal) said: 'I will judge according to the Book of Allah.' He (the Messenger of Allah then) said: 'What if (the legal ruling) is not explicit in the book of Allah?' He (Mu'adh ibn Jabal) replied: 'Then (I will judge) according to the *Sunnah* of the Messenger of Allah (SAW).' He (the Messenger of Allah) then said: 'What if (the legal ruling) is not elaborate in the *Sunnah* of the Messenger of Allah peace be upon him.' He replied: 'Then I will use my independent judgement and I would not spare any effort (to try to come to the correct solution (*Ijtihād*).' He (the Messenger of Allah) then struck me on my chest and said: 'All praise is for Allah who rendered suitable the messenger of the Messenger of Allah and caused him to be in agreement with that which pleases His Messenger' [469].

Another argument raised by the non-*Salafi* Muslims of the area of study was on the adoption of new things into Islamic practices in addition to those that had been demonstrated by the Prophet is traced to the lives of the four orthodox caliphs. They maintained that a number of good innovations or inventions in Islam today were brought from Abubakr (632 – 634 C.E.), 'Umar ibn Al-Khattab (634 – 644 C.E.), and 'Uthman ibn Affan (644 – 656 C.E.). On the first premise, they cited that the Holy *Qur'ān* which was revealed in piece-meal for a number of twenty three years (23 years) to the Prophet was not in the exact shape it is today. Besides, they maintained that its verses were written in parchment materials such as dead–animal-skins, hides as well as animal bones (scapular) and they were located in many places of *Hijāz* (*Makkah*) and *Yathrib* (*Madinah*). They added that the expansion of the verses of the *Qur'ān* to *Madinah* was due to the migration of the Prophet along with the early Muslim converts of *Makkah* to *Yathrib* for asylum. This is a core reason why the divisions of the *Suwar* (chapters of the *Qur'an*) are categorized into two viz: *Makkan* and *Madinan Suwar*. The Makkan *Suwar* were revealed for thirteen years while that of the *Madinah* took ten years. Throughout the whole twenty-three years of this divine revelation; the Prophet never instructed any of his companions to collect or compile the various materials with which the scripture was

written. They were left at where they were written though the titles of each of the *suwar* were mentioned by the Prophet.

Upon the demise of the Prophet (632 C.E.), there was a necessity to gather and compile the materials on which the Qur'ānic verses were written. It was suggested to Abubakr who was the first caliph after the Prophet. The opinion was raised by 'Umar ibn Al-khattab – who later became the second caliph. This new idea of the compilation seemed strange not only to Abubakr but also other companions. After much persuasions and convictions coupled with the death of many Muslims including memorisers of the *Qur'ān* in the first civil war in Islam after the death of the Prophet, Umar's motion was not only supported but also ratified. The battle is referred to in the Islamic history as the *Ghazwat- al-Yamāmah* (Battle of apostasy). It claimed the lives of many memorizers of the Qur'an. The root cause of the battle was on the evolution of fake prophets by some members of the Muslim community (among who was Musaylimah *al-Khadhāb*) and rejection of some people to pay *zakat* [470]. These two acts are not only tantamount to destruction of the society but also against the Islamic culture. This is so, because, *zakāt* is an institution that brings solidarity to society while the *Qur'ān* had revealed that the Prophet Muhammad was the last of the prophets of Allah (Q33:40).

With regards to this compilation which was a later development after the Prophet, they upheld that the *Sharī'ah* accommodates good inventions or innovations that are not antithetical to the philosophy of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*. This is the reason why the secondary sources of the *Sharī'ah* are wide and cannot be closed or restricted to a particular tradition or custom. They argued that since the compilation could not be referred to as a *bid'ah* or *harrām* in the *Sharī'ah*, it means that not everything that a Muslim does which the Prophet did not do could be regarded as *bid'ah* or *harrām*, except if such an act contradicts the dictates of Islam or makes what is *halāl* (lawful) to be *harrām* (unlawful) or vice versa.

In addition to the above expression on the compilation of the *Qur'ān*; they (non-*salafis*) also upheld that many new things were invented into the practice of Islam during the administration of 'Umar bn al-Khattāb. 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb was claimed to have brought a number of positive innovations to Islamic practices during his reign as the second orthodox caliph (634 – 644 C.E). He resuscitated some practices that had been

restricted by the Prophet; such as observing the *Tarāwih* prayers in the mosques in lieu of individual houses as it was in the prophetic era during the night periods of each day of *Ramadān*. *Tarāwih* is a voluntary prayer that Muslims usually observe throughout the nights of *Ramadan* immediately after *Şalātul-Ishai'*. However, 'Umar discovered that some Muslims find it difficult to perform the *Tarāwih* at homes after *Ishāi'* due to the stress of the fasting (*Şawm*).

By and large, 'Umar suggested the performance of the *Tarāwih* in the mosque after the *Salātul-Ishā'* even in congregation with the *Imāms*. His era was referred to in the history of Islam as the golden age of Islam. Among his other innovative impacts was the establishment of the Islamic or *Hijrah* calendar. *Hijrah* was performed during the prophetic era, but he (the prophet) did not introduce the counting or the calendar as the guide for the counting of the days. The era of this caliph therefore invented the Islamic calendar for the calculation of the Islamic days. This innovation has brought a lot of tremendous development to Islam. The counting is still in use till this present age globally. Not only this, the non-*Salafis* also cited the reign of the third caliph as a reference for opposing the *manhaj as-salafiyyah* on the interpretation of *bid'ah*. The standardization of the Qur'ān was referred to as *bid'ah* that was introduced by the caliph 'Uthman bn Affan and accepted in Islam. This is regarded in this study as the completion of the religious innovation moved by 'Umar ibn Al-Khattāb, carried out by Abubakr and then crowned by 'Uthman ibn Affãn (644 – 656 C.E).

Another claim of the non-*Salafis* on the innovative act besides what the Prophet did is traceable to lives of the four notable Sunni Imams of the Islamic schools of thought (*Madhāhib al-Arba'ah*). They maintained that these four schools of the Islamic law served as reference points for the comprehensive study of development of the applications of the *Sharī 'ah*. They explained that the *Madhāhib al-Arba'ah* deliberated on many issues that were raised by the *Qur'ān* and *hadīth* of the Prophet and as well the words of the orthodox caliphs. They equally upheld that the four schools agreed on some issues and they have divergences of scholarly opinions. This is the reason why there are common and different opinions among them in the ''*uşūl-al–fiqh.* However, they submitted that the differences of verdicts among them did not bring discord into the religion as in the case of neo-*salafiyyah* practices in Yorubaland at present.

It is on these premises that the *Salafis* and other Muslims (non-*salafis*) in Southwest Nigeria have different perceptions on what are *bid'ah* and *muharramāt* nowadays. The disparities on the perceptions are many. However, some of them were examined as variables in this study. These are *ad-Da'wat ila as-Salafiyyah* (calling to accept the *Salafiyyah*), *Al-walau wa Al- barrau* (love and unfriendliness), *bid'ah*, *harrām* and manner of performing *'aqīqah* (Naming ceremony). Others are issues of *niqāb, nikah, takfiriyyah, lā jamā'ah* (condemnation of Muslim associations), perceptions on democracy, calling to pristine Islam and defamation of non-*salafi* Islamic scholars.

The findings were carried out through the qualitative method. It was revealed that there are different notions on the above. For instance, the issue of calling to *Salafiyyah* generated many arguments. Why the *salafis* regarded the calling to *salafiyyah* as the clarion call that every Muslim should yield to, the non-*Salafis* objected to it. They were of the opinion that calling to the path of the *salafiyyah* is a factional calling and it is against the calling to Islam. Not only this, they also perceived the calling as a deviation from the real Islamic doctrines. Hence, they opposed the principle of *salafiyyah* and its adherents.

Similarly there are different perceptions on *al-walau wa al-barrau* (love and distancing). In *salafiyyah* principle, it denotes an act of accommodating only *Salafis* as the devotees of Allah while non-*salafis* and non-Muslims are to be hostile with. This principle was rooted in their interpretation of the provision of Qur'ān 60 verse 4. However, the non-*salafis* oppose this interpretation. They claimed that it is different from the textual meaning of the verse. According to them, the verse addresses the conversation between those who believed in Prophet Ibrahim and the idolaters. They added that it also addresses that Muslims are different from *mushrikūn* (polytheists) in religion. They concluded that the verse does not imply hostility with a Muslim or non-Muslim on creedal differences. Verse 6 of chapter 109 and chapter 2 verse 256 were equally cited by some non-*salafi* Muslims to substantiate their point that Islam preaches unity in the community without compromising its doctrines.

Most of the arguments that metamorphosed into open confrontation between the *salafis* and non-*Salafis* in the region are majorly centred on the notion of *bid'ah* and *harrām.* Till now, there is no mutual agreement on the two variables among the Muslims. Its consequence has led to the divisions of the Muslims into two opposite factions. Not

only this, it has also led to labeling each other with hate-names such as '*al-Mubtad'i* (innovator)*, Ahlul-Harrām* (follower of unlawful act), *ahl-Alkufr* (the infidel), *al-Munāfiq* (hypocrite), *ahlun Nār* (people of the hell-fire) and *ahlu-Dalāl* (the strayed). Besides these, the issues of *bid'ah* and *Harrām* continued to generate blasphemy and preaching of '*aqāid* (creeds) against each other.

In Islamic jurisprudence, '*aqīqah* is an act of giving names to a child after birth. It is an essential aspect of being gratitude to Allah over His blessing on a Muslim. This is expressed in several verses of the Qur'ān such as chapter 42 verses 49 to 50:

> The control of heaven and earth belongs to Allah. He
> creates whatever He wishes. He bestows whoever He
> wishes with female. He gives whoever He wishes
> males. He bestows whoever He wishes with both
> male and female children. He at time makes some to
> be barrens. He is most knowledgeable and powerful.

By the virtue of the above verse, it is obligatory on the father of the newly born child to fulfil all the rites of the naming in accordance with the dictates of the jurisprudence. These are cutting the child's hair, slaughtering a ram for a female and two for male and giving him or her beautiful Islamic name. These rites have been carried out in different communities in Yorubaland with the inclusion of each community's traditions that do not contradict the Islamic rule. These include inviting the Muslim clerics, cooking the meats and serving it with foods and drinks. Friends, relatives and well-wishers are always invited to share from the joy of the naming. The event usually takes place on the seventh or eighth day of delivery.

At present, there are disparities among the *salafis* and non-*salafis* on the appropriate manner of conducting the '*aqīqah* in accordance with the Islamic rites. While the non-*salafis* uphold the above method of conducting it, the *salafis* object to it and as well regarded it as unorthodox. Accordingly, the *salafis* claimed that the meat is meant to be shared and distributed raw. Not only this, inviting the Islamic clerics is also rejected in the manner of the rite. However, it was discovered that the *salafis* are also divided on the manner of conducting '*aqīqah*. While some of them agreed with the non-*Salafis* on its celebration, some disagreed. The disparity emanated from some of the *salafi* clerics and it was spread by their disciples across the region.

Solemnization of *Nikāh* is another variable under the study. It is a compulsory *Sunnah* in Islam on mature and sane Muslims who have means of sustaining it. Many references from the Qur'ān point to the significance of *Nikāh*. Meanwhile, the manner of conducting it is divided among the Muslims. The *Salafis* regarded the mode of conducting the *Nikāh* by non-*Salafis* as unorthodox while the non-*Salafis* perceived that of the *salafis* as uncivilized and barbaric. For instance, merry-making, sitting together of the couples and use of ring are not tenable in *salafiyyah*; while they are allowed by non-*salafi* scholars. The manner of solemnizing *Nikāh* therefore calls for critical understanding under the *Sharī'ah*. Meanwhile, its method of performance can be influenced by the environmental traditions that are not against the Islamic practice. Such tradition includes the local custom ('*urf*) of Yoruba. Islam allows such custom as a method of felicitating with the families of the new couple.

Muslim female mode of dressing is elaborate in the Islamic jurisprudence. This is due to the nature of female in physical appearance. There is concession among the jurists on the obligatory use of *Hijãb* and *Khimãr*. They all unanimously agreed that the *Hijāb* should be lower to cover the bosom and the cloth should not be transparent. This is in accordance with the dictates of the Qur'ān as examined in many verses among which is chapter 24 verse 31. However, there is divergence of opinions on the use of *Niqãb*. Some schools of thought prescribed it as obligation on *Muslimah* (female Muslim) while it was recommended by some.

Niqāb, face veil is contestable in the Islamic jurisprudence. There are divergences of perspectives among the schools of thought. Not only this, the contemporary Islamic jurists also differ on its use. Their arguments are based on the interpretation of verse 31 of the Qur'ān chapter 24 which reads thus "…except what is apparent or exposed from it (female's attire)". Accordingly, the concession of the three Imams of the four schools of the Islamic thought; Mālik, Ash-Shāfi'ī Abu and Hanīfah was that *niqāb* is not an obligation [471]. They buttressed their position that the face of a woman is not naked (*awrah*). They also emphasized that it is permissible for a woman to leave her face uncovered when performing *Salāh*, *Hajj* and in *Ihrām* [472]. However, it is compulsory in *Hambaliyyah* School of *fiqh*.

Besides this, many narrations were reported on the interpretations of the verse. That is why the opinions are different. Anas ibn Mālik narrated that the meaning of the above verse refers to the 'face and hand'. Also, ibn 'Abbas' interpretation reads 'not to show-off their adornment except only that which is apparent' refers to the hand and face" [473]. Thus, it does not mean that the face should be veiled. Their interpretations were also similar to many of the early narrators of *Hadith* among who were 'Āishah, 'Abdullāh ibn 'Abbās, ibn Abi Hātim, ibn Abi Shaybah, Al-Bayhaqi, *ibn* Hazm, *ibn* Kathir, *ibn* Athir and *at-Tabari* among others. In another version of the interpretation, *Al-Mughni* in his work titled *al-Umdah* argued that *Niqāb* is not emphasised as part of the female dress [474]. He commented on the extract in the work that "there is no prohibition for woman to uncover her face and hands when buying, selling, giving and taking…'. The prophetic advice to Asmā *bint* Abu Bakr on her mode of dressing was also cited as a reference. It was reported that the Prophet counselled her to shun wearing tight cloth and be using *Hijāb* or *Khimār*. The Hadith goes thus:

<div dir="rtl">

يَا أَسْمَاءُ إِنَّ الْمَرْأَةَ إِذَا بَلَغَتِ الْمَحِيضَ
لَمْ تَصْلُحْ أَنْ يُرَى مِنْهَا إِلاَّ هَذَا وَهَذَا

</div>

O *Asmā'*, when a lady is mature, her dressing should be modest and anything should not be seeing in her dressing except this and that (He pointed to his face and hands) [475.]

These jurists uphold that the *niqāb* is not compulsory as part of women mode of dressing. Their arguments evolve round the above Qurānic verse and other similar references in the *Qur'ān* and *Hadīth*. However, they maintain that *Khimār* and *Hijāb* are made obligatory on woman in order to keep her chastise and modesty.

On the other hand, *Niqāb* is made compulsory on women by some scholars among who was *Imām* Ahmad *ibn* Hambal. According to them, the interpretation of the verse obliged a woman not to expose her face. Among them also uphold that the whole face should be veiled while eyes or an eye can be exposed in some of their interpretations. These tend to be the reason why there are different *niqāb* styles. References were made to other extract of the verse besides the above. This include "…and let them draw their *khimār* down to bosoms". Meanwhile, the bosom is

interpreted to include head, shoulder and face of a woman. This was substantiated with a hadith which illustrates that 'the *Salāh* of a woman will not be accepted unless she wears *Khimār*' [476]. Thus, the verse refers to face-veil in their interpretation.

The contemporary scholars also differ on their *fatāwah* (Islamic verdicts) on *niqāb*. Some uphold that it is optional while some claim that it is obligatory. According to Shaykh Nasruddin *al-Albāni*, he affirms that the *niqāb* is not compulsory on any woman. He cites a number of hadith to buttress his explanations. Reference was made to ibn Abbas' report on *Al-Fadl* (his brother) when he was warned by the Prophet by looking at a beautiful woman from the tribe of Kath'am [477]. Not only the above, hadith on the prophetic advice to Asma' to be covering her body except face and hands is also referred to. However, he submitted that *niqāb* is prescribed for women in the *Sharī'ah* under the recommended act (*Mustahāb*) but was not made obligatory (*Fard*).

References of the proponents of *niqāb* are based on their interpretations of the verse that are related to the nature of woman in the texts. By and large, they uphold that the entire body of a woman even her voice are *awrah* (nakedness), hence, it should be covered. This is contained in the interpretation of *al-Qadi* abu Bakr, a student of *Malikiyyah* (but differ from his teacher's thought). Another hadith was also cited to buttress their argument that the face of a woman should be veiled by putting on *niqāb*. They claimed that woman's face is the primary cause of *zina*. The hadith quoted reads thus "the Prophet of Allah expressed that eyes commit and their *zina* is by looking, then the act may lead to fornication or deny it' [478].

Citing from the edicts of *ibn* Taymiyyah, ibn Taymiyyah upholds that *niqāb* is mandatory on every woman. He claimed that the women in the prophetic era used to wear *Jilbāb* which contained *niqāb* through which their faces would be veiled. He cited the instance of *ihrām* as an exception due to the *hajj* rites. His verdict was corroborated by a hadith related by 'Aishah in which she said that they used to cover their faces when the riders were passing by their sides. It reads thus: 'we used to lower our *Jilbāb* over to our faces when we were with the Prophet, but we used to cover our faces when the riders came near us until they passed' [479]. The jurist laid claim on this hadith as the verdict that established that some women used to cover their faces in *niqāb* in the prophetic era.

Interpretations of the verses of the Qur'ān especially the references on judgement (*Ahkām*) take different dimensions among the *mufassirūn* (exegetists) and the schools of thought. This is due to the chains of narrations of *hadith* that each of them uphold on the interpretations. Examples of such verses are those that centre on the nature and woman's mode of dressing. From their arguments, *Hijāb* and *Khimār* are the prescribed head covers for mature female while *niqāb* is optional. However, whoever uses *niqāb* should not be undermined by those that are not and vice versa.

Therefore, Islamic jurisprudence paves way for Muslims to adopt the norms of the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith*. Not only this, verdicts of the schools of Islamic thought should also be adopted. Basically, the schools usually have concessions on some issues while they at times have divergences on the contents of the scriptures. The jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) paves way for Muslims to abide by the verdicts of any of the four schools of the Islamic thought. For instance, an adherent of the edict of *Malikiyyah* may at times adopt the verdict of *Hanafiyyah* on an instance.

From the above, it is obvious that the interpretations of the *Qurānic* verses on the female mode of dressing especially on the face-covering take different dimensions among the scholars. However, it is obvious that the *hijāb* and *Khimār* are made compulsory for mature female Muslims while *Niqāb* is optional. The *Hijāb* and *Khimār* are literally defined as anything that covers something. In the *Shari'ah*, both refer to garments that cover the head, neck and bosom. Meanwhile, *hijāb* also refers to what covers the whole body of female while *khimār* means head-cover of a woman. *Niqāb* on the other hand denotes face-veil which covers the face of woman but shows the eyes. Similitude of *niqāb* is *Burqa*; which also means a garment that covers the woman's face but leaves an eye. Hence, the prescribed mode of dressing for a Muslim woman is the garment that covers her body, head and bosom but leaves the face, two hands (to the wrist) and legs. This is why many Muslim women dress in that manner in accordance with the verdicts of the above three *Imāms* of the schools of thought. Thus, *Niqāb* serves as preference or recommendation for whoever wishes to use it while it was made compulsory by the *Hambaliyyah* school of thought.

Considering the nature of our study area, using *hijāb* and *khimār* is much more considered by the society than *niqāb*. The rationale behind it is due to the norms of the

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society as a multi-religious one. Further more, the government allows the use of *hijāb* and *khimār* for Muslim students and in civil service in southwest Nigeria though there are discriminations in some places. *Niqāb* is not totally allowed by the government. Its use in the civil service may deprive female Muslims their rights to get employment. Since the use of *niqāb* is not empasised by the consensus of the *fuqahā'* (Islamic jurists), it should be classified as the recommended act in female mode of dressing in Yorubaland.

In *Salafiyyah* ideology, *niqāb* is compulsory. The notion of the use of *niqāb* therefore does not need to generate rivalry among the *salafis* and non-*salafis*. Thus, ample knowledge on the Islamic jurisprudence on its use is needed. By this, the *salafiyyah* practitioners in Yorubaland should imbibe the verdicts of the Islamic jurisprudence.

Takfīriyyah, calling another Muslim an infidel is another issue that causes discord among Muslims in the area. The ascription emanated from the perceptions of the *salafis* by referring to non-*salafi* Muslims as oppositions to the *salafiyyah*. The root cause of this name was due to the divergences on the doctrinal ideas. For instance, the *salafis* uphold that Islamic teachings should be practised according the principle of the pioneer *salafis*. However, non-*salafis* do not. Instead, they are of the opinion that Islam cannot be practised as it was done in the olden days. These differences thus led to the ascription of the hate name by referring to non-*salafis* as dibelievers.

Calling another fellow Muslims such name is not tenable under the Islamic jurisprudence. It is regarded as one of the doctrines of the *Khawārij* (Kharijites). The sect that seceded from 'Ali's camp and tagged Shiites *kuffār* (infidels) for their being loyal to 'Ali. This marked the beginning of the concept of *takfir* among the Muslims. This utterance always led to hatred among the Muslims who are not *salafis* and the *Salafis in* Yorubaland. The *salafis* arrived at using the names due to the rejection of the *Salafiyyah* by non-*Salafis*. Not only this, the attitudes of the non-*salafis* were also perceived as unorthodox.

In Islamic jurisprudence, ascribing melancholic names such as *Kāfir* is not tenable. This is due to the enmity that it causes in the society. The Qur'ān chapter 49 verse 11 cautions Muslims against such names. It says:

> The Muslims should not mock one another. The mocked
> may later be better than the mocker. The women also
> should not make jest of one another. The mocked may be

better than the jester. Do not defame or satirize one another. Do not call each other with nicknames; such as the hate names after you had believed in Allah. Whoever does not desist from this illicit act is a wrong doer.

As a result of the above verse, it is not tenable to be ascribing hate names to another fellow Muslims irrespective of disparity among them.

Lā Jamā'ah (condemnation of Muslim associations) also contributed to the discord among the Yoruba Muslims. This is due to different perceptions on it among the Muslims. Majority of Muslims who are non-*salafis* upheld that the formation of Islamic associations is essential as a forum to gather Muslims for propagation of the religion. They also regard the formation as a core needs for the growth of Muslims in Yorubaland. The case is different in *Salafiyyah*. It was perceived as an innovation which was not practised by the early companions of the Prophet. These different perceptions also brought in another discord among the Muslims.

Engaging in western system of education is also abhorred and condemned by some factions of *salafiyyah*. It is perceived as the form of education that promotes only the western ideology and abrogates the Islamic literacy. As a result of this, some of them rejected the curriculum of the western education and do not enroll their children to learn it. The non-*salafis* embraced the western education and are as well sending their children to acquire it. They are of the opinion that the western literacy is essential for the propagation of Islam in Yorubaland nowadays. Not only this, it also provides employment opportunities for Muslims. In schools established by non-*Salafis*, courses in Arabic and Islamic Studies are incorporated.

Under the jurisprudence, it is not forbidden to acquire knowledge of the west. Instances were given during the prophetic era. He encouraged his disciples to seek for knowledge outside the Arabian territory. Such areas he enjoined them to explore for knowledge included China. This was due to the advanced civilization of the country by then. Its acquisition by Muslims facilitated the methodology of propagating the religion to non-Muslims globally. Hence, it is tenable under the *Sharī'ah.*

Concept of democratic system of government is examined as a variable among the *Salafis* and non-*Salafis*. From the *Salafis'* view, it is perceived as the mode of administration that was adopted in Yorubaland to oppress Islamic governance. Thus, the

Salafis argued that it should be substituted with the Islamic theocracy. The non-*Salafis* disregarded their proof. They argued that it should be sustained. They upheld that not only in Yorubaland that democracy is embraced but the whole federation. Hence, the administration of Yoruba polity should not be an exemption in Nigeria.

Islām allows *Shūra* and election as means of appointing a leader. This is determined by the tradition of a society. However, *Shūra* plays crucial roles on the nomination of candidates before he will be appointed or elected. This is why the Islamic system of governance is different from the western ideology. Thus, selection into political offices can either be by appointment or election after the work of the *shūrah* committee.

The advent of neo-*Salafiyyah* in Yorubaland has caused divisions among the scholars of the land. At present, there are *Salafi* and non-*salafi* scholars. The denominations were caused by the *Salafis* who praise *salafi* scholars as the most knowledgeable and pious while the non-*salafi* ones were regarded as incompetent and unorthodox clerics. Similarly, the *salafis* condemned the non-*salafis* and tagged them many hate names. The rationale behind this defamation was on creedal disparities.

In the Islamic jurisprudence, it is unlawful for Muslims to defame each other irrespective of their grievances or discords. This is reiterated by the Prophet in many of his sayings. An example of such was reported by Abu *Hurayrah* in his narration which reads thus:

> From Abu *Hurayrah* he reported that the Prophet (SAW) admonished every Muslim by saying: 'do not envy each other, do not inconvenient each other, do not defame one another, do not neglect each other and do not undermine one another. A Muslim should embrace another Muslim. He should not lie against him or defame him. Muslims should be conscious of each other. Be your brother's keeper. Muslims should protect each other, guide against division among themselves, and should not defame one another [480].

Exegetically, Islam forbids defaming another Muslims due to organizational or doctrinal differences. Hence, all the *Salafis* and non-*salafi* Muslim associations in the South-West need to work together for the growth and development of Islam.

4.12.5 Da'wah Mechanism

Da'wah is an Arabic word which literally means "to preach, to appeal, to call, to sermonise, or to invite'. In the religious context, it can be defined as the act of calling or inviting people to the way of Allah. It also denotes the manner of inviting people to the path of Allah in accordance with the dictates of Islam. A person that calls or preaches to people is called *dā'i* in Islam. His role as a missionary is to invite Muslims and non-Muslims to the fold of Islam with wisdom. Such a person should possess certain qualities which include comprehensive knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and its application in different societies, *Taqwa*, knowledge of the science of the *Qur'ān, Hadith* and Islamic history. *Da'wah* is an obligatory duty on every Muslim (*fard al-Kifāyah*) in either Islamic or Muslim (multi-religious) society. This is the primary duty of a Muslim on another Muslim and people of other religions in his or her environment. His roles are elaborate in a number of the Quranic verses as follows:

وَلْتَكُن مِّنكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ وَأُوْلَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ

Let there arise among you some people who will be calling others to Islam and forbidding them from doing wrong. They are the ones who prosper (Qur'an 3 verse 104).

And also

كُنتُمْ خَيْرَ أُمَّةٍ أُخْرِجَتْ لِلنَّاسِ تَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَتَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ وَتُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللّهِ

You are the best of people raised for mankind. Invite people to follow the dictates of Allah and forbid them from disobedience to Allah and instruct them to believe in Allah… (Qur'an 4 verse 10).

The above verse established that every Muslim is obliged to call other fellows into the fold of Islam. This is the reason why some people arose in Yorubaland in order to spread the ethics of Islam. However, d*a'wah* methodology of the *salafis* took another dimension and generated controversies among the Muslims of the Yoruba region. Not only this, it has divided the *Ummah* into two. At present, the Muslims in Yorubaland have divided on the notion of *Salafiyyah* into *Salafis* and non-*Salafis*.

Islam does only enjoin Muslims to propagate the religion through *da'wah* (preaching) but also lays down certain principles or methodologies of *da'wah*. On the first

premise, *Hikmah* (wisdom) and soft admonition are prescribed as the fundamental needs of calling people to the fold of Islam. This is due to the feature of man. For instance, calling people of other religion to accept Islam requires wisdom and soft words through which they can be convinced into Islam. A verse of the Qur'ān addresses this as the core need for *da'wah* in the society:

ادْعُ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحِكْمَةِ وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ
وَجَادِلْهُم بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ ...

Invite people to the path of Allah with wisdom and beautiful preaching. And argue with them constructively (with wisdom and soft word in calling to accept Islam)… (Qur'ān 16 verse 125).

Similarly, a *da'i* (a caller into Islam) should be much patient in his mission of calling people to accept the religion. He is thus warned not to enforce people to accept the faith. He should also know that the acceptance of the religion should not be by enforcement or hostility to people of other religion. By this, he is obliged to imbibe the methodologies that are laid down in the jurisprudence in lieu of rational proof and extremism as in the case of neo-*Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. The Qur'ān says:

أَفَأَنتَ تُكْرِهُ النَّاسَ حَتَّى يَكُونُواْ مُؤْمِنِينَ

…do not compel people to become Muslims (yours is to call them to accept Islam) (Qur'ān 10 verse 99).

Based on the above verses of the Qur'ān, it is not expected of a *dā'i* to enforce people to yield to his call. The verse makes it obvious that the methodology of *da'wah* should be gradual. This is due to different perceptions, assimilations and reactions of people to religious issues. While, some people may accept it immediately; it may be long for some people to be convinced on their cultures and religions. By and large, the calling should be gradual. The *da'i* (a preacher) needs to establish cordial relationship with the people that he or she wants to invite to his own religion. These qualities were displayed by the Prophet as well as his companions.

*S*alafiyyah practictioners in Yorubaland should ensure that their ideologies and doctrines (*manhaj* and *'aqāid*) are structured in the way that will engender cordial relationship with every Muslim. The methodology of preaching will determine the

acceptance of the practices by people. Not only this, not every Muslim will subscribe to the practice at a time. However, the methodology will enlighten the generality of Muslims in the region to comprehend the exact meaning of *Salafiyyah* in the Islamic jurisprudence. Similarly, the notion of extremism and radicalism are not tenable in the *Sharī'ah* [481] as in the manner of *Salafi Jihādi* and some factions.

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CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

This study examined the practices of *Salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. The area of this study represents the Yoruba speaking region in Nigeria. It comprises six states in the federation viz; Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo. It traces the etymology and origin of the *salafiyyah* in *Islām*. Not only this, the neo-*salafiyyah* in this contemporary era is also surveyed. Through examinations on the practices of *Salafiyyah* in the periods of the companions of the Prophet (who were referred to as *as-Salaf aş-şalihun, orthodox Salafis*) and the present society, there is paradigm shift from what the term really connotes in the Islamic jurisprudence and what it denotes in the society nowadays. By and large, the study requires academic investigation and opinions of Muslim jurists especially that of the Islamic jurisprudence.

Historically, *Salafiyyah* contextually means the practices of the pioneer companions of Prophet Muhammad especially that of the first three generations that succeeded him after his demise. Their ways of life religiously, intellectually, politically and socially made them to be referred to with the appellation. It also refers to as *Tajdīd* (renewal) and *Islāh* (reform) of the manner of Islamic principle as it was demonstrated by the Prophet. Its practice was summed up by some Sunni Muslims as the pristine Islam. Neither of the generations of the *şahābah* ascribed the appellation to themselves. They only abided by the laid down principles of the first generation of the Prophet's companions. Those principles were also followed by the second generations till the third one. The four rightly guided caliphs (*al-Khulafāu ar-Rāshidūn)* were the pioneers to be referred to with this title by the later generations. This was due to their proximity to the Prophet. They witnessed the dawn of his prophethood till his death. Their unprecedented practices of *Islām* as successors made them to be referred to as *salafis* (*Salafiyūn)* by their contemporaries. They too were succeeded by another sets of companions who were *şahābah, Tabi'ūn* and *tabi'u at-tabi'īn* (followers of the followers).

The adoption of '*Salafi'* as the nomenclature that refers to the early *şahābah* (prophetic companions) began during the reign of *Imām Abu Hanifah*. This was due to his skill in the *fiqh*. His *Madhhab* (school of thought) was spread by his students from *Kufah*

in Iran to many nations such as Iraq, Cairo, India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, the connotation of the term, *Salafiyyah* was changed during the era of *Ibn* Taymiyyah. This was due to the adoption of reasoning and conservative interpretation of the *Hadīith* and some verses of the *Qur'ān*. His ideology influenced Muhammad *ibn* 'Abdulwahhab who later founded his school of thought known as *Wahhabiyyah* (Wahhabism). Most of the adherents of *Salafiyyah* in many societies including South-West Nigeria subscribed to the *Manhaj* of these two schools. Both have become reference points in all their activities.

At present, the *Salafiyyah* is traced to various origins among which are Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashīd Rida, Sayed Qutub, Hasan *al-Banna* and Jamāl al-Dīn *al-Afghanī* among others. The common ideologies of all these origins are centred on calling to *salafiyyah* and pristine Islam. These ideologies were preached by them through their doctrines. Era of premodern *Salafiyyah* began in 18th century in Saudi Arabia with the teachings of Muhammad 'AbdulWahhab. His methodology was adopted by many Muslims. He aimed at reviving the land to pristine Islam and to establish Islamic State. He emulated the principle of Taqi al-Dīn Ahmad *ibn* Taymiyyah. The modern *Salafiyyah* emerged among some contemporary Sunni scholars. A number of them were university graduates from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They were influenced by the ideologies of the early and contemporary Saudi *Salafi* scholars among who were Abdul Aziz *ibn* Baz, Yahya al-Hajuri, Nasr al-Din *al-Albāni*, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, Muhammad ibn Shalih al-Uthaymin, Shalih al-Fawzan and Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. The footsteps of these scholars are being followed and emulated. They first emerged in Saudi Arabia and their eras could be referred as the beginning of modern *salafiyyah*. Early branches of *Salafiyyah* also emerged through the philosophical thought of these scholars. Other factions were also formed through the ideological thoughts of *ibn* Qayyim *Al-Jawziyyah* and Muhammad *al-Shawkānī*.

Additionally, Muslim Brotherhood, (*Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*) of Egypt influenced some *Sunnis* to subscribe to *salafiyyah*. It was founded under the leadership of Muhammad Sayyid Qutub (d. 1966). The group negates the democratic form of governance and adopts Islamic system of administration. This is named as *Hakimiyyah.* Thus, any society that adopts other form of government besides the Islamic one is regarded as an infidel society which should be attacked. Other arm of *salafiyyah* emerged

among some sets of Muslims who tagged themselves *Ahl-al-Hadīth*. This is the faction of those who strictly argued that only *Hadīth* should be followed after the *Qur'ān* in the Islamic jurisprudence.

Da'wah (methodology of preaching) of the Saudi Arabia council of *Ulamā'u* of some of these *Salafis* in various localities also motivated some Muslims to subscribe to *salafiyyah.* This is titled as the Higher Board of '*Ulamā'* and the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions (*al-Lajna al-Da'ima lil Buhuth al-Ilmiyyah wa al-Iftā'*). Other factions also include Muhammad Aman ibn 'Ali Jami (b. 1930) and Rabi *Al-Madkhali* (b. 1931). Both are from Ethiopia and Yemen[101]. Their creeds centred on substitution of the politics of the present government and modernity with Islamic political system. Nasruddeen *al-Bāni'*s *salafiyyah* was also established in Saudi Arabia. Its ideology centres on the survival of the Islamic education and eradication of western literacy. The movement is well embraced in the nation and other countries include South-West Nigeria.

Succinctly, there are proliferations of *Salafiyyah* nowadays. However, they can be classified as the 'fundamentalist' and the 'political Islamist *Salafi*'. The fundamentalist advocates for the return of Islam to how it was actually practised in the eras of the pioneer *Salafis*. The latter opposes the western system of governance and calls for its substitution with the Islamic system of government. The practices of *Salafiyyah* can also be categorised into three viz: the *Jihādists*, purist and politicos. The *Jihādis* are volatile on their approaches to issue of *'Aqīdah*. They are so militant and forceful on religious affairs. The purist advocates for the eradication of western education and calls for the adoption of Islamic system of education. The third category preaches for the adoption of Islamic government in every society. Lastly, there are also *salafiyyah harakiyyah, salafiyyatu jihādiyyah and Salafiyyah 'ilmiyyah*. The first restricts Muslims to the acquisition of the *Fiqh*, *Hadith* and the *Qur'ān*. The second category upholds violence as a mean of calling people to subscribe to the *Salafiyyah*. This makes its adherents to be hostile with non-*salafi* Muslims. The third segment is referred to as *salafiyyah Islāhiyyah*. It lays emphasis on the pursuance of knowledge and reconciling religious affairs in accordance with the *salafiyyah* methodology.

Salafiyyah practice is spread globally. Its proliferation in this century began in 1975 in Saudi Arabia with the title of *Jamā'at as-Salafiyyah al-Muhtasibah*. Its fundamental aims were based on the spread of its ideology: *tawhid*, *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and going against taking photographs. Its mission was first embraced by the society. Later, it challenged the government of adulterating the Islamic system of administration with the western ideology. It thus advocated for substitution of the government. This concept of changing the government gradually led to extremism, radicalism and confrontation to the incumbent government. After a while, another faction emerged and was rebellious against the government in 1979. It was formed by the disciples of Juhayman *al Utaybi*. Other group sprang up in the kingdom as a non-violent movement. It was formed out of the teachings of Muhammad Surur Zaynu *al-'Abidīn*. It was tagged as the Sururists. By and large, it has been spread to many countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, India, Kuwait, Malaysia and Nigeria.

Neo–*salafiyyah* emerged in Saudi Arabia in the year 1990. Its establishment was borne out of politics and opposition to the government's policy of the nation. Initially, it began as the aftermath of the second gulf-war between Iraq and Kuwait. In response to the request of Kuwait's government on its request for protection against the invasion of Iraqi's government, Saudi Arabia invited American troops to the Kingdom and Kuwait for asylum. However, after the battle, the troops were still accommodated by the Saudian government to be living in the country. This brought the notion of opposition to the government's decision by some young scholars. They first challenged the government for fighting Iraqi with American soldiers and permitting the soldiers to still remain in the country after the war. Not only this, they also urged the government to be strict to the dictates of the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* (which are the codes of conducts of the country) in the administration. These young scholars were referred to as "*Shabāb Shahwa* or *'Ulamā' Shahwa* (young activist). Among them were Salman Awdah, Shafar Awwali and Diwanul Qarni. Majority of the citizens supported them and they were recognized in the town as the 'Human Right Activists'.

After some times, another scholars sprang up in the country as a group for pro-governmental policies. Pioneers on this mission were Muhammad Amman al-Jami'i (b. 1931 d. 1996) and Rabiu *al-Madkhali*. Both advocated for the government and preached

against criticism on the governmental policy. They preached that the living of Americans in the country is tenable. They tagged them as "*musta'malun*" (Those who were permitted to be working and residing in the city by the government). In recognition of their activities as the advocates of the government, they were empowered financially. On the other hand, those who were antagonizing the government were deprived of their rights by the government. Not only this, they were also denied the opportunities of securing jobs into the governmental establishments.

Due to the governmental empowerment, the pro-government scholars embarked on recruiting people among the students who came to study in the country from different nations among which is Nigeria. Meanwhile, the rationale behind this recruitment was to suppress those who were against the governmental policies and most especially on the invasion of Americans and their living in the kingdom after the war. Other doctrines were also inculcated into the minds of the adherents. These included the notion of *bid'ah,* condemnation of election, crticising the anti-governmental scholars, strictness to the contents of the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. Others include opposition to any scholar that did not support the government, hostility to non-members, hatred to the *ikhwanul* Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhod Organisation), labelling any act of another fellow Muslims as *bid'ah*, tagging Yusuf *al-Qaradawi* as a bad innovator (*Mubtadi'*) and upholding an aspect of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) on divergences of verdicts. Their doctrines were spread to many countries and places including the South-West Nigeria by their disciples.

Neo-*Salafiyyah* began in Southwest Nigeria in the year 2000 as an Islamic reform. However, there had been several reforms in the region prior to the year 2000 by some Islamic scholars among whom were Shaykh Usmah Uwais, 'Abdulbaqi Muhammad, Muhammad Thani Kharashi, S.S. Magaji, 'Abdul Majid Ahmad, Adam 'Abdullah *al-Aluri*, Ahmad Awelenje, *Alfa* Alaga and Bisiriyu Apalara. Meanwhile, none of those scholars claimed *salafiyyah or* arrogated the title of *salafi* to themselves. The motives of their *da'wah* were to reform Muslims from syncretism and to enlighten them on the tenets of Islam in their various vicinities. Meanwhile, emergence of the neo-*salafiyyah* was caused by some Sunni youths who perceived that the Muslims of nowadays have been influenced by western ideologies. They advocated for the revival of Islamic principle to what was practised during the eras of the *Sahābah* and strict adherence to the *Sunnah* of

the Prophet. Moreover, their approaches on the propagation of the movement generated many controversies in the society and also led to intra religious discord. Not only this, they also caused doctrinal differences among the Muslims. The main factor that brought its advent can be succinctly categorised into internal and external factors. The internal factor was caused by some youths among the members of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) on their advocacy for return to *Salafiyyah*. They were of opinion that the manner of practising *Islām* nowadays has been adulterated by western influence. The first argument on the adulteration of the Islamic tenet first arose in 1990. This made the society, MSSN challenged every member to be substantiating his opinion with proves from the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah*; otherwise such opinion would be unacceptable. However, some members claimed that substantiating any issue with references from the *shari'ah* was not enough to authenticate an opinion but to start practising Islam as it was done by the pioneer *Salafis*.This notion led to their saying of "let us return to *Salafiyyah*". Not only these, some of them began to address themselves as '*Salafiyyun*' (*salafis*) since then till now. By and large, the membership of the society was split into two, the MSSN members and the *Salafis*. In year 2000, the secession of some members from the organization facilitated the emergence of neo-*salafiyyah* in South-West Nigeria. Those who subscribed to the *Salafiyyah* seceded from the society and started operating in different localities as *salafis*.

Another argument broke out among the members and those who seceded in the year 2001 on *salafiyyah* practice in Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife. It centred on the different perspectives on the use of face-veil and purdah (*niqāb*). Meanwhile, such issue had early occurred in Federal University of Technology, Akure in 1995 and was resolved amicably. Year 2002 witnessed another phase of *salafiyyah* at the same University. *Salafis* among the members of the society did not only oppose the MSSN activities but also formed another faction of the society. Hence, there were mainstream Muslim Students' Society and *Lā Jamā'ah-Salafiyyah* or the splinter. The splinter made use of Awolowo and Fajuyi hostels as its secretariats. While the mainstream was recognised by the University management and the Muslim community, the splinter was not, due to its factional ideology and opposition to the MSSN.

The discord escalated to disunity among the members and gradually led to open secession from the MSSN. Causes of the segregation can be summed up into four viz: *Nikah* solemnisation on the campus without the presence of the parents or guardians of the spouses, compulsory use of face-veil (*Niqāb)*, withdrawing of female Muslim students from University education and advocacy for cancelation of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria in the institution. The *salafis* adopted that a female Muslim can be married to another male Muslim by the *Amīr* without necessarily informing their parents. The *Salafis* also opined that the use of *Niqāb* is compulsory on female Muslim students on the campus. Western education was perceived as antithesis to the dictates of Islam. It thus preached against it and withdrew some students from campuses. These ideologies gradually spread to the larger society by their adherents in different localities of South-West Nigeria.

The adherents of the *salafiyyah* movement believed they are the most pious Muslims and regarded the non-*salafis* as nominal Muslims. Hate-names such as innovators (*al-Mubtadi'ūn)* infidels*, ahlu-Bid'ah, ahlul-Kufr* and *ahlun-Nār* were ascribed to any Muslim who does not subscribe to their methodology. Similarly, all the existing Muslim organisations were also condemned and blasphemed as *bid'ah*. This marked their beginning of ascribing *Takfīr* to non-*salafi*-Muslims and ideology of *Lā Jamā'ah* (cancelation of formation of Muslim organisation) in Yorubaland.

In order to curb the condemnation of Muslim organisations, a proactive mechanism was taken by the leadership of the MSSN of the 'B Zone' which comprises Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states. First, open discussion (*Nadwah*) between the *salafis* and other Muslims across the Yorubalnd was orgainsed. The first *Nadwah* was held in the year 2005 and the University of Ibadan was chosen as the venue. Discussions took a whole week and the scholars at the debate, which consisted of the *salafis* and non-*salafis* agreed to accept the existing Muslim associations for propagation of Islam based on '*Urf* (culture) of Yorubaland. However, the *salafis* returned to their condemnation after the resolution of the discourse. Another congregation was held at Oja-Oba central mosque on the same subject. Series of issues and their solutions on the Islamic jurisprudence were thrashed out by ebullient scholars from the South-West. Among them were Alhaj 'Abdurrasheed Hadiyyatullah, from Iwo, Osun State, Dr. Idris Sekoni from Akure, Ondo

State, Professor A.A. Oladosu of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan and ex-National *Amīr* of the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN), Professor Abideen Olaiya (ex-zonal *Amīr* of the MSSN), *Shaykh* Sulayman Amubieya, Miftah Mikail, Alhaj *Shaykh* Isa Akindele (a prominent leader of Organisation of *Tadhāmunul Muslimīn*, Ibadan) and many other '*Ulamāu*. The *Nadwah* updated some of the disciples of the *salafi* scholars on the real tenets of Islam. Majority of them were reformed through this debate.

It was discovered through series of *Nadwah* that the advocates of the movement wanted to be reckoned with by the public with their doctrines on divergence of opinions on the religious matter and preaching of pristine Islam. Meanwhile, alteration of the fundamental doctrines of Islam is only what can lead to disparities among Muslims not associational creeds. There is dire need to consider the environmental factor by the adherents of *Salafiyyah*. The *Nadwah* resolution also enjoined every Muslim to uphold the creed of *Ahlusunnah wal Jamā'ah* and be referred to as Muslims in lieu of *salafis*.

Those who seceded from the MSSN continued propagating the movement in various states of the south-West. It started in Osun State on the issue of leadership of the MSSN at the Osun State Area Unit of the Society. The *Salafis* among the members were denied being members of the executive council at the state level of the Society. This was due to their opposition to the activities of the association. This decision annoyed them and made them break away from the membership. The same issue on the rulership of the MSSN also caused the spread of *salafiyyah* in Ede. Those who broke away from the society called for revival of Islam and returning to the eras of the *sahābah*. They played active role in the spread of the movement to many provinces of the State. In Ibadan, *Ustādh* Sulayman Hamzah facilitated the spread of the movement. He was an ex-*Amīr* of the MSSN at the University of Ilorin and Director of Studies at the Central Branch. His activities as well as that of *Ustādh* Sulayman Amubieya and others led to the fast growing of *salafiyyah* in Ibadan metropolis. Shaykh Najimuddeen and Murtada Adedokun who were also former executive members of the MSSN at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ife are pioneer founders of *salafiyyah* in Lagos State. In Ondo State, it was formed by some Muslim brothers who are among the clerics in the state. Notable among them are *Ustādh* Ma'ruf 'Abdulghaniy (who is also referred to as *Abū* Ramlah), *Ustādh* Hashim Omotayo,

Ridwānullah Sulayman and *Ustādh* Mahmud Kuranga. Their disciples also facilitated the spread of the movement to many areas in Ondo State.

The external factor is caused by the graduates of universities in the Middle-East such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Cairo, United Arab Emirates and Malaysia. Majority of them are disciples of some *Salafiyyah* scholars in those nations. Some of them are also the disciples of *Madkhaliyyah* or *Madakhilah*, the neo-*salafiyyah* that emerged in Saudi Arabia in the year 1990. Its ideology was propounded by Rabiu *al-Madkhali*. It emerged as the pro-governmental *salafiyyah* movement.

Upon their return to Nigeria, they were embraced as versatile scholars who had learnt from the Arab nations. As a result of this belief, their mode of *da'wah* influenced the majority of youths who had been yearning to update their knowledge of the religion. However, d*a'wah* of some of them based on neo-*Salafiyyah* doctrine caused the split of the entire Muslims into two factions in Yorubaland viz: *Salafi* and non-*Salafis*.

Due to the manners adopted by individual neo-*salafi* leaders in the South-West Nigeria, there are *salafiyyah* factions. They are summed up as *salafiyyah* of those who seceded from the MSSN, *salafiyyah* of returnees from Arab nations, moderate *salafiyyah*, educated, individual, anti-political, *salafiyyah at-Takfiriyyah*, *Lā Jamā'ah,* anti-western, *Taqlīdiyyah,* campus *salafiyyah* (splinter), local scholars and *Salafiyyah Hizbiyyah* or *ustādhiyyah* (Partisan *Salafiyyah*).

Globally, the practices of *Salafiyyah* are based on (*Manhaj*) methodologies or ideologies and doctrines (*'Aqāid*). These two concepts are always emphasised by the adherents of the neo-*salafiyyah* not only in the South-West Nigeria but also in every society. These are summarized in this study as '*Aqīdat Al-Wala' wal Bara',* returning to pristine *Islām,* rejection of verdicts of the *Imāms* of the Islamic schools of thought by some of them (*Taqlīd),* rejection of concession of the notable jurists (*ijtihād)*, condemnation of formation of *jamā'ah*, living the ascetic life (*zuhd*), *Al-Imān bi Allah, Tawāsul* wa *Shifa'a, Ad-Da'wat ila as-salafiyyah,* rejection of modern exegesis of the *Qur'ān*, opposition to the *ilm al-Kalām,* condemnation of the Gregorian calendar, rejection of any form of *bid'ah*, hatred to *Sufism* and *Shi'ah, Imān bi al-Qur'ān was-Sunnah, Takfīr* on non-*Salafis* and opposition to modern system of government. All these *manhaj* and '*aqāid* are based on dichotomous ideology, *Tawhīd* and strict adherence to the

Sunnah of the Prophet in all affairs of life. Hence, any act that does not conform to the tradition of the pioneer *salafis* is to them tantamount to innovation (*bid'ah*), unlawful act *(Harrām)* and polytheism (*shirk*) in *Salafiyyah's* practices. The *'aqīdah* is the creed that every *salafi* upholds while the *manhaj* is the application of such *'aqīdah*. Both are what make the *salafis* different in their doctrines from other Muslims. Nasrudin *al-Bāni* emphasises that the two notions are inseparable in *salafiyyah's* tradition. He further expresses that only *salafis* practise the *sunnah* of the Prophet accordingly.

In the study area of this work, the *'aqaīd* and *Manhaj* of *Salafiyyah* are encapsulated into: *Al-Walau wa Al-Barrau* (sincere love and hatred), *Lā Jamā'ah* (cancelation of Muslim associations), *Wahdaniyyatu-Allāh* (belief in the oneness of *Allāh*), forbidding prostration and kneeling to elderly fellows irrespective of their status, tagging any act that the Prophet did not do as *bid'ah* and *harrām* (inventive idea and forbidden act), condemning the manner of *'Aqīqah* (naming ceremony) celebration, *Wājibatu-n-Niqāb* (advocacy for the compulsory use of purdah by every Muslim woman), disregarding the manner of *nikah* solemnisation and disregarding the use of *hijāb* by female Muslims. Others include *Takfīriyyah* (calling another Muslim a disbeliever), referring to non-*Salafi* Muslims as infidels, ascription of *salafi* nomenclature to the adherents only, rejection of democracy, returning to pristine Islam*,* regarding the congregational supplication as *bid'ah,* prescription of *madrasah* education for female Muslims, hostility to *Sufiyyah* (Sufism), advocacy for substitution of the Muslim leaders with *salafis*, condemnation of the early Islamic scholars, ascription of hate names to non-*Salafi* Muslims, regarding wearing long-trouser as *kufr,* condemning Muslim women associations, wearing *Jalābiyyah,* condemnation of echoing the *Imām's saying* in (*salāh*), regarding MSSN constitution as *Harrām* and *Bid'ah, r*ejecting the *Taslīm* of non-*Salaf*-Muslims*,* claiming of *Shaykhiyyah* and *Ustādhiyyah,* regarding *tasbih* as *kufr,* extremism and radicalism.

Besides these *manhaj* which are generally upheld by the *Salafis*, there are also other *'aqāid* in the practices of some factions among which are condemnation of *i'tikāf* in other mosques beside the *Makkah* and *Madīnah*, condemnation of voting in election*,* rejection of chieftaincy titles, *nikah* solemnisation without the conscent of the *waliy*

(parents or guardians), (this is common among campus *salafiyyah* in which *Amīr* serves as the *Waliy*) and condemnation of the* Islamic Vacation Course (IVC).

From the examination of the study, it is obvious that there is paradigm shift on the manner of practising *Salafiyyah* from what it really connotes. This study thus surveys its real definition under Islamic jurisprudence and nowadays. The difference is based on the activities of its practioners. Investigation was also carried out on the rationale behind its emergence in South-West Nigeria of this century by some young Muslims. Similarly, perception on the practices of neo-*salafiyyah* is summed into two perspectives: the compliant and the non-compliant. The former are the Muslims who do not only subscribe to *salafiyyah* but also practise and preach it to others. They are tagged as *salafis*. The latter are those who opposed the practice and regarded it as an act of extremism. These perceptions were carried out via qualitative methodology. The study also investigates the aims and objectives of the emergence of the neo-*Salafiyyah* as well as the divergences of perceptions of the Muslims on its *manhaj* and ʻ*Aqāid*. Similarly, rationale behind its advocacy by some young Muslims in south West-Nigeria is examined with a view to determining the extent of their compliance with the Islamic jurisprudence.

The research population involved key informants (*salafis* and non-*salafis*): ʻ*Ulamā'*, students, teachers, lecturers, Alfas (Muslim clerics) and *Imāms*. The sample size of the interviewees was variously selected throughout the six states of the Yorubalnd viz: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo on ratios. The population comprised the *Salafi* practitioner Muslims and those who do not subscribe to the *Salafiyyah*. The practioners were referred to as *salafis* while the other Muslims were named non-*salafis*. Gender was also considered in the selection. The results of the interviewees were done in three phases. It consisted of the responses of the *salafis*, non-*salafis* and the application of the theory on the practice.

Examination of the practice brought different perceptions. While some Muslims (*salafis*) upheld and regarded it as a clarion call to the pristine Islam, the non-*salafis* perceived it as extremism and radicalism. Those who do not subscribe to it based their arguments on the Islamic jurisprudence on each society's ʻ*Adāt* (traditions), *Istihsān* and ʻ*Urf* (local custom). They also claimed that the Yorubaland culture cannot be compared with that of any Arab society.

Other segment of the results revealed that *Salafis* and non-*Salafis* admitted that *Salafiyyah* practice is prevalent in South West Nigeria. They both also believed that there are factional *salafiyyah* in Yorubaland. Also, it is well admitted that some among *Ahlus-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah* are *Salafis*. It was established from the responses of the interviewed *salafis* and non-*salafis* that most of those who seceded from the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) are *Salafis*. In *salafiyyah*, *bid'ah* is any invented act by a Muslim rather than what the pioneer *salafis* had done. The non-*Salafis* also affirmed that any new act in the practice of *Islām* is termed as *bid'ah* in *manhaj as-salafiyyah*. Such acts include modernity, chieftaincy titles and using rosary in counting numbers of supplications (*ad-du'ā'*). Additionally, performanace of *hajj* by a female Muslim without being accompanied by her *mahram* or husband is tagged *bid'ah* and *harrām*. The act of allowing a woman to perform *Hajj* or '*Umrah* without a *Mahrram* as it is prescribed by the Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Board in the South-West is opposed in *Salafiyyah*. The non-*Salafis* attested that the *Salafis* objected the act. However, they (non-*salafis*) accepted the decision of the board. They (*non-Salafis*) based their responses on the poor economic situation of the Yorubaland and the average financial capacity of each family. They also buttressed their argument that in lieu of not performing the pilgrimage by both spouses together due to the high expenses, a woman should be allowed to perform the *Hajj* without her *Mahrram* as prescribed by the Pilgrim Welfare Board.

In the same vein, methods of conducting '*aqīqah* and *Nikah* by non-*salafi* scholars are not tenable in *salafiyyah*. They are tagged as unlawful methods. Similarly in *salafiyyah* practice, *niqāb* is prescribed as the ideal mode of dressing for female Muslims. They argued that a female Muslim that uses *hijāb* is a nominal one. Responses of *salafis* on Sufism showed that the *Sufis* are regarded as deviant infidels in *salafiyah* while the practice of *sufiyyah* is condemned. On the measurement of trouser, they believed that the sizeable length of trouser should be limited to the top of the ankle while any lenghth below the ankle is tagged as *kufr*. Not only this, establishment of Muslim association is also regarded as *bid'ah*.

On politics, democracy is opposed and tagged *Kufr* by *salafis*. On this accersion, *salafis* believed that the Nigerian system of governance is not tenable. They claimed that the system is not Islamic and was neither practised by the Prophet nor the pioneer *salaf*

as-şalihīn. Besides, non-*salafis* attested that *salafis* do not vote or participate in any election in the South-West.

The responses also revealed that the *salafiyyah* claims that the present manner of practising Islam has been basterdised by western ideology. Hence, the *salafis* call for pristine Islam; by obliging Muslims to be strict to the practice of Islam as it was demonstrated by the early *salafis*. In addition to this, they also claim that the non-*salafi* scholars are incompetent and should be substituted with the *salafis*. Lastly, there were mixed responses on the manner of *salafiyyah* practice in Yorubalnad. While the non-*salafis* tagged the manner of the practice as violence, radicalism and extremism, the *salafis* do not. They (*Salafis*) argued that the manner of practising Islam by other Muslims who are not *Salafis* has been influenced by western ideology. They believed that the practice is in accordance with the *manhaj* of *ibn* Taymiyyah, Muhammad 'Abdulwahhab and *ibn* Baz. Not only this, they also tilted towards practising Islam in the exact manner that it was practised by the pioneer *salafis*.This is the core reason why there is divergence of perceptions on its practice in the region.

5.2 Conclusion and major findings of the work

Reviewing the sampled opinions on the practices of neo-*salafiyyah* in the South-West Nigeria, it is discovered that the *salafis* regarded any Muslim who does not belong to *salafiyyah* as innovator (*al-Mubtadi'*) while the non-*salafis* regarded the practice as extremism. By and large, the Muslims are sub-divided into *salafis* and non-*salafis* in South-West Nigeria.

In the same vein, the divisions have also created doctrinal differences among them. For instance, the *Salafis* did accuse the non-*Salafis* of compromising the dictates of Islam. Most of the lectures of the *salafi* scholars always centred on the condemnation of the act of the non-*Salafis* in the coverage area. In *salafiyyah*, the adherents arrogated the orthodox Islam to their practices while the religious activities of other Muslims who are non-*Salafis* are regarded as unorthodox. The *salafis* did not only call every Muslim to accept *Salafiyyah* but also to uphold the doctrines.

Democratic system of government in the South-West was opposed by the *Salafis* in their doctrines with the notion that it is not Islamic. The government is thus regarded as part of modernism which they opposed in their practices. The findings showed that the

Salafis do not participate in politics or vote during the election. Politics in their creed is regarded as the modernist method of voting for a leader. This is the reason why they do not participate in the exercise.

On the other side, the findings also reflected the attitudes and perceptions of the non-*salafis*. They regarded all the practices of the *salafis* as extremism and baseless. The non-*Salafis* attitudes in the South-West Nigeria showed that not all western ideologies are unlawful. It was also discovered in the findings on the notions of the non-*salafis* that Islam allows democracy, and that the South-West is not an Islamic nation. The perceptions of the non-*salafis* to the practices of *salafis* showed that there is no mutual understanding between the two. The *salafis* tilted towards propagating orthodox Islam, meanwhile their practices were perceived as extremism by the non-*salafis*.

5.3 Contributions to knowledge

This study examines the exact manner of the Islamic principle on social interaction in the society among Muslims and adherents of other faith. It serves as impetus for Muslims especially a *da'i* (Islamic preacher or missionaries) to be highly skilled on knowledge of the application of the *sharī'ah*. Hence, comprehension of the knowledge of the Islamic jurisprudence is different from its application. This is due to the nature of each society. Thus, all the principles that are tenable in the Islamic community will not be obtainable in the Muslim environment. Therefore, nations are grouped in the findings into two viz, Islamic and Muslim nations. An Islamic country is a *Sharī'ah* compliant nation. It operates Islamic system of government politically, economically and socially. Meanwhile, a Muslim nation operates a democratic or western polity. For instance, while the *shari'ah* can be completely abided in an Islamic society, it may not be so in a Muslim society. However, parts of it may be practised by Muslims in a non-Islamic society like that of the South-West Nigeria. Similarly, the ethics of *da'wah* (calling to Islam) methodology which centres on softness, kindness, wisdom and accommodation should also be followed not only by the *Salafis* but also any Muslim religious group.

5.4 Recommendations and area for further studies

From the perceptions on the *salafiyyah* practices in South West Nigeria, the following recommendations are put forward to the society:

It is essential for the generality of Muslims to form a forum where all Islamic creedal issues will be discussed periodically. This will pave way for assimilation of the Islamic tenets and doctrinal differences.

The adherents of *salafiyyah* need to accommodate non-*Salafi* Muslims and vice-versa as brethren of the same religion in lieu of being hostile to one another.

Scholars of *salafiyyah* need to enlighten their disciples on the real concept of *salafiyyah*. This becomes essential because some of the misunderstandings were caused by the followers based on their assumptions on the meaning of the concept.

Muslims generally need to seek for ample knowledge of Islam as the mechanism to comprehend the real principles of Islam.

Learning and reading Islamic verdicts (*Fatāwa*) through social media should be verified before their applications. This is so because, some of the disciples among the *salafis* usually read the *fatāwah* of foreign neo-*salafiyyah* scholars on-line and applied them without considering the environmental factor of Yorubaland.

It is essential for the *salafiyyah* practioners to consider the local culture ('*Urf*) of Yoruba people on any religious matter. This is due to the nature of the land as a Muslim or multi-religious society. Thus, not all what is obtainable in the Arab nations which are Islamic states could be practised in Yorubaland.

Muslims in Yorubaland should embrace one another irrespective of their different religious organisations. This is by being passionate to other fellow Muslims on all affairs of life.

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