

**Blavo Etsri**

**BY**

**Blavo Etsri Babatunde  
B.A., M.A. Classics (Ibadan)**

**Matriculation Number: 82720**

**A Thesis in the Department of Classics,  
Submitted to the Faculty of Arts  
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**of the**

**UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN**

**December, 2019**

**NAME:** Babatunde Etsri **BLAVC**  
**MATRIC. No.:** 82720  
**TITLE:** **PATRONAGE IN REPUBLICAN ROME AND MODERN NIGERIA**

## ABSTRACT

1 Patronage, an asymmetric relationship between two individuals of unequal social status,  
2 permeated the socio-political landscapes of ancient Rome and modern Nigeria. Previous  
3 comparative studies on Rome and Nigeria have focused on literature, legal system and history to  
4 the neglect of the patronage system. This study was, therefore, designed to compare and contrast  
5 the socio-political significance of patronage in Republican Rome and modern Nigeria, with a  
6 view to determining its influence on the socio-political space.

8 The study was anchored on Karl Marx's Class Theory while the interpretive design was used.  
9 Texts drawn from both classical and Nigerian sources were purposively selected due to their  
10 depiction of patronage. The texts from classical sources included Dionysius of Halicarnassus's  
11 *Antiquitates Romanae*(AR), Horace's *Satires and Epistles* (SE), Cicero's *On Duties* (OD)and  
12 Juvenal's *Sixteen Satires*(SS). The texts from Nigerian sources included Albert's *Explaining*  
13 *Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics*(EGNP), Al Chukwuma's *The Contradiction of Godfatherism*  
14 *in Nigeria Politics*(CGNP), Familusi's *Moral and Developmental Issues in Political*  
15 *Godfatherism*(MDIPG) and Onwuzurigo's *Recontextualisation of the concept of*  
16 *Godfatherism*(RCG). The texts were subjected to content analysis.

17 The AR traces the origin of patronage to the founder and first king of Rome, Romulus, who  
18 divided the citizens into the upper and lower classes of patricians and plebeians respectively. The  
19 patricians became the patrons and the plebs, clients. A patron was a social superior who was  
20 socially responsible for looking out for a set of social inferiors (clients), who were in turn loyal  
21 and supportive of the patron. Similarly, EGNP traces the origin of patronage in Nigeria to the  
22 naming practice of the Catholic Church, as well as instances of its deployment in pre-colonial  
23 Nigeria. The RCG espouses the concept of patronage through the activities of the  
24 *Babaogun*(Yoruba), *Nnam Ukwu*(Igbo) and *Maigida*(Hausa) who served as power brokers in the  
25 socio-political spheres of their respective societies. The OD vividly describes the patronage  
26 system as a mechanism of social integration based on social advantage. The patronage system in  
27 both societies became degenerated and its cherished traditional function was corrupted. The SS  
28 demonstrates that patrons were no longer committed to their responsibilities as demanded by the  
29 patronage system. The CGNP and MDIPG reinforce the same concern in Nigeria's case. The  
30 activities of contemporary godfathers in Nigeria's politics have relatively declined and its  
31 fundamental functions of social engineering and social development have been defeated.

32 The patronage system in both Republican Rome and modern Nigeria emerged from a historical  
33 and religious context, but later degenerated into a practice that undermined the socio-political  
34 space of both historical contexts.

**Keywords:** Republican Rome, Godfatherism in Nigeria, Patronage system

**Word count:** 427

## CERTIFICATION

I certify that this work was carried out by Mr Blavo Etsri Babatunde in the Department of Classics, Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan.

---

**Supervisor**  
**Olakunbi O. Olasope**  
**B.A., M.A., Ph.D. (Ibadan)**  
**Professor, Department of Classics,**  
**University of Ibadan**

**DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project first to **Olodumare**, the source of everything, seen and unseen, known and unknown.

**AND**

To my Late Dad, Theophilus Efue Blavo.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I am perpetually grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Olakunbi O. Olasope, for the privilege of becoming one of the first set of her PhD supervisees. It is an honour bestowed on me to be among these ‘first borns’; her immense guidance, patience, understanding and kindness served as a balm of Gilead that eased the pains experienced in the journey. I cannot thank her enough for giving me this rare opportunity.

My appreciation also goes to Prof. Folake Onayemi. It was she who encouraged me to take the PhD form even when I had no interest and the financial power to pursue such an academic journey. I will forever remain grateful. As I usually tell my friends, it was Prof. Onayemi that planted my feet in the academic field; it is Prof. Olasope that has been watery it and it is God that has enabled it to grow.

I equally want to appreciate all the academic staff of Classics department for accepting my idiosyncrasy. I thank them immensely.

In the course of carrying out this research work, I have met with several scholars on patronage. I must use this opportunity to thank them for their guidance. First is Prof. Olawale Albert for granting me the rare privilege to discuss with him the concept of Godfatherism in ancient Roman politics. I also thank Prof. Ajala of the Anthropology department, Dr Olumuyiwa Omobowale of the sociology department, Prof. Evans Richard and Prof Philip Bosman both of the University of South Africa for giving me the opportunity to present series of seminar on my work. I also thank Prof. Mike Lambert, former chair of Classical Association of South African for making my stay in South African smooth and also for introducing me to his extended family members. They all took me as part of their family.

Finally, I thank members of “the Fellowship”; Dr Bisi Olawuyi (G.O), Dr Babatunde Ojegbuyi, Dr Demola Lewis, Dr. Francis and Dr Israel Fadipe.

## TABLE OF CONTENT

	<i>Pages</i>
Cover page . . . . .	i
Abstract . . . . .	ii
Certification . . . . .	iii
Dedication . . . . .	iv
Acknowledgment . . . . .	v
Table of Content . . . . .	vi
<b>Chapter One</b>	
1.1 Background to the study . . . . .	1-6
1.2 Statement of Research Problem . . . . .	6-7
1.3 Purpose of Research . . . . .	7
1.4 Objective of the study . . . . .	8
1.5 Research Problem/Limitation . . . . .	8
1.6 Scope of Research. . . . .	8
1.7 Significance of the study . . . . .	9
1.8 Methodology . . . . .	9
1.9 Theoretical Framework . . . . .	9-14
<b>Chapter Two</b>	
2.1 Literature Review . . . . .	15-28
<b>Chapter Three</b>	
3.1 Ancient Roman Society: In the Beginning . . . . .	29-31
3.2 Roman Family and Household . . . . .	32-39
3.3 The Class Struggle . . . . .	40-45
3.4 Origin of Patronage in Ancient Rome . . . . .	45-51
3.5 Socio-Political significance of Patronage in Ancient Rome . . . . .	51-59

3.6 Women in Ancient Rome . . . . .	. 59-64
3.7 Women as ‘Patrons’ . . . . .	. 64-69

**Chapter Four**

4.1 The Pre-colonial Period . . . . .	. 70-74
4.2 Marriage, Family and Kinship . . . . .	. 74-77
4.3 Patronage in Yoruba Socio-political Institution. . . . .	. 77-79
4.4 Patronage in the Socio-economic Institution of the Igbos . . . . .	. 79-81
4.5 Patronage in Hausa/Fulani Socio-political structure . . . . .	. 81-82
4.6 Emergence of Ethnic Nationalism and Nationalists in Nigeria. . . . .	. 82-86
4.7 Ethnic Nationalists as Political Patrons. . . . .	. 86-88
4.8 Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo . . . . .	. 88-90
4.9 Late Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe. . . . .	. 90-91
4.10 Late Sir Ahmadu Bello. . . . .	. 91-92
4.11 Political Patronage in Nigeria Fourth Republic.. . . .	. 92-96
4.12 Political Patronage in some States in Contemporary Nigeria. . . . .	. 96
4.13 The Anambra State Experience (1999-2017) . . . . .	. 96-98
4.14 Patron Politics In Oyo State . . . . .	. 98-99
4.15 Patron Politics In Kwara State . . . . .	. 99-100

**Chapter Five**

5.1 Summary and Conclusion . . . . .	. 102-104
References . . . . .	. 105-110

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.1 Background to the Study

#### Why study patronage?

Patronage, which is a socio-political concept, has always been an interesting discourse. This is because the concept finds parallels in different cultures of the world. Hardly is there any society that does not have an element of patronage in its socio-cultural or political spheres. However, the origin of patronage can be traced to dim antiquity, particularly, ancient Roman Society. In ancient Rome, a man was obliged to relate with an individual of superior status and influence under whose guide and protection he would be. One good reason for this is that the Romans never seemed to have believed that all men were created equal. They preferred to organise their lives on the assumption that certain men were born to lead and others were born to be followers. In this Roman social relation, the *patronus* (*patron*) was a mentor, benefactor, protector and sponsor to a client; the Latin terminology used to describe this sort of relationship was *patrocinium* (*patronage*). Usually, the client is of lower social class, sometimes, too, both the patron and the client might even be of the same financial status, but the patron would possess greater socio-political and legal rights, influence, prestige, or power that would enable him to be a benefactor and do favours for the client.

This inequality in ancient Roman society, and which is also reflected in many relationships among men in most societies, was as a result of struggles for survival and control of resources. Morgenthau (1993) discussed this struggle for power and survival in his book, *Politics Among Nations*. Morgenthau explained that just like any politics, international politics is basically about struggle for power and natural resources; that whatever are the main aims of international politics, control of resources and possession of power is always the immediate goal.<sup>1</sup> This struggle for power, wealth, position and freedom is an integral part of human existence. An individual may describe his aim in line with social, religious, economic, or philosophical ideal. He may also hope that this

---

<sup>1</sup>Morgenthau J. Hans, *Political Among Nations; The Struggle For Power And Peace*. Kenneth W. Thompson (Ed.) 1993, p.4



aim would be realised through his own personal will, through a divine intervention (*deus ex machine*), or through the natural incidence or interaction among other men. Sometimes, too, a man's aim could be materialized through non-political avenue. Whatever ways a man strives to realize his aim or goal, he does so by striving for power.

Also in their *History of Political Theory*, George Sabine<sup>2</sup> and Thomas Thorson<sup>3</sup> opined that “political and social organization is perhaps the most important form of human adaptation to environment, both external and internal<sup>4</sup>. According to them, a man has no leathery armour like a porcupine, but he does have social life and the capacity to organize it efficiently for the sake of survival<sup>5</sup>.

It is in this light that men, whatever their standing in society, struggle to maintain their ranks or improve upon them. And maintaining or improving upon these social and political standings is mostly determined by a man's relationships and co-operations among other men in their various societies, whether as a group or as individual. A man's relationship with his fellowman and his relationship with his immediate environment more often than not determine how successful or otherwise he would become.

Taking a cue from this, Omobowale (2007) stressed that:

Going by the theoretical postulation of social exchange theorists, individuals cannot but engage in social interactions (Ritzer,1996). This is because nobody may ideally live in isolation except he is so subjected to such condition due to punishment or medical treatment. Thus, individuals engage in social interactions for the reciprocal exchange of valued resources.<sup>6</sup>

Cicero in his treaties *On the Good Life* which he wrote in fifth century BC stressed the need for social relation among ancient Romans. Cicero claimed that no individual,

---

<sup>2</sup> George Sabine, a professor of political science at the University of Ithaca, New York

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Thorson teaches political science at Indiana University, South Sand, U.S.A.

<sup>4</sup> See George, S. and Thomas, T. 1973.*A History of Political Theory*. Oxford Press (Fourth Edition).p.3,

<sup>5</sup>George Sabine and Thomas Thorson, 1973,p.3

<sup>6</sup>See Omobowale O.A. 2007. Baba-Ogun Relations and Grassroots Politics In Ibadan, Nigeria, *International Journal of Social and Management Sciences*, Vol.1 No2 p145.

<sup>7</sup> See Cicero,*On The Good Life*. Michael Grant (Trans.) 1971. Penguin Books Ltd, England. p.140

whatever his station in life can do without the assistance of a fellowman. He continued by saying that a man cannot isolate himself from the rest of mankind to the extent of not having a friend or a companion to discuss with. However, if an individual is not regarded as a good man, then no one will have any desire to talk to such an individual.<sup>7</sup>

Here Cicero emphasised the need of association and most importantly social relations among the Romans. His opinion reflects the realities in the Rome of his time where patrons competed for clients in order to have a better social and political standing. In ancient Rome, this sort of association was socially accepted. As stated above, a Roman was obliged to relate with another Roman of better and superior status. And once such relationship is introduced, they are maintained by the exchange of resources, which may be material or non-material. This kind of relationship is tagged *patronus-cliens*, patron-client relationship. The relationship was termed *patronatus*(patronage) and *clientele*(client) and could be hereditary on both sides<sup>8</sup>. The patron-client relationship was an important characteristic and lasting feature of a Roman life, and, in one form or other, it determined the development of modern society, politics, and even relationships among nations.

In the late Roman Republic and early principate, citizenship was based on a dependent relationship between two citizens in which the difference in power and status between the two parties was acknowledged. It was importantly a personal voluntary relationship on the initiative of the dependent in gratitude for a certain benefaction. It was hereditary and brought no stigma to the client. There was mutual exchange of services although there were no impositions and exactions and it was multi-purpose rather than confined to specific aids. Although some services and reciprocal obligations became customary, yet there was no prescribed legislation for the bond, thus everything was flexible according to the needs and status of the involved parties.

The worth of the relationship for both patron and client depended on the dominant position of the patron in the state. In ancient Rome, for instance, so long as the aristocrats

---

<sup>8</sup>Cacopino J, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome*, p.71

were the only citizens with legal and civil rights (since the plebs had no civil rights), a plebeian could afford to sacrifice his personal independence in return for protection. Again, in a dispute over property, the support of a client's patron assured a client of justice even against a patrician (and might even secure him more than justice if the opponent were an independent plebeian).

In Nigeria, the patron-client relationship is evident in a concept called godfatherism; a system in which a man of immense wealth and influence uses his position to secure political offices for his dependants. As has been noted earlier, a patron-client relationship is a unique and principal ingredient in the socio-political and religious existence of the various peoples of the world. Scholars (particularly those in Nigeria) have tried to trace the origin of patronage to one community or religious institution or the other. For instance, Albert (2005), Familusi (2012), Omobowale and Olutayo (2007) and Onwuzuruigbo (2013) have maintained that the origin of godfatherism has socio-cultural roots in all the society of the world. Albert, for instance, stressed that a godfather in Europe is similar to a 'cuddly uncle.' And that in a Roman catholic church, a godfather is a member of the congregation who serves as a role model and counsel a new convert on how to live a responsible life.<sup>9</sup>

Albert's submission above is equally true in the case of 19<sup>th</sup> century America where the function of patronage lies not only on the mutual exchange of goods and services between a patron and a client, but, also as a strategic method for the reproduction of structure in which a few of community leaders dominate the socio-political life of the state. Riordon (1967), shed more light on this when he illustrated that patronage was evident in the socio-political activities of the 19<sup>th</sup> century America. He informed us that George Plunkitt, a statesman and leader of Tammany Hall was a patron of many clients. Riordon while quoting Plunkitt said that people went to Plunkitt as a district leader for

---

<sup>9</sup>Albert, O.I. 2005. Explaining Godfatherism in Nigeria Politics. *African Sociological Review*, 9, (2), pp. 75-105. See also; Familusi, 2012; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2010; and Onwuzuruigbo, 2013.

their personal problems. They went to him for various favours: from seeking a job, asking for a citizenship papers to helping to bail a husband or son out of jail.<sup>10</sup>

From the above excerpt, it is obvious that in the earliest period of America's socio-political history, there had been cases of political figures with pockets of clients as supporters. An important thing to note, also, is the fact that patronage is made possible by the inequality in the socio-economic status among individuals and the resultant effect is the exchange of goods relations.

Furthermore, a glimpse of patronage could be seen in other European countries. For instance, Philip (2001) observed that patronage evolved because of isolation of non-citizens and immigrants from the economic and political processes in Australia. Also, Lazer (2004) while exploring the importance of patronage in Bolivia maintained that patronage is a system that enables a vast majority of underprivileged to gain access to valued resources. In all the above examples, it is obvious that patronage takes a predominant role in social issues like citizenship or gender inequality.

However, the Nigerian situation we are examining, like the case of the 19<sup>th</sup> century American socio-political history, has some resemblances with that of ancient Rome. Albert, while explaining how Godfatherism works, maintained that discourses have raised two questions in regard to the concept. Albert claimed that hierarchy and inequality played important role in the discourse on patronage. He further stressed that social status is hinged on the upward ranking of people in any society. And that the ranking could be divided into two: that is, those at the top and those at the bottom. Those at the top rung of the social ladder possess the right to exercise social, political or economic while those that occupy the bottom of the societal ladder the less significant members of the society with no social, economic or political power.<sup>11</sup>

This social classification is quite similar to that of ancient Roman society in which there was a class division between the patrician and the plebs. The division highlighted

---

<sup>10</sup>William L.R. 1963. *Origin of Godfatherism and Partisan Politics in Government (An America example)*, Introduction xvii

<sup>11</sup>Albert, 2005. For more detailed account of patronage in 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe, see Philip, 2001 and Lazar, 2004.

the social inequality between these two classes. As explained earlier, clients (in this case plebs) were obliged to have a patrician as a patron. And clients ranged from freeborn men, freedmen, businessmen, writers, and artists. For instance, Augustus Caesar was involved in many of such relationships, taking up the role of a patron to many young and vibrant Romans in order to project his image and popularity (Augustus Caesar's patronal role is discussed in chapter three).

Despite the above, modern writers on patronage have not successfully brought out similarities and parallels of patronage in ancient Rome and godfatherism in contemporary Nigerian society. Most works on patronage rather concentrate on the positive and/or negative impact of patronage on the socio-political and economic spheres of their respective societies. To a group of these scholars, patronage has an adverse effect on society. To the other, however, patronage is vital to the socio-economic life of any society. The views of these scholars are also examined in the next chapter.

Nevertheless, it is in the socio-cultural and political contexts of Nigeria that patronage or godfatherism as a concept is predominant. And it is from here that parallels and similarities will be drawn. Some writers like Albert, Adeoye, Omobowale and Olutayo, and Onwuzuruigbo have all maintained that godfatherism as a concept is not new to Nigeria. Albert, for instance, explained that the coinage 'godfather' has are semblance in Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa cultures and that the term has been in use since the pre-colonial days.<sup>12</sup> Adeoye (2009), while affirming the view of Albert, further stressed that the advent of military into Nigerian politics helped in entrenching godfatherism in Nigeria. According to him, this was made possible through the concentration of means of production, in this case, wealth, in the hands of a few corrupt individuals and the promotion of political and economic centralization and allocation of much power to leading politicians at various levels.<sup>13</sup> Omobowale (2006), in his own contribution to the discourse, claimed that patronage is evident in Yoruba traditional society. He gave an example of pre-colonial Ibadan society where the *baba-ogun* was seen as a power broker. According to him, the '*baba-oguns*' were members of the community who because of their military prowess gained popularity and respect among members of their various

---

<sup>12</sup>See Albert, 2005; Adeoye, 2009; Omobowale, 2006

<sup>13</sup>Adeoye, 2009 and Omobowale, 2006.

communities. Their successes at the war fronts and their ability to protect their various communities against any external forces turned them into social and political figures or patrons of some sorts.

Examining critically the socio-political and cultural realities in ancient Roman and contemporary Nigerian societies, this study has brought out the parallels and resemblances of the patron- client relationship in ancient Roman and Nigerian cultures.

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

Patron-client relationship or godfatherism, as it is called in Nigeria's socio-cultural and political fields, has generated heated debates among scholars, administrators, politicians and the entire citizenry of Nigeria. There have been different views regarding the concept and some of these views have hastily condemned both the concept and godfathers. For instance, Agbaje (2010), Adeoye (2009), Albert (2005), Familusi (2012) and Omobowale and Olatayo (2007) have all extensively examined the effects of patronage on Nigeria's social, economic, political, and moral life. According to Albert, the political godfathers in Nigeria, like the patrons in ancient Rome, surround themselves with retinue of clients and also use their popularity and status to control other members of society. He went further to say that godfatherism does not only destroy but also introduces unhealthy practices which bring chaos to the system.'<sup>14</sup> These actions have raised questions on the credibility and importance of godfathers in the social and political space of the country.

Despite the criticism, some scholars like Joseph and Onwuzuruigbo believed that godfatherism is relevant in any society. Other modern scholars like Albert have earlier affirmed Onwuzuruigbo claim.<sup>15</sup> However, Omobowale cleverly put it thus:

In order to sustain the socio-political system, both  
the grassroots and the political elite engage in

---

<sup>14</sup> See Albert, 2005; Adeoye, O.A.2009; Omobowale, A.O. and Olatayo, A.O.(2007; Agbaje, 2010;Familusi, 2012.

<sup>15</sup>Many scholars on patronage have all agreed that patronage is very significant for the survival of any society. See Joselph, R. 1987. *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria*. New York: Cambridge University and Onwuzuruigbo, I. 2013. Recontextualization of the Concept of Godfatherism: Reflection Nigeria. *Africa Development*, Vol. xxxiii, Nos. 1&2, pp.25-50

exchange- relations whereby each party reciprocally gives valued resources required by the other<sup>16</sup>.

From the above, it is obvious that we cannot underestimate the importance of patron-client relationship whether in antiquity or in contemporary societies. Patronage serves as a social tool for the poor and disadvantaged who do not have access to resources in which to climb on the ladder of success. Consequently, claiming it to be inimical would only transform into denying the ordinary and poor citizens the opportunity to get access to means of production which they deserve to have. These arguments are further affirmed by Saller (1982), Wallace-Hadrill (1984) and Albert (2005). They all opined that patronage (whether in ancient Rome or godfatherism in contemporary Nigeria) is fundamental to each society as a social mechanism.<sup>17</sup> Patronage to these scholars is a social tool which people that occupy the lowest rung of the social ladder use to seek help and protection from those at the top of the same ladder. Thus, the study examined comparatively Patronage in Ancient Rome and Nigeria and it is on this premise that we based our justification that patron-client relationship whether in ancient Rome or in contemporary Nigeria is not new as it is erroneously believed.

### 1.3 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH

The research aims at highlighting, particularly in its socio-cultural and political perspectives, the motives behind the *patronus-clientis* (patron-client relationship) in ancient Rome and in contemporary Nigeria. We have enumerated certain socio-political reasons why people-both in ancient Rome and modern Nigeria- seek a benefactor who would help in achieving their lifelong aims or ambitions. The study also, seeks to examine the socio-political basis for class struggle in both societies. Finally, the study debunked the claim by critics of patronage that the practice is entirely strange and inimical to Nigerian society and its nascent democracy.

---

<sup>16</sup>Omobowale, O.A. 2007.

<sup>17</sup> It is this social mechanism that helps to generate the power of godfathers. See Saller, R.P.1982. *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Wallace-Hadrill, A. 1984. (ed.) *Patronage in Ancient Society*. Cornwell, T. J. Press (Padstow).

#### **1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The specific objectives of study are:

- (a) to draw parallels and similarities of patron-client relationship (godfatherism) in ancient Roman society, particularly, the late Republican-*cum*- early Empire and Nigeria
- (b) to highlight the ingredients or contractual elements in a patron-client relationship
- (c) to argue that godfatherism as a social institution is not new and so, it is not inimical to Nigeria's socio-political space.

#### **1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEMS/LIMITATIONS**

In order to carry out this research properly, we must first consider the material upon which we can base our assumptions and conclusions. Unfortunately, the research presents a few challenges because the issue of godfatherism in Nigeria occupies the minds of a few Nigerian scholars. Nonetheless, we have gathered pieces of evidence as best as we can from various scholars on patronage; deductions were also drawn from hints, lectures, papers presented at seminars and newspaper articles.

#### **1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

The study captures major works that deal with ancient Roman society particularly in late republic and early principate. The study focuses mainly on the socio-political activities of the people of ancient Rome, with emphasis on patron-client relationship. It also critically examined the concept of godfatherism in contemporary Nigeria zeroing in on the socio-political context by comparing the ancient Roman and Nigerian cultures.

#### **1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The study is aim to give an insight into the history and development of the patron-client relationship as it affects the Nigerian socio-political environment (since no work so



far has compared patronage in Nigeria and Roman) in order to enhance the understanding of its nature and practices in Nigeria. It also sheds more light on some fundamental ingredients of a patron-client relationship in ancient Rome and Nigeria with a view to debunking certain misconceptions about godfatherism in Nigeria.

## **1.8 REASERCH METHODS**

The research method used was a qualitative research method. By giving an in-depth analysis of classical literature on patron-client relationship and examination of scholarly literature on godfatherism in Nigeria, we have proper interpreted socio-political events in ancient Rome and Nigeria. Works of classical writers and socio-political events were analysed to bring out the parallels and resemblances of patronage in Ancient Rome and Nigeria. Modern scholars on patron politics were adequately examined to lend credence to the claim of parallels and resemblances of patronage in both cultures. This method has given a clear, systematic examination and analysis of literary evidence.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In discussing the theoretical framework in this study, we considered the social inequality and Class struggle of both Karl Marx and Max Weber respectively.<sup>1</sup> This is important because it was the inequality in the society which was made possible by the struggle for power and the control of resources that generated a patron's power. These two theories helped to identify the different social classes in ancient Rome as well as Nigeria. They also aided in placing the research in a proper theoretical framework.

Some scholars, like Pakulski and Waters (1996), opined that the social class theory is long dead, but other sociologists, for example, Hall (1997), McNall, Levine and Fantasia (1991) and Marshall (1997) opined that the Class theory could be revalidated.<sup>2</sup> Despite these divergent views presented by the two schools, it is generally accepted that the class theory is still relevant to societal issues in many societies of the world. Therefore, the use of the Marxist theory as a working tool is appropriate for this study. Although the patron-client relationship in ancient Rome precedes the theoretical postulations of Max and Weber as they date back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Max and Weber's ideas are quite relevant in explaining the workings of patronage. This is because the struggle for survival generated the idea or concept of patronage as a socio-political means of creating political power outside the established bureaucracy. Undoubtedly, patronage as a concept entails two classes of people, patron and client, (the strong and the weak) who exchange valued resources for the sustenance of the social structure. However, power inequality and dominance may arise as one party has more valuable resources to offer than the other party. This is evident in ancient Roman society where Patrons used their influence and position to offer valuable resources that client needed.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Class Struggle is fundamental to this research.

<sup>2</sup> For a thorough discussion on this see McNall, S. G, Levine, R. Fantasia (Eds) .1991. Bringing Class Back in: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. See also Pakulski, J and Waters, M. 1996. The Death of Class. London: Sage and Marshall, G. 1997. Repositioning Class: Social Inequality in Industrial Societies. Sage: London.

Furthermore, it is imperative to broadly examine the various ways in which the term 'Class' is used among sociologists. Wright (2002) in explaining the concept of Class says that a class situation arose whenever a group of people have a basic component of their life chances together as long as the component is characterized by socio-economic interests through the ownership of goods and opportunities for revenue, and is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets.<sup>3</sup>

The above as explained by Wright can be linked to the problem of inequalities in an economically-defined society. Weber further clarified this by saying that in most capitalist societies, the means of production which are brought to the market-exchange interpret such inequalities in life chances. Weber's explanation of the term 'Class', as elaborated by Wright, is based on the categorisation, and also, describe the historical difference in the inequality presence in the social classes.

Class, in Wright's view, is among a wider multidimensional representation of stratification in a society where the most significant contrast is between "class" and "status". These status groupings mentioned by Wright above are categorised within the scope of social interaction or what Weber describes as the social order and often signifies a number of identities in the manner of some known positive or negative social valuation of honour<sup>4</sup>

The status groupings or social order mentioned above is similar to the stratification in most societies in antiquity, particularly in ancient Rome, in which there were Orders and an individual was conscious of his membership of any of these groupings. The clarification between status and class further provide a vital point in the analysis of Weber's historical variations in schemes of inequality. For instance, in ancient Roman society, a man's citizenship status was determined by the social evaluation of his honour and the way people around him perceived him. This is so because in ancient Rome status reflects social standards, morals, values and perception rather than legal regulations. However, differences are less accurate than in the case of social orders. The basic components of social rank, that is, wealth and birth, were not always at par with

---

<sup>3</sup> See Wright, E.O. 2002. *Class counts: Comparative studies in Class Analysis*. Cambridge University, Press

<sup>4</sup>Wright, 2002.

each other. For example, a few among the influential and most wealthy Romans came from very humble families, while a few of those from noble birth fell into poverty.

What Wright is suggesting here is that when the foundations of the procurement and distribution of means of production are somewhat stable, grouping by status is favoured. Wright maintained that most technological advancement and economic change affects status stratification and drives the class situation into the background. Wright continued by stressing that societies and countries where the class situation is of main importance and constant are the eras in which their economy and technology are at an advanced stage<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless, for Weber, however, he is no doubt uninterested in the issue of the material deficiencies and benefits of different classes of people as such, or in the struggle that might originate from such benefits and shortcomings that the social interaction presented. Class, for Weber, takes on its vital sociological meaning as a way of illustrating how people related to means of production under situations in which their economic dealings are measured in an extremely efficient manner<sup>6</sup>.

For Marx, however, the most distinctive characteristic of the concept of class is the notion of exploitation. Marx agreed with Weber on the point that class ought to be grouped in tandem with the social interactions that bind people to the common resources that are economically important to production. This assertion was discussed plainly in Marx's work on the mode of production. As societies interact with their environments, they experience improved knowledge about same. This improved knowledge leads to the acquisition of means of conquering the environment. However, as a set of people emerge to own the means of production, there emerges as well, relations of production. Marx, like Weber, regards these relations as having a systematic effect on the economic status of people of various classes.<sup>7</sup>

In his discussion on social class, Bourdieu (1987) gave a lucid explanation to the concept of class by Weber and Marx. Bourdieu stressed that despite Weber's agreement

---

<sup>5</sup> For more on Weber's treatment of slaves, see Wright, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Wright, 2002, forcefully argues that it is as a result of this that Weber does not regard slaves as members of any social class. His statement is an affirmation of conditions of slaves in ancient Rome. For further discussion on this, see Wright (2002); Sayer (1991) and Jones 1975.

<sup>7</sup> For a more detailed analysis of "social class", consult Garth, H. and C.W. Mills. 1958. From Max Weber, Oxford University Press

with Marx that class is hinged on the economic interest and that social mobility or change happened through conflicting relationships, they have diverse concepts on the issue of social class. Marx situated class inequalities around the relation of production, while Weber, in addition to the class, placed it within economic relations. He also added two non-economic-based dimensions that had a tremendous contribution to class stratification; status group which is synonymous with social demand and party or power associated with the political Order.<sup>8</sup> This dimension presented by both Weber and Marx are in tandem with the social order in ancient Rome. Orders, for instance, in ancient Rome are those social groupings defined by the state through statutory or customary laws.

Furthermore, Marx also maintained that only the earliest period was devoid of some sort of social division on the bases of class. He believed that class forms of social stratification only exist immediately humans begin to produce more good than it is required for their daily needs. The conclusion of Marx's conception of social class is that all human societies are based on class structure in some shapes or forms. Marx went further to say that most societies of the world are faced with the struggle between two social classes, that is, those who have access to means of production and those who do not. For instance, Marx explained this relationship in terms of master-slave (*Dominus-servus* as it was in ancient Roman society); and *bourgeoise* and proletariat (as it is found in contemporary society). The relationship is a mutually dependent one because the capitalist requires peasants to work for them in order to make profits. So also, the peasant required the capitalists in order to earn a living for their physical continued existence.

Marx, however, was not unaware that there could be social mobility between the two social classes. For instance, a capitalist could be driven out of business into poverty by bankruptcy or even by competition the same way a poor working class could move up to the proletariat class. To understand this argument vividly, it should be noted that these social classes, according to Marx, are unbiased categories in any society other than a communist one. This, however, does not mean that social classes can exist without people. It simply means that in order to be categorised as belonging to a particular class,

---

<sup>8</sup>See Bourdieu, P.( 1987) *Barkeley Journal of Sociology Vol. 22 pp.1-18*

an individual will have to comply by the economic, and sometimes birth, (as in the case of ancient Roman society) stratification.

Despite the Marxist explanation above, Mosca's (1939) position is to some extent different from that of the Marxists. Mosca disagreement lies in his belief that *elite* recruitment was only possible on an individual basis. For him, it is possible for one social class to replace another. He nevertheless disagreed with the Marxists belief that that can only happen through revolution. Mosca argued that it is possible for an individual from a humble background to join the *elite* class through a combined social mobility. He, however, maintained that such attainment was majorly as a result of such individual's social, economic and professional efforts<sup>9</sup>.

Despite Mosca's contrary views, there is a common agreement on the socio-political and economic importance of the Class Theory to any society – be it ancient or modern. Mosca also believed that there exist already in most developing societies a group of people who are ready to enhance the communication between the rich and the poor. And that this group of people also used their talents to move up the societal ladder.<sup>10</sup> The improvement in production improved the range of powers which a segment or group of society had over other section or group. This, invariably, multiplies the violence that was part of the struggle for survival and growth among social classes.<sup>11</sup>

Having considered the views of many scholars on class theory, how valuable is this theory to the social stratification in ancient times, particularly in ancient Roman society? Are we to examine the socio-political divisions in ancient Roman society as status distinctions in the manner of Weber or Marx? In my view, this is not a helpful method to the discourse on social inequality and social stratification in the ancient world. Garnsey and Saller (1987) clarified this by saying that even in the analysis of contemporary society, the approaches enumerated above could create difficulties. According to them class membership is subjected to conflicting interpretations.

---

<sup>9</sup>For more detail on Mosca, discussion on social class, see Mosca, G. 1939. *The Ruling class*. New York and London Cambridge Press

New York and London. See also Wright, 2002.

Wright, 2002

<sup>10</sup>Mosca, 1939

<sup>11</sup>Garnsey and Saller, 1996. p. 109

Garnsey and Saller (1987) suggested a way out of this seeming difficulty. They opined that in placing patronage on an appropriate theoretical framework, we must not discard the useful insights that Marx's analysis can undoubtedly provide. Marx employed exact class categories -bourgeoisie, proletariat, and so on - developed in the context of 19th-century industrial society which cannot be transported or used to analyse class structure in ancient Roman society. He also established conceptual tools for classifying the fundamental processes producing and reproducing inequalities in society over time. A fruitful use of aspects of Marx's class analysis can be made without imposing modern categories on Roman social divisions. Garnsey and Saller (1987) solved the problem by stressing that instead of focusing on the membership of social groupings, it would be more appropriate to examine the processes that give rise to and preserve inequalities, and then use this analysis to shed more light on the construction of the social stratifications in ancient Roman society<sup>12</sup>.

The basis of ancient Roman economic and social inequalities was rooted in the system of acquisition and transference of property. The ancient Roman society was an agrarian society, and therefore wealth was essentially based on landed property and acquired by inheritance through a legal framework. In this, only when the family died out and there were no adopted heirs, could non family members gain control over valued resources. It was characteristic of the Roman culture that non family members that benefited were lower-class dependants (freedmen, slaves) who had won the confidence or affection of their masters.

For this study, however, Marx theory of Class is appropriate. This is because since the position of the *elite class*, in this context, the Patricians class, depended on the control over productive property (political power, social influence and wealth) as the basis or source of their wealth and power, their propensity to manipulate the legal system validated their domination over property through ownership rights and the use of sanctions, including coercion, to safeguard and enforce the distribution of property in their favour. And their control of means of production-in this case political power/position- enabled them to attract different categories of clients.

---

<sup>12</sup>Instead of focusing on membership of social classifications, Garnsey and Saller, 1987,opine that one can start by examining the processes which give rise to inequalities.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Nature, Form and Importance of Patron-Client Relations

Many classical authors, especially historians and satirists like Horace, Sallust, Martial, Cicero, Seneca and Juvenal dedicated huge amount of literature to the social relationship between a *patronus*(patron) on the one hand and *aliens* (client) on the other. This is because the ancient Romans placed much emphasis on the place of an individual in a society; his membership of a family, his position in the society, and participation in a series of personal relationships even outside the household<sup>13</sup> Seneca, whose famous essay was devoted to this subject, maintained that the exchange of favours and services (*beneficio*) which is the bedrock of the patron-client relationship which ‘most especially binds together human society’,<sup>14</sup>. Seneca further emphasised that the reciprocal exchange of goods and services is justifiable on several grounds. He stressed that such relationships eased tensions and conflicts caused by divisions and inequalities, and it provides many of the services for which today we turn to impersonal governmental or private institutions.<sup>15</sup>

This view by Seneca is in concord with the societal expectations among the people of ancient Rome. Patronage was central to the socio-political life of ancient Rome as it also formed the basis of any human relations that was vital to the sustainability of the state. Badian(1958) backed Seneca’s comments by stressing that the ancient Roman society was able to survive the political storm of the Republic as a result of the solid structure of patronage. Badian went on to say that patronage does not only cement human relations but also strengthens relationships among nations (between a world power nation like United Kingdom and developing nations such as Nigeria).

---

<sup>13</sup> The Roman Emperor was a replica of the *Paterfamilias* of the ancient Roman household who possessed absolute power over the Empire

<sup>14</sup> See Seneca’s *On Benefits*

<sup>15</sup> Garnsey and Saller maintain that it is as a result of the inequality in society and the need to survive that made an individual to seek help from another powerful individual or institution. For further detail see Garnsey, P. and Saller, R. 1987. *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture*, Duckworth and Co. Ltd, London.4. Badian’s works focuses on how ancient Roman Empire was able to subjugate the entire part of the Mediterranean and part of North Africa using the patron- client relations. For more detailed account, see Badian, E.1958. *Foreign Clientelae*(264-70BC.). Oxford.



Despite the comments above about the importance of human relations in a society such as ancient Rome, however, Seneca's *On Benefits* is not a work of sociology or anthropology, but rather ethical treatises on how humans ought to conduct themselves in the act of giving and receiving of favours and services. Seneca's central argument is that a client after receiving a favour from his patron owes him gratitude. A man who neglects these ethical rules has failed in his social duty. Seneca says: Homicide, tyrants and conspirators there will always be, but even more grievous than all these is the offence of ingratitude.<sup>16</sup> Cicero while expressing the same feeling enumerated the moral obligations inherent in patronage. According to Cicero, a client ought to pay obeisance to his patron. This respectful obedience is reciprocal to the patron's protection. Cicero finally stressed that: 'To fail to repay a favour is not permitted to a good man.'<sup>17</sup>

Horace, a Roman satirist, has also discussed and highlighted the importance of patronage to ancient Roman literature. Horace in his *Satires* acknowledged that his success in the literary world was due to his patron, Maecenas, a senior aide to Emperor Augustus. He explained that it was Virgil who introduced him to Maecenas.<sup>18</sup> Horace himself acknowledged Maecenas' benefaction when he confessed, 'I'm lucky to enjoy Maecenas' company, and have Virgil and Varius to thank for that.'<sup>19</sup> However, it should be noted that the help a client gets from a patron is most times based on personal talent and achievement of the client. As Horace emphasised clearly when he explained that it was the devotion and interest his father put in his education that contributed largely to his success rather than the help of a patron.<sup>20</sup>

The above suggests that patronage operated on so many phases and shades in ancient Roman society. It was evident in politics, religion, entertainment and the literary world. One other aspect in which patronage also functioned was making sure that the accomplishments and achievements of famous political figures were immortalised. In practice, the approval of an audience and its acclamation of a single figure played a role in highlighting eminence, but the taste and loyalties of the crowd changed quickly with

---

<sup>16</sup> Garnsey and Saller, 1996

<sup>17</sup> These comments made by Seneca and Cicero are similar to a Yoruba adage that says: *Eniti a se lore tiko dupe, o da'biki olosa koni loru lo* ( an ingrate is like a thief ).

<sup>18</sup> Horace, *Satires* (2002) Smith, P. B (Trans.) University of Chicago Press.

<sup>19</sup> Horace, *Satires* 1.6 lines 11-12

<sup>20</sup> Horace, *Satires* 1.6 lines 15-17

the socio-political tides. Evans (2003) identified putting together and delivery of entertainments in form of games and circuses as another form of patronage. He explained that great and immediate popularity could be achieved through the financing of large-scale entertainment.<sup>21</sup>

The above submission by Evans is equally true when one considers the amount of public buildings donated by various patrons or politicians to provincial cities in Roman Empire. Some of these public buildings were built by the patrons themselves in their various communities. The buildings were constructed to win the favours of the electorate during elections. Although the buildings were not the only emblem that depicted popularity or good reputation, they, however, served as tools in canvassing votes and support from the Roman populace. Again, the social functions that the patrons performed were, also, used to unite those living in Roman suburbs with the centres through the controlled access to the resources.<sup>11</sup> Nicols (1989) affirmed Evans' view by revealing that all over the Roman Empire, inscriptional evidences suggest that ancient Roman women also performed the roles of benefactors, and that they participated in public activities by using their wealth to enhance their own families' prestige and fulfilled social and religious responsibilities. Nicols, however, observed that later in the republican Rome, this means of gaining popularity and patronal control were no longer possible as patrons could not build or commemorate their own achievements, and also, that Romans outside the senatorial class could not involve in patronage with the urban communities in the provinces as an avenue for competing for political power and rallying armed support.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the views of scholars enumerated above, it is vital to consider how the phenomenon of patron-client relationships caught the attention of western scholars. Eisenstadt and Louis (1980), claimed that discourse on patronage started attracting the attention of modern scholars in the sixteen century. According to them, contributions of scholars to the discourse, at the time, were marginal in the societies where such researches on the subject were carried out. During the period, discourse on patronage had not occupied the minds of scholars, especially the anthropologists and sociologists.

---

<sup>21</sup> Evans, J.R. 2003. *Questioning Reputation: Essays On Nine Roman Republican Politicians*. UNISA Press: Pretoria, p.5

<sup>11</sup> Evans 2003, p.7

<sup>12</sup> Nicols, J. 1989. *Patrona Civitatus: Gender and Civic Patronage*, Deroux, C.(ed.) *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History V*. Brussels (Latomus) 117-142

Today, however, studies on patron-client relationships included many societies of the world.<sup>13</sup> Eisenstadt and Louis predicted clearly that the modern and new insight into the discourse on patron-client relationship are bound to remain on margins of societies nor would the relationship vanish with the establishment and advancement of modern democracies.<sup>14</sup> This new direction, as Eisenstadt and Louis further explained, was as a result of the extension of the study from the relatively limited interpersonal relations between a patron and a client to a wide range of social relations.

What the above suggests are: (1) that patronage or patron-client relationships have now become a universal phenomenon and so it is not peculiar to ancient or medieval society (2) that patronage can no longer be restricted to mere personal relationship as the modern concept has accommodated other categories of the relationships. Today patronage can be found in a relationship between an individual and a community, on the one hand, and between a single individual with a network of dependants, on the other. It has also manifested in other relationships outside the expected scope. For instance, shades of patronage have been found in religious organisations, sports, businesses and in educational institutions.

Patron-client relationship was made possible in ancient Rome because the Roman society made very little pretence about the egalitarian society. Patronage is able to function well in modern society as a result of inequality in the society. This distinction in social structure is almost similar to that of ancient Roman society. To the Romans, everyman belonged to one social class or the other. Membership of the social groups was determined by birth rather than wealth. For instance, a freedman may possess more wealth than his ex-master or patron but he cannot claim the same equality or legal rights with his master or any other freeborn as the case may be. As Garnsey and Saller (1987) explained, a man might have 'superior friend', 'equal friends', lesser friends' and 'humble clients'; and the categorisation of others into one or another of these depended on their resources.<sup>15</sup> Those who could exchange comparable benefits were friends of equal

---

<sup>13</sup>Nicols, 1989.

<sup>14</sup>Eisenstadt, N. and Loius, R. 1980. Patron- Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange. *Journal of Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.22, No.1 p. 52

<sup>15</sup>Garnsey and Saller, 1987, p. 10

social standing, while most stood higher or lower in the services in return. For it was socially demeaning for a Roman to demand favour from another Roman because it exposes the implication of social inferiority arising from the fact that they had to turn to someone else for help. One of the noblest conducts a recipient must exhibit was to recognize and to propagate his patron's generosity and power.<sup>16</sup> However, the patronage system changed with the social realities toward the end of the Republic, when terms such as *patrocinium*, *patronus* and *cliens* were applied in a more formal and restricted sense than *amicitia* which means friendship. The usage included political friendships and alliances, or *hospitus* which implies mutual guest-host bonds between families. This new form of the relationship shall be discussed extensively in the next chapter.

### **Patronage as a tool of Comparative Analysis**

Discourse on patronage as a tool of comparative analysis can be divided into two main approaches. The first approach concludes that patronage is a phenomenon confined to some historical societies; especially those characterised by the break-up of family-ties and tradition, or those in the early days of modernisation or industrialization. This approach was developed by Bourne(1986). According to Bourne, patronage is more crucial in places or communities where political integration and social intervention are restricted by the weakness of market forces and the ineptitude of central government.<sup>17</sup> What Bourne meant is that Patronage has no place in a well-administered modern state. The outcome of such claim is that patron-client relations are mainly associated with a transitional phase in state development and the wider processes of modernisation. That is to say, patronage emerges to tighten economic and political relationships where the ties of kinship are no longer effective and the integrative and distributive functions of market and state do not yet operate. This approach, despite its merit, is contrary to the socio-cultural realities of patronage. It is true that patronage helps to cement economic ties as propounded by Bourne. However to say that patronage is restricted to a particular period in history is tantamount to hasty and dangerous conclusion.

---

<sup>16</sup>Garnsey and Woolf, 1996

<sup>17</sup>For more detailed discussion on this see Bourne, J. (1986), *Patronage in Nineteenth Century England*

The exposition of Bourne's concept on patronage above, no doubt, is contrary to the second approach, which Bloch (1961) propagated. In his own analysis, Bloch claimed that patronage is a universal phenomenon; universal across culture, across class and across time. Here, Bloch is suggesting that to 'seek a protector or to find satisfaction in being one are common to all ages'.<sup>18</sup> What Bloch's approach does is to explain the doubtless fact that the public and the private sectors of contemporary societies are filled with 'powerful patrons' and 'obligated clients'. Bloch further explained that the patronage ties strengthen and smoothen the institutions of modernity. From Bloch's explanation, we can safely conclude that clients would rather seek social or economic advancement through their patrons when the established system failed them. This is a fundamental element in Bloch's analysis of patronage. Unlike Bourne who denied the significance of patronage in a well-organised and properly run government, Bloch stressed that patronage has greater relevance in a modern society. Bloch further argued that while patronage is 'never absent, being a universal phenomenon, it is historically subject to fluctuation in importance and intensity.'<sup>19</sup> Such fluctuation, Bloch observed, is conditioned by socio-political and cultural importance placed on patronage in a particular society.

In their own contributions to the discourse, Johnson and Dandeker (1984) faulted the claims of both Bloch and Bourne. They maintained that Bloch and Bourne failed in their analyses of the socio-political and economic relevance of patronage. According to them the difference between the two approaches—that is, those who set patronage as a universal phenomenon and those who limit it to a particular historic construction- is deep-rooted in a common failure to identify between two levels of analysis of patronage. Such a distinction, Johnson and Dandeker argued, did not only explain the differences in the two approaches identified above, but also helped to solve a number of contradictions which have arisen in the literature of Rome.<sup>20</sup> Johnson and Dandeker further went on to say that Patronage is a primary or cell structure of social life with unique, yet universal traits. This claim further affirmed the point that patronage is understood as a system of personal

---

<sup>18</sup>Further analysis can be found in Bloch, 1961, *Feudal Society*. L.A. Manyon (Ed.), London

<sup>19</sup>Bloch, 1961.

<sup>20</sup>Johnson and Dandeker, 1984, give thorough analysis of this in their work: *Patronage: Relations and System in Ancient Society*. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (Ed.)

relationship, constituting a social system that functions mainly in the reproduction of the major institutions of power.<sup>21</sup> Such a contrast would allow us to accept that any seeming decline of patronage in the course of ‘modernisation’ could lead to a shift in its strategic significance.<sup>22</sup>

Johnson’s and Dandeker’s analyses are useful in that they affirmed that the patron-client relationships were usually particularistic and diffuse. It is believed that while any single type of patronage may fade under such conditions, new forms of the relationship may appear, and these new forms can be identified in a wide range of endeavours in many societies, cutting across various segments of political regimes and economic development; performing significant functions within these new and more advanced forms.

However, it is on the universality of patronage, which Bloch forcefully expressed and the ‘middle point’ that Johnson and Dandeker canvassed, that we shall base the focus of this research, since one of the objectives of this study is to show that patronage as a social mechanism is not peculiar to the Nigerian socio-political space; that it is common and universal to ‘all ages, across time, culture and time’. This conclusion has been affirmed by Lande(1983), Adeoye (2000),Albert (2005),Omobowale (2007) and Familusi (2012).They buttressed that patron-client relationship can be identified in a range of national and institutional levels where it has undergone various practices. In Lande’s opinion, the patron-client relationships have been observed in early kingdoms and empires, in both developed and developing countries, in military system of government, and in modern democracies. Lande went on to add that patronage has also been identified at various strata of societies. It is evident among the lower class of the people and at the core of the struggle for control of power and material resources -among members of *elite* class.<sup>23</sup>

From the various positions highlighted above, it is obvious that patronage cuts across the socio-political and cultural strata of different societies. Patronage is a concept which has survived from pre-civilization period to modern times via various cultural approaches and

---

<sup>21</sup>Johnson and Dandeker, 1984.

<sup>22</sup>Johnson and Dandeker, 1984.

<sup>23</sup>Lande, C.H.1983. Political *Clientelism in Political Studies: Retrospect and Prospect. International Political Science Review*4(4) 435-54.

social importance devoted to it that enables each participant to possess what he or she require to sustain himself or herself within the social structure. In other words, the patron-client relationship is evident within civilian and military structures, and within political organisations; between unskilled workers and their labour contractors; between religious leaders and their followers, between small-scale business owners and their workers; and between superior officials and junior members of a large multinational companies or organisations.<sup>24</sup> The rules regulating the distribution of these goods and services were agreeably particularistic, in comparison with the general guidelines synonymous with modern establishments. They were regarded as personal favours which were bestowed on loyalists, not as government's positions or services to be shared on the basis of impersonal competition and which are openly available to all competent or qualified persons, citizens or subjects.

If we agree with Bloch and Lande that patronage is universal and peculiar to different cultures of the world, then, we must also accept the complexity of patronage as a system. And such a system cannot be understood only by a type of relationship but as a complex and hierarchically organised web of chains. It is a structure which cannot be exhaustively defined by reference to the basic ingredients of patron-client relationship because its emergent properties cannot be understood in terms of one-to-one asymmetric reciprocity. Johnson and Dandeker again explained that patronage system could not be described by aggregating individual patron-client relationships. As it is clearly explained, societies have existed where such system played strategic roles in the maintenance and reproduction of power relations<sup>25</sup> such as had been done in ancient Roman society.

### **Patronage and Voluntarism**

Among the emergent properties of patron-client relationship to which volumes of literature have been dedicated, and which we too will direct our focus is the systematic effects of voluntarism in inhibiting the emergence of stable, inherited forms of power holding. The inclusion of voluntarism into a system of resources allocation, Saller (1984) argued, introduces a stabilising factor because, according to him, patron-client

---

<sup>24</sup>Lande, 1983

<sup>25</sup> Johnson and Dandeker, 1984

relationship tends to function as a competitive and multicultural system in which patrons rely on maintaining a high impact clients support in a situation where clients were neither owned nor totally controlled.<sup>26</sup> What that means is that: client choice is crucial in the system and clients constitute a major resource within it.

However, it is imperative to note here that the *patronus-libertus* relationship, which for the purpose of this study is classified as patronal, is different from the *patronus-clientis* relationship in several important aspects. Wallace-Hadrill enumerated the dissimilarities of the two relationships. According to Wallace-Hadrill, the *patronus-clientis* relationship is not voluntary; that is, the freedman neither has a choice over whom to adopt as his patron, nor over whether to have one at all. Again, Wallace-Hadrill continued, the obligations of deference and service (*obsequium et officium*) were, unlike those of the client, enforceable in law.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, it should be noted that the patron-client relationship may well vary considerably in the distance and intimacy that exist between patron and client and the patterns of reciprocal exchange which operated between them and sometimes between intermediaries. As Bourne(1986:7) pointed out, 'it was not uncommon for patron and client to be entirely unknown to one another.' Gibbon and Higgins (1974) have also shown in another context that the maintenance of intimacy might lie in the mediating role of brokers rather than in any direct encounter between patron and clients.<sup>28</sup> Such brokerage or intermediary, according to Garnsey and Woolf(1996) 'may itself vary between the extreme of commercialised agency, where the market is more dominant.' Garnsey and Woolf made this point in relation to the Roman provinces. They stressed that access even to the resources might be in the gift of a powerful man and a peasant might make overtures to a kinsman to gain access to his patron; or he might even present his village to a rich man whose client he already was.<sup>29</sup> Thus, a patronage system may remain personalised and be based on reciprocal exchange; however these processes are neither bound by, nor are they describable in terms of the patron-client dyad.

---

<sup>26</sup>Johnson and Dandeker, 1984

<sup>27</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, A.1989. Patronage in Ancient Society, in *Patronage In Ancient Society*. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (Ed.), T.J Press, Cornwall.

<sup>28</sup>For more on Brokerage, see Bourne, 1986. See also, Gibbon and Higgins in *Patronage, Tradition and Modernization: the case of the Irish Joberman*, *Economic and Social Review* 16, no 1 Oct-Nov., 27-43

<sup>29</sup> Garnsey and Wolf, 1996, p. 124



## **Patronage and Political Development**

Also discourse on patronage has been deliberated upon on the basis of national political developments. For instance, Joseph (1991) presented a significant contribution to the discourse when he identified both prebendalism and clientelism as crucial ingredients of political activities in Nigeria. Joseph claimed that the attainment of administrative and political positions naturally linked with social or ethnic association. And more importantly, an official is nominated for position as a result of the recommendation of a patron. Of course, such an official is obliged to be loyal to the patron who endorsed his nomination for the office, while there is also exchange of goods and services through the patronage that ensures his appointment.<sup>30</sup>

### **Patronage, Multiple Patrons and Loyalty**

A further discourse which has emerged as a result of the commitment to a central issue is the issue of multiple patrons. A number of works provide evidence of clients admitting to or even boasting of relations with several patrons.<sup>31</sup> The evidence of multiple patrons does suggest that the ethics of personal loyalty was often strained to its limits. It is clear, at least, that Saller's relational concept is deficient and that the principle of voluntarism emphasised by Drummond (1989), and Garnsey and Woolf (1989), also mentioned cannot be discarded. However, once the principle of choice is admitted, then, it is clear that a system of patronage will be characterised by fluidity, the transit of clients from one patron to the other, and by struggle among patrons for clients.<sup>32</sup> Evidence shows that multiple patrons existed in Rome at a particular time and place. However, this is not suggestive or in no sense indicative of a weakening of patronage as a system. For instance, Augustus hoped to sustain his authority not only by reinstating the old social order, but also by establishing his authority through the traditional means of patronage and beneficence. In fact, Drummond maintained that if we accept that Roman society was characterised by the tolerance of such ambiguity, then this may help to explain the

---

<sup>30</sup> Joseph, R. 1991. *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria*, Cambridge University Press, New York

<sup>31</sup> Saller, 1982. *Personal Patronage under the Roman early Empire*, Cambridge

<sup>32</sup> Saller, 1982.

failures of some scholars to identify a clear or stable set of meanings associated with Roman usage of the term client.<sup>33</sup>

Another important issue that patronage has generated and which most classical scholars have deliberated upon is the concept of *fides*'-loyalty or trust which in itself may be rooted in the ethics of friendship. As has been noted, a client was expected to give absolute support and loyalty to his patron. The *fides* serves as the cement of the system on which the operation of the principle of choice, however, extensive or restricted it might be, still depends.<sup>34</sup>The web of relations which make up the system is constantly and necessarily subject to discrepancies between the ideal and the reality. If such discrepancies become regular in occurrence, then, the terms of discourse itself may be subject to shifts of meaning and ambiguity.<sup>35</sup>

Drawing parallels and similarities from the ancient Roman experience on patron-client relationships, one can find patterns of patronage in the socio-political sphere of Nigeria. Although these two societies differ both in culture and in space, there are still resemblances which one can pick from the two cultures. For instance, the class division that was so conspicuous in ancient Roman society is also evident in the Nigerian state. Although the class distinction in ancient Roman society was based on birth rather than wealth, one basic similitude is that both societies have two broad classes of people: the rich and the poor.

### **Patronage and Socio-political and Cultural contexts**

In order to understand the concept of patronage in the Nigerian socio-political space, however, one needs to look at the contextual meaning that is synonymous with the term 'patron' in Yoruba thought. According to Albert(2005) and Omobowale and Olutayo (2007), the Yoruba word for godfather is *Baba-isale*. The word is a coinage of two Yoruba words: '*baba*' and '*isale*'. *Baba* stands for father and *isale* connotes 'base'. Given the contextual meaning, therefore, it means father of the base.<sup>36</sup>The 'base' could mean 'root of support'. Omobowale went on to say that a patron in Yoruba society

---

<sup>33</sup> Other terms that should also be taken note of include *patronus*, *amicus* and *paterfamilias*

<sup>34</sup> *Fides* could mean 'trust or loyalty' and it is a vital ingredient in a patronal relationship.

<sup>35</sup> Wallace-Hadrill, 1989

<sup>36</sup> See Albert, 2005 and Omobowale, A.O and Olutayo, A.O. 2007

possesses credibility and values that his clients and people around him would want to emulate. The credibility, as Omobowale opined, is rooted in a patron's ability to give help and support to his numerous clients. Omobowale stressed further that a Patron in Yoruba society is usually someone in whom a whole community reposes its trust, and so, such a person must be able to have the trust and respect of the whole community. Therefore, a patron who is regarded as 'father- at- the base' (*baba-isale*) is not just a sponsor as the English 'patron' connotes. He must also be a good role model who would abide by societal rules and values as specified by members of such a society.

Also, scholarship is divided between two schools of thought, those who view patronage as positive to the socio-political situations and those who regard it as inimical to the socio-political development of the society. For instance, Golden (2003), Fonchingong (2004) Marty (2001) Taylor (2004), Albert (2005) and Olutayo and Omobowale (2007) maintained that patronage is a destructive aspect of culture with damaging effect on the societal structures and development. To this group of thought, patronage does not only destroy the socio-political structure of a given society, it also introduced unethical behaviour which pollutes the system. They concluded that political patrons in ancient Rome and Nigeria surround themselves with an array of loyalists and use their power to manipulate other members of the society. And that godfatherism does not only destroy but also introduces unhealthy practices which brings chaos to the system.<sup>37</sup>

Lazar(2004), Zapale(1998), Philip(2001) and Onwuzuruigbo (2013) however considered patronage as a tool by which the less privileged gain access to resources which are beyond their reach. Therefore, any other interpretation to consider patronage as inimical to socio-political life of the people would only deter them, particularly, the lower class of people and the access to productive resources which they ought to have. Onwuzuruigbo in his recent paper posited that most of the criticisms against patronage is because discourse on patronage has always been dominated by political scientists rather

---

<sup>37</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Albert, 2005; Golden, M. A. 2003. Electoral Connections: the Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy, *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (2): 189-212; Fonchingog, C.C. 2004. The travails of Democratization in Cameoon in the context of Political Liberalization since the 1990s', *African and Asian Studies* 3(1): 33-59. Marty, M. 2002. Mauritania: Political Parties, Neo-patrimonialism and Democracy, *Democratization* 9 (3): 92-108. Taylor, L. 2004. Clientship and Citizenship in Latin America, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23 (2) : 213-27.

than by anthropologists and sociologists. He further stressed that, until anthropologists and sociologists contribute their inputs to the discourse, there will always be criticisms of the concept. He maintained that anthropologists and sociologists will help to situate the concept in the historic and cultural perspectives in order to bring out the contradictions as well as abuses that is inherent in the concept.<sup>38</sup>

The same thought was also held by Wallace-Hadrill. He maintained that the relationship worked because the patron was in a position to deliver the goods to large numbers of dependants. Wallace-Hadrill, nevertheless, stressed that the patron's power may not be derived in his 'ability to secure benefits for all who ask, but from the sheer impossibility of securing them for any but a minority.'<sup>39</sup>The secret of the patron's power is the manipulation of scarce resources; where all need resources that are in short supply, it is easier for a patron to secure control of the routes of access, so rendering access impossible except through a patron.<sup>40</sup>

A similar process is espoused by Juvenal in *Satire 5*. He declared that clients themselves are the dupes, for the Roman patrons have no intention of rewarding their services, a meal is all they get, and that that did not even come often; and when at last, after two months the neglected client is invited, he is insulted with cheap and nasty fare while the patron gorges luxuriously.<sup>41</sup> Horace also narrated a story that suggests how patronage may have enabled urban landlords to manage distant farms through clients (*Epistles 1.7.46-82*). Tenancy is a fertile ground for patronage. The position of a landless peasant who cultivated a plot owned by his social superior is close to that of a client and may become that. This attitude of a Roman patron to his clients also has relevance in the politics of Oyo state, a state in western Nigeria (we shall adequately discuss this in a later chapter).

Scholarship on patronage has also focused on the possibility whether Rome's relation with other states may be interpreted in terms of clientele. This view is vehemently propagated by Badian in his book, *Foreign Clientele*. To a great extent, the

---

<sup>38</sup> For more detailed account on the positive significance of godfatherism, see Onwuzuruigbo I. (2013), 'Re- contextualization of the concept of Godfatherism: Reflection on Nigeria', *Africa Development, Vol. Xxviii. Nos. 1&2.pp.25-50*

<sup>39</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, 1989.

<sup>40</sup> See Juvenal *Satire 5*. See also Horace, *Epistle 1.7.46*

<sup>41</sup>Badian, E. 1958.*Foreign Clientelae* (264-70BC).Oxford, Clarendon Press.

personal patronage of individuals could accord well with the patronage which Rome claimed to exercise as a state. Personal patronage in the provinces and kingdoms could be seen as functioning in the context of a beneficent state-patronage. For instance, by the late Republic, the concept of patronage was used as a prototype in which conquerors or governors serving abroad applied to establish personal relationship as patron to a whole clan or communities. The relationship might be perpetuated as family obligation. For instance, the Marcelli family were patrons of the Sicilians because their ancestor, Claudius Marcellus had conquered Syracuse and Sicily. By transferring the right of citizenship to municipalities or provincial families, most patrons were invariably increasing the number of their clients for political purpose just as Pompeius Strabo did among the Transpadanes.

However, some scholars have fiercely attacked this idea and consider it to be baseless. Nevertheless, Rich (1985) brilliantly defended Badian. Although he disagrees with him on some of his summation, however, he stressed that whether a state or a province enters any relationship with Rome, either on a friendship basis or on a treaty, such a relationship must be regarded as patron-client relationship as long as the union is unequal and the ally states are in subjugation to the superior state<sup>42</sup>. Rich, finally, concluded that Badian's critics were wrong to conclude from the infrequency with which the Romans used their patron-client terminology of their interstate relations. Rich maintained that it is not valid to interpret those relations in terms of clientele. From Rich's insight, it is evident that there is much in common between the patronage relationships of the Roman people with other states, and we may continue to speak of other states as Rome's clients. Rich's disagreement with Badian's idea, no doubt, is confined to some aspects of the theories that he built.<sup>43</sup> However, the idea of Badian has been buttressed by Wallace-Hadrill while exploring patronage in Roman society. According to him patronage was indeed as vital to the Roman social system in reality as in ideology, and that, though across the centuries different and varied relationships were

---

<sup>42</sup> Rich, J.W, 1985, Review of Gruen. 1984. *Liverpool classical monthly* 10.6, 90-96

<sup>43</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, 1989.

seen by the Romans themselves as patronal, they all have in common a significant social function.<sup>44</sup>

### **Patronage In Nigerian context**

In their analyses of the origin of patronage in Nigeria, Albert (2005), Gambo(2006), Adeoye(2009) and Familusi (2012) maintain that it is an integral part of Nigerian politics. For Adeoye (2009), godfatherism (patronage), is a word that describes the relationship between a godfather and a godson. According to Adeoye, a godfather is a superior, mentor and kingmaker, a godson, on the other hand, is the recipient and beneficiary of the generosity of a godfather. From this definition, one can say that a godfather is an individual who has built enormous admiration and followership (voters) in his community, and possessed an effective socio-political structure, and who has secured total acceptance from the voters that could secure his endorsed candidates victory.<sup>45</sup>

Familusi (2012) looks at the moral aspect of godfatherism. He explains that a godfather is like ‘a god,’ and so, he is expected to lead by example. However, this is not so in the Nigerian context. As a result, the roles of godfathers in politics are counter-productive. They are not guided by any moral value but self-centeredness. Oyeshile (2004) buttressed this while explaining that morality in most societies arises as a result of the differences between good or bad conduct so as to ensure a peaceful co-existence in a society.<sup>46</sup>

Consequently, morality is one of the criteria to be considered in pronouncing a person a godfather. Again, in African societies, elderly persons are considered to be upright in their day-to-day dealings. Thus they are responsible for their being accorded great respect. Therefore, godfatherism as a concept in modern times is a moral contradiction as it follows the line of separating politics from morality. Furthering this claim, Omoregbe opined that in Nigerian politics, politicians have assumed that morality and politics are two different things, that once an individual joins politics such an individual must

---

<sup>44</sup>Wallace- Hadrill, 1989.

<sup>45</sup>Adeoye, O.A. 2009. *pp.* 268-272. See also Familusi,2012

<sup>46</sup> See Oyeshile, O. 2004. Religious and secular Origins of Morality within the Yoruba framework: Implication for man and society,” in *Orita: Ibadan Journal of Religious studies*, *pp.* 136-156

abandon morality and that by its nature, politics involves the use of corrupt and unethical means. Omoregbe further stressed that this belief stems from the doctrine propounded by Machiavelli. Nicolo Machiavelli, an Italian politician, had suggested that morality should not be mixed with politics and in thinking that the only way to be successful in politics is to deploy any means at one's disposal.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup>Omoregbe, J.J. 1998.*Ethics: A systematic and Historical study, Lagos: JERPL*. Also see Marchiavell's classic, *The Prince*

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.1 ANCIENT ROMAN SOCIETY: IN THE BEGINNING...

It may seem difficult to give a vivid account of Rome in her early development. The reason for this is because the early history of Rome is obscure and modern accounts freely contradict one another, and all in some degree, are conjectural<sup>1</sup>. Different accounts abound illustrating the origin of Rome. Many of these accounts are based on mythological evidences on how Rome was founded. However, it was Virgil who presented a harmonised account of Roman foundation history and it is on him we shall rely. But, first a brief historical account of Rome in her formative years will be appropriate. This is important because it will afford us the opportunity to analyse the socio-political events in order to trace, identify and bring out evidence of patronage in ancient Roman society.

Rome, before the Republic, attracted little attention from the contemporary Greek world, and the first Roman account of the city was written by a patrician, Fabius Pictor.<sup>2</sup> In ancient Greek world, most cities often had a city-protecting god and a myth that attached such god to the original city, emphasizing features which were thought to be really important. The Roman foundation myth was a very complex one. It focused, instead, on things that were agreed to be bad (vagabondage, ruthlessness, brutality and killing).<sup>3</sup> For instance, Romulus and Remus, the great ancestors of Rome, were the miraculous sons of Mars, the god associated with the blind fury of war. Turned out of their household, Romulus and Remus were exposed to the savagery of nature, only to be rescued and suckled by a she-wolf, the animal that lived in the ancient countryside and which most popularly embodied ferocity. Later the twins were reared by shepherds, who of all people were considered to be outsiders and uncivilized. When they grew up, Romulus and Remus decided to found a city in the region where they had been exposed. However, in a quarrel over who should have the right to establish the city, Romulus killed his brother and went on to found Rome by encouraging the homeless and dissidents of Italy to come to the city and take refuge at the asylum. Also, at this time in Italy,

---

<sup>1</sup>Virgil, *Aeneid* (trans. By Rolfe Humphries )

<sup>2</sup>See Brunt. P. A. 1971. *Ancient Culture and Society; Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic*. Chatto and Windus, London.

<sup>3</sup>Brunt, 1971.



ancient connections with the Greek world were often given a background in the myth of Heracles and his wanderings of heroes and their followers which followed the Trojan war-tales made famous in the epic of Homer. The Romulus story did not fit in easily into this type of myth. However, the Romans through Emperor Augustus re-wrote the history of Rome by tying it to the world of ancient Greece and particularly to the story of Aeneas, a Trojan hero, who wandered around the world after the destruction of Troy. Aeneas later settled in small community in main Italy where Romulus (the pioneer ruler of ancient Rome) and his twin, Remus, were later to be born. This new account of the origin of Rome became widespread at a period that Rome began to be well-known in the Mediterranean world, and it took its peculiar characteristics in the epic, the *Aeneid*, which was written by Virgil to eulogise the first emperor, Augustus<sup>4</sup>.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek historian, gave a vivid account of the early years of Roman history.<sup>5</sup> Dionysius explained that Rome had the city ruled for two and a half centuries by Etruscan kings. Romulus was succeeded by six other kings. The last was Tarquinius Superbus. Very little is known of these kings, and in fact, some classical writers have questioned the numbers of kings that were said to have ruled Rome for such a long period. But there is no need to doubt the existence of the institution or the historical reality of, at least, the last three kings. Indeed, Marcius Tarquinius is associated with major building works in Rome, and his reign belongs to the end of the seventh century, precisely the time that archaeology reveals the first large civic buildings in the centre of the city.

Tradition ascribed to the kings<sup>6</sup> the creation of many of the fundamental institutions and social structures that were later the characteristics of Rome. In writing about them, historians borrowed models from the Greek world for this as well. So, Numa who established many aspects of Roman Religion has more than a limit of the Spartan founder-hero, Lycurgus, or the Athenian reformer, Solon. Servius, who reorganized the citizen body, has close similarities to Cleisthenes of Athens. The picture of the Tarquins

---

<sup>4</sup> It was generally agreed that Augustus Caesar commissioned Virgil to re-write the history of Rome and much more to trace his ancestry to the Trojan prince Aeneas. See also Virgil's *Aeneid*

<sup>5</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* is a classics 2.9-11

<sup>6</sup> Peter, k.1997.p. 19

was elaborated from the stories told of Periander and Peisistratos, the archetypal tyrants of sixth-century Greece<sup>7</sup>.

The account of Roman world in the sixth Century BC in general was clearly illuminated by an ever-increasing number of inscriptions, particularly from the cities of Etruscan. They reveal a world in which men of influence moved easily from community to community with their families and clients. The historical tradition, too, preserves memories of the world of clan-leaders. Titus Tatius, king of the Sabines, was reportedly invited by Romulus to share in his rule in Rome. More informative is the story that the king Tarquinius Priscus was an emperor from the Etruscan city of Tarquinii. During the early Republic, Attus Clausus, the ancestor of the great Roman gens, the claudii, migrated to Rome 'accompanied by a large company of clients' and was granted land and citizenship. One of the most abiding features of Roman history is the continued importance of aristocratic individuals whose primary loyalties were at all times to their families and followers, and who only reluctantly, and never completely, subordinated their own interest to those of the broader state.

The early kings were regarded simply as clan-chiefs who attained recognition for their leadership roles in the community. In Roman custom practices, they were entrusted with *imperium*, authority, a key political term which was designed to empower the leaders with legal rights to give order to Romans of lower class. The *imperium* was by all means all-defined, wide-ranging, and sadly arbitrary. At the inception a vital way in which the *imperium* could be used was to impose by war the holder's authority and that of Rome on neighbouring towns and cities who were believed to have questioned it.

It is also a curiosity of early Roman history that at key turning points we find stories about women. Perhaps the most famous of these was of Lucretia, whose cynical rape by a son of the last king of the monarchical period, King Tarquinius Superbus, and her subsequent suicide, aroused the anger of a noble, Lucius Junius Brutus who championed the revolution that expelled the first royal king and his immediate family from Rome circa 510/509BC. The account of the banishment of the Tarquins was vividly revealed in Roman literary tradition. The Tarquins expulsion from the city stirred up are

---

<sup>7</sup> In particular traditions ascribes to king Servius Tullius, a fundamental reorganization of the political system.

volition which took place mostly in south Italy, Sicily and Greece. What is important is the way in which it came about in 510/509BC. Therefore, for many centuries, the Romans jettisoned the idea of kinship and the domination by one man. This was germane to the way in which the institutions of the Roman Republic were established.

By the end of the monarchical era, the Romans were certainly literate. Laws and treaties were promulgated for proper governance of the new era. However, many accounts claimed that these legal documents must have perished in the Gaulic sack of Rome. Although some earlier texts were preserved by ancient authors, their dating or authenticity is in doubt. According to Brunt, it was the custom at Rome to date documents (be it legal, business or political) by the names of the ruling consuls; for examples, an event that happened in 68BC was said to have occurred in the consulship of Marcus Tullus Cicero and Lusus Antonius.

Nevertheless, the Roman substituted the kings with the magistrates, who were called consuls. The law establishing the office of the Consul stated that they could only hold office a year and were not immediately re-elected. They could be brought to account after leaving office, and as they held it for so short a time, they were much more likely to defer to the will of the senate. Membership of the senate was for life and the consuls themselves were senators, and it was in their own best interest to safeguard their own statutory powers.

However, it is in the relationship between the patricians- who no doubt were also members of the senate – and the plebeians, a class of the commoners, that we shall focus our searchlight in this chapter. Before then, it is imperative to quickly run through the Roman family life so as to have a proper understanding of how the Patron-client relationship works. Since the word Patrician or patron' is derived from '*pater*' which means father, the Patron undoubtedly is modelled after the *paterfamilias* of the Roman household.

### 3.2 ROMAN FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD

The Roman family or household was a very important institution in ancient Rome. It represented all the social ideals in Roman society. The Roman family served as the basic social unit through which status, wealth and authority were transferred to the larger society. Therefore the perpetuation of the aristocracy, the distribution of landed wealth, the possibilities for social mobility, and other social issues fundamentally relied on patterns of family background and behaviour. Beyond these social realities, the conception of the Roman *familia* has had a progressive effect on the socio-political and legal thoughts of western civilization.<sup>8</sup> In early Roman history, discipline in the family was hard and standards of virtue expected from members of the family were also high. Following the re-introduction of Roman legal system in late medieval Europe, scholars adopted the nearly absolute legal power of the *paterfamilias* in the household as a standard for the power which nature endorsed to be the absolute sovereignty in the state. In addition, 19<sup>th</sup> century theorists<sup>9</sup> who focused their study on the evolution of society, emanating from the Roman family, advocated for a common period in human history characterized by elements in the Roman household in particular.

An understanding of the Roman family, however, should begin with the linguistic categories of the Romans. The Latin words for ‘family’ are *familia* and *domus* (household), but neither has the semantic range or emphasis of “family” as it is used today with the standard meaning of ‘father, mother and children’<sup>10</sup>. When Cicero in *on duties*, for instance, discusses family obligations, he refers to wife, children and household (*domus*), but never to *familia* defined in this way. Under this definition most wives of the classical period were not in their husbands’ *familia* because they were not married in a fashion to bring them under the authority (*manus*) of their husbands<sup>11</sup> and a young boy whose father had died could possess power in his own- *familia*.

*Domus* in the sense of household was more freely used by Romans than *familia* in reference to the family. Though often defined as ‘family’, *domus* comprised a larger group than is usually associated with the family today, comprising the husband, wife,

---

<sup>8</sup>Garnsey and Saller, 1996, p. 128

<sup>9</sup>Garnsey and Saller, 1996.

<sup>10</sup>Garnsey and Saller, 1996

<sup>11</sup>Garnsey and Saller, 1996

children, slaves and others living in the house<sup>12</sup>. The difference between Roman and contemporary definitions as well as Nigeria's sense of *familia*, underscore the cardinal facts about the Roman family. It must be assumed in the context of a slave as a household staff, at least for the prosperous class. The ever presence of slaves must have had important results for paternal authoritarianism, child-bearing and patterns of sexual behavior.<sup>13</sup>

In the Roman household, there are women, especially the *materfamilias* or matron, who performed a significant part in sustaining the family values, and who also had gained a dignified and powerful position. Unlike her counterpart in ancient Greece, a woman in ancient Rome carried out her daily activities in the atrium, which was located at the centre of the house, openly and not in seclusion. Her main duties were the upbringing of her children, to perform the household tasks, and to make wool for weaving which she would use to produce the family clothes. She could attend religious festivals or banquets and had a nearly complete social freedom. Despite this unique freedom, a woman under the Roman law had no personal life and on marrying she merely moved from the authority (*potestas*) and care of her father to that of her husband.

According to Olasope (2006), in the eye of the Roman law, women were subject to the absolute control of men. This may partly explain why a *paterfamilias* chose husbands for their daughters without their consent<sup>14</sup>. For those who lost their *paterfamilias* or husbands to war or natural death, the law placed them under a guardian, who administered and took charge of any business and legal transactions on their behalf. Later in the empire, women who met the legal condition of bearing three children were freed from guardianship. These social and legal requirements created clear restrictions upon Roman women which impeded their participation in social and political activities. Roman women were prohibited from voting, thus they did not have a political voice.<sup>15</sup>

Despite the highlighted restrictions of women in Republican Rome, later laws that were enacted gave some women legal rights. For instance, later on in the principate, a law was promulgated that gave a woman the right to divorce her husband. The law also gave

---

<sup>12</sup>Garnsary and Saller, 1996.

<sup>13</sup>Garnsary and Saller, 1996

<sup>14</sup> See Olasope, 2006. Marriage Alliances in Ancient Rome, p.10

<sup>15</sup>Olasope, 2006.

a woman the right to recover her dowry after demise of her husband, even after divorce. She also has the right of ownership. The new law no doubt gave some women significant financial leverage and liberty. A vital aspect of marriage was the property arrangement, which reflected the ambiguous position of the woman in the family. Although a wife was a physical and social member of her husband's family, her property was quite separate.

The wife's property was in the dowry she brought to her husband's house. A marriage could not hold in ancient Rome without the presentation of the dowry. The word 'dowry', from a Latin word '*dos*' literally mean 'gift'. It is a gift made to consolidate a relationship between two families. And it could be in form of clothing, jewellery, land or even slaves. The dowry was central to a Roman marriage, and how huge a dowry was signified how wealthy the family of the bride was. As Olasope (2006: 43) stated, the amount of the dowry mostly depends on the status of the bride's family. It was a social rule that a bride's dowry fit into her husband's status. This is because if a woman provided a dowry that was more than her status, she might be accused of being overly-anxious to be married off by her family and vice versa.

The above excerpt, however, does not suggest that the sole purpose of a dowry is to show or exhibit social status. For a bride could be given a *pecunia*, savings, during his lifetime. Olasope (2006:40) further clarifies this:

Dowry was meant to serve as a 'cushion' for the financial responsibility that would come to the husband upon getting married. It was supposed to alleviate the financial burdens of marriage. The provision of a dowry was regarded as a duty of the father, but was not mandatory for a legitimate marriage. While dowries were sometimes large, up to one million sesterces, their value and function must be put into perspective. In some early modern societies, the dowry constitutes the daughter's share of the family property, or at least the bulk of it. This was not the case in Rome, where daughters could expect equal or substantial share of their father's property on his death.

Consequently, though dowries were reckoned as part of the daughter's inheritance from her family, they probably represented only a fraction of her full share. According to legal texts, they were intended to be of a size to contribute to the household living

expenses. Modest dowries make sense in the Roman context of early Roman marriages and frequent divorce. It is doubtful that a father might have willingly give a large share of the patrimony to his daughter before his (the father) death. Or he might even be unwilling to transfer a substantial dowry to a husband who might well divorce the daughter in order to keep parts of it. The modest size of dowries also helps to explain certain noticeable silence in our texts.

The *paterfamilias* as mentioned above held absolute power. This power was said to include that of life and death, *vitae necisque potestas*, over every member of his household, that is, his wife, his legitimate children and his slaves. In reality, the *potestas* of the *paterfamilias* was absolute and total till he passed on. After his death, sons would take over as the *paterfamiliae* of their individual households. Despite the *paterfamilias* total power, however, Classical scholars have focussed their studies mainly on the legal definitions of the *pater potestas* (the father's power). By the third century AD, the powers of the father were highlighted in the *Corpus* by jurists like Ulpian and Gaius, and it was taken as precise and dependable illustrations of Republican realities.<sup>16</sup> Modern classical scholars emphasise the enormity of the powers of the *paterfamilias*. According to Emma Johnson, the study of the ancient Roman family has recently gained momentum when writers in the nineteenth century adapted the Roman family and its patriarchal thoughts as indication of a linear progression in history leading either to enlightenment or decline.<sup>17</sup>

What the above suggests is that the evidence available to modern scholars determine their perception of the *paterfamilias*. For instance Morgan saw the *paterfamilias* as a father with absolute power, and went on to say that the contemporary modern family system is no doubt an improvement upon that of the Graeco-Roman.<sup>18</sup> Marx and Engels followed the line of thought of Morgan. For them the decline in the pattern of moral life of the Romans was responsible for the fall of the *paterfamilias*, a process of destruction that strengthened their opinions about the social status of a father of modern-day society.

The Roman *familia* was regarded as a state within a state. Its members were subject to the judgement and absolute power of the *pater* (father) just as citizens were

---

<sup>16</sup> Johnson, E.2007. Patriarchal Power in the Roman Republic: Ideologies and Realities of the Paterfamilias,

<sup>17</sup>Johnson, 2007.

<sup>18</sup> Morgan, L.H. 1992. *Ancient Society*, Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co

subject to the judgement and full authority of the citizen's body or the Emperor. More immediate was the incapacity of anyone under paternal power to act as a fully independent agent under Roman law, above all in financial matters and in the making of contracts. In theory the *filius familias*, the son who was under a paternal control, had little more independence than a slave. Exactly like a slave, the only way he could own property was through *apexulum*- a private fund conceded to his use by his father, but revocable at any point, and automatically returning to the father in the case of death. However, unlike the *filius familia*(son of the family), a slave's status in a Roman household was that of a mere property. In ancient Roman society, a slave or a freedman could not claim equality with an *ingenuus*- a freeborn citizen. For the slave and even the freedman, the encounter with slavery had ruined his honour and irreversibly degraded his mind and body. Fitzgerald claimed that the servility of slaves revealed itself primarily in their judgment and moral facilities, rather than in their general intellectual ability.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the stereotypical slave could exhibit both cunning and a certain amount of cleverness, but he could not act according to oral principles<sup>20</sup>. The slave's nature was routine cowardice and criminality.<sup>21</sup> Olasope buttresses the above assertion: 'Slavery was an undeniable reality in Rome. Slaves were beaten, chained on the ground for laziness or any form of misdemeanour.'<sup>22</sup>

The notion of servility of slaves does not tell the whole story. It stretches the assumption that the Romans thought that enslavement at a stroke robbed a man of his moral facilities, and it is likely that an individual's experience of slavery was recognized as a factor in the creation of 'servile' personality. Although a slave was formally defined by his subjection to the authority of another, the practice of slavery obviously mattered

---

<sup>19</sup>Fitzgerald, W. 2000. *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.135

<sup>20</sup> Although much evidence abound in classical literature where slaves are portrayed as perpetrators of evil, a good number of slaves were also known for their high moral standards. One of such is Cicero's slave, Tiro. Compare also, Tyndrus, in Plautus' *Captivi*..

<sup>21</sup>As Watson 1987. 39 noted, the Roman sources reveal 'a story suspicious that slavery was detrimental to the slave's character

<sup>22</sup> See Olasope, O.O. 2001. The Roman slave and his prospects in the late Republic and early empire. *CASTALIA: Ibadan Journal of Multicultural/Multidisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 6, pp. 63-71.



too. While the slave's 'social death' left him perpetually dishonoured, it seems that the treatment he received was responsible for his 'servile' mind and body.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, the slave did not have any legal right to protect him from violence or other forms of physical abuse, which might also include sexual exploitation. The Roman legal sources disclose a common expectation that slaves might be abused sexually by their masters. It is explained in the *Digest* that a freed woman could not be a victim of *stuprum* (rape or sexual assault) committed by her patron; an evidence that also suggested that ex-slaves did not recover full physical integrity<sup>24</sup>. Scars together with tattoos and branding marks were not just physical signs of servitude, but also visual markers of servile mind.

The treatments given to slaves differed at the Republican period and the Principate. In the former, slaves were treated as mere chattels, as illustrated in the ensuing latter period. Although the slaves did not suffer a similar fate in the regal period, their fate on the whole took a lighter form. This might be due to many factors: luxury and the growing civilization, stoic influence on men's morals, the philanthropic attitude of the age and legal sanctions on maltreatment of slaves. The Principate also witnessed another division in the classification of the slaves: the private slaves, *servi urban*; and the public slaves, *servi publici*.

The public slaves, *servi publici*, were properties of the state and were controlled by the magistrates as the slaves of the senate and various local communities. The methods by which they were acquired varied. Some were provided by conquest and towards the end of the Republic, proscriptions and confiscations provided others. The legal and social statuses of the public slaves were superior to those (statuses) of private slaves. The private slaves, however, were acquired frequently by gift in the will of a rich

---

<sup>23</sup>Mouritsen, H.2011.*The Freedman in the Roman World.s* Cambridge; Cambridge University, Press. p.38

<sup>24</sup> See the *Digest* 25.7.1 (*Ulpian*); 34.9.16.1 (*Papinian*).

and devoted citizen by individuals or the state. This was the major difference between the public slave and private slave.

Being a slave or an ex-slave of the emperor meant that one was in a strange position. First, one had access everyday to the pinnacles of wealth, power, status, and information. Second, one naturally moved to some extent in the same surroundings as one's owner. But one was still subject to terrifying dangers of slavery. For instance, Doctor Galen told the following story:

He (Galen) had a friend who was normally a gentle and reasonable soul, but prone to anger. One day, they (Galen, his friend and retinue of slaves) were travelling from Corinth to Athens when it turned out that a case containing something that this man particularly needed at that time had been left behind. In fury, he took a sword in its scabbard and struck the two slave boys who were responsible on the head, so hard that the blade split the sheath and horribly injured them. Horrified at what he had done, he galloped away, leaving Galen to bring the party safely to Athens.<sup>25</sup>

It is a fair record that, according to Galen, he was later filled with remorse. He panicked partly because if the slaves had died it would have caused serious trouble for him with the authorities. But the story demonstrates the vulnerability of the slave to abuse of every kind.

The transition from slavery to freedom for a slave came with a significant amount of legal and social interpretations. In the eyes of the society, a freed slave still carried several moral and mental inadequacies that were associated with servitude. Mouritsen<sup>26</sup> explained that:

While the ex-slave became a *libertus* or *libertinus*, *i.e* a person who had just received freedom, the former owner received a new title of *patronus*. This particular designation is significant, since it

---

<sup>25</sup> See Massey, M and Moorland, P. 2001. *Slaves in Ancient Roman Society*. Bristol Press, London .p.57  
See, also, *Digest*, 48.9.1(Marcian)

<sup>26</sup>Mouritsen, 2011. p. 51

<sup>27</sup>Mouritsen, 2011. p.37

associated the freedman with two different social institutions – that of clientele and that of the Roman household, the *familia*.<sup>27</sup>

The new relationship between an ex-master and his freedman was socially and legally constructed through a mixture of elements taken from various aspects of Roman life. For instance, the position of the freedman as *filius sine natura* was clearly explained in the *Lex pappea* of c.52 BC where it is stated that a *libertus* that killed his patron was liable for patricide.<sup>28</sup> Also, the pseudo-filial construction of their relationship presented economic advantages to the patron, who could make claims on the freedman's estate. However, an ex-master's (now a patron) control over his ex-slave (now a freedman) was not legal. Unlike the absolute power, *vitae necisque potestas*, he has over the member of his family, the *paterfamilias*'s control on his freedman is mere patronal. Mouritsen explained further:

The Roman patron, it must be emphasised, did not hold any formal authority over his freedmen, nor did he enjoy any legally enshrined *potestas* over them.<sup>29</sup>

Moreover, the presentation of the patron as a fatherly figure, one who would guide and control the freedman after his freedom from servitude, was in several ways only an ideal which in the nature of things would often have been rather different from the reality. Mouritsen complained that most patrons did not represent an ideal image of a mature and authoritative *paterfamilias*. The reason, according to Mouritsen, was because some of these patrons were women while others were 'too young to exercise any patronal function'<sup>30</sup>

Nevertheless, despite the patron's lack of control over his freedman, he still enjoyed certain rights and privileges. The freedman owes his patron *obsequium*, dutiful respect. In reality, the freedman was obliged to treat his patron and his family with consideration, refraining from actions that might hurt the patron and his family. The

---

<sup>28</sup>Mouritsen, 2011. p.40

<sup>29</sup>Mouritsen, 2011. *Ibid.* p. 41

<sup>30</sup>Mouritsen, 2011.

freedman's obligation to his patron also include: protecting the reputation of the patron, not using verbal abuse or physical violence on the patron, and not instituting legal action against the patron or his children.<sup>31</sup>

What the above discussion on Roman household suggests is that there was a great division among the members of a household. The status of the *parterfamilias* was greater than those of, say, his wife or children. So was the condition of the wife which was better than that of the slaves. These distinctions among the members of a Roman *familia* were a reflection of the larger Roman society. As mentioned in chapter 2, the ancient Roman society was highly stratified and each member of that society belonged to one class or the other. The Roman society was broadly divided between the patricians and the plebs. The patricians were superior to the plebs who mostly depended on the patricians for their survival.

### 3.3 THE CLASS STRUGGLE

The strong division in the Roman society between the patricians and the plebs, and coupled with the inability of the plebeians to live above their means resulted to a long struggle (*stasis*) between the two classes. Right from the start the key question was who was entitled to hold the magistracy? At the very beginning of the Republic, a group of *genes*(clan or family that pronounced themselves as patricians (*patricii*), claimed the exclusive right to hold the majority of political and religious posts).<sup>32</sup>The basis of their claim is not now recoverable, because even in antiquity there was no agreement over the origins of the term 'patrician'.<sup>33</sup> It is argued that since they alone had the necessary religious knowledge to carry out the duties of the magistrates of the new Republic in a way to ensure the favour of the gods, in 450BC, they managed to get passed a short-lived law which forbade marriage between patricians and non-patricians. This was an attempt to turn the patricians into an exclusive priestly caste. As explained above, the magistrates were mainly from the patrician class who dominated the senate. They were closed order throughout the Republic, and in early period of Roman history, they prohibited intermarriage with the other citizens, the plebeians or masses. The distinction was that of

---

<sup>31</sup>Mouritsen, 2011.

<sup>32</sup> See Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* 2.9-11

<sup>33</sup> It is safe, however, to rely on the account of Dionysus of Hallicarnasus

birth and not of wealth. Again, property was originally concentrated more in the hands of the patricians, and for this reason and because they also controlled the government, the patricians were held responsible for the miseries suffered by the poor<sup>34</sup>.

Dionysius informed us that all plebeians were clients of the patricians, and that, by the early Republic many plebeians were evidently free of clientage.<sup>35</sup> *Annalists* also mentioned that the patricians were often supported by loyal clients against the rest of the plebeian class. Brunt's suggestion that the belief that patrons were supported by their clients in their socio- political activities may have been as a result of the experience of latter times rather than by genuine tradition, may be correct! It is no wonder that most men had to have a patron, without whose help they might have but small prospect of redress against a wrong deed, at once more powerful and devoid of scruple.<sup>36</sup>

But for its oppressive character, the patricians rule might have lasted for a long time. Tradition relates that there was grave discontentment among the masses, owing partly to an economic depression in the fifth century. Local farmers were constantly falling into debt, *nexus*. According to the *Twelve Tables*, a debtor (who was unable to pay his debt), was likely to be sold into slavery abroad by his creditor<sup>37</sup>. The social strife between the two classes was both political and social, but it was also economic. For instance, Scullard maintained that the struggles were as a result of the agrarian troubles of *Gracchii* days. While other classical writers have written that the economic factor was highly exaggerated in order to provide precedent for later agrarian legislation, and that the intra-party fights were modelled on the political upheavals of Sulla's day.<sup>38</sup>

Without an iota of doubt, many classical scholars have written extensively on the factors that were responsible for the social strife. Some have posited a political factor; others economic. However, as long as the concessions won by the plebs were political, we may presume that the rich plebeians worked to that end. But as economic legislation also resulted, it cannot be deduced that economic suffering of the plebeians was the real cause

---

<sup>34</sup>Brunt maintains that although the social conflicts re-appear, this time it was difficult for the poor to find champion. For further discussion on the class struggle, see Scullard, H.H.(1980), *A History of the Roman World, 753-1346BC*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London

<sup>35</sup>Scullard H. 1980. p.458

<sup>36</sup>Scullard H. 1980. p.458.

<sup>37</sup>Scullard H. 1980. p.458

<sup>38</sup>Scullard H. 1980. p.458

of the trouble; whether directly or only because the leaders of the struggle were clever enough to use it as a handle for their own political ends is another matter<sup>39</sup>.

To be sure, what is certain is that the urban plebs only wanted protection and political recognition and privilege, while the country plebs demanded for more land and greater freedom. The land, it is said, was owned by the state (*ager publicus*) but exploited almost wholly by those who controlled the state, the patricians, for their own benefits. In furthering the claim that the struggle could also be economic, Brunt opines that:

No doubt, details of the stories of these agitations were invented in latter ages when recession of debts and distribution of public land were again popular demands, but it is very unlikely that there is no truth at all in the tradition; indeed, in the fourth century maxim was abolished, and it cannot be an anachronistic figment of the annalists' imagination<sup>40</sup>

The wretchedness of the masses' economic position made them to clamour that the *ager publicus*(public land)should be re-distributed to the poor plebeians. Though the amount of public land at that period was scanty, and such a cry was typical of Gracchi times, there is no good reason to question the fact.

In 494 B.C, a great assembly of the plebs sat down *en mass* outside Rome and declined to enrol in the army. Such a 'secession' or strike undoubtedly took over two hundred years for its benefit to materialise. And by 287 BC, some revolutionary measures were taken which accounted for the concession the patricians were forced to make, that is, the establishment of the tribune of the plebs. The tribunes were ten men chosen among the rank of the plebeians. The tribune of the plebs was elected annually by the assembly of the people (plebs) who were organized in voting units called tribes. These tribes were local divisions of the state, originally four within the city and seventeen in the countryside. The assembly of the tribunes was democratic as representatives of each of the tribe were of the same number.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup>Scullard H. 1980.

<sup>40</sup>Brunt. P. A. 1971. *Ancient Culture and Society; Social Conflicts In The Roman Republic*. Chatto and Windus, London

<sup>41</sup>Scullard H. 1980. p.458

<sup>42</sup>Scullard H. 1980.

The statutory function of the tribunes was to protect the lower class Romans against oppression by the magistrates; they did so by literally stepping between them and their intended victims. This act was called *intercessio*, intercession. The magistrates did not dare touch their persons who were ‘*sacrosant*’. This is because the whole plebs had sworn to avenge them by lynching whoever laid hands on them<sup>42</sup>. Also, the tribune held meetings of the tribal assembly at which resolutions were moved and they could be passed. The resolution was called plebiscite, and - at first had no binding-force for the whole state. They could only be turned into laws by votes in the centuriate assembly, and until 339BC, the assembly could not legislate without the sanction of the patrician senators<sup>43</sup>

Having gained concession against the patricians, the plebs then clamoured for the unwritten law to be published so that the patricians would no longer be the only interpreters of the law. Tradition revealed that the agitation started with the tribune Terentibus Harsa, who in 462 threatened to limit the consular *imperium* by means of legislation. The following year, another tribune proposed to set up a commission of ten to legislate in the whole field of law. The patricians resisted the proposal and a struggle between the orders continued until a compromise was reached in 454, when three envoys were sent to Greece to study the Athenian legal system instituted by Solon. On their return, it was decided that the constitution together with the magistrates, the consuls and the tribune should be suspended so as to set up an executive government. In 451, a commission of ten who were unrestricted by the right of appeal was set up. The ten members were called the ‘*Decemvirs*’. All the members were patricians, and they worked with fairness and justice. At the end, they issued a code inscribed on ten tablets, which was duly approved by the *comitia centuriata*.

In 450BC, another set of envoy was inaugurated to complete their work; apart from its leader, Appius Claudius, its members were all new and some of them were plebeians. The new commissioners added two more tablets to the existing ten<sup>44</sup> and began to rule oppressively, refusing to resign. Two acts of violence heralded their fall: (1) a brave warrior and tribune, Sicinius Dentatus, was murdered, (2) and the maiden Virginia

---

<sup>43</sup> Scullard H. 1980.

<sup>44</sup> This, perhaps, is the origin of the Twelve Tables, a tablet that contained the Roman first Code

was slain by her own father to save her from the clutches of Appius. The plebs, however, seconded the *Decemvirs* abdication, and negotiations resulted in the restoration of constitutional government.

During the fifth century, the plebeians had obtained many concessions from the patricians. In civil law the two orders were equal politically. The plebeians' institutions were recognized, although they did not form part of the constitution. The patricians, despite all these measures, still entrenched behind their religious privileges and maintained their leadership in the senate and the assembly. However, towards the end of the century, the plebeians slackened in their demands, partly because there was less unity of purpose among the rich and the poor members of their order<sup>45</sup>

We may then say that the patricians retained their monopoly too long because of the great number of their clients. However, Brunt gave another reason:

In the late Republic candidates for office seldom, if ever, stood on programmes, they solicited vote per their personal merits, or when these were tripling or unknown (as might often be the case), on the services their ancestors had rendered to the state<sup>46</sup>

In the early Republic only the Patricians were nobles. Even when admitted to office by law, rich plebeians could hardly compete, unless they made themselves popular champions, which they were seldom disposed to do, as their economic interests were in general the same with those of the patricians. In 566, for instance, the plebeians insisted that it should be prescribed that one of the consuls should always be a plebeian, and even so for many years the voters defined the law and chose two patricians.

It has been observed that despite the plebs' agitations and the concessions that the plebs got, the poor plebeians were still subjected to socio-political and economic hardships. Their rich counterparts quietly abandoned them with the struggle immediately they had achieved their selfish ends. Croix vividly explained that the plebs as a group was not as homogenous as the patrician class. For the plebs, their leaders were wealthy individual who could aspire and attain any political positions in the city. Therefore their interest was not truly in getting their plebeians counterparts access to social and political opportunities, rather, they were

---

<sup>45</sup> This is because once the rich plebeians realized their political ambitions, they abandoned the cause of the order

<sup>46</sup> Brunt, 197, p. 51



interested only in getting political offices; just like the patricians, and the opportunity to strengthening their own position.<sup>47</sup>

The above suggests that the hope of the plebeians on their rich leaders was dashed because of personal interest and greed of the plebeian leadership. Croix, again, gave a better judgement when he explained that it is imperative to identify the conflict of the orders as combination of series of tacit negotiations between the two different Plebeian groups. First, the leaders who had no significant economic demands and whose goals were purely political were concerned with the removal of a strictly legal disqualification for offices which they were well qualified to hold. And second, the mass of poor Plebeians who desired a better socio-economic status for themselves.<sup>48</sup>

The poor plebeians were disappointed by those who were supposed to be their advocates and since they were also unable to meet the requirements (financial) for elective positions, they had no better choice than to attach themselves to the patricians as clients.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus informed us of the restraint exhibited in the long struggle between the two classes. At the end of the struggle of the Orders, little was achieved by the plebeian class. What they got was, in form, a greater measure of democratic control that later turned out to be an illusion. The Plebeians could be appointed to office. However, by surrendering their monopoly of power, the patricians still preserved for themselves a share of some political power. From the concession reached, a new set of nobility was formed in which only a few plebeians were admitted, and at which the patrician class was dominant. But its oligarchy sentiments and economic interest were so different. Despite these, the society order still remained the same. The former social conflicts were to resurface. This time it was difficult for the poor plebeians to find a champion who would lead the agitation immediately the political ambitions of the rich plebeians had been satisfied. While all this was going on, the ancient Roman government directed her energies to oversea-conquests, and the colonization that followed from these conquests went a long way to appease the plebeians' discordance.

---

<sup>47</sup> Croix, 1981, p.334

<sup>48</sup> Croix, 1981.p.336

### 3.4 ORIGIN OF PATRONAGE IN ANCIENT ROME

There are quite a number of accounts of the origin of patronage in ancient Rome. However, the account of Dionysius of Halicarnassus seems to be popular among classical scholars.<sup>49</sup> In his effort to name Romulus as the originator of patron-client relationship, Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes how Romulus divided the Roman population into two classes of patricians and plebeians. According to Dionysius:

When he had divided the lesser men from their betters, Romulus then prescribed and regulated the duties of each. The patricians' duties were to serve as priests, magistrates and judges, conducting the affairs of the community in partnership with himself and concentrating on business in the city. The plebeians were to be released from concerns because they had no experience of them and their poverty deprived them of the necessary leisure; rather, they were to engage in agriculture, the rearing of livestock and gainful occupations.<sup>50</sup>

The above excerpt does not only show that it was Romulus who divided the Roman population into the classes of patricians and the plebs, but that he also assigned to each of the groups its socio-political and religious responsibilities. Here Dionysius explains:

The customary practices of patronage which Romulus then defined and which long remained in force among the Romans were as follows. The patricians had to expound the law to their clients, who were ignorant of it; whether their clients were present or absent they had to look after their interest, omitting nothing that fathers do for their sons, in respect both of money and pecuniary contracts; where clients were wronged in contractual matters, the patron had to bring a suit on behalf of the injured party and he had to defend any suit brought against the client. In short, one could say that it was the patron's duty to ensure for his client that tranquillity in personal and public affairs of which he had a particular need.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup>Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* 2.9-11

<sup>50</sup>Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* 2.9-11.

<sup>51</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* 2.9-11

Dionysius of Halicarnassus further highlighted the obligation of a client to his patron as instituted by Romulus. Dionysius explains:

For their part, clients had to assist their patron with dowries. For their daughters' marriages, if the father lacked the means. And, also, the client was expected to come to the rescue of his patron whenever the patron or his children were kidnapped by an enemy by paying ransom. If the patron lost a private suit or incurred a public penalty which involved a monetary fine, the clients had to meet it from their own resources as a favour, not a loan; on a par with kinsmen they had also to contribute to their patron's disbursement in magistracies, offices and all other public expenditures.<sup>52</sup>

However, as far back as one can trace, the term *patronus* carried a dual meaning, the first denoting a person who had freed a slave, and the second a superior person in a patron-client relationship. The use of the paternal model in both contexts is important given the exceptional position of authority held by the *paterfamilias* within the Roman household. The importance of the *patronus-clientis* relationship in Roman ideology does not in itself prove that patronage in the modern sense was important in their structure; but it does constitute an invitation to us to explore the structural significance of patronal relationship.

Evidently, the Roman used the semantic of patronage indifferent kinds of relationships with both humble dependants and their junior aristocratic colleague clients. It must be noted, however, that the common expression used to describe a young and junior aristocrat and other relatives down the pyramid of the socio-political ladder was *amicus*. Saller explains that the connections between senior aristocratic senators and their juniors in relation to 'friendship' are seemingly misleading because of the egalitarian overtures that the word connotes in modern English<sup>53</sup>. Though willing to extend the concept of the term *amicus* to describe some of their inferiors, the status-conscious Roman did not allow the concept to distort the relative social values and recognitions of the two parties. On the contrary, *amici* were sub-divided into different types: superiors,

---

<sup>52</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* 2.9-11

<sup>53</sup> Saller, 1984, p. 61

inferiors and then down the hierarchy, humble client. Each group was aware of his position in the society<sup>54</sup>.

The social stratification of Roman society was recreated and strengthened daily through the common Roman custom of the salutation. Every day a lesser man showed up at the houses of the great. According to Saller, the salutation provided a visible marker of status in two ways: the standing of the callers was expressed by the order in which they were received by the patron, and the patron's status was displayed by the number and importance of his callers. Martial's *Satire* (Epig. 10. 70; 74; 82) suggests that the early morning scramble to the house of the patron was one imposition that put the caller in his place. Seneca claimed that the formal classification of callers could be traced back to the second century BC when the custom was initiated by Gaius Gracchus and Livius Drusus

The ambitious attempts of new men intending to make their way in the imperial aristocracy were associated with the need to cultivate the favour of the great by attending *salutatio*. Plutarch advised a young municipal notable to be satisfied with a local Census rather than pursuing the procuratorship and governorship of provinces where it is likely to make much money and in pursuit of which most Roman men grow old lingering at the doors of other men's houses and while abandoning their own affairs<sup>55</sup>. In going to *salutatio*, then, the young senator or equestrian hopeful of an appointment had to subordinate his interests and behave like a client<sup>56</sup>.

Linguistic usage shows that the terms *patronus* and *cliens* are used for a wide range of ties or connections between men of unequal status, which include junior and senior aristocrats. This is not surprising because the condition for patronage was that one of the parties must be superior having the three concepts: *dignitas*, *auctoritas*, and *pietas*. This condition was an accepted part of the relationship between junior and senior equestrian and senators. Also, the broad semantic field of *amicitia* and *clientele*, and the considerable overlap between them should not be allowed to obscure the fine gradations of Roman personal relationships<sup>57</sup>. The Roman recognized the difference between a junior senator and a client however they might be labelled. To express the gradation in

---

<sup>54</sup> One of the central questions of this research is to determine whether *amicus inferiors* and *client* suggest the same meaning. For further information between *amicus inferior* and *client* see Seneca, *De Ben* 6. 33.

<sup>55</sup> Saller, 1984, p. 68

<sup>56</sup> Saller, 1984

<sup>57</sup> Saller, 1984

English, Garnsey and Saller maintain that one might translate *amici* superiors and *amici inferior* directly and write of superior and inferior friends, as distinct from clients, but that solution to the problem of translating Roman categories seems inordinately awkward in English. Furthermore, it separates *amici* from clients more clearly than the Roman themselves did<sup>58</sup>.

Perhaps it would be profitable to clear the air on *amicitia* and *clientele* by turning our attention to particular relationships that have provoked the critics; that of Garius Clarus and Fronto, on the one hand, and of the younger Pliny and Corellius Rufus, on the other<sup>59</sup>. However, the former would do for our purpose. According to Saller, Fronto in AD 163 wrote a recommendation to his former student, the emperor Lucius Verus, on behalf of his close personal associate, the senator Garius Clarus. In the letter, Fronto gave a good report about Garius Clarus as a lesser senator whose friendship he courted.(Advenue 2.7)<sup>60</sup>.

The above excerpt illustrates the importance of social rank and personal relationships in ancient Roman society. Therein, Fronto, drew a clear distinction between Gavius Clarus, ordinary clients and *liberti*. And again, Clarus' attainment of a *curule* office, or praetorship, did not entitle him to friendship on an equal footing with Fronto because their *auctoritas*, *dignitas* and *pietas* were still far from being equal<sup>61</sup>. This was the thrust of Konstan's argument in his paper, *Patrons and Friend*. He forcefully disagreed with Horse fall that the dichotomy between *amicus*, which commonly means friend and the *amicus* used to describe a client ought not to be drawn at all at any time in the relationship.<sup>62</sup>

Again, the possibility of categorizing the relationship between a master and ex-slave, *patronus-libertus*, as patronage is very dicy. The relationship is different from the *patronus-clientis* relationship in several crucial respects. It is not voluntary: the freedman neither has choice over whom to adopt as his patron, nor over whether to have one at all. The obligations of deference and service (*obsequium et officium*) were, unlike those of

---

<sup>58</sup> Garnsey and Saller R., pp. 152-156

<sup>59</sup> See Saller R. 1984. Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: drawing the distinction. *Patronage in Ancient Society*. Anchrew Wallace-Hadrill (Ed.)

<sup>60</sup>Saller, 1984. Pp. 56-58

<sup>61</sup>Saller, 1984

<sup>62</sup> Konstan, D. 1995. Patron and Friend. *Classical Philology*, Vol. 90, No. 4..328-344, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

the clients, enforceable in law. The freedman in fact is a special case, since the transition from slavery to freedom is a special case of the transition from non-Roman to Roman. The obligatory nature of this patronage clearly protects the interests of the master<sup>63</sup>.

From the above, and from the perspective in which this research looks at patronage, it is safe to group Romans of lesser social status in the category of clients so as to have a better and crystal comprehension of the concept of patronage. This is because class divisions in ancient Rome was not totally clear and was filled with fluidity. As Konstan admitted, the patronage relationship between a patron and a client was undoubtedly a semi-formal one at Rome, and obligations are always not clear or easy to define.<sup>64</sup> Konstan's belief was further buttressed by Garnsey and Saller. They opined that even in the analysis of contemporary society, class membership is open to conflicting interpretations, if only because class boundaries are unavoidably in a state of flux.<sup>65</sup> Garnsey and Saller further inquired that 'in a culture so sensitive to rank, how was the hierarchy of rank made known and reinforced across culturally diverse communities?'<sup>66</sup> In ancient Roman, status was centred on the social judgement of a man's honour, the opinion of people around him as to his prestige.

The primary elements of rank, that is, birth and wealth, were not always in step with each other; some very wealthiest came from very humble families, and some with the best pedigree fell into poverty. For instance, during the empire, some wealthy freedmen were able to reach the summit of the propertied class. They contributed four of the ten richest men known during the Principate, and were befriended for their enormous influence even by members of the *elite* orders. Unlike other freedmen, they generally married freeborn women.<sup>67</sup> The aristocrats tried to justify their sense of outrage against the imperial freedmen on some grounds other than the accident of servile birth. The aristocrats maintained that neither freedom nor citizenship nor affluence could change the uncultured, servile spirit of an ex- slave.

---

<sup>63</sup>Konstan, D. 1995

<sup>64</sup>Konstan, D. 1995

<sup>65</sup> This is important in the patronage relationship between the freedman and his ex-slave, and the society at large.

<sup>66</sup> Garnsey and Saller, p. 109

<sup>67</sup>Garnsey and Saller

The intensity of the aggression directed against these men, that is, the imperial freedmen, whose position rested entirely on their proximity to and influence over emperors, can be identified in the offensive expression used by the normally mild-mannered Pliny, as he described his reaction to an inscription written to honour a freedman of Claudius, Pallas with free birth and the insignia of the second most senior magistrate, the praetor.<sup>68</sup>

Wallace-Hadrill, while exploring patron-client relationship in Roman society maintained that the relationship worked because the patron was in a position to deliver the goods to large numbers of dependents. Although, according to Wallace-Hadrill, the patron's power may not have derived from his ability to secure benefits for all who ask, but from the sheer impossibility of securing them for any but a minority.<sup>69</sup> The secret, according to Wallace-Hadrill, then is the manipulation of scarce resources: where all need resources that are in short supply, it is easier for the patron to secure control of the routes of access, so rendering access impossible except through a patron.<sup>70</sup>

Wallace-Hadrill's argument illustrated above resonates in the *Satires* of Juvenal. Juvenal declared that for the clients; a meal is all they got, and that not often; and when at last after two months the neglected client is invited, he is insulted with cheap and nasty fare while the patron gorges luxuriously.<sup>71</sup> Here, food may stand as the symbol of the resources a patron distributes. The patron's authority comes not only from generous and constant distribution, but from keeping him on tenterhooks with the hope of gaining access to material things which are in fact never fully granted. Juvenal's description of patronage in this manner has similarities with patron politics in Oyo State, a State in the western part of Nigeria, in which a late political godfather turned his abode into a Mecca of some sort by providing daily meal (*Amala* and *Gbegiri*) for countless of his supporters.<sup>72</sup> Thus the slogan 'Amala politics' is synonymous with Oyo State politics.

---

<sup>68</sup>The imperial freedmen (*Cesaris Liberti* or even *Cesaris Servi*) were said to possess some privileges and rights than poor freeborn and freed citizens.

<sup>69</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, A, 1984. A Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to empire. *Patronage in Ancient Society*. Wallace-Hadrill( Ed.). pp. 63-68

<sup>70</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, A, 1984.

<sup>71</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, A, 1984.

<sup>72</sup>Late chief Adedibu was regarded as a strong man of Ibadan politics and a godgather.

The client's only chance of breaking out of the system, however, is to make the unacceptable admission that the resources are not available and in any case superfluous. Here, then, may be a first step towards understanding the use by the Romans of patron-client relationship as a socio-political control. The aristocratic class comprising the generals, legal counsel, priest, magistrates and judges, all together, stood across all the major lines of communication with the centre of power and the resources it had to distribute.

### **3.5 SOCIO-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PATRONAGE IN ANCIENT ROME**

From the above, we have seen how the ancient Romans used Patronage in their inter-personal relations. In this segment, however, we shall concentrate on the socio-political relevance of patronage in ancient Rome. Patronage, as we have seen in the body of literature discussed in chapter 2, is a way of generating power. We will examine various literary works of notable Roman satirists such as Juvenal, Horace and Martial. We shall also look at some works on the socio-political activities in ancient Rome with a view to explaining the significance of Patronage.

Wallace-Hadrill in the introduction of his book maintains that:

Even the political patronage of the late republic has now become controversial, and it is paradoxical that the period which has always provided the clearest evidence of patronage at work is also one in which a whole constellation of factors were at work which ended to undercut traditional patterns of patron-client relations. But despite all controversies and difficulties of evidence and interpretation, there remains an underlying consensus among the contributors: that if we want to understand the structure of social relationships in antiquity, patronage study is a tool of analysis<sup>73</sup>.

In the late republic, patronage was used as a model when conquerors or provincial governors initiated personal ties as patron to whole communities, ties which then might be continued as family obligation. Thus, the Marcellus had conquered Syracuse and Sicily. Spreading rights of citizenship to municipalities or provincial families was one

---

<sup>73</sup>Wallace-Hadrill, A, 1984.



way to increase the number of one's clients. Also, the close bond between patrons and freedmen meant that the latter could be used as pledges of his good faith and even exchanged as hostages.<sup>74</sup>

Augustus Caesar also sought to establish his authority not only by reinstating the social order, but also, by showing his own legitimacy through the traditional methods of patronage and beneficence. Through the instrument of patronage, he shared his benefits individually to those that have access to him and, also, to favoured groups, notably the Roman plebs and the army. Closeness to the emperor opened up to a privileged circle, such as close relations, friends of high rank, and servile members of his household, afford them a variety of opportunities, that is, opportunities to be given political office and honours, to financial assistance and granting of citizenship rights and so on.<sup>75</sup>

Numerous traits of imperial society gave this type of patronage a special importance in the Principate. As mentioned above, example of Emperor Augustus's patronal role served as a vivid and one practical. Augustus took on the role of the *pater pateriae* and figuratively became the patron of all citizens of Roman. In the Republican period, clients would flock to the households of their patrons in the hopes of receiving political favour. Later on in the empire, however, patron no longer found the clients helpful in affirming their socio-political standings but, in its place, focussed their attention to Augustus. Former patrons became clients of Emperor Augustus and seek political position not from the people but from the Emperor.<sup>76</sup> Patronal support was needed in the enrolment of the imperial *elite* because no bureaucratic instruments were developed to supply the next generation of aristocratic officials. The emperor's role in making these appointments is often emphasized, but in the absence of training schools or application procedures the

---

<sup>74</sup> For instance, Plancus wrote to Cicero that Lepidus as wastage of his good faith-*Obside fidei illius*-had sent him a certain Appella, Presumably a trusted freedman of Lepidus. For further discussion on this Cicero, Fam p. 17 3; Tregiari (1969a).

<sup>75</sup> These were personal favours bestowed on loyal clients.

<sup>76</sup> Garnsey P and Saller R. 1996. *The Roman Empire. Economy, Society and culture*. Herald Duckworth and Co. Ltd London

<sup>77</sup> Garnsey P and Saller R. 1996.

<sup>78</sup> Garnsey P and Saller R. 1996.p.153.

Emperor had to appoint those brought to his attention by senior friends like Corelius Rufus.<sup>77</sup>

Emperors, however, did not and could not monopolize patronage. They did not pretend to be patrons to all their subjects, since universality would have undermined the motivation for personal gratitude on the part of the subjects. Rather than suppressing the patronal networks of the aristocratic houses in ancient Rome, the emperor only encouraged them positively by providing them the resources needed to reward their clients.<sup>78</sup>

The Patron-client bonds were also extended out from Rome to the provinces. For instance, the emperors, governors and other officials representing his power had a patronal role. As the provincialization of the Roman aristocracy advanced in the late first and second centuries, there was a gradual increase in the number of provincials that had some of their prominent members in well-positions in Rome. These prominent members served as patronal mediators between themselves and the Roman rulers. This, no doubt, gave them alternative opportunity to gain access to the favours distributed from Rome, and also a means of influencing the administrators sent out to rule them. No longer were they governed by foreign conquerors, but by friends of friends.<sup>79</sup>

On a social level, the image of the patron as a paternal figure who would continue to guide and control the freedman after his release from slavery was in many respects merely an ideal which in the nature of things would often have been different from the reality. The Roman patron, it must be noted, did not hold any formal authority over his freedmen, nor did he enjoy legally enshrined *potestas* over them.<sup>80</sup> Though the patron had no defined powers over the freedman, he did enjoy certain rights and privileges. A client was prohibited from damaging the patron's reputation or attack his reputation, or use verbal abuse, let alone physical violence, nor was he generally entitled to sue the patrons

---

<sup>79</sup> Pliny buttresses this when he says that '... the ideology of the good emperor was one not so much of administrator as of patronal protector and benefactor.' see Pliny, Pan. 23.1.

<sup>80</sup> Fabre, 1981., pp. 222-223, though the patron's authority included the right to kill the freedman, however, see the sensible comment by Watson (1975)

or his children.<sup>81</sup> More appropriately, the patron was entitled to *obsequium*, dutiful respect, from his freedman. In practical terms it meant treating the patron and his family with consideration, and restraining from any action which might harm them.

Evidence of patronage, also, can be seen in the works of classical writers. In this study, however, we shall only concentrate on a few of these writers.<sup>82</sup> The first book of Juvenal's satires, for instance, set out a vivid illustration of the patron-client relationship. Juvenal complained that the relationship was no longer based on loyalty on the part of the client or fatherly benevolence on the part of the patron but purely on materialistic consideration that have replaced the once humane values of the past. Once in earliest Roman tradition, both patron and client had a sincere mutual relationship which was based on obligation, trust and service: but all we see now are clients whose friendship was exchanged with a meal-ticket stashed in their wallets'<sup>83</sup> The Romans of Juvenal's time worshipped money. Clients are ready to betray their patrons when 'their palm is greased with ample bribe'.<sup>84</sup> Juvenal presents patronage as a system that has been significantly corrupted.

Juvenal, in his *Satires*, presents to us a world in which the distinction between *amicitia* and *cliens* is intertwined as a result of decline in the concept of *amicitia*. He complained that it is difficult not to compose satire in a city that has been so much corrupted with different social vices and that the once cherished *amicitia* has been degraded to a mere financial exchange. Both Juvenal and Martial, in their works, also, complained about the decline in patron-client relationships. To both writers, the decline is more prominent in the later period in the imperial Rome. This is a contrast with the literary patronage in Augustus period where writers had good relationship with their generous patrons. The poetry profession did not yield financial profits in itself- at least the poet could not depend on it as his only source of livelihood - but it did offer other opportunities for poets

---

<sup>81</sup>Watson, 1975. pp. 104-5

<sup>82</sup>Watson, 1975

<sup>83</sup>Juvenal, 1974. *Sixteen Satires*. Peter Green (Trans.). Penguin Books Ltd. England

<sup>84</sup>Juvenal, 1974.

through their integration into the upper class circles of society and the connection to an influential and wealthy patron.<sup>85</sup>

A critical look at the works of Juvenal and Martial exposes social tensions as a result of unclear distinction between *amicitia* and *cliens*. The first is that while *amicitia* relationships were private, they were also unequal. For instance, Horace was not comfortable with the nature of his relationship with Maecenas because of the social connotation. Both Juvenal and Martial have expressed the same feelings in their respective works. Juvenal, especially, has, bitterly complained that most patrons hardly treat their clients with utmost respect. According to Juvenal, the relationship which was meant to be a private one has turned into a public one whereby clients lined up at the patron's house for a daily distribution of doles to indistinguishable set of people who often flatter the patron just to make a livelihood.<sup>86</sup>

The degeneration in the interpersonal relationships resurfaces in Juvenal *Satires* 3 wherein Umbricius, seemingly a close acquaintance of the poet, expresses his determination to leave Rome owing to Rome's increasingly ignoble nature. Umbricius explains that many of them who are poets remain impoverished in Rome because they cannot humiliate themselves either by performing dehumanising jobs that others are performing in order to support themselves or by flattering just to gain favour.<sup>87</sup>

In addition, Umbricius laments that aristocratic or upper class men deliberately choose hypocrites that use flattering words as clients, many of them Greek, rather than honest and straightforward Roman men like himself. Umbricius also noted that patrons no longer consider a man's morals, but only his status, income or ability in flattery; he lamented that clients even offer a source of amusement to the patrons. Cicero, in his *De Officiis*, written earlier in the empire had explained that merit should be one of the criteria to be used when granting patronage, not the wealth of the client.<sup>88</sup> Also, Plautus in his play *Menaechmi*, also expressed the same feelings. The play, which was written immediately after the Second Punic war, presents the protagonist of the play returning

---

<sup>85</sup>Angelica P. 2012. Juvenal, Martial and the Augustan: An Analysis of the production and Reception of Satiric Poetry in Flavian Rome. Thesis. Department of Greek and Roman Studies, University of Victoria. p. 16

<sup>86</sup>Angelica P. 2012.

<sup>87</sup>See Juvenal *Satire* III, line 28- 47

<sup>88</sup>See Cicero's *De Officiis*

from the forum, tired and frustrated. Menaechmus has been hired to represent a client in a lawsuit, though he regards the client as a rogue and the suit as a nuisance. But just like other members of his class, he has no choice.<sup>89</sup>

The gulf between the mythology and ideology of patronage and its reality within Juvenal's *Satires* are obvious. For instance, when the services performed by a client are traditional, Juvenal suggests that the tradition has become travesty. The *salutatio* or early morning call upon patron by his clients preliminary to escorting the patron to the forum has been turned into undignified competition for dole-money (the *sportula*) engaged in not only by the humble citizen-client but by senior magistrates and rich ex-slaves as well.<sup>90</sup>

Juvenal devotes *Satire IV* and *V* to explaining way in which this relationship has become tainted example of the original self. In *Satire V*, for instance, it could be seen from the top of the socio-political ladder, where emperor Domitianus and his privileged caucus are on show. In *Satire V*, Juvenal portrays a similar scene. Here, we see a member of Domitianus circle now as an influential patron playing host to a group of his supporters at a dinner-party. However, he deliberately tortures them with the contrast between what he is given and their own unpleasantly cheap entertainment.<sup>91</sup>

What Juvenal is suggesting here is that patrons no longer perform their obligated role as demanded by patron- client relationship. La Fleur while analysing Juvenal *Satire V* opined that 'the relationship between patron and client has become...venal, contemptuous, even hostile.'<sup>92</sup>In the same *Satire V*, Juvenal goes on to describe Trebius awakening anxiously at the start of dawn in order to be among the crowd that greets Virro at his door each morning. This is a customary element in accounts of popular patronage, where the conventional reward such a show of support is a bucket of goodies.

Horace, on his own part, had some positive things to say about patron-client relationship and *amicitia* generally. In his first book of his epistles, Horace mentioned a great deal about his relationship to Maecenas and about patrons generally. In all, he defended the simple life as the antidote to the form of dependence that association with

---

<sup>89</sup>see Plautus' *Menaechmi* (trans.)

<sup>90</sup>See Juvenal's *Satires IV*, lines 85-87

<sup>91</sup>Juvenal, *Satires V* lines 25-48

<sup>92</sup>Juvenal, *Satires*

the rich might encourage.<sup>93</sup> Just like other examples we have highlighted in Juvenal *Satires*, Horace portrays a rather gloomy instances of *amicitia*, the decentralisation of a friendship which was hinged on mutual exchange of resources in a respectful manner has now turned into a mere exchange based entirely on paltry financial recompense and humiliation. Horace, however, focuses on the philosophical questions of how to live and how to defend his position in Maecenas' circle. His focus on vindication and idealization shows that Horace is conscious of the insecurity about his position with Maecenas.<sup>94</sup>

Furthermore, Horace also expressed his feelings on the gradual decline in literary patronage. Horace, in *Satires* 9, gives an analogy of a worn-out male prostitute who is not being paid enough to support himself. He cries that, despite the enormous wealth of his patron, his pay is laughable and his services underrated. By comparing literary production with prostitution, Horace gives the notion that the world of inspired literary production no longer exists due to a lack of generous kind patrons. Therefore, poets just like prostitutes, are practising their art solely to make ends meet.<sup>95</sup>

As we have seen in the *Satires* of Juvenal and Horace, Martial also expresses the same view of the decline of the patronage system. For instance, in his *Epigrams* 12.18, which he wrote to Juvenal; Martial highlights the various obligations of an urban client that Juvenal must perform. These obligations include: waiting on the thresholds of great man, wandering in the Subura, treading the hill of Diana, and climbing the Mons Caelius.<sup>96</sup> It is clear, however, in the piece of *Epigrams* that while Martial may too have been indebted to serve a overbearing patron, in Spain at least, he, unlike Juvenal, enjoyed the life of leisure that he had always dreamed of. Martial also writes many epigrams in praise of generous patrons. For instance, in the same epigrams, Martial praises the younger Pliny and some consuls such as: Silius Italicus, Licinius Sura, Stertinius Avitus, and L. Arruntius Stella, whom he refers to as 'my star'.<sup>97</sup> Martial also got the generosity of Decianus of Emerita, M. Aquillius Regulus, and indeed writes poetry in praise of other aristocratic men.<sup>98</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup>See Horace, *Satires*. 1986. Niall Rudd (Trans.). Penguin Books Ltd, Middlesex, England

<sup>94</sup>Horace, *Satires*

<sup>95</sup>*Horace, Satires*

<sup>96</sup> Angelica, P. 2012. p.23

<sup>97</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.p.34

<sup>98</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.

Furthermore Juvenal complains about the replacement of the *sportula* for dinner invitation. As stated much earlier, Juvenal while contributing to the decline of patronage pays more attention to the distribution of the *sportula*. He explains that a client of humble background must struggle for his meagre offering with magistrates, foreigners and freedmen.<sup>99</sup> Martial, further gives clarification on the composition of the *sportula*. According to Martial the *sportula* consist of a hundred quadrantes, a small sum, which was usually distributed in the tenth hour or in late afternoon.<sup>100</sup> Sullivan, while affirming Martial, maintained that since the *sportula* was intended to replace the dinner, it follows that its distribution would be around late evening. Sullivan, finally concluded that Juvenal must have mistaken the practice of the *salutation*, or the morning greeting a client gives to his patron, with the distribution of the *sportula*.<sup>101</sup>

As mentioned earlier, a large part of *amicitia* was hinged on mutual exchange. For instance, Martial would write poems for his patrons and would expect gift from his patron in return. While the life of an ordinary client may not have actually changed drastically over time, neither Juvenal nor Horace nor Martial was required to perform the duties of ordinary client. As White rightly argues, the poet had the ability and natural gift to boost the prestige of his well-to-do *amici* by celebrating and immortalising their names in his work. Martial, for instance, wrote many epigrams to commemorate special occasions such as- the birth of a child, a wedding or a death- for his wealthy patrons and it was clear that he was rewarded greatly for his effect.<sup>102</sup>

Finally, Martial, more than the others, vividly describes the difficulties in being a client and also the dehumanising activities or duties a client were expected from his patrons. Aside the various gifts a client was obliged to give to his patron, Martial also lamented how the obligation of waiting on his patron affect his personal life and profession. Martial complaint, no doubt, provides a searchlight into the life of the poet-client.<sup>103</sup> While Juvenal presents a disturbing view of patron-client relations, Martial softens this with examples of kind and generous patrons. However, what is most

---

<sup>99</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.

<sup>100</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.

<sup>101</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.

<sup>102</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.

<sup>103</sup> Angelica, P. 2012.

important is that both poets express the decline in literary patronage which was in contrast with what obtains during Augustus reign.

### 3.6 WOMEN IN ANCIENT ROME

In ancient Rome, the ideal Roman women seemed to be quite submissive and dependent; 'a woman who knew only one man in her whole life, *univira*'.<sup>104</sup> She was expected to keep the home. She made wood and engaged herself in embroidery. It was the duty of a Roman woman or matron to organise dinners or parties for her husband and his colleagues. A woman's glory was properly defined, if she is neither talked about in praise nor otherwise. She was to be seen and not to be heard.

The ancient Romans placed much importance on values that include modesty, submission to the head of the family and devotion to the state and family religion. At an early age, every Roman girl, no matter her status, was expected to be taught spinning and wool-working. She was expected to work in wool in order to clothe her family. Even though some of the girls, especially from rich and aristocratic homes, learned as highly as the boys, they simply used it to support their husbands at home. For example, Cornelia Metella, wife of Pompey the Great, at the time of her death, was highly respected because of her knowledge in music, geometry and philosophy. Explaining the significance of a Roman woman's involvement in household chores, Olasope (2009) says:

A woman's role in the home was to complement her husband's activities in the forum. 'Happy to stay at home' signified a woman's lack of interest in social life outside the house. She was compliant and contented with her natural matronal role.<sup>105</sup>

The traditional Roman woman did not have much of literary education, for a woman to be learned in literary arts and law was seen as being manly and so was viewed

---

<sup>104</sup> For further reading see Olasope.2009. Univera: The Ideal Roman Matrona.LUMINA. Vol. 20, No 2, Holy Name University, Philippines

<sup>105</sup>Olasope. (2009)

<sup>106</sup>Olasope. (2009)

<sup>107</sup> Junenal, for instance vehemently condemned women who went beyond their societal assigned roles. For detailed

example, see Juvenal, 1967.*Satires VI*, Peter Green(Trans.), Penguin Classics



with suspicion by men. A few of the ancient women were learned in Greek and Latin. Those who engaged in sports, such as hunting, wrestling and chariot racing, were considered immodest<sup>106</sup>. This seeming immodest behaviour of some Roman women was a topical issue raised by satirists such as Juvenal, Martial and Persius. However, it was Juvenal, in his *Satires VI*, that came out so harsh against women. In Juvenal's view, ancient Roman women manipulated their husbands, nagged their husbands till what they wanted would be achieved, kept a copious flow of tears at the ready waiting their commands.<sup>107</sup> Juvenal's criticisms and attacks on women may seem exaggerated. It, however, reveals what sort of behaviour irritated Roman men.

Despite Juvenal castigation of women of his days, some of his contemporary satirists still commended some of them. Propertius, for instance, exemplified the ideal Roman woman through Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus, who was married to Tiberius Sempronius Grachus. She was married to only one man, and such was portrayed as the ideal wife according to a long- standing Roman tradition<sup>108</sup>.

In the eye of the Roman law, however, women were placed under the absolute control of men. This explained why a *paterfamilias* chose husbands for their daughters without their consent.<sup>109</sup> For those who lost their *paterfamilias* or husbands to war or natural death, the law placed them under a guardian, who administered and took charge of any business and legal transactions on their behalf. Marriage in itself had nearly no effect on a woman's legal status. If she had been *sui iuris*, she remained so, and her husband gained no claim over her property. More important to a woman's property rights than marriage was the presence of a so-called *tutor or* guardian. The word is the same one used to describe the administrator who took care of the property of a minor, but the guardian of an adult woman had a much smaller role.

Later on, there was a trend toward reducing what authority the guardian did have. At the beginning, it was common for a freeborn woman to have a guardian over whom she had some other form of leverage, say, a freedman who owed her deference. Later on,

---

<sup>108</sup>Olasope, 2009. *Univera: The Ideal Roman Matrona*, p.118  
model examples to follow.

<sup>109</sup>Olasope. O. 2006. *Marriage Alliances in Ancient Rome*, p.10

a woman has the ability to decide on whom her *tutor* would be, and especially to do so frequently, meant that unsupportive guardians could be removed. Short of this, magistrates could step in on an ‘emergency’ basis if a woman’s guardian was unavailable. This seems to have become routine, even in cases in which the *tutor* was simply unwilling rather than unable.

Later in the empire, also, women who met the legal condition of bearing three children were freed from guardianship. This law, no doubt, reduced the legal restrictions placed on women in ancient Roman society as those who met the condition of “bearing three children” were able to transact their businesses without relying on guardians.<sup>110</sup> However, the gradual retirement of guardianship of women represented a sort of freedom, and the freedom was achieved only in the areas of civil competence. As Packman(1994) opines that in the area of political rights, women in ancient Rome were restricted socially and legally in all periods of Roman history. Nevertheless, men of different age in ancient Rome who had not been freed from *paterpotestas* were disallowed from engaging in any civil duties such as: owning property or entering into contracts.<sup>111</sup>

The basis of sex on which Roman women were banned from taking legal action on behalf of other parties could be said to have been borrowed from the political sphere.<sup>112</sup>

Concerning slave women, however, classical writers were indifferent to the life of the poor in town and country. This is because slaves, no matter their categorisation, were seen as possessions, a being without family ties and emotion. The city slave, however, lived in a house, but in a cramped quarters, feeding on left over, depending on prospects of freedom and living on the master’s whims. An educated female slave might probably become her matron’s maid, might hope for early freedom, but if the maid had born children to a slave partner, either he or she would have to pay for their liberty. A slave woman could be punished or sold off, if she offended her master or mistress. Again, she might be sold for failing to gratify her master. The slave woman who was not sold away from her partner or child could be sent away from them to hard labour on the country estate. The death of a master or mistress could free large numbers of slaves by their will,

---

<sup>110</sup>Packman, 1994,p.104.

<sup>111</sup> Packman, 1994

<sup>112</sup> Packman, 1994

or it could uproot them to be sold away from the only home they knew. Fanthern *et al* stress that a slave woman who did not earn her freedom before she grew old would become the cheapest and most abused of slaves.<sup>113</sup>

However, slaves and ex-slaves women still possessed some social importance. For instance, some female slaves worked at different jobs. Spinners were invariably slave women, and they also mended clothing. Also some female slaves and freed women served as various kinds of personal assistants, that is, maid, attendance, foot servants and hairstylist. As mentioned above, slave women took care of mirrors, jewellery and clothing. Some female slaves and freedwomen were nurses and some were child minders or attendants of *elite* children. Midwives and women with the title *medica* were attendants to their owners' health and probably to the pregnancies and illnesses of slave women in the *familia*. Slave women and freedwomen acted as interpreters and secretaries, although they, unlike their male counterparts, were not allowed to administer the household's finances, property or public business.

Another category of women were the vestal virgins. These women were more public than private because of their religious roles in ancient Rome. Unlike other categories of women, the six vestal virgins were mostly seen in public attending dinners and visiting forums where they were accorded special seats of honours. Definitely, the Vestals surrendered their years without marrying so as to transfer their powers to Rome and for the renewal of the generations. In June every year, the vestal virgins sacrificed a pregnant heifer in a ritual by burning it and using the ashes and other religious material to cleanse the temple. Also during this period, it was regarded as ill-omened for any young woman to marry.<sup>114</sup> The vestal virgins, also, had the right to make their own wills, and they were treated in some ways like men. The vestals unique service to the state earned special privileges and penalties, described here by Plutarch, a classical writer who explained that if any of the vestal virgins is found wanting, no matter how minute the offence may be, they can only be punished by the high priest. The high priest would

---

<sup>113</sup>See Fantham *et al.* 1994. *Women in Classical World*. London Oxford Press. p. 334

<sup>114</sup>Fantham *et al.* 1994. p.334

scourge the offender with or without the clothes. While any Vestal girl that broke her vow will be buried alive.<sup>115</sup>

The Vestals possessed unique religious qualities, privileges and distinct social status, and could exhibit significant political impact. Again, it is very possible for many of the vestal virgins to acquire enormous wealth. In early Roman history, the Vestals were the only category of women that were exempted from the law of guardianship; they were directly under the control of the *Pontifex Maximus* (the high priest). As noted earlier, Vestals were exempted from the social obligation of marriage and the stress of caring for children so they could have the time and “purity” to devote themselves to the adherence of rituals which were considered essential for the survival and protection of Rome.

While the different categories of women in ancient Rome have been enumerated, it is, also, imperative to examine their socio-political contributions to the Roman society. Before then, however, a clear understanding of women in the socio-political sphere of ancient Roman society may only be made relevant when we consider the activities of some of Nigeria’s top political office holders’ wives. Suffice it to mention in this case the wives of some state governors and the president of Nigeria. These women in their own rights wield some kind of socio-political influence whether as a result of their husbands’ positions or on their own personal strength. A case in mind is the Rivers State House of Assembly crisis during the 2011-2015 legislative dispensation where the former first lady of Nigeria, Dame Patience Jonathan, was purportedly accused of using her influence to fan the embers of discord among the legislators. A member of the Legislative house, Evans Bipi, was reported to have said that the former First Lady was/is his ‘messiah’. In his words, ‘the godson’ legislator declared, “why must he (Governor Amaechi) be insulting my mother, my Jesus Christ on earth.”<sup>116</sup>

Bipi in another interview he granted *Punch Newspaper* further explained:

Politically and otherwise; I can say it anywhere. I can say that she (Patience Jonathan) is my Jesus

---

<sup>115</sup>Fantham et al. 1994. p336

<sup>116</sup>The *Guardian Newspaper*,25 July, 2013.

Christ because she has made me who I am today.  
That is the truth and I can defend it anywhere<sup>117</sup>.

When he was asked why the former First Lady of Nigeria, Patience Jonathan, was so special to him, he retorts:

Babangida's wife was from Delta State. Her people called her mummy. Yar'Adua's wife is from Katsina, all the people from Katsina call her mummy. When a woman attains such level, everybody calls her mummy. It is a form of respect to her. But to me, my mummy (Patience Jonathan) is special because she brought me up to this level<sup>118</sup>.

This analogy, however, is to clearly show the enormous strength which ancient Roman women wielded in the political field, since their experiences were similar to those of their contemporary Nigerian counterparts. Despite the social and legal limitations they faced in all periods of Roman history, the ancient women were able to make their impact felt. Onayemi affirmed this by saying that the experiences of women in Nigerian and Roman societies were similar despite the differences in space and time and in cultural and socio-political setting. In both, women were confronted with the myth of their 'natural' inferiority<sup>119</sup>

### 3.7 WOMEN AS 'PATRONS'

Evidence about ancient Roman women of immense wealth and influence comes largely from the inscriptions of the Roman Empire. For instance, Nicols (2013) in his discourse on the nature of female city patronage explains that since a city patron was recognised by the decree of the *decuriones*, then it is reasonable to conclude that "all inscriptions which were authorised by a *decretum decurionum* and which also refer to patronage may properly be said to involve patrons of communities". Nicols further gives two conditions for the recognition of a city patroness. These conditions are: the use of the titles patroness and the official recognition of the text of the inscriptions by the *decuriones*.

---

<sup>117</sup>*Saturday Punch*, September 14, 2013, Vol. 7193 No. 1693. pp 44-45

<sup>118</sup>*Saturday Punch*, September 14, 2013, Vol. 7193 No. 1693. pp 44-45

<sup>119</sup>Onayemi, 2007 p. 307

However, Hemelrijk claims that the second condition raised by Nicols is rather problematic. He opines that public honorific inscriptions were not necessarily set up by the *decuriones* themselves, though they had given permission for it. These inscriptions, Hemelrijk argues, could be mounted by the citizens or aliens who are residents in the city, by the plebs *urbana*, or even by the women of the town; besides, the official authorisation by the *decuriones*, though obligatory for all statues and inscriptions set up in public places. Thus, Hemelrijk (2004:212) concludes that:

...a woman should be regarded as a patroness of a community, when the inscription calling her a patron is set up by the city (*colonia, municipium, res publica, civitas, praefectura etc.*), the or do *decurionum*, the citizen body or a substantial section of it (such as the *plebs urban*) or when it is authorised by a decree of decurions.

All over the Empire and diverse communities, women functioned as benefactors and participated in public activities, they also used their wealth to enhance their own families' prestige and also fulfilled social and religious responsibilities. A group of such women was the imperial women. The imperial women, as seen in Roman literature, used their positions to construct roles that allowed some of them a degree of independence, influence and even opposition to the dominant imperial ideologies of the period.

The imperial women were able to influence politics in a number of ways. One of the ways Roman women used to have a socio-political relevance was through marriage. Many would get married to a rival family in order to cement political ties or increase their husband's proximity to power.<sup>120</sup> Apart from this, any other involvement in the political field was as a result of the drive and the ingenuity of the individual women concerned. Never the less, a woman's family background and status could significantly increase her chances of success in politics. If she could promise money or imperial support, she could get her opinions expressed in the Senate by those senators who were in effect under her patronage. One of such women was Livia, wife of Augustus and stepmother of Julia. According to Tacitus, Livia was the most important among the imperial women during the Julio-Claudian reign. She was an ideal Roman woman.<sup>121</sup>

---

<sup>120</sup> Onayemi, 2007 p. 299

<sup>121</sup> Onayemi, 2007

Despite Livia's good qualities, she was alleged to be a power-drunk. Her desperation for power came into the limelight when she opted to be a co-ruler with Tiberius after the death of Augustus. This crisis between Livia and Emperor Tiberius caused the Emperor to remove her from public activities. He also went ahead to stop people referring to him as "son of Livia". For the fact that Emperor Tiberius made these measures signified that Livia was not only regarded as the "mother of the emperor", but also held a socio-political influence on the people of Rome. Interestingly enough, she was deified by Emperor Claudius who succeeded Emperor Tiberius in AD 42, a recognition which neither Emperor Tiberius nor Emperor Caligula had deemed fit for her. Suetonius(1989) claims that a statute was erected for Livia in the temple of *Divi Augusti* in the Palatium. Emperor Claudius also encouraged the use of her name in oaths-taking while sacrificing by the Vestals<sup>122</sup>.

In his own contribution to the discourse on female 'patrons', Konstan (2000) opines that Livia had her own retinue of clients, and she would sometimes receive as guests senators while she was a widow. Josephus, a Jewish writer and historian, who was cited by Konstan recalled Livia's benefactions to the Herodian family and advice to Salome, the wife of king Herod. After her death, Livia was honoured by the Roman Senate by erecting an arch in her honour. Her popularity was so great that she was informally bestowed the title paralleled to Augustus', *mater patriae*, mother of the fathers.<sup>123</sup>

Another upper class woman that made her presence felt in the socio-political spheres of ancient Rome was Cornelia, the daughter of one of Rome's finest generals, Scipio Africanus. She was married to Sempronius Gracchus. She had twelve children for him. Unfortunately, only three of them survived. Her influence was made manifest in her two sons, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, who were known for their social and economic reforms that brought a political change in Republican Rome.

Cornelia was known for her stern discipline and her devotion to her two sons. She was solely responsible for the education of her sons by bringing philosophers Blossius

---

<sup>122</sup>Suetonius, *Twelve Ceasers*. Michael Grant (Trans.) Penguin Books, London.

<sup>123</sup>Suetonius, *Twelve Ceasers* . see also Konstan, 2000

from Cumae and Diophanes from Mytilene. She was also known to have conversed with the scholars herself<sup>124</sup>.

An imperial woman who was exempted from being under a male *tutor* was Antonia. Since Antonia had three children, she was free from the control and protection of a guardian as required by law. Antonia exerted a huge political influence on the reign of Emperor Tiberius. She mentored and managed many young and vibrant foreign princes and princesses in the field of politics.

Other categories of women who also contributed to the socio-political life of ancient Rome were the women of lower status. Some of these women deployed their wealth and resources for the public good, as well as their own individual purpose. One of such women was Echemia, the daughter of Lucius<sup>125</sup>. Echemia was not only a wealthy Roman woman; she was also a holder of a vital public priesthood. In the year 64C.E, she donated a gigantic public building at the centre of the forum at Pompeii. The commissioning of the building came just at the moment her son was contesting for public office, and her charity must have contributed to her son's success in politics.<sup>126</sup> According to Fanthem *et al*, an inscription to commemorate her death was erected in the city. Fanthem *et al* while citing the inscription describe Echemia as a public priestess who with her personal money decorated the vestibules including the gallery and the porticoes. She later dedicated it in her own name and that of her son, Marcus Numistrius Fronto, in honour of Augustan piety and the goddess Concord.<sup>127</sup>

The above excerpt suggests that some of these women did not only lend out money, but also engaged in businesses as well as philanthropic activities. This no doubt illustrates a relative autonomy of these women at some levels of their lives or that of Roman history. This brief illustration of Echemia's public philanthropy seems to have a direct resemblance in the socio-political life of Nigeria. For instance, the Late *Iya La'je* of Lagos, Chief Habibatu Mogaji, was claimed in some quarters to have wielded enormous influence that secured her son, the former governor of Lagos State in

---

<sup>124</sup>Onayemi, 2007

<sup>125</sup> See Forbis Elizabeth, 1990. Women's public image; Italian Honorary Inscriptions. *America Journal of Philology* III: 493-512

<sup>126</sup> Forbis E. 1990

<sup>127</sup> Her generosity helped to secure her son the position of a provincial governor. See Fanthem *et al*.



southwestern Nigeria, Otunba Bola Ahmed Tinubu,<sup>128</sup> the position of Lagos State governor<sup>129</sup>. It is doubtful if she built any public monument like Euechemia. Nevertheless, her influence over the market women of Lagos state and her influence in Ansaru-deen society of Nigeria, an Islamic organisation, cannot be underestimated.

Fanthem *et al* further give a list of women who were reported to have lent out money. The list includes Julia Felix Asellina and her waitresses, Zmyrina, Maria and Aegle. Concerning these women Fanthem *et al* say:

Their single and somewhat exotic names as well as the content of the graffiti suggest that they were slaves, but they nonetheless engaged in the public world of politics as well as of work.<sup>130</sup>

Next in line are women who resided in some provinces or colonies of Rome. Some of these colonies were in Africa and central Italy and had women who received the extraordinary status of civic patrons. One of such women is Plancia Magna, a daughter of a senator. She held numerous public and religious positions. Fanthem *et al* further quote an epithet written at the base of a status erected by her community describing her as the daughter of the city whose father is Marcus Plancius Verus. The epithet further describes her as the Priestess of Artemis, public priestess of the mother of the gods and Patriotic to her fatherland.<sup>131</sup>

Plancia Magna, Fanthem *et al* continue:

...gave to her city a monumental entrance-gate, parts of which still survive as do a number of its inscriptions and the graceful draped statue of Plancia herself which was one of the many to decorate the gate.<sup>132</sup>

Many women like Plancia, no doubt, administered a large private fortune and partook in the ideology of public service for public good that seemed to have inspired generations of Roman men. Later on, this public practice was extended to the wives of local magnates as a routine response to their benefactions and incentive to their

---

<sup>128</sup> It is rumoured that Bola Tinubu is her foster son.

<sup>129</sup> Bola Tinubu was governor of Lagos State for two terms; 1999-2003, 2003-2007.

<sup>130</sup> Fanthem *et al*.

<sup>131</sup> Fanthem *et al*.

<sup>132</sup> Fanthem *et al*.

contributions. Just as illustrated earlier on the different honours and influences exhibited by wives of political office holders in Nigeria, the provincials of Rome and that of Greece also honoured the provincials' wives with statues most probably in appreciation of their involvements in local politics.

Also, Forbis maintained that women of important families used their wealth and positions to provide donations and patronage to the districts where their estate were located, to their birthplace or to regions where their husbands' political duties took them. Forbis opines that the discoveries of numerous inscriptions made it possible for the reconstruction of long-standing traditions of public benefactions and patronage of wealthy women, both civic and religious honours were granted them in the eastern and western provinces.<sup>133</sup>

Finally, there is no way we can adequately estimate the number of women that received honour in terms of statues and inscribed bases, nor how many gave and on what scale. However, the many evidences from inscriptions point to a clear connection between honours and the importance and roles these women played in public and private lives.

---

<sup>133</sup>Forbis E, 1990, p. 501

## CHAPTER FOUR

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF NIGERIA'S SOCIO-POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

#### 4.1 THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD

This section of the study presents a brief analysis of Nigeria's socio-political history. Nigeria as a geographical entity began to take its form in the pre-colonial period. It was during the pre-colonial period that the various parts that made up the country, Nigeria, began to shape their existence as socio-political entities. Pre-colonial Nigeria comprised different clans and kingdoms. These kingdoms included the Yoruba kingdoms, the Hausa\Fulani dynasty, the eastern part of Nigeria, predominantly occupied by the Igbo people, as well as other numerous smaller ethnic communities. Apart from the Igbo kingdom of eastern Nigeria, other clans and kingdoms were governed by traditional rulers, who were political heads of their respective communities. Nevertheless, the seemingly political stability and relative peace among these autonomous indigenous communities was suddenly interrupted by the advent of the Europeans who came to Nigeria as preacher<sup>1</sup>

The coming of the Europeans brought a new era and life to the socio-political and religious order in Nigeria. According to Afolayan, the advent of the colonial masters shook, if not shattered, the cultural and religious foundations of all the different ethnic groups that made up Nigeria. At that time, different parts of Africa were under the control of European nations until the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885. It was during the Berlin Conference, which was organized to discuss the modalities for the partitioning of the African continent that the political entity called Nigeria was allotted to Britain.<sup>2</sup>

The British, after the Berlin conference, began to make penetration into the different kingdoms that made up Nigeria. There was, however, resistance from some native inhabitants of the various communities. Many scholars have regarded this early

---

<sup>1</sup>See Lawal, K. 2001, *Britain and the Transfer of Power in Nigeria(1945-60)*, Lagos State University Press, Lagos

<sup>2</sup> Lawal, 2001

resistance as the first phase of nationalist struggle in Nigeria. By the end of the twentieth century, particularly during the colonial era, the phase of Nigeria nationalism changed as a new form of nationalist struggle began cutting across ethnic groups and during this time, nationalists based their struggle on the actualization of a free and independent Nigeria.<sup>2</sup>

In general, the reality of colonial rule had generated reactions in form of protests. These protests showed the dissatisfaction of the people over the inadequacies in the colonial policies as perceived by the colonial subjects. In the southern part of Nigeria, for instance, reactions to various colonial policies and actions, though apparently varied, carried a single message; that the indigenous peoples were not ready to be mere onlookers in what they often perceived as undue persecution and exploitation by European government. Lawal (2001) opines that prior to World War II, there was no platform of communication between the educated *elite* and the colonial administration in Nigeria. Thus, the colonialists were busy with the traditional ruling *elite* in whom it found ready “collaborators” with whom to run the machinery of government<sup>3</sup>. The above submission by Lawal may not be entirely wrong as pockets of protests were led by the native people, who were not exposed to western education. Also, in 1908, there were local anxiety and protest in Lagos over the introduction of water rate by the colonial masters on the mass of people. The agitation resulted in the birth of the *Ilu* committee in 1916<sup>4</sup>.

The resistance embarked on by the indigenous people of Nigerian and their traditional rulers against the British, as mentioned above, constituted the early stage of nationalist movement in Nigeria. The resistance took many forms, one of which was the non-chalant attitude which the indigenes displayed towards the British. To start with, King Ovonranmen of Benin kingdom refused to give his consent to a British treaty aimed at making Benin one of the British colonies and then Ovonranmen’s placement of trade embargo on the British River, which hindered trading activities of the British merchants,

---

<sup>3</sup>Lawal, K. 2001 maintains that lack of good and serious *rapport* between the educated Nigerians and the Colonialists during this period contrasted sharply with the attempts made by the latter to reach out to the former after 1945.

<sup>4</sup>The various protests both in Lagos and elsewhere by the locals echoed similar ones in ancient Rome as a result of the debt bondage which the plebeian class were subjected to.

were among the non-cooperative measures displayed by traditional rulers and local indigenes.

By early 1940s, anti-colonial activities became more articulate and persistent. A combination of factors may have accounted for this. First, by this time different elitist associations were springing up; second, the indigenous people were fed up with the draconian policies of the colonialists. In summary, colonialism did little in terms of development in the colony. Lawal buttresses this assertion by explaining that Nigeria's population in 1940 was 20 million people. The population could hardly boast of 1% of children of school age being in schools all over the country. However, the situation was slightly better in the Western and Eastern provinces than in the North<sup>7</sup>. Apart from the peoples of the middle belt to the South, the more open terrain in the North, with its need for irrigation, encouraged the early growth of centralised states. Such states in the 8th century included Kanem-Bornu in the Northeast and the Hausa states in the West. The more prominent Hausa states that included walled cities were Kano, Kastina, Zazzau (also called Zaria), Rano, Daura, Gobir, and Biram. Still another attempt at state formation led to the emergence of Jukun kingdom. However, by the end of the seventeenth century, the Jukun became a tributary state of the Bornu empire.<sup>8</sup>

In addition, the resistance struggle also included individuals who fought fiercely against the so-called western culture. These individuals were trained and educated in mission schools that were founded by the white missionaries. According to Ubaka, Emeh and Anyikwa, these individuals were denied a place within their ancestors' culture. They, too, agitated for equality with the white men. Ubaka *et al* go on to list these individuals:

This group of Nigerians was led by Edward W. Blyden (1832-1912) - a foremost Pan-Africanist and advocate of western African culture; Bishop James Johnson (1871-1938) - an author and diplomat whose writings and activities demonstrated his deep concern of black life and subsequently became the first black man to assume the position of the field secretary of the National Association for Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP);

---

<sup>7</sup>Lawal (2001)

<sup>8</sup> Lawal (2001)

Mojola Agbebi (1860-1917) - a Nigerian Yoruba Baptist Minister; John Payne Jackson - the editor of Lagos Weekly Record (a Newspaper founded in 1890) who was equally an immigrant from Liberia; William Bright Davies; and Tejumade Osholake Johnson.<sup>9</sup>

Agitations and reactions to colonial policies in the Southern part of Nigeria were not limited to the above. For example, in 1929 the women of Aba, a community in Eastern part of Nigeria, had come together to protest and resist aspects of the taxation policy of government.<sup>10</sup> The tax protest by the women of eastern part of Nigeria encouraged other women in different parts of the country to demand their rights from the colonial masters as well as from indigenous leaders. Also, in 1916, at Okeiho Iganna (a community in western Nigeria) revolt had broken out among the people who were rejecting Native Authority taxation.<sup>11</sup> In various ways, different methods and strategies were employed by the indigenes to express their disapproval of some aspects of colonial policies. In whole, therefore, the expressions of disapproval of colonial administration may be regarded as the forerunners of the sustained agitations by the *elite* in the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>12</sup>

Indeed, the agitations by the largely illiterate masses freely debunked the claim often expressed by the colonial officials that the majority of the colonised people did not complain about colonial rule until the educated *elite* roused them from their complacency. This method of anti-colonial activities was also evident in northern Nigeria where political oppression and persecution was more blatant in the early days of colonialism. Here Lawal explains that the colonial administration in Nigeria based its principle on indirect rule with its nucleus in the Native Authority system. Little wonder why in the Northern part of Nigeria, anti-government activities were mostly directed against the native authorities since the people largely perceived them as the cornerstone of British Rule<sup>13</sup>.

---

<sup>9</sup>Ubaku K, Emeh C and Anyikwa C (2014), have given an extensive historical development of Nigeria's Nationalism.

<sup>10</sup> This is discussed in detail in A.E Afigbo's 1972. *Warrant chiefs* 1891-1929.

<sup>11</sup> See Atanda, J.A. 1976. *The Oyo Empire 1894-1934*. Longmans.

<sup>12</sup> Atanda, J.A. 1976

<sup>13</sup> Atanda, J.A. 1976

Another factor that may be responsible for the agitation and nationalism is the colonial policies. Omolewa states that there were racial discriminations in most policies made by the colonial masters. These policies prevented Africans not deemed eligible for top positions in the civil service. Most educated Nigerians were denied participation in the governance of their respective regions. He further cited Ubaka *et al* as saying that, ‘most qualified Africans were denied access to good jobs, and even if they were appointed, they did not have equal status and salary with their European colleagues.’<sup>14</sup> The Nigerian *elite* were treated as second-rate citizen in their own land.

In addition, many pre-colonial societies had legal and social measures of settling dispute and resolving political matters. Some African scholars have even speculated that Africans would have developed to a more open participatory politics had they not been interrupted by the advent of the colonial masters.<sup>15</sup> For instance, among the Yoruba and Igbo societies, the most important instrument of governance was the doctrine of accountability. Community leaders in both cultural settings could not disregard the opinions and views of their subjects or followers because they could risk revocation of that consent and loss of their positions.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, among the common characteristics of most pre-colonial African societies were tales of origin that traced their political communities to a particular god, a mythical ancestor. This belief is similar to that of Western societies where their origin was traced to one mythical figure or the other.<sup>17</sup> Joseph *et al* further explain that:

The pervasive role of religion in the theory and practice of governance ensured that the use of social power was legitimized by divine and supernatural forces.<sup>18</sup>

This explains why so many pre-colonial African political systems were theocratic in their demand for loyalty. Among Africans, loyalty was expressed in the rights of both

---

<sup>14</sup>See Omolewa, M. 1986. *Certificate History of Nigeria*. Harlow: Longman Group, p. 184

<sup>15</sup>Omolewa, M. 1986

<sup>16</sup>Omolewa, M. 1986

<sup>17</sup>See Joseph, O., Ibeogu, A. and Nwankwo, O. 2014. Political Godfatherism and Governance in a Developing Democracy: Insight from Nigeria. *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4

the ruler and the ruled, and it was defined in communal rather than personal terms. Later, the loyalty was extended to individual member of a family in the post-colonial period.

#### 4.2 MARRIAGE, FAMILY AND KINSHIP

The family unit in the traditional Nigerian society is often defined by kinship ties linked by blood and by marriage. These links could occupy a common household or separated households. In Nigeria, family is a social group and a social institution. The family as a social unit is composed of a man, his wife or wives and children living together in the same household, interacting and influencing the behaviour of each other in a more intimate manner than with others who do not belong.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, family as a social institution implies that it is a formalized, regular, and patterned process. These patterned processes underline other social institution systems such as marriage. It also establishes norms guiding the marriage practice. For example, among the Yoruba, incest taboos prohibit sexual intercourse with blood relations, and this necessitates the rules of exogamy.<sup>20</sup>

There are two types of family in traditional Nigerian societies:<sup>21</sup> the nuclear and extended family. Extended family evolves from polygamy while nuclear family evolves from monogamy. Extended families usually have more members than nuclear family. Hence, extended family produces more labour to sustain agriculture system. The family system in Yoruba traditional culture is rather a complex one. It does not only include members who have biological ties or the same bloodline, but also members who are not related biologically. In Yoruba tradition, it is a general knowledge that a family household occupies a big compound where families of different genealogies from two or more generations are living together as one united family.<sup>22</sup>

In order to explain clearly the complexities in a Yoruba family, it is important to examine the concept of a family in Yoruba culture. The Yoruba word for a family is *Ebi*. Another

---

<sup>19</sup>Oke, 1986.

<sup>20</sup>Oke, 1986

<sup>21</sup>Oke, 1986

<sup>22</sup>Oke, 1986



word is *Idile*<sup>23</sup>. There are two similar meanings of the word. On the one hand, *Ebi* means members of a family living in a household; on the other hand, it connotes family bond beyond the natural family. That is, it includes other family connections outside one's immediate family.<sup>24</sup> Elliot and Gray add that:

The family is not necessarily, or even essentially, a biological unit. It is a social construct. The 'myth' of biological relation has been used in argument about property and inheritance but has little relation to the way people operate in terms of family.<sup>25</sup>

Family in the Yoruba socio-cultural system is a household that consists of hierarchy. Each basic unit of the household is headed by a *Baba* (father). As the head of his immediate or nuclear family, the *Baba*'s decisions were final. He oversees the day-to-day activities of his immediate family. He maintains discipline among the family members, and also settles quarrels. If there were challenges he could not handle, the *Baba* would consult the *Olori Ebi* for help.

A very significant and basic notion in the discourse of the Yoruba traditional family system is the idea of an *Olori- Ebi* (head of the family). The *Olori-Ebi* is the oldest man in the household, *Idile* or *Agbo-ile*.<sup>26</sup> He commands authority over all member of the household. He manages, regulates and oversees all affairs in his family. Fadipe affirms:

It is the duty of the *baale* (the *Olori-Ebi*) to preserve peace and order within his compound, a duty he probably owes, in the first place, to members of the (family) compound and secondarily to the large compound....It is his duty to see that the members of his compound are of mutual benefit to each other and interact with a minimum of friction.<sup>27</sup>

Any resolution of conflicts was usually seen as a social responsibility of the elders of a community. Accordingly, it is a social duty of any head of a family (whether a *bale* or *Olori-ebi*) to mediate whenever tension mounts among members of the family. The ability of the *Olori-ebi* or any other unit heads to manage conflict in traditional Yoruba

---

<sup>23</sup>Oke,1986

<sup>24</sup>Oke,1986

<sup>25</sup>See Elliot and Gray 2010.

<sup>26</sup>Elliot and Gray 2010

<sup>27</sup>Fadipe, N. A. 1970. *The Sociology of the Yoruba*. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan.

society was a function of some moral principles. According to Fadipe, one of such principles is the fact that the *Yorubas* accord great respect for intellect and expertise for the use of language, particularly, the appropriate use of proverbs; an elder (head of a household) ought to demonstrate adequate skills and knowledge of this capacity.

Furthermore, within the larger society, each *Olori-Ebi* ensures that there is sufficient coordination and cooperation and harmony among members of the family, for the betterment of each member of the family, the household and the larger community. Since the society is a collection of different family units rather than of individual members of a household, it simply means that the gathering of all family units serves as designers of cultural values and social stability which promote and protect the well-being of both individuals and the society. As designers of social values, every member of each household must inculcate all social rules as established within the family.<sup>28</sup>

The analysis of traditional Nigerian family clearly reveals that the social order cannot be obstructed by the activities of any member of the society. This is because each member of the society carries with him or her the symbol of the family. Therefore he or she is expected not to bring disrepute to the family by performing disgraceful acts in the public.<sup>29</sup> A man belongs to two families. The first is the natural family; that is, the family in which one is born. The other type is the family of procreation; which is the family where one raises and rears his or her children. Every Nigerian society tends to protect, sustain and ensure continuity of family property and as a result does replenish the stock of the lineage through procreation.<sup>30</sup>

Marriage systems in traditional Nigerian societies varies in features and practice; although it is accepted in all Nigerian societies that marriage is an agreed contractual obligation existing between two or more spouses and families, and even more so for procreation so as to maintain family continuity. In Yoruba society, for instance, it is believed that marriage is usually between two families rather than individuals and so, efforts are put in place to safeguard the integrity of the family.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup>Fadipe, 1970

<sup>29</sup>Fadipe, 1970

<sup>30</sup>Fadipe, 1970

<sup>31</sup>Fadipe, 1970

Although the focus of this chapter is to explore the socio-political experiences of Nigeria as a nation in order to show that the concept of patronage is fundamental to that experience, the traditional family unit that we have briefly examined serves as a basis to understanding the socio-political significance of patronage under discussion. As we have seen, the traditional family head in Nigeria possessed some patronal roles that reflect the larger society. However, this segment of the study will examine the various shades of patronage in traditional Nigerian societies in order to expatiate on the socio-cultural significance of patronage. For this purpose, we shall examine the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa socio- cultural settings.

### 4.3 PATRONAGE IN YORUBA SOCIO-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The Nigerian family unit examined above shows that African family unit is an autocratic and hierarchical one. The most important member of the family possesses a significant role not only within his family but also in the larger community. The head of the family, either the *Olori- Ebi* or *Baale*, serves as a protector of his family. He represents his family members in the community by protecting their interests and seeing to the overall progress of his family members and that of the community as a whole. This part of the research will examine the origin of patronage in the Yoruba traditional society.

In tracing the origin of patronage to the pre-colonial Yoruba society, Omobowale (2007) explores the *Babaogun* exchange relations. According to Omobowale, the *Babaogun* performed an important role in the government and politics of pre-colonial Ibadan.<sup>32</sup> The *Babaogun* is a warrior who had distinguished himself in battle. He had control and dominion over numerous people of different family units. Because of his military prowess, members of his communities pay homage, tributes and taxes to the *Babaogun*.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, he settled disputes in his communities and recruited able-bodied young men to be soldiers in his army.<sup>34</sup> While buttressing the patronal role of the *Babaogun*, Omobowale explains:

Ibadan's preference for *babaogun* may have been as a result of the war-like nature of the town in pre-

---

<sup>32</sup> Omobowale, A. O. 2007. *Babaogun Exchange Relations and Grassroots Politics In Ibadan, Nigeria. International Journal of Social and Management Sciences*, Vol. 1 No.2, pp.143-163

<sup>33</sup> Omobowale, A. O. 2007

<sup>34</sup> Omobowale, A. O. 2007

colonial times. The attributes of *babaogun* were as enshrined in the *baba-isale* exchange relations. Individuals aspiring to successful military careers had to attach themselves to notable military leaders who would serve as their patrons and expose them to arts of warfare.<sup>35</sup>

Aside his military authority, the *babaogun* also provided adequate protection to his followers (clients) and his communities at large. In addition, the *babaogun* protected the interest of his followers at the town council meeting while his followers reciprocate the gesture by being loyal. Awe (1964), in her own contribution to the discourse opines that the *babaogun* who was obviously a warrior and a military chief in modern sense had numerous vibrant and ambitious young men under his tutelage. His first responsibility was to give these young men proper military training by taking them on expedition with the approval of the town authorities.<sup>36</sup>

It is clear from the above that patronage existed in pre-colonial Ibadan and that the *babaogun* exchange relation was inherent in the cultural, political and military structures of Ibadan land. One important point to note, however, on the significant role the *babaogun* played in his community is that the *babaogun's* relationship with his clients depends on trust and respect for his personality.

Furthermore, O' Hear (1986) in his study of commercial and political clientele in Ilorin, a town in western Nigeria, also presents a clear evidence of exchange relation in the economic and socio-political life of the indigenes of Ilorin town. According to him, the *Baba Kekere* (the small father) was a very famous and influential community leader who provided the socio-political as well as physical security for people in the community especially those with a lesser status. The people (clients) in turn paid respect, tribute and loyalty to him. This insight provided by O'Hear is similar to Omobowale's *babaogun* relation in the socio-cultural history of Ibadan.

O'Hear goes on to explain that the *Baba Kekere* provided 'a wide range of services to his clients.' These services include mediating between his clients and other

---

<sup>35</sup>Omobowale, A. O.2007 pp.150-51

<sup>36</sup>See Awe, B. 1964. *The Rise of Ibadan as a Yoruba Power in the Nineteenth Century*.Ph.DThesis. Sommerville College, Oxford University Press. Also, see O' Hear, A. 1986. *Political and Commercial Clientage in Nineteenth Century Ilorin*, *African Economic History*, 15: 69-83

higher authority, providing access to land and justice and so on. Similarly, Barnes (1986) affirms O'Hear submission in her discussion on the patronal role of the Baba Isale in Mushin, a town in the suburb of old Lagos. Barnes gives the illustration of a Baba-Isale who was the political patron in local politics of Mushin, a local area of Lagos.<sup>37</sup>

#### 4.4 PATRONAGE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC INSTITUTION OF THE IGBO

Unlike the evidence of patronage in the Yoruba socio-cultural life illustrated above, patronage is more conspicuous in trade and commerce of the Igbo people. Although it comes in different shades, the concept of patronage was not strange among the people of pre-colonial Igbo communities. Onwuzuruigbo (2013) gives reason why patronage was not too grounded in pre-colonial Igbo political sphere. According to Onwuzuruigbo, the non-centralization and the segmentary nature of the socio-political life hindered the development of large-scale political institution on which patronage flourishes. Nevertheless, he agrees that patronage thrives more in the trade and commerce sector of the pre-colonial Igbo society.<sup>38</sup>

Nnamani (2004), while narrating the influence of godfathers in trade and commerce among the Igbo people of Nigeria, corroborates Onwuzuruigbo. Nnamani states that, an average Igbo family would seek a guardian, who will not only be a master but also a patron to the young boy. The patron's duty is to motivate and inspire the boy using his (patron) wealth of experience, contacts and accomplishment.<sup>39</sup> Onwuzuruigbo, however, explains that the term *Nnam ukwu* or *Ogaranya* in Igbo language is synonymous with the word godfather just as *Odibo* is to a godson. Every parent in traditional Igbo society would send his child to be trained by a more successful and respected member of the society. This fact is also affirmed by Nnamani. Nnamani opines that it is very dangerous in Igbo society to allow a young boy waste his life in the comfort of his father's house at the commencement of his life. Such young boy, he continues will be handed over to a master who doubles as a patron, and who is charged with the

---

<sup>37</sup>For more detail on patronage system in colonial Nigeria, consult Barnes, T. (1986). *Patrons and Power: Creating A Political community in Metropolitan Lagos*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

<sup>38</sup>Onwuzuruigbo .I.2013. Recontextualisation of the Concept of Godfatherism: Reflection Nigeria. *AfricaDevelopment*, Vol. xxxiiii, Nos. 1 &2, pp. 25-50

<sup>39</sup>Nnamani.C.2004.The Godfather Phenomenon in Democratic Nigeria: Silicon or Real? *International Journal of Philosophy: 1.1*

responsibility bringing up the child and inculcating in him all the qualities of a responsible man.<sup>40</sup>

Nwanna, who was cited by Onwuzuruigbo, opines that one can also find evidence of godfatherism in pre-colonial Igbo society. He gives a classical example of this by narrating a story from Pita Nwanna in his classic book. It is a story of a character, Omenuko, a rich and successful merchant who had several apprentices under his tutelage. One day Omenuko while on his usual business journey lost his whole merchandise in a river. To cover for his loss, however, he decided to sell off some of his apprentices as slaves to fellow traders and merchants from other towns. Omenuko's action was vehemently condemned by people in his community and his relatives. Having realized the enormity of his evil action, Omenuko fled to another village on a self-imposed exile.<sup>41</sup> One important lesson which can be drawn from the short narrative is that the Igbo custom placed an obligation on any merchant or benefactor like Omenuko to provide his apprentice with the wherewithal that will enable him to succeed in life.

This practice has continued until recently due to the clamour for western education. Both the *Nnam-Ukwu* and the *Odibo* (godfather and godson) are obliged to engage in a rewarding relationship that encourages the rapid development of the community. The key element in the relationship is trust. And the trust, according to Adetula (2005) "covers all aspects of human endeavour, from politics to business."<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, Onwuzuruigbo (2013) explains that most of the successful Igbo businessmen, particularly those in the transportation and haulage companies in Nigeria, started out as apprentices of first generation of Igbo merchants or business godfathers.<sup>43</sup>

#### **4.5 GLIMPSES OF PATRONAGE IN HAUSA/ FULANI SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE**

The concept of patronage was also evident in the socio-political history of pre-colonial Hausa\Fulani society. The first glimpse of patronage is seen in trade and commerce of the Hausa\Fulani people. Abner Cohen, Polly Hill and Lovejoy, in separate

---

<sup>40</sup>*Nnamani.C. 2004*

<sup>41</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, 2013.

<sup>42</sup>Adetula, 2005.

<sup>43</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, 2013.

papers, used the term *Maigida* to describe a godfather in Hausa\ Fulani society. According to them, the *maigida* provided brokerages services to some of his fellow Hausa traders who were engaged in the cattle and kola business.<sup>44</sup> Albert (2005) citing Abner Cohen, Polly Hill and Lovejoy says that some Hausa traders would bring cattle from the North to sell in the South-western part of Nigeria. In return, they take back kola nuts which they bought at various points they stop and transact business. To carry out these, they depend on a *maigida* to facilitate their business transactions.<sup>45</sup> The *maigida* ensures that the traders are well-taken care of by providing them accommodation, storage for their goods, and also providing them brokerage service. In return, the *maigida* is compensated for his services.<sup>46</sup>

It is clear from the above excerpts that the *maigida* helped in promoting trading activities among the Hausa. He provided both accommodations and storage, and even brokerage services to Hausa merchants at different trading posts where fellow Hausas engaged in business transaction in southern West Africa.

Again, patronage as a concept was deeply rooted in the socio-political space of pre-colonial Hausa\ Fulani communities. Onwuzuruigbo (2014) affirmed that the prosecution of the Jihad war by the Fulani created a new political dynasty. According to him, this dynasty introduced more sophisticated hierarchical levels of organization bound by patronage system.<sup>47</sup>

The investigation into the socio-cultural and political spheres of the three major tribes in Nigeria reveals that patronage was fundamental to the traditional societies under discussion. It has also been made clear that the patrons from the various ethnicities examined were people of integrity, and that they freely commanded respect from the members of their respective communities. The coming of the colonial masters, however, saw to the rise of new set of patrons. The nationalist struggle brought with it a shift in the traditional concept of patronage.

---

<sup>44</sup>See Albert, I.O. 2005.

<sup>45</sup>Albert, I.O. 2005.

<sup>46</sup>Albert, I.O. 2005.

<sup>47</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, 2013.

#### 4.6 EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND NATIONALISTS IN NIGERIA

A few scholars have written extensively on the origin and emergence of nationalism.<sup>48</sup> There is a general consensus, however, that nationalism in Nigeria emanated from the resistant struggle against the colonial masters by the various ethnic communities. Olusanya agrees to this fact. He explains that:

The emergence of Nigeria's nationalism predated the establishment of effective British rule over the whole country now known as Nigeria. This is because, the various areas which now constitute modern Nigeria were acquired at different times and certain forces and conditions favouring the emergence of the nationalist idea were already at work before 1914 when Nigeria became an administrative unit.<sup>49</sup>

The nationalists, no doubt, found a fertile ground for their agitations in their various ethnic parties. As early as the 1900's, various ethnic-based nationalist movements had started making impacts in the socio-political space of the country. This at first came in form of socio-cultural groups that later metamorphosed into political parties or what should be rightly called regional movements. For instance, the Yourba movement, *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* assumed a political dimension in the manner of a civic movement by the 1940's and by the early 1960's and late 2000, it has become a formidable group in Nigeria's socio-political space. Other regional movement in Nigeria also took the same form as the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*. Ajala affirms that:

Formation of group identity and socio-political movements among the Yoruba people in the colonial period was different both in form and functions compared with what it was during the pre-colonial period. At the pre-colonial Yoruba society, the group consciousness was mainly created as

---

<sup>48</sup>For a detailed account of Nationalism in Nigeria, see Olusanya, G. O. 1980. *The Nationalist Movement in Nigeria*, in Ikimi, O (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigeria History*, pp. 545-569, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books

<sup>49</sup>Olusanya, G. O (1980), *The Nationalist Movement in Nigeria*, in Ikimi, O (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigeria History*, pp. 545-569, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books



historical link among the Yoruba people, mostly through the refugees and the Oyo migrants of the collapsed Old Oyo kingdom, who worked history to construct a political hegemony linking several Yoruba sub-groups (Doortmont, 1989, Falola and Genova 2006)<sup>50</sup>

These regional parties or groups, despite their enormous contributions to Nigeria's independence, nevertheless added to the disunity of the country. During the colonial period, for instance, ethnic nationalism employed aggressive political measures, these measures saw to the establishment of political parties based on ethnic and regional considerations. There was the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) whose leader was Herbert Macaulay; Northern People's Congress (NPC), founded by the Northern educated *elite* in 1949. In the West, the socio-political group, *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* which later transformed into a political party in 1951, under the name Action Group, held sway among the Yoruba of the Western Nigeria. These regional political parties sought to advance regional and ethnic interests instead of the overall interest of the country. And each leader of the parties, according to Albert (2005) transformed into a political patronage.<sup>51</sup>

Some of the nationalist leaders later transformed into regional political leaders in the 1950s and 1960s. The ethnic political leaders of those times were Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who was the party leader of Northern People's Party (NPP); Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was the leader of Action Congress (AG), a political party that dominated the Western part of Nigeria and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, of the NCNC was the leader. The other elder statesmen that fell into this category are Mallam Aminu Kano and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim. The ethnic social and political leaders, according to Albert, up to the point of their death, dictated who could occupy political offices in the geo-political regions they led.<sup>52</sup> Ajala in explaining how these political leaders have used ethnic politics and violence to gain political powers. He further states that power struggle

---

<sup>50</sup>Ajala, A. S. 2006. Identify and Space: The Reconstruction of Ibadan Politics in Western Nigerian. *Stud Tribes. Triba Kamla- Raj*, 100, p. 1-14

<sup>51</sup> Ajala, 2006

<sup>52</sup> Ajala, 2006

<sup>53</sup> Ajala (2006)

assumed a new turn when political *elite* used their ethnic support as a political hegemony to instigate chaos in the political sphere in order to frustrate their opponent.<sup>53</sup>

Sadly, the same divide and rule policy of the western administrators, which the nationalists condemned bitterly, was modified and used by the same nationalists in the quest for prestige and power, resulting in ethnic nationalism as against true nationalism geared toward national integration which encourages unity among the different ethnic groups in the country.

The nationalist disagreement showed its manifestation, first, in the post-1945 years and this could be traced to the early years of the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, Igbo State Union and *Jamiyyas Mutanen Arewa*. The first two became mutual antagonists and they found it convenient to disagree almost every time. By 1951, when these three bodies had effectively transformed into political parties, consideration of political issues was often done by their so-called leaders in terms of ethnic consideration. In his own contribution to the discussion, Lawal maintains that:

The backfiring effect of this disunity in the nationalist class was that Britain's colonial administration did not experience any 'common' action from the educated elite since they disagreed among themselves on almost every point at issue.<sup>54</sup>

By empowering certain individuals and groups and weakening others, the British further deepened the feeling of distrust and left a heritage of harsh authoritarian domination that persists today. Despite this, it is evident that the class interest and political ambitions of the Nigeria *elite* in the disguise of fighting for political independence led to the emergence of ethnic nationalism. The so called nationalists spearheaded the socio-political revolts and resistance to colonialism in different parts of the country. They imposed on themselves the onerous task of criticizing and bringing pressure to bear on the colonial administration. By 1945, sufficient grounds existed for the intensification of anti-colonialism by the nationalists. Taken together, realities of colonial economic would seem to be the more durable explanation for the rise and

---

<sup>54</sup> Lawal (2001)

sustenance of confrontation between them and the colonial administration. Lawal submits that:

In legal terms, proclamations, ordinances and order-in-council were major instruments through which laws considered exploitative by the nationalist were promulgated.<sup>56</sup>

The above did not endear the colonial government to any section of the society. On the contrary, the path to independence was one paved by restiveness and revolts of all manner by the people, who led the nationalist struggle, who sought to seek accommodation and then later to demand participation in the governance of the country.

The leaders of the anti-colonial struggle came to regard control of the country as a means to pursue personal and ethnic interests rather than collective, national interests. Thus, the three largest ethnic groups dominated the political struggle and the agitation for a sovereign state called Nigeria. Surprisingly, these ethnic identities did not exist in their contemporary forms in the pre-colonial era and they were clearly delineated only in the context of colonial rule to manage the colony and establish administrative areas. Again, if the indigenous groups were set against one another, no unified threat of opposition to British authority would have emerged.<sup>57</sup> Ake further buttresses this:

Ethnic nationalism was already well developed before the nationalist era. Ethnic loyalty was something that made sense to a lot of people, and its utility was already demonstrated in the urban areas, where ethnic associations catered for the needs of new immigrants from the countryside.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup>Lawal, 2001

<sup>57</sup>Lawal, 2001

<sup>58</sup>Ake.C.1995. Is Africa Democratizing? In Mimiko, N. O. (ed.) *Crisis and Contradiction in Nigeria's Democratization Programme 1986-1983*. Akure Stebak Printers

#### 4.7 ETHNIC NATIONALISTS AS POLITICAL PATRONS

The Nigerian state that transformed into independence was one which was not designed for the true independence and survival of the nation as an entity. As mentioned earlier, the ethnic nationalists struggle for power and recognition further widened the gap of distrust and hatred among the socio-cultural groups that made up Nigeria. Her neo-colonial form and character, as well as the selfish orientation of the new breed of leaders whom Davidson (1993) sarcastically referred to as “pirate in power” saw to this.<sup>59</sup> Davidson explains that the state-centred neo-colonial economy encouraged the indolent ruling *elite* to be excessively dependent on state resources for private use and so there was an uncontrollable struggle for the state and its resources.<sup>60</sup> It was the ethnic divisions that were propagated by the nationalists through their various regional political parties that allowed the nationalists to play their patronal roles effectively and unhindered.

In addition, the Nationalists were leaders of various political parties that were formed after the amalgamation of 1914. Many of the political parties were established, first, as pressure groups and later metamorphosed into full-fledged political parties as a result of their stance against the subjugation by foreign powers. This form of nationalism, according to Anderson (1983), was based on the experience of the educated Africans who were fluent in the language of their colonial masters, tutored in its national history, and staffing the colonial administration.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the above, the nationalists political spread was expectedly limited to their ethnic territories or regions. As noted earlier on, ethnic nationalism was already in place during the colonial era. It came through different ethnic and professional associations.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup>Ake, 1995

<sup>59</sup> Davidson, B. 1993. *The Blackman's Burden: African and the curse of the Nation-state*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd

<sup>60</sup>Davidson, B. 1993

<sup>61</sup>Davidson, B. 1993

<sup>62</sup> Aluko

The predominance of ethnic nationalism, no doubt, led to the emergence of regional or ethnic political patrons. These regional political patrons, especially of the first republic, became so popular and so powerful that their philosophies and followership are still intact decades after their demise. For instance, Obafemi Awolowo was the political leader and patron of the Yoruba in western Nigeria; Nnamdi Azikiwe was that of the Eastern part of Nigeria and so on.

The Nationalist leaders held so much sway and respect among their ethnic populace to the extent that a number of them were idolized or even deified after their demise. Accordingly, this accorded them a distinguished position in the socio-political life of their various communities. However, in this segment, I shall highlight some of the nationalist leaders who also doubled as political patrons, and also examine their contributions to Nigerian politics. These patrons shall include: Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, late Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe and late Aminu Kano or Ahmadu Bello.

#### **4.8 CHIEF OBAFEMI AWOLOWO (March 6, 1909- May 9, 1987)**

Obafemi Awolowo, fondly called Awo, was born in Ikenne, a small town located in western part of Nigeria. He was a son of a peasant. Obafemi Awolowo was a highly respected statesman and nationalist. He played key roles in the political arena and was part of those who agitated for Nigeria's independence. He was noted for his outstanding contributions to the Western Region during his tenure as the Premier. Obafemi Awolowo was a federal commissioner; a job which he diligently and successfully carried out. He was also the vice-president of the Federal Executive Council and contributed his ideas toward the development of the country.<sup>64</sup>

Late Obafemi Awolowo was educated at Wesley College, Ibadan in 1927. After few attempts, he was admitted to the University of London as an external student. He graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce (Hons.) degree. Obafemi Awolowo later travelled to England to study law at the University of London and was called to the Bar by the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple in 1946. While still in London, Awolowo

---

<sup>64</sup>James, B. 1981. Writers and politics in Nigeria, *African Pub. Co.*, p. 52

formed a socio-cultural association, the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*, which was responsible for the preservation and advancement of Yoruba culture.

Awolowo's political career started out so well that in 1951 he founded the Action Group with some members of the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* as pioneer members. Part of the party's agenda was, first, to see to the end of the British rule and, second, to develop numerous social welfare programme for the wellbeing of the people. The party won its first elections in the Western region of Nigeria. In 1954-59, as an elected premier of the Western Region, Awolowo's party agenda was to reform the region's economy. He worked to improve most especially the education, social services, and agricultural sectors. Despite his political achievement, his political ascendancy did not come easily. He survived many attempts by some party members who tried to hijack the party from him. In 1963, Obafemi Awolowo was arrested and imprisoned by the Nigerian government for conspiracy and for wanting to overthrow the ruling government. In 1966, after the first military coup took place, Awolowo was released from Prison. In the Second Republic, he became the leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). And he ran for the office of president in the elections of 1979 and 1983 respectively. He was, however, defeated at both times.

Obafemi Awolowo was respected for his principles and ideology. And his disciples are spread all over the country. His most famous bequests are in exemplary leadership, his free education policy and his welfare policies. Obafemi Awolowo passed away peacefully on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May, 1987 at his Ikenne home. He was 78 years old. He was buried in his hometown, Ikenne, amid encomium across all political and ethno-religious groups and all over the globe.

#### **4.9 CHIEF NNAMDI AZIKIWE (1904-1996)**

Late Nnamdi Azikiwe, a foremost Nigerian nationalist-*cum*-political patron, was born in Zungeru, a town in Northern Nigeria on November 16, 1904 to parents of Igbo descent. He attended his primary school in Onitsha. He later went to Methodist Boys' High school, Lagos, a mission school in Lagos Colony. In 1925, Azikiwe travelled abroad for his University education. He attended both the famous Howard and Lincoln Universities where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science.

After his educational sojourn in America, Azikiwe returned to Nigeria in 1934 to start a career in Journalism. He got a job as newspaper editor, the *African Morning*, a daily Newspaper in Accra, Ghana. Three years later, he returned to Lagos to establish his own Newspaper, the *West Africa Pilot*, which was an aggressive nationalist Newspaper. His career as a journalist was so successful that he oversaw six daily newspapers in Lagos and four other cities in Nigeria.

Nnamdi Azikiwe's political career began while he was an editor of the *African Morning Newspaper*. He was part of those that formed the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1937 where he participated actively in youth's involvement in Nigerian politics. In 1944, he also co-founded the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), where he was elected as the council's General Secretary. Later in 1946, he became the Council's president. During his tenure as the president of the Council, Azikiwe held a number of public offices. One of such public office was as member of the Nigerian Legislative Council from 1947 to 1951. He was also member of the Western House of Assembly from 1952-1953. He emerged as the premier of the Eastern Region in 1954. In 1959, he became the president of the Nigerian senate. In all his public responsibility, he participated actively in Nigeria's march toward independence. It was during his tenure as the premier of the Eastern Region that the foundation stone of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka was laid. Azikiwe became the appointed Governor- General at Nigeria's independence on October 1, 1960. Also when Nigeria became a republic on October 1 1963, Azikiwe was appointed as the first executive president. He was the president until he was overthrown in a military coup in January 15, 1966. Nnamdi Azikiwe was respected for his immense contributions to the Nigerian politics and for his visionary leadership. He died in 1996 at the age of 94 years.

#### **4.10 SIR AHMADU BELLO (1909-1966)**

Late Ahmadu Bello was born in Rabah, a small village in Sokoto state in North-West Nigeria. He was a great grandson of Uthman Dan Fodio, a popular Islamic leader and Jihadist. Ahmadu Bello had his first taste of western education at the Sokoto Provincial School, and later attended the Teacher Training College. Immediately he graduated from the school, he taught in a few secondary schools in Sokoto for some

years. In 1934, he was appointed by the emirate as the head of Rabah community or district. And in 1938 he contested for the office of the Sultan of Sokoto. His attempt at the Sokoto Royal stool was however not successful. In a surprise move, the new Sultan conferred on Ahmadu Bello the traditional title of Sardauna of Sokoto. He was also elevated to the Sokoto Native Authority Council.

Ahmadu Bello's involvement in politics began after the World War II. In 1945, he collaborated with some Northern youths to establish a social club named the Youth Social Circle which comprised notable educators and civil servants. In 1948 the group was joined by other young and vibrant northerners and birthed a new party called the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which was first a socio-cultural group but which later metamorphosed into a leading political party in Northern Nigeria. Ahmadu Bello's interest in politics increased while at the Northern People's Congress. His interest and active participation in party politics won him the representative ticket of his party. In 1949, he won his first election into the Northern House of Assembly. During his tenure as a representative, he contributed immensely to the 1949-1950 discourse on constitutional reform. He was a leading advocate of the politics of the Northern people.

His position as the leader of his party, NPC and Premier of the Northern Region made Ahmadu Bello, undoubtedly, one of the most famous political figures in Northern Nigeria. And his contributions to socio-political discourse were indeed commendable. He had an unhidden dislike for the South-west method of politicking and had no interest in participating in government at the central level, which would require him to reside in Lagos. This notwithstanding, he participated in national discourse on constitutional reform. He was a member of the Federal House of Representatives from 1952 to 1959. His interest in politics was basically for the social and political development of the north and the protection of the region from what he regarded as Southern incursions in politics. Thus he remained Premier of the Northern Region, when Nigeria gained independence in 1960. His deputy at NPC, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was later appointed the prime minister of Nigeria.

In 1964, Ahmadu Bello was responsible for the alliance between Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and his own party NPC. The new alliance party,



which was named the Nigerian National Alliance, won almost all the positions the federal elections of 1964. And in the following year, the party won a controversial victory in a fierce and disputed regional election. Bello's quest to throw his support behind his political allies led to a successful *coup d'etat* in January, 1966.

#### **4.11 POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC**

The new political dispensation saw a paradigm shift in the activities of political patrons (godfathers). Unlike in the first republic where godfathers were more responsive to their socio-political and cultural life of the people, the fourth republic's political patrons and their clients (godsons) have brought in new dimension into Nigerian political space. From the inception of the fourth Republic, there has been condemnation on both the activities of godfathers and their godsons. Scholarly literature on political patronage is rife with strong disapproval of the concept on the one hand, and activities of the godfather on the other. According to Onwuzuruigbo (2013), the disapproval is because discourse on political patronage is dominated by political scientists and that emphasis has always been on the activities of godfathers from the political point of view.<sup>65</sup> Onwuzuruigbo brilliantly puts it thus: array of latest scholarly literature on patronage is highlighted by two major faults. That scholarly literature only looks at the current traits of patronage. The focus is merely on the development of patronage in political activities, particularly on electioneering, election rigging and conflicts in political activities in Nigeria; therefore mistakenly perceiving and inferring that godfatherism is a new concept bedeviling the Nigeria's budding democracy.<sup>66</sup>

According to Onwuzuruigbo, most scholarly literatures have only considered the activities of the so-called godfathers in the political field and came to a conclusion that patron politics is dangerous and inimical to the socio-political development of any society. However, it is imperative to look at the different perspectives and terms which some scholars have used to describe godfatherism. The political patron looks out for the social and well-being of his godson by using his connection and wealth to get him into any social or political positions. To put it more vividly, a political patron is a self-seeking

---

<sup>65</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, 2013

<sup>66</sup>Onwuzuruigbo,2013

individual who deploy his resources to manipulate government activities for his own good.<sup>67</sup>

For Albert, godfathers are individuals who surround themselves with an army of strong supporters and party stalwarts with the intention of using them for their own political goals which often depend on access to power and monetary considerations, to control and manipulate them. Political godfathers use their popularity and access to political posts to hinder the participation of others in politics. According to Albert, the political patrons act like gatekeepers; they determine who partakes in politics and under which party and conditions.<sup>68</sup>

In his own contribution to the discourse, Omotola defines godfathers as those who possess both the social and political, local influence, financial wherewithal, and so on, to plan and manipulate elections at different levels.<sup>69</sup>

The various definitions of patronage and political patron itemized above suggest that the interest of Nigeria's Fourth Republic political patrons' (godfathers) have shifted significantly from the traditional roles which they played in the pre-colonial period. According to Ogbonwan, the Fourth Republic godfathers no longer depict the qualities of the traditional godfathers. He goes on to say that today's godfathers have assumed the role of a *mafia* lords whose interests are against the public good and the overall development of the society.<sup>70</sup>

Another thing to note from the definitions is that emphasis is placed more on political godfathers. To this, Onwuzuruigbo explains that the definitions do not take cognizance of the socio-cultural foundations of patronage. He explains that political patronage ought to be placed in its right perspective. First as a tool or mechanism of social exchange rather a mere political process and so, conceiving it as a tool of political interaction and exchange is not only faulty but reduces the understanding of the context in which it is found from the outset.<sup>71</sup>

Onwuzuruigbo's claim is justifiable considering the myriads of criticisms of the political patrons. A good number of scholarly works have condemned the concept itself.

---

<sup>67</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, 2013

<sup>68</sup> Albert, 2005

<sup>69</sup> Omotola, 2010

<sup>70</sup> Ogbonwan, 2012

<sup>71</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, 2013.

However, this study is not set out to justify whether or not godfatherism is moral. That has been stated in the objective of this study. It is simply the aim of the study to arrive at a reasonable conclusion that godfatherism or patronage is fundamental to every society of the world. And to buttress our point, it is appropriate at this juncture to examine the socio-political life of 19<sup>th</sup> century America where patronage was used as a strategic mechanism for the reproduction of structure of power in which fractions of community leaders dominate the political life of the state.<sup>72</sup>

William Riordon goes further to state that:

Politics was a way out of the slums. In this way Tammany was equal to the Catholic Church's hierarchy as an engine of social mobility for gifted, ambitious Irish-Americans who lacked the capital, the educational advantages, and the connections of the sons of established families. In both, institutional career were open to talents.<sup>73</sup>

From the above excerpts, it is evident that in the earliest period of America's political history, there had been cases of political patrons with pockets of clients as supporters. However, the Nigeria situation, which we are examining, has resemblance with the America's experience that was described above.<sup>74</sup>

It is the social inequality that Albert describes above, that has made patronage discernible. The Nigeria's Fourth Republic saw the rise in political patronage and the activities of the political patrons. According to Collier, the activities of the political patrons attract criminals into the Nigerian politics.<sup>75</sup> He goes further to say that violence and other electoral malpractice are synonymous with the fourth republican patrons.<sup>76</sup> The Nigeria's Fourth Republic came with its attendant crises. Most of the crises were caused by the activities of the political patrons. For the purpose of this study, we shall x-ray the activities of some of these patrons in some states in Nigeria.

---

<sup>72</sup> William, L. R. 1963. *Origin of Godfatherism and Partisan Politics in Government (An America Example)*, E. P. Dulton and Co. Inc, New York

<sup>73</sup> William, L. R. 1963.

<sup>74</sup> Albert, 2005

<sup>75</sup> Collier, P. and Vincente, P. 2008. Do or Die Affairs: Experimental evidence on Electoral violence in Nigeria. NP: Institutions for pro-poor growth.

<sup>76</sup> Collier, P. and Vincente, P. 2008.

#### **4.12 POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN SOME STATES IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA**

Just as in the pre-colonial period in Nigeria's socio-political history, patronage as a form of social exchange is prominent in Nigeria's fourth republic. This time, however, it is with a new vigour and ideology. The fourth republican political patrons, however, do not have the same principles as those of the pre-colonial period. As discussed above, personal ambition and the desire for materialism, coupled with civil disorder and organized crime helped in no small measure to facilitate the rise of the fourth republic's political patrons. The negative tendencies of political patronage by this time (although these negative tendencies were present in the pre-colonial period, it was not as dominant as it is now) have destroyed the various political structures and institution in Nigeria. At the advent of the fourth republic, elections were no more a cherished democratic standards whereby voters elect leaders of their choices. The political patrons hijacked the electoral processes, thereby making voting a mere formality. However, it is imperative to examine patron politics in a few states in contemporary Nigeria; especially those that were bedevilled with many political crises due to the activities of the political patrons. In line with this study, we shall look at evidence of patron politics in just three states of contemporary Nigeria. The three states are picked from the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria.

#### **4.13 THE ANAMBRA STATE EXPERIENCE (1999-2017)**

Anambra state is one of the states that made up the states in eastern part of Nigeria. The state witnessed two major political crises as a result of clashes among some political chieftains in the state. The first crisis was between Emeka Offor, a business tycoon and patron and the then governor of the state, Chinwoke Mbadinuju. Between 1999 and 2003, the two political gladiators were engaged in a struggle over the control of the state. This crisis, according to Nkwede, Nwankwo and Ibeogu (2014), was because Mbadinuju refused to fulfil his political obligation to his patron, Emeka Offor. The tussle between the two almost destroyed the social activities of the state as both used their

various political machineries against each other.<sup>77</sup> The tension between Mbadinaju and Offor continued until the end of Governor Mbadinaju's tenure as Anambra state governor. As the crisis unfolded between Mbadinaju and Offor lasted, a new, young and vibrant political patron was secretly preparing his godson for a shot at the government lodge, Amawbia, the official residence of the governor. Before the election, the governorship aspirant for the People's Democratic Party (PDP), Dr Chris Ngige, was alleged to have signed an agreement with his sponsor and political patron, Chris Uba, in which he vowed to always do the bidding of his political patron, Chris Uba. Also, it was alleged that Dr Chris Ngige signed some undated letters of resignation as the flag bearer of his party, firstly, secondly, as governor elect, and as substantive governor respectively.<sup>78</sup>

Chris Ngige was accused of reneging on his promises just a few weeks after his swearing-in as Governor of the state. Consequently, on July, 2003, Ngige was abducted by a group of fierce-looking policemen whose commander was an Assistant Inspector General of Police (AIG). He was later rescued through a telephone call that he made from where he was kept.<sup>79</sup> The attempted abduction was not successful, and so, there was widespread chaos and wanton destruction of lives and public property which lasted for four days. It was said that hoodlums were paid paltry sum of ten thousand naira each. According to Agbo, the public disturbance was planned to smear the political image of the governor.<sup>80</sup> The Uba camp, in a press statement, explained that it took the action to let Anambra people know that they (the Uba camp) had taken full control of the governance of the state and thus encourage the citizens of the state to support the movement because "Ngige is going today."<sup>81</sup>

However, two years into his tenure, Ngige was booted out of office by the verdict of Supreme Court who invalidated his election. The change in leadership brought a new

---

<sup>77</sup> Nkwede, J. O., Nwankwo, O. U., and Ibeogu, A. S. 2014. Political Godfatherism and Governance in a Developing Democracy: Insight from Nigeria, *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 3 No 4, pp. 137-144

<sup>78</sup> Adeyemo, W. 2004. The Deal of the Carpet Beggars. Ayoade, J.A.A (Ed.) 2008. *Godfather in Nigeria Politics*, Abuja: International Foundation for Electoral System IFES

<sup>79</sup> See Agbo, A. 2004. Day of the Jackal. Ayoade, J.A.A (Ed.). 2004. *Godfatherism Politics in Nigeria*, Abuja: International Foundation for Electoral System IFES

<sup>80</sup> Agbo, A. 2004

<sup>81</sup> Agbo, A. 2004

lease of life to the political terrain of Anambra state as a new man who was not known in the political scene took over the mantle of leadership. Mr. Peter Obi, was inaugurated as the new Governor. Peter Obi ruled Anambra state without the usual political crisis that was experienced in the tenures of the earlier governors. As was noted earlier, at the beginning of the fourth republic in the state, there had been various political tussles between the various godfathers and their godsons. The political crises affected, in no small way, every sector of the state economy.<sup>82</sup>

Nevertheless, the above evidence of patron politics in Anambra state demonstrated the relevance of godfatherism in the political landscape of the state. It also showed the importance of political connections, not to the godsons alone, but also to the godfather himself.

#### **4.14 PATRON POLITICS IN OYO STATE**

In Oyo state, a state in the western part of Nigeria, patron politics was also evident in the political drama that took place between the then incumbent governor, senator Rashidi Ladoja and his political patron, late Chief Lamidi Adedibu. Before this time, there had been cases of tussles between godfathers and godsons. However, the case of late Adedibu and Ladoja brought into the limelight the issue of patron politics in Oyo state politics. For instance, during the election of Chief Kolapo Ishola, Adedibu was instrumental to his election to the government house, Agodi. However, their political union became threatened when Chief Ishola refused to keep to the promises he made prior to his election.

Nevertheless, it was in the fourth republic, that political crisis between a political patron and his political son became most evident. Just as in the case of Anambra, the fourth republic witnessed so much unrest in the political terrain of Oyo state. The battle between Senator Rashidi Ladoja and his benefactor, Late Lamidi Adedibu caused so much distraction and social unrest in the state. Prior to the election of 2003, the state had been ruled by the opposition party, Alliance for Democracy (AD).<sup>83</sup> Despite this, Late Adedibu succeeded in fixing his political son, Senator Rashidi Ladoja, as the next governor of the state in 2003. By that time, Adedibu had succeeded in establishing

---

<sup>82</sup> Agbo, A. 2004

<sup>83</sup> Agbo, A. 2004

himself as a strong political patron in the state. As a political businessman, Adedibu relied mainly on rents from his clients for self-sustenance. According to Okafor, the trouble began when Adedibu decided to nominate 80 percent of the members of the cabinet. However, hell was let loose when the governor sacked about 70 percent of Adedibu's men in a cabinet reshuffle. The action enraged Adedibu and he relied on his massive political clout and employed it to bring back his erring political son in line.<sup>84</sup>

The animosity between Adedibu and Ladoja continued into 2004. In the month of March, 2004, there was a display of chaos in the state as a result of the local government election. The enormous political might that Adedibu unleashed on the state and the numerous threats he made to the governor did not bring any desired results. Even the intervention of the then Nigeria president, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, in settling the rift did not achieve any favourable results. Ladoja still stuck to his gun. These and other issues triggered the crisis even more. In all this, Ladoja was alleged to have reneged on the agreed revenue sharing formula. Adebamigbe opines that as a result of the crisis, Ladoja became adamant and, so, built his own political platform with supporters all over the state.<sup>85</sup>

In a state Television interview, Adedibu claimed that Oyo state's security vote was sixty-five million naira monthly. That since most state governor do not account for the money, he (Ladoja) promised to give him (Adedibu) fifteen million naira of that every month as his godfather. But Ladoja reneged on his promises.<sup>86</sup>

#### **4.15 PATRON POLITICS IN KWARA STATE**

Another evidence of patron politics in Nigeria's fourth republic is taken from Kwara state, a state in the north central of Nigeria. As with other examples examined above, the Kwara case also witnessed the brazen show of power and crass disdain for rule of law that the political patrons of the fourth republic are noted for. Kwara state has always been dominated by the Saraki Dynasty since the first republic. Late Dr Olusola Saraki was a successful medical professional. He used his wealth to provide infrastructure to the dense poor population in his community. Perhaps this singular effort

---

<sup>84</sup> Okafor, C. 2006. The Ladoja Impeachment. *Vanguard Newspaper*, January 14.

<sup>85</sup> Adebamigbe, 2007:23

<sup>86</sup> Adebamigbe, 2007

endeared him to the people of his community, and also established him as a socio-political benefactor.

Late Olushola Saraki's role as a political patron started far back in 1979. According to Gambo, in the second republic, late Saraki backed Alhaji Adamu Attah as the governorship aspirant in the election. However, later on in governor Attah's tenure as the governor, a misunderstanding with the governor and his political sponsor ensued. Late Dr. Olusola Saraki could not swallow the misbehaviour of his political son that he shifted his interest to Chief Cornelus Adebayo, an aspirant of a rival party, Unity Party of Nigeria. Chief Cornelus Adebayo was eventually declared winner of the 1983 governorship election.<sup>87</sup> In the new political dispensation of the fourth republic, however, Saraki found a new godson in the person of Alhaji Mohammed Lawal. He (Saraki) supported the political ambition of Lawal as his political son and Lawal won the governorship election on the ticket of the then All Peoples Party.

However, at the beginning of Lawal's tenure, a crisis ensued between Lawal and his political patron. The crisis grew into a strong rivalry between the two. The disaffection degenerated to anarchy in the state as there were skirmishes among the supporters of both political gladiators. As the next election year was approaching, the political patron, Saraki crossed carpeted to another party, the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P) and this time decided to nominate his biological son who is a medical doctor as an aspirant for the governorship election. Bukola Saraki, the son of Olusola Saraki eventually defeated the governor, Mohammed Lawal.<sup>88</sup>

The various evidence of patron politics examined in these few states of Nigeria suggest that the concept of patron politics in the fourth republic has shifted in function from the traditional concept that encourage love, mutual respect and mentorship which are the hallmark of the earlier form. As Onwuzuruigbo rightly noted that the redefining of patronage into its new form was fully completed by 1960. At that time, the colonial administrators had transferred political activities and power to the new breed of Nigerian politicians.

Having dealt with the socio-cultural and political significance of patronage in ancient Roman and Nigerian societies, and its implications for individuals and institutions

---

<sup>87</sup>Gambo, 2006



in both societies, this final chapter gives a summary *cum* conclusion on the subject matter. Nevertheless, it is imperative to say that a central theme in this study is the scale of participation in the patronage system in the two societies understudied. It has also been identified in the course of the study that patronage or patron-politics is a universal one. And as a result, it is in tandem with the socio-cultural and political needs of most societies of the world.

There is, need, therefore, to summarise the socio-political significance of patronage to the socio-political and economic development of any nation, on the other hand, and its usefulness to individuals who wish to climb on the wing of patronage for social mobility. This is so because social mobility and associations are important aspects of social structure. They enable individuals to come together in order to attain specific goals or, in some cases, they are formed in order to meet particular needs of a community.

In contemporary Nigeria, social associations are in form of ethnic grouping, social affiliations, political groups, religious and occupational interests. For instance, in ancient Roman society, marriage was between two families and the heads of both families were deeply involved in the consummation of the marriage. Likewise in Nigerian society, most especially among the Yoruba, marriage is not just a relationship between two people but a relationship between two families.

As seen in the literature review, patronage as a discourse has been studied by various scholars not only in the social sciences, but also in the humanities. In the same vein, patronage as a socio-political and cultural mechanism was also central to the development of ancient Rome. It operated in different shades and phases. It could be found in politics, religion, entertainment and even in the literary world as mentioned in chapter three. Badian (1958) opined that the ancient Roman society was able to survive the political storm of the late republic as a result of the solid structure of patronage.

Having established that patronage is central to any society's socio-political development, the study traced the origins and metamorphoses of patronage in both ancient Roman and Nigeria cultures. In ancient Rome for instance, a common and acceptable record of historical background of patronage came from a Greek historian, Dionysius of Halicarnasus. Dionysius claimed that it was the first King of Rome,

Romulus that instituted the phenomenon called patronage. As discussed extensively in chapter three, Romulus, for the purpose of effectively governing Rome, appointed hundred elders to assist him. These elders were chosen from different households and so, they invariably became *paterfamilias* of their respective families.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 Conclusion Contributions to Knowledge and Recommendations

Having dealt with the socio-cultural and political significance of patronage in ancient Roman and Nigeria societies, and its implications for individuals and institutions in both societies, this final chapter gives a summary *cum* conclusion on the subject matter. Nevertheless, it is imperative to say that a central theme in this study is the scale of participation in the patronage system in the two societies under review. It has been identified in the course of the study that patronage or patron-politics is a common phenomenon in most cultures. Consequently, it is in tandem with the socio-cultural and political needs of most societies of the world.

There is need, therefore, to summarise the socio-political significance of patronage and its contribution to the social, political and economic development of any nation, on the one hand, and its usefulness to individuals who wish to climb on the wing of patronage for social mobility, on the other hand. This is so because social mobility and associations are important aspects of social structure. They enable individuals to come together in order to attain specific goals or, in some cases, in order to meet particular needs of a community.

In contemporary Nigeria, social associations are in form of ethnic grouping, social affiliations, political groups, religious and occupational interests. For instance, in ancient Roman society, marriage was between two families and the heads of both families were deeply involved in the consummation of the marriage. Likewise in the Nigerian society, most especially among the Yoruba, marriage is not just a relationship between two people but a relationship between two families.

As seen in the literature review, patronage as a discourse has been studied by various scholars<sup>51</sup> not only in the social sciences, but also in the humanities. In the same vein, patronage as a socio-political and cultural mechanism was also central to the development of ancient Rome. It operated in different shades and phases. It could be

---

51

found in politics, religion, entertainment and even in the literary world as mentioned in chapter three. Badian (1958) opined that the ancient Roman society was able to survive the political storm of the late republic as a result of the solid structure of patronage.<sup>522</sup>

Having established that patronage is central to any society's socio-political development, the study traced the origins and metamorphoses of patronage in both ancient Roman and Nigerian cultures. In ancient Rome for instance, a common and acceptable record of historical background of patronage came from a Greek historian, Dionysius of Halicarnasus. Dionysius claimed that it was the first King of Rome, Romulus, who instituted the phenomenon called patronage. As discussed extensively in chapter three, Romulus, for the purpose of effectively governing Rome, appointed hundred elders to assist him. These elders were chosen from different households and so, they invariably became *paterfamilias* of their respective families.

Similarly, in Nigeria, the origin of patronage can be traced to the family unit. As explained in chapter four, the *Olori-Ebi* of the Yoruba cultures performs multiples of roles. His role as the family head is patronal which is similar to that of the ancient Roman household. Other heads of families in other ethnic groups in Nigeria also performed the patronal roles. While some perform this role in trade and commerce, others perform it in religious activities. However, a notable difference is that the Nigerian head of families do not possess the power of life and death like their counterpart in ancient Roman society.

## 5.1 CONCLUSION

From the two cultures examined, it is clear that patronage or godfatherism, as it is popularly called in Nigeria, is peculiar to both cultures. Although there are cultural and societal differences, the similarities outweighed the differences. However, two notable facts can be drawn from the comparison of patronage in both ancient Rome in and contemporary Nigeria. Onwuzuruigbo (2013) finally affirms this by saying that two vital points of the understanding and analysis of patronage is that: First, patronage can be identified in the historical, cultural and social contexts, therefore, cannot be understood as a wholly new concept in Nigeria. Placing the phenomenon of political patronage in a historical standpoint enables us to see clearly not just its foundation, but also, the

---

<sup>2</sup> Badian, 1958

contradictions and the corrupt form which it has transformed into. Second, and which is more important, is that political patronage should not be understood mainly as a mechanism or tool for political interaction and exchange. Political patronage should be seen as a concept experienced in the realm religion, commerce, politics and all other walks of human endeavour.

It is also, clear from the study that patronage is obtained in many democratic societies of the world. It is very common to have people of great influence who provide strong backing and protection to candidates during and after elections. There is nothing wrong in that if the goal is to get the right, competent and honest candidates into elective offices. What is wrong, however, is that the political patrons have made politics a sort of business ventures- a venture whereby they rigged for the highest bidders with a view to forcing a preferred candidate into office, as we have seen in the case of Nigeria.

Consequently, the erroneous claim that patronage is strange and inimical to Nigeria nascent democracy holds no ground. It is no doubt that the activities of most political patrons especially in Nigeria's political scene leaves much to be desired; nevertheless, patronage as a concept is still relevant to the development of any society. This argument is further buttressed by Wallace-Hadrill:

We meet tension and conflicts surrounding various aspects of patronage on a scale not seen before. Patronage is now frequently presented to us as 'corrupt'. So the role of patronage in appointment to public office becomes problematic in a way...not because it is in itself seen as objectionable, but because it is believed to be abused in itself often.<sup>53</sup>

## **5.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE**

From the in-depth analyses of the patronage system in both the ancient Roman and Nigeria socio-political and cultural experiences, it has been shown that this study has no doubt contributed to the discourse on political patronage or what is popularly known as godfatherism in Nigeria's parlance. The study contributions to the body of knowledge are based on the classics point of view. Therefore, it is imperative to say here that the concept of godfatherism; whether in politics, religion, business or social aspect of life is

---

<sup>53</sup>. Wallace-Hadrill

not new. This is because many scholars have erroneously claimed that the concept of godfatherism or political patronage is a new development in the socio-political life of Nigeria. The faulty conclusions by these scholars have led to a lot of confusion and misunderstanding of the patronage system.

Another area the study has, also, contributed to the body of knowledge is the comparison method used to clarify and shed more light on the true nature of the concept. Before now, studies or discourses on patron politics have only been limited to the political activities in Nigeria. Even more alarming is the inability of some of these scholars to situate the concept as an instrument of exchange rather than a mere political interaction between the godfather and his godson.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Political patronage as a system can be employed as a tool in raising honest and responsible leaders who have passion for the human and social developments of their people. This can be achieved by entrenching proper mentoring of ambitious young men who have the talents and wherewithal to bring socio-political and economic developments to their respective communities. The erroneous belief that political patronage or godfatherism is responsible for the socio-political and economic upheaval in Nigeria should be jettison. Rather, efforts should be made by the government and stakeholders in inculcating the right sense of discipline in the young ones through sound mentorship.

## REFERENCES

- Adeyemo, W. 2004. *The Deal of the Carpet Beggars*. Ayoade, J.A.A (Ed.) 2008. *Godfather in Nigeria Politics*, Abuja: International Foundation for Electoral System IFES
- Agbo, A. 2004..Day of the Jackal. Ayoade, J.A.A (Ed.). 2008. *Godfatherism Politics in Nigeria*. Abuja: *International Foundation for Electoral System IFES*
- Adeoye, O.A. 2009. Godfatherism and the Future of Nigeria Democracy, *Africa Journal of Political Science and International Relation* Vol. 3(6), pp.268-272
- Ajala, A. S. 2006. *Identity and Space: The Reconstruction of Ibadan Politics in Western Nigeria*. in stud. Tribes.Triba, Kamla-Raj.
- Ajala, S. A. and Jegede, A.S.2012. A Brief Ethnography of the Peoples and Cultures of Nigeria.Madubuike, C. (Ed.). *Ethnography of Culture and Civilisation in Africa*. Ibadan: Agbo Areo Publishers.
- Akinola, O. A. 2009. Godfatherism and Future of Nigerian Democracy.*African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 3 (6).
- Albert, I.O. 2005. Explaining Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics. *African Sociological Review*. 9(2):79-105
- Anglica, P. 2012. Juvenal, Martial and the Augustan: An Analysis of the production and Reception of Satiric Poetry in Flavian Rome.Thesis. Greek and Roman Studies, Humanities, University of Victoria.
- Atanda, J.A. 1976. *The Oyo Empire 1894-1934*. Longmans
- Ayoade, J.A.2006. Godfather Politics in Nigeria. IFES, *Money, Politics and Corruption in Nigeria*, London: *Department of International Development, DFID*
- Ake.C.1995. Is Africa Democratizing? In Mimiko, N. O. (ed.) *Crisis and Contradiction in Nigeria's Democratization Programme 1986-1983*. Akure Stebak Printers
- Awe, B. 1964. The Rise of Ibadan as a Yoruba Power in the Nineteenth Century.Ph.DThesis. Sommerville College, Oxford University Press.
- Barnes, T.1986. Patron and Power: Creating a Political Community in *Metropolitan Lagos*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Bauman, R.A. 1994. *Women and Politics in Ancient Rome*. New York: Routledge.
- Bloch, M. 1961. *Feudal Society*. Manyon, L.A (Trans.). London.
- Bourdieu, P.1987. Barkeley. *Journal of Sociology* Vol.22.Pp.1-18
- Bourne, J. 1986. *Patronage in Nineteenth Century England*. London
- Cicero, *On The Good Life*. Michael G. (Trans.) 1971.England: *Penguin Books Ltd*.

- Collier, P. and Vincente, P. 2008. Do or Die Affairs: Experimental evidence on Electoral violence in Nigeria. NP: *Institutions for pro-poor growth*.
- Davidson, B. 1993. *The Blackman's Burden: African and the curse of the Nation-state*, Ibadan: Spectrum
- Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae* 2.9-11.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. and Luis, R. 1984. Patron, Client and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge.
- Evans, R. J. 2003. Questioning Reputations: Essay on nine Roman Republican Politicians. Pretoria, *UNISA Press*.
- Fadipe, N. A. 1970. *The Sociology of the Yoruba*. Ibadan University Press, Ibadan.
- Familusi, O.O. 2012. Moral and Development Issues in Political Godfatherism in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*. 14(70):11-25
- Ferrero, G. 1993. *The Women of the Caesars*, New York: Barnes and Noble
- Fitzgerald, W. 2000. *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Forbis, E. 1990. *Women's Public Image* in Italian Honorary Inscription. *America Journal of Philology* III 493-512.
- Fonchingong, C. C. 2004. The Travails of Democratization in Cameroon in the Context of Political Liberation since the 1990s', *African and Asian Studies* 3 (1): 33-59
- Gambo, A. 2007. Godfatherism and Electoral Politics in Nigeria, Benard, O. D. (ed.) *Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics and the Impact on National Development*, Lagos: Centre for Management Development, Shangisha.
- Gibbon, P. and Higgins, M.D. 1974. Patronage, Tradition and Modernization: the case of the Irish Joberman. *Economic and Social Review* 16, No 1.
- Golden, M.A. 2003. Electoral Connections: the Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy, *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (2): 189-212.
- Hall, S. (Ed.) 1997. *Culture, Media and Idealities. Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*. Sage Publications, Inc., *Open University Press*
- Hemelrijk, A. E. 2004. City Patronesses in the Roman Empire. *Historia: Zeitschrifts für Alte Geschichte*, Bd. 53, H.2. 2004.
- Horace, *Satires* (Trans.) Niall Rudd 1986. Penguin Books Ltd, Middlesex, England
- James, B. 1981. Writers and politics in Nigeria, *African Pub. Co*



- Johnson, T. and Dandeker, C. 1984. Patronage: relation and system in Patronage in ancient Society, Wallace-Hadrill (ed.) Cornwell, *T.J. Press* (Padstow).
- Joseph, R. 1987. *Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Joseph, R. 1991. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall of the Second Republic*. Spectrum Books Limited.
- Juvenal, 1977. *The Sixteen Satires*. Peter Green (Trans.). London, Penguin Books Ltd.
- Konstan, D. 1995. Patron and Friend. *Classical Philology*, Vol. 90, No. 4.328-344, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Lande, C. H. 1983. Political Clientelism in political studies: retrospect and prospect. *International Political Science Review* 4(4): 435-54.
- Lazar, S. 2004. Personal Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Election in El Alto, Bolivia, *Bulletin of Latin America Research* 23(2) 228-243
- Lawal, K. 2001. *Britain and the Transfer of Power in Nigeria (1945-60)*. Ojo: Lagos State University Press.
- Marty, M. 2002. Mauritana: Political Parties, Neo-Patrimonialism and Democracracry, *Democratization* 9 (3): 92-108.s
- Massey, M. and Moorland, P. 2001. *Slaves in Ancient Roman Society*. London, Bristol Press
- Mosca, G. 1939. *The Ruling class*. New York and London Cambridge Press
- Mouritsen, H. 2011. *The Freedman in the Roman World* Cambridge; Cambridge University, Press.
- Nicols, J. 1989. Patrona Civitatus: Gender and Civic Patronage, Deroux, C. (ed.) *Studies in Latin And Roman History*, V. Brussels (Latomus) 117-142
- Nnamani, C. 2004. The Godfather Phenomenon in Democratic Nigeria: Silicon or Real? *International Journal of Philosophy*.1(1).
- Nkwede, J. O., Nwankwo, O. U., and Ibeogu, A. S. 2014. Political Godfatherism and Governace in a Developing Democracy: Insight from Nigeria, *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 3 No 4, pp. 137-144
- Ogbonnwan, S. 2004. The Nigeria Political Godfather: Edo State as a case study. [www.dawodu.com](http://www.dawodu.com)
- O'Hear, A.1986. Political and Commercial Clientage in Nineteenth Century Ilorin. *African Economic History*, 15:69-83.
- Okafor, C. 2006. The Ladoja Impeachment. *Vanguard Newspaper*, January 14.

- Olasope, O.O. 2006. *Marriage Alliances in Ancient Rome*. Ibadan, Hope Library Series, Vol 6.
- Olasope, O.O. 2009. *Univira: The Ideal Roman Matrona*. LUMINA. Vol. 20. No. 2.
- Olusanya, G. O. 1980. The Nationalist Movement in Nigeria, in Ikimi, O (Ed.), *Groundwork of Nigeria History*, pp. 545-569, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books
- Omobowale, A. O. 2006. *Political Clientelism and Rural Development in selected Communities in Ibadan, Nigeria*. Thesis. Ibadan, University of Ibadan.
- Omobowale, A. O and Olutayo, A.O. 2007. Chief Lamidi Adedibu and Patronage Politics in Nigeria, *Journal of Modern African studies* 45 (3):425-46.
- Omobowale, A. O. 2008. *Clientelism and Social Structure: an Analysis of Patronage in Yoruba Social Thought*. African Spectrum 43(2):203-24.
- Omolewa, M. 1986. *Certificate History of Nigeria*. Harlow: Longman Group
- Omeregbe, J.J. 1998. *Ethics: A systematic and Historical study*, Lagos: JERPL
- Onayemi, F.2007. 'Finding a Place': Women's Struggle for Political authority in classical and Nigerian Societies, In *Women's History Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 297-309.
- Onwuzuruigbo I. 2013. Re- contextualization of the concept of Godfatherism: Reflection on Nigeria', *Africa Development*, Vol. Xxxviii. Nos.1&2. pp.25-50.
- Oyeshile, O. 2004. Religious and secular Origins of Morality within the Yoruba framework: Implication for man and society, in *Orita: Ibadan Journal of Religious studies*, pp. 136-156
- Pakulski, J. and Waters, M. 1966. The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advance Society, *Theory and Society*, Vol.25, No5.pp.667-691.
- Plautus' *Menaechmi* Watling E.F. (Trans.)s1964. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Rich, J.W. 1985. Review of Gruen. Liverpool Classical Monthly 10.6, 90-96.
- Sabine, G and Thorson, T. 1973. *A History of Political Theory*. London: Oxford Press.
- Saller, R.P. 1982. *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scullard, H.H. 1969. *A History of the Roman World, 753-1346BC*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
- Taylor, L. 2004. Clientship and Citizenship in Latin America, *Bulletin of Latin America Research* 23 (2): 213-27

- Ubaka, K. C. et al. 2014. Impact of Nationalist Movement on the Actualization of Nigerian Independence, 1914-1960, *International Journal of History and Philosophical Research*. Vol.2, No.1, Pp.54-67.
- Wallace-Hadrill, A. 1984. (Ed.) *Patronage in Ancient Society*. Cornwell, T.J. Press (Padstow).
- Watson, A. 1975. *Rome of the XII Tables, Persons and Property* (Princeton)
- William, L.R, 1963.*Origin of Godfatherism and Partisan Politics in Government (An American example)*. New York, E.P. Dulton and Co. Inc.
- Williams, I. 2004. Citizenship Godfatherism and Democracy.*International Journal of Philosophy*1(1)
- Wright, E. O. 2002. *Class Count: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*. London: Cambridge University Press.
-