DYNAMICS OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN ADDRESSING BOKO HARAM TERRORISM, 2009–2016

Abstract

Since 2009, Boko Haram’s violent activities have threatened domestic and international peace and security. The frequency and lethality of its attacks have necessitated studies which concentrated on its evolution, ideology and operations with little emphasis on the Nigerian government’s conflict management strategies in addressing the problem. This study examined the dynamics, effectiveness and challenges of the government’s conflict management strategies in addressing Boko Haram terrorism from 2009 to 2016.

Lederach’s Conflict Transformation Theory and Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Handling Styles served as framework while a case study research design was adopted. Maiduguri, Damaturu, Yola and the Chad Basin in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States respectively constituted the study locations. Thirty-three in-depth interviews were purposively conducted with the Nigeria military (3), Multinational Joint Task Force (1), Nigeria Police Force (1), Office of the National Security Adviser (1), National Defence College (1), traditional rulers (3), religious leaders (15) and Civilian Joint Task Force (1). Others included the Chairman, House Committee on Interior (1), National Human Rights Commission (1), Federal Ministry of Justice (1), Nigeria Immigration Service (1), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (1), National Orientation Agency (1) and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (1). Secondary data were derived from reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group. Data was content analysed.

The Nigerian government adopted both the hard and soft-power strategies in addressing the Boko Haram terrorism. The hard-power strategy included the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order, Operations BOYONA, ZamanLafiya, Lafiya Dole, Crackdown and Gama Aiki, the declaration of a state of emergency, the formation of a Multinational Joint Task Force and the incorporation of a Civilian Joint Task Force. The soft-power strategies included anti-terrorism legislations, de-radicalisation programmes and addressing the socio-economic problems of the affected areas. Between 2009 and mid-2015, these strategies proved ineffective in addressing Boko Haram terrorism. However, from September 2015, the expected results became manifest as Boko Haram became territorially displaced; territories hitherto under the control of the group were recaptured while the frequency and intensity of its attacks decreased. Despite these successes, there were a number of challenges such as operational inexperience in unconventional warfare, weaknesses in the criminal justice system pertaining to terrorism-related cases, mismanagement of counterterrorism operations funds, allegations of human rights violations, poor information management strategy and low commitment to addressing human security issues.

The dynamics of hard and soft power approaches utilised by the Nigerian government were successful in addressing Boko Haram terrorism. However, there is the need for continuous training of the Nigerian military in counter-terrorism operations. There is also the need to build the capacity of judges in the handling of terrorism-related cases as well as addressing poverty, unemployment and demonstration of strong commitment in the rebuilding of destroyed communities.